

MYTHS OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY?

Towards Building Pillars of Hope,
Unity and Transformation in Africa



Edited By
Munyaradzi Mawere &
Ngonidzashe Marongwe

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**Munyaradzi Mawere
&
Ngonidzashe Marongwe**



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Democracy, Violence and Peace in One House: The Dilemma of Post-colonial Africa

Ngonidzashe Marongwe & Munyaradzi Mawere

Introduction

Usually it would be outlandish to discuss democracy, violence and peace in one sentence. Ironically, in 21st century Africa it would be strange if this would not be done. What emerges is an apparent ambiguity of placing these conflicting and sometimes competing dynamics alongside each other. These dynamics do not always co-exist, for instance where violence exists, democracy and peace are usually absent. This is supported for example, by Galtung (1969: 167), who argues that “peace is absence of violence”. Primarily, the dilemma for Africa emanates from the tendentious coexistence of the opposing phenomena in many post-colonial African polities, where peace and democracy are preached amidst violence. To an outsider the troubling question is: “How is this possible?” For this chapter, the more relevant question would be: “Why are we discussing them all in one volume?”

While this may be an intricate task if not a rhetoric question, we argue here, as Grewal (2003, n.p) that “an adequate understanding of violence is required in order to understand and define peace [and democracy].” To us, a clear understanding of violence inadvertently leads to a greater understanding of what peace and democracy are and should be like. This is fundamental to violence discourse given the centrality and co-existence of violence with peace and democracy: for without violence no one would talk of the need for peace and democracy. Likewise, without the idea of democracy and peace, no one would conceive of violence for everyone would believe that their peace is what they call violence. A cogent and precise understanding of violence, therefore, is necessary and in fact peremptory for it does not only lead us to peace, but also to moral excellence and mutuality.

As well, each of the dynamics needs the other two to be more meaningful. In this regard, for peace to be a valued virtue it must be a stand out of the meshes and mazes of violence and struggles for democracy. The picture that presents itself for Africa is such that since the 1960s when the decolonisation process gathered momentum and seriously promised to herald a greater space for the democratisation of the continent, almost all nations of Africa have, in one way or another, suffered violent episodes of varying proportions. These include but not limited to liberation wars, confrontations over the distribution and access to resources like land and minerals, border conflicts, transboundary resource sharing conflicts, ethnic and religious tensions and over access to – or denial of – state apparatus. The above causes are useful, broadly, in accounting for the violent armed struggles against colonial masters in many southern African states including Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique; the seemingly unending Horn of Africa crises; the militarisation of many African states leading to *coup se tats* and counter *coup de tats* in countries like Nigeria, the DRC and Libya; the rise of religious fundamentalisms in places like Nigeria dominated by the Boko Haram, the growth of the al-Qaeda cells in the Sudan, Egypt, Mali, Tanzania and South Africa, and the Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya; as well as the emergence and sustenance of regimes that have employed coercive nefarious tactics to remain hanging in power at differing moments in many countries like Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea and Kenya.

The apparent centrality of violence in Africa is a clear manifestation of a moral-political crisis that calls for increased efforts into an understanding of the causes and effects of the multifaceted expressions of violence on the continent's peace and democratisation efforts. The cue comes from the contention offered by the former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela in 2002 in a *Foreword* to the World Health Organisation (2002: n.p), who opined that: "violence strives in the absence of *peace and* democracy, respect for human rights and good governance." The above cases of violence have also added to the strengthening and greater troubling of the debates on the place of democracy in post-colonial Africa's predicament. Critically, it has opened up an acrimonious discussion

on the relationship between democracy, peace and violence. Broadly, this is encapsulated in the question: How can democracy be a true and fitting form of government when it doesn't make those we vote for accountable? Is democracy, and attendant democratisation processes, a cause or effect of the banal violence on the continent? Does the violence in Africa represent, in the Mawere and Mwanaka (2015: vii) formulation, a fledgling state of democratisation that is "still learning to crawl" and needs nurturing to progress? Alternatively, is the violence an affirmation of the doomed and hopeless nature of African democracy that continues to "stagger like a drunkard [and will] ultimately crumble?" (Ibid). To what degree is the perpetuation of violence a part of the Fanonian "pitfalls of nationalism?" (Fanon, 1963: 157-159). The debate that is opened up by these questions leads to other pertinent questions, including the seemingly rhetorical one: Will Africa ever know peace? Or, as asked with some sarcasm by Moffett (2009) in the title of his article on the Democratic Republic of the Congo: "Is peace possible in the heart of darkness?" The significance of understanding the place of violence in the world, and indeed in Africa, emanates from the sad fact that:

No country or community is untouched by [or is immune to] violence. Images and accounts of violence pervade the media; it is on our streets, in our homes, schools, workplaces and institutions. Violence is a universal scourge that tears at the fabric of communities and threatens the life, health and happiness of us all. Each year, more than 1.6 million people worldwide lose their lives to violence. For everyone who dies as a result of violence, many more are injured and suffer from a range of physical, sexual, reproductive and mental health problems. Violence is among the leading causes of death for people aged 15–44 years worldwide, accounting for about 14% of deaths among males and 7% of deaths among females (World Health Organisation, 2002: 4).

As such, violence impacts the attainment of peace and democracy in the world. It [violence] mendaciously and hopelessly stifles and thwarts the hopes and aspirations of the people.

Understanding violence in Africa

The purpose of this sub-section is to complicate our reading of violence by, broadly, inviting a [re-]consideration of the understanding of the phenomenon away from the binary of good and bad that has so often pervaded discourses on the subject. This should enable a troubled analysis of the relationship that violence has on the attainment of peace and democracy in Africa. According to the World Health Organisation (2002: 4), violence “is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation”. Thus, violence is caused from the outside, can be verbal or actualised, is injurious either psychologically or physically and it leads to, or is intended to produce, an involuntary action. Psychological violence as separated from physical violence is not easily deciphered and it includes verbal abuse, maltreatment, personal abuse, detentions, solitary confinements, brainwashing and misuse of education (Dagenaar, 1990: 76). Besides this, violence operates under different discourses, including structural, instrumentalised and emancipatory.

Stanage (cited in Dagenaar, 1990: 74) posits that violence is normally associated with the following terms: “abuse, break, cease damage, defeat, desecrate, dishonour, disagree, disobey, embarrass, erupt, excite, fear, force, harm, humiliate, impair, impede, injure, insult, interrupt, kill, maltreat, mar, murder, obstruct, perturb, prevent, punish, resent, spoil, stop, torture, thwart and wound.” These key words imply that violence leads to a violation of basic human rights, including rights to: life, liberty, security, cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment, protection of the law, freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, opinion, and expression (Marongwe, 2013). Whilst care must be made not to limit violence to the human rights and legal discourses suggested by the terms above, the terms, however, suggest connotations which provide useful insights with regard to multiple forms that render a more complex and nuanced analysis of the violence that pervade Africa.

The problematic of violence in Africa should, however, also be situated in the broader context of worldwide history of nationalism, nation formation, and political change as epitomised by the French and American revolutions, colonialism and decolonialisation. The overall aim is to show that while violence seems to be in the negative, it nonetheless can, and has played, a significant positive political role in the history of mankind regarding power and state formation. It was, for instance, through violence against the oppressor that the oppressed of Africa emerged free and a sovereign continent. The thesis of this section is encapsulated by Karl Marx's dictum (cited in Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006: 2) that violence is "the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one," and that violence is the midwife of "all change in history and politics."

Regarding state formation and under the "war makes states" theory, Sparling (2005: 37) forcefully posits that "[i]n medieval Europe, the primary cause of state formation was the violent expansion of empires and territories. The threat of wars compelled 'would-be' nation-states to develop strong state apparatus' so as to avoid defeat." Following from the above, there is little disagreement that the process of European colonialism which resulted in the altering of the political-social-economic ambitions of other people as well as decapitation of the geography of most of the Third World and the creation of new polities was a violent process. In this regard, the dispossessions, territorial conquests and economic expropriation were supported by force (Fanon, 1963). In terms of political administration, Mamdani (1996: 4) asserts that colonialism was buttressed by the violent bifurcation of people in the colonies. The indigenous people were classified under 'tribes' while the non-indigenous were classified as races. The distinction went further at law where the indigenous groups were governed by customary law as opposed to the other races who were governed by civil law, which determined these groups' claims to the state, that is customs and rights, respectively (Mamdani, Ibid: 4-8). Similarly, the process of decolonisation that brought independence to the colonies was also underwritten by the force of arms, violent protests and other various forms of coercion against the colonialists including economic embargoes and diplomatic isolation (Fanon, 1963).

Moving forward, violence has also to be understood from other lenses that visibilise the not so obvious forms, which may be the bedrock upon which the more overt forms of violence are undergirded. Zizek (2008: 1) for example, discusses the nexus of a triumvirate of violence in the form of subjective violence and the two forms of objective violence, that is, symbolic and systematic violence. For Zizek, subjective violence is that which is visible, for example crime and terror, while symbolic violence is rooted in language and its subtle forms like racism, hate speech and discrimination. Systematic violence is found in the economic and political systems of the world. Most importantly, Zizek posits that there is a link between subjective and objective violence. To him, what may be perceived as irrational (subjective) violence could be rooted in the objective forms of violence which are not easily decipherable. For him, systematic violence operates like “a notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all too visible subjective violence (Ibid: 2).”

From the foregoing discussion of violence, what emerges is that violence manifests in multifarious forms. As such, there is need to perceive of it in a broader sense. However, this broadness is encapsulated by the Galtung (1969:186) definition of violence as: “present when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisation.”

Democracy in Africa

This section rages into the debate on the place of democracy in Africa. We note in our attempt to define democracy that it is an amorphous term that is as widely used as it is misunderstood such that it means different things to different people, hence is subject to multiple interpretations. However, in spite of its tenuous nature and elasticity, we deploy a definition of democracy as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl, n.d: 103). This understanding of democracy resonates with the widely accepted understanding of democracy as pronounced by Abraham Lincoln who conceives it simply as a government of the

people by the people and for the people. This understanding of democracy enables us to conceive of democracy as a way of rule that prioritises the wishes of the ruled, promotes political competition and puts the rulers to account to the electorate. What emerges, sadly from the two definitions provided above is that such kind of democracy does not apply to the prevailing conditions in most African states, where in the process we see the emergence of what may be termed as a democratic deficit. In this existence other regimes of governmentality subsist on the continent like “autocratic, authoritarian, despotic, dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian [and] absolutist” (Schmitter and Karl, n.d). As such, the question is: What causes this democratic deficit? An effort to discuss post-colonial African democracy deficit that is undergirded by among others, violence and coercive politics of mobilisation, long-serving state leaders and/or wars, inadvertently leads to a desire to understand the connections between post-colonial African governmentality with pre-colonial governance systems. As such, we deliberately deploy a historical analysis model to try to discuss democracy and understand its genealogy in Africa. The two episodes speak to eras in which Africa was ostensibly free of direct European domination. As such, they share the commonality of seemingly undiluted African governance. There are numerous studies across Africa, by Mamdani (1996), Hammond-Tooke (1964) in the Xhosa states of the Transkei, Aletum (2001) in Cameroon, and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2001) for the Ndebele society which have revealed that by and large pre-colonial African governance was based on respect for the rights of the subjects and was not necessarily by absolute dictatorships or based on coercive mobilisation. While some leaders such as Tshaka of the Zululand wielded enormous political and economic power on the surface, on the whole they practiced variegated forms of participatory democracy in which they shared power with especially the elders, queen mothers, lesser chiefs, and different councils (Mudenge, 1988: 84-110). At the same time, there were also reciprocal obligations that rulers shared with their subjects. Thus, elements of participatory politics are decipherable, although they may not have been fully developed. However, as Mudenge (Ibid) established for the Mutapas

the advisors and advisory councils were more often hand-picked by the rulers to assist them and served at the mercy of their appointers.

Some of the studies by scholars such as Mudenge (1988) and Beach (1980) are also significant in highlighting the possibilities that existed in precolonial African societies for the upward mobility of women some of whom ended up occupying the senior positions in state administration. Critically, also all women in their societies were afforded community protection from abuse (Bennett, YR: 32). Furthermore, as Bennett established, the governing code in most of the pre-colonial African societies was the common good of the communities, which put the need for one's duty to society above their individual rights. This code also instructed chiefs and other leaders, who could face censure, be removed from power or even killed if they deviated from the goal of the common good of their societies (Ibid). In 21st century Africa, the common good for society members is encapsulated in the notion of *Ubuntu/Unhu*, which is largely understood as members exist because of others in which their first duty is to the community (Marongwe and Mawere, 2015). In other instances, dissatisfied subjects could switch allegiance or emigrate from unpopular rulers (Quashigah, 1999; Beach 1980). Among the pre-colonial Shona, in addition to the above, there were "elections" of sorts for village heads and sub-chiefs who were intermediaries between common people and chiefs (Beach, 1980: 94). Another check on the abuse of power of rulers among the Karanga of Zimbabwe was the *mbondoros* or spirit mediums (Mudenge, 1988: 65), who also played a key role at leadership succession (Ibid, 81). The above gives credence to the notion that most pre-colonial kings ruled through the grace of their subjects, for a King was not a king without subjects (Quashigah, 1999: 44). Among the Shona of Zimbabwe, the above was captured by the idiom, *ishe vanhu* (one is a King because of people). The essence of this was that the king was supposed to be a servant of his subjects. This necessitated that leaders had councils that helped them to govern, adjudicate and ensure that the community objectives were adhered to and allowed common people, especially adult males, to participate at the community assemblies. It was again on the basis of these strong kinship bonds that vulnerable

groups, including women and children, had community-based protection.

Broadly, this section has attempted to demonstrate that unlike what the Eurocentric historians who essentialised history in order to justify European colonialism, many pre-colonial African states had serious measures that sustained differential forms of participatory democracy. This is also an attempt to debunk the myth that was popularised by some African post-colonial leaders who tried to justify their long hold on state apparatus. To this list was Mathieu Kereku who is quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008: 87) to have argued: “have you ever heard or seen a retired King in Africa?”

Enduring calls for peace

Despite the continued manifestations of violence and anti- and un- democratic tendencies in Africa, there have been enduring and clarion calls for peace on the continent. Broadly, the calls have come from numerous sectors and actors, including state actors, regional and the continental African Union body, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics, lay people, traditional leaders and religious-based organisations. The now standard definition of peace is the age old, and now more common sensical one, given by Albert Einstein. According to Albert Einstein, “peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order—in short, of government” (cited in Sandy and Perkins, 2008: 1). This definition has been amply qualified by a doyen of peace studies, Johan Galtung (1964), who in the inaugural editorial of the *Peace and Research Journal* broadened the understanding of peace into negative and positive peace. To Galtung, negative peace articulates the absence of the more apparent and physical forms of violence, including wars while positive peace describes the absence of structural violence and where there are moves towards the “integration of [a] society (Ibid: 2). To this, Grewal (2003) advances that the major differences between negative and positive peace are that negative peace concerns itself with “absence of violence, pessimistic, curative, peace not always by peaceful means” and positive peace is about “structural integration, optimistic, preventive, peace by peaceful means”. The significance of

the analysis enabled by Galtung (1964) and Grewal (2003) articulations of peace and its conflicting counterpart, violence is that there is need for Africa and those who analyse violence and peace efforts on the continent to move beyond the narrow articulations of violence and peace to enquiries that seek holistic understanding of the two phenomena. In the end, therefore, a comprehensive articulation of peace must be read as “the absence of violence in all its forms – physical, social, psychological, and structural (Reardon, 1988: 16, cited in Sandy and Perkins, 2008: 1). We add that peace does not only end with absence of violence: it also affords people with opportunities to fulfil their hopes and aspirations in an enriching and generative manner. This means that in order for Africa to endure peace there is need to tackle violence at its core, including the invisible forms, while generatively advancing human aspirations. In this regard, peace efforts should include tackling the devastating impacts of colonialism and neo-colonialism including the continuance of racial inequalities, economic marginalisation and exploitation, limited access to the state, militarisms, neo-colonial influences and ethnicisation of relations in many parts of Africa. As well, there is urgent need, to end the cycles of impunity, poverty and anti-democratic tendencies in many post-colonial countries, which so to speak are also forms of violence that downplay the logic of peace.

A summary of the chapters

The chapters that constitute this informative volume speak to the triad of violence, democracy and peace, which outside of the development discourse pervade narratives in almost all of Africa’s 53 nations. As already intimated in many parts of this chapter, we dissected the discussion of the three dynamics in a bid to help to bring out the ambiguities and dilemmas that confront post-colonial African countries. This chapter is ably backed up by interesting chapters that consider these three dynamics from a multi-disciplinary, multi-spatial, and multi-theoretical orientations and frameworks.

The second chapter by Duri tackles head-on the dynamics of xenophobic violence in South Africa, where victims sometimes turn into agents of xenophobia unleashing the attacks to their erstwhile

agents. Arguing in view of Zimbabweans who find themselves entrapped in the hodgepodge of xenophobia, Duri, thus, avers: “while many Zimbabweans fell victim to waves of xenophobia that saw many of them returning home, some remained in South Africa where they improvised a surfeit of strategies to survive in a hostile environment rather than go back to Zimbabwe and wallow in abject poverty in a political dispensation characterised by violence, intimidation and other gross human rights abuses”. The change in status of victims of xenophobia in resilient agents is, for Duri, usually not a willy-nilly metamorphosis, but something done as a survival tactic to navigate the turbulent waters in the hostile terrain the victims find themselves living. Yet, whether for the good of the agents, Duri is apt to condemn xenophobic violence as for him, it “does not usually achieve the desired ends of the assailants, of chasing away immigrants, if the socio-economic and political conditions in their home countries are more threatening”. Duri concludes his chapter with a tone that seem to be urging the people of Africa to focus more on the root causes of xenophobia and enduring strategies to curb it rather than engaging in persistent attacks on one another.

In the third chapter, Nkwazi Mhango delves deeper into an analysis of the violence of xenophobia – xenophobic violence – and ethnicity – ethnic violence – that have a growing influence in post-colonial Africa. Broadly, the chapter draws insights from the structural underpinnings of violence on the continent. For Mhango, the problems that Africa faces today are direct products of European colonialism in Africa. In his words:

“it is ... evident that many of the violent conflicts that Africa has faced– and is still facing– can be traced back to the machinations of European colonialism. As such, arguably, whenever one wants to discuss the root causes of conflicts related to ethnic tensions, xenophobia and other forms of attacks and counter-attacks, *inter alia*, in Africa, one needs to go down the historical lane and interrogate colonialism and its effects on Africa.”

By extension, and borrowing analytical lenses of structuralists on violence, the chapter also argues that if these conflicts are to be firmly and irrevocably resolved, there is need to remove the systems that colonialism instituted, especially what he terms “negative ethnicity”.

Artwell Nhemachema’s “Unemployment, social support and the violence of individualistic ontologies: Insights from Namibian female and male youths’ experiences” constitutes the book’s Chapter 4. In it, Nhemachema critically and meticulously interrogates how social systems that are undergirded by government, family, social and kin support networks are crucial in securing moves out of unemployment for Namibian youths. This is against the growing influences of the violence of individualising and neo-colonial matrices of globalisation that pervade the Namibian communities. Arguing for the continuance of social ties as opposed to the promotion of individualism, the author argues that “privileging the individualistic ontologies, in oblivion to antecedent social support, amounts to violence akin to separating fish from water.” What is also critical in the chapter is how Nhemachema conceptualises globalisation as offering invisible structuralising violence that breeds unemployment, poverty and famine in the Third World nations, such as Namibia. Furthermore, globalisation, as Nhemachema argues, has contributed to a loss of “social identity and social connectedness” among the youths, and more broadly across African societies. Nhemachema’s chapter also problematises the ambiguity of globalisation that “throws national, group and individual identities into disarray even as it professes the birth of a collective global community or global village.” The chapter ends with a strong call for the increased engendering of global solidarity but one that also prioritises solidarity at the “levels of families, households, nations, regions and the [African] continent.”

The fifth chapter, titled: “Enhancing Democracy and Surmounting the Challenges of Election Management in Africa: Insights from Nigeria” by Johnson Olaniyi prompts a rethink on how greater democratisation can be strengthened in Africa. Drawing on the case of the genealogy of the establishment of election management bodies in Nigeria, Olaniyi primarily contends that revamping the management of elections is central to enhancing

democracy. In this regard, using examples of how the compromised position of election management at different moments in Nigeria's history, including 1964, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999 and 2011, Olaniyi builds a case for the reconstitution of electoral bodies across Africa. Thus, to him, Nigeria and Africa have to reorganise, empower and assert the independence of national election management bodies. Among others, he calls for the allocation of more financial resources to the bodies, the reduction of national Executive oversight on the operations of – and personnel deployment to – the bodies as well as the enhancement of the technical capacities of the election management bodies. This argumentation comes from the contention that by making electoral management bodies stronger and more independent enhances their management of elections, which are the key benchmarks for participatory democracy across the world.

In Chapter 6, Marongwe and Makaye wade into the debate on the role of violence in the politics of Zimbabwe. This is a significant addition to the many works that have been produced on political violence in Zimbabwe. However, it departs from a focus on the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front as the source of all violence in Zimbabwe (Marongwe, 2014) to an analysis of other sources of the quantum of violence recorded in new millennium Zimbabwe. By asking the inescapable question: What is the place of violence and other coercive tactics in the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T)'s politics of mobilisation, survival and, possibly, its implosion?, they trouble the permeation of the 'culture' of violence in African politics through the case provided by the MDC-T of Zimbabwe. Broadly, the authors argue that intra MDC-T and inter-MDC-T and ZANU-PF violence have contributed significantly to the waning political fortunes of the MDC-T writhing in the process huge hopes of the multitudes of Zimbabwe who had begun to conceive of the MDC-T as the most likely alternative government for Zimbabwe. The other significance of the chapter, as Marongwe and Makaye aver, is that it enables a window "to understand the culture of violence within political parties in Zimbabwe [and by extension Africa] because if and when they eventually capture state power that violence could pervade structures

of the state potentially generating negative implications on national socio-economic development.”

Hlongwana and Muguti in Chapter 7 brilliantly dissect the South African mediation role over the political impasse in Zimbabwe that degenerated into a crisis during the first decade of the new millennium. Largely, the chapter troubles the achievements and failures of the South African mediation role in Zimbabwe. Importantly, the chapter also analyses the constraints which undermined the same mediation process. Among their key findings is that the South African mediation failed to get to the foundational cause of the crisis largely because the mediation process was flawed and heavily compromised by the political connections that existed between former South African President, Thabo Mbeki (and his African National Congress party), the key mediator and President Mugabe and ZANU-PF. As well, they noted that the regional, if not continental, appeal and seniority that Mugabe had played against an even mediation. The above also meant that the mediation process was always held in scepticism by the other protagonists to the political paralysis, the MDC-T and MDC-Mutambara. To Hlongwana and Muguti, because the mediation failed to stem out the root of the Zimbabwean crisis, future political impasses could not be ruled out in Zimbabwe.

In an effort to throw the democratisation debate more openly, Abdulrasheed Alada Muhammad, in Chapter 8, assesses and brings to the fore the challenges and weaknesses of political systems that are dominated by two parties in a state. As Muhammad rightly observes, two-party political systems exist across the world and speak to situations in which only two parties are capable of winning elections and/or exercise profound influence on the electioneering process. This often exists against the backdrop of declared multi-partyism in different polities. This scenario, which exists also in the United States of America (USA) where the Democratic Party and the Congress Party, and in the United Kingdom where Labour and the Conservative parties, dominate, exists in many countries of Africa, including Nigeria and South Africa. To Muhammad, the two-party dominant system has profound negative influences on the fledgling and floundering democratisation of Nigeria because it limits

democratic competition to only two main players, which may serve to create political polarisation, heighten political competition that may generate violence and inflammatory political rhetoric and increase political consciousness.

In Chapter 9, Tasara Muguti explores how the now endemic xenophobic attacks largely directed against African immigrants in post-independence South Africa may affect future relations between South Africa and the rest of Africa. Whilst there have been many scholarly works that have been produced on South Africa, the major contribution of his chapter lies, as the author contends, in the fact that many “contemporary scholarly works have devoted a lot of attention to the underlying causes of xenophobia without examining their likely implications on future intra-African relations.” Furthermore, to Muguti, the xenophobic attacks have the potential of undermining the celebrated ethos of Ubuntu/Unhu (African humanness) and African renaissance, both of which have strong ideologues in South Africa. As he tells us, it is also imperative to note that the two philosophies are critical for African solidarity and future socio-economic and political development.

In chapter 10, David Tagarirofa and David Tobias adopt sociological and political theoretical lenses, to interrogate the effects of inconclusive elections on the democratisation of Africa. To clearly articulate their argument, they draw on the controversial election management in countries such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya Tunisia and Libya. To them, while elections are supposed to be a harbinger for participatory democracy and peace in its holistic terms, in post-colonial Africa they have served to usher violence in the pre-election times and have most often degenerated into serious conflicts in their aftermath. Calling for a “hybrid democratic model” for Africa, the duo laments that major reason for the transfiguration of elections into mini-battles and wars is the wholesale importation and superimposition of Western democratic values to Africa that has a different philosophical foundation.

Paul Ilesanmi Akanmidu, utilising the case-study of post-colonial Nigeria adopts a phenomenological approach to “evaluate the impact and legacies of militarisms on Africa’s democratic processes after the disengagement of the military from power”, in Chapter 11. Broadly,

Akanmadu laments that: “Nigerian democracy has been experiencing perennially tortuous military interventions to its democratisation process, which manifest in the grave socio-political and economic challenges that have been threatening the stability of its corporate existence as a nation since the end of military-based governance in 1999.” This was because of the “leaders’ unbridled corruption and bastardisation of the culture of due process” and, also because “the ... decades of military rule in Nigeria sowed the culture of militarised way of life, indiscriminate killing, maiming, unbridled corruption, gangsterism, and civil militia and varied forms of military insurgency in Nigeria, including the emergence of the Boko Haram.” Akanmadu concludes by sadly noting that many years of vigorous attitudinal and political reorientation of Nigerians may be required before a culture of democracy can be fully [r]established in Nigeria.

In Chapter 12, Bernard Humbe and Munyaradzi Mawere entreat us to some dissection of the narratives of the commission of intra- and inter-party election-related violence in Africa through the experiences drawn from Zimbabwe. Theirs is a welcome addition to a growing body of literature that tries to make sense of politically motivated violence, which has threatened the democratic promise for many post-colonial African states. The authors utilise their lived and research experiences, especially from Buhera District and secondary literature to illuminate this critical topic and to draw out some profound discourses.

Marongwe and Mazambani’s Chapter 13 discusses the intersections of symbolic forms of violence and the emergence of cryptic forms of xenophobia in post-colonial Zimbabwe that were directed against Zimbabweans of Malawian, Mozambican and Zambian origins. To illuminate their case, Marongwe and Makaye draw on various forms of hidden xenophobic attacks and expressions that have been directed at these groups of people, including troubling their citizenship statuses, denying the indigenous Zimbabwean children to marry these ‘foreigners’ by creating certain demeaning ‘fairy tales’, referring to them using derogatory and denigrating terms and by creating of negative connotations of foreigners in the post-colonial [re]constructions of Zimbabwean nationalism. The chapter is a welcome contribution because it helps to bring to the fore the

need to widen the articulations of xenophobia from the now regular physical forms to ones that also capture the “subtle and other everyday manifestations.” Their insightful chapter compels further researches on symbolic xenophobia and symbolic kinds of violence directed at ‘foreigners’, which to them, result in “almost similar effects, of othering, exaggerating difference, mental brutalisation, economic marginalisation and dehumanising outcomes, as the physical forms of attacks against foreigners.”

The book ends with a discussion of how Africa can achieve the much-needed peace by the illuminating Chapter 14 by Olatunji, Issah, Muhammad and Lawal. Their significant contribution lies on the place and role that peace education may play in ending cycles of military-backed, religious and ethnocentric violence in Nigeria. The quartet demonstrates this agility through their contention that due to the violence:

[Nigerians] feel more differentiated; the spate of violence increases and the people of the country plunge deeper into the abyss of social unrest, insecurity, deprivation, poverty, misery and under-development. Consequently, the nation projects a panorama of escalating human rights violations and innocent civilians falling helpless victims of senseless killing.

Their chapter is an intellectual intervention meant to stem out the culture and cycles of violence in Africa’s most populous and leading economic giant through peace education. As they tell us, the desire is to: “underscore the relevance of peace education and peace culture in achieving sustainable peaceful co-existence and an improved security of lives and properties in the country ... a wide gap that needs to be covered practically and academically.” This chapter also broadly advances the calls by Galtung (1988, cited in Grewal, 2003: n.p) that “peace should be achieved by peaceful means.” What also emerges from the chapter is an optimistic that peace is achievable in Africa if the right modes are taken up.

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From Victims to Agents: Zimbabweans and Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Fidelis Peter Thomas Duri

Introduction

Considerable numbers of ordinary Zimbabweans in South Africa, together with other foreign nationals of African descent, experienced xenophobic attacks since 1994 when the host country attained independence. These xenophobic attacks intensified from the year 2000, owing to the influx of millions of Zimbabweans, most of who were fleeing the debilitating socio-economic challenges and political violence obtaining in their country. There is, however, no consensus on the number of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa because most of them entered clandestinely. Estimates for the year 2008, for example, range from 1.5 million (Muzondidya 2010) to 3 million (McConnell 2009; Sibanda 2008). Zimbabweans were arguably the most affected group by xenophobia because they constituted the largest number of immigrants in South Africa. “In South Africa,” noted Crush and Tevera (2010: 21) “Zimbabweans elicit the most consistently negative responses of migrants from any country in Africa (with the exception of Nigeria).” The migrants who were caught up in xenophobic violence have often been portrayed as passive and despondent victims in foreign lands.

This chapter argues that while many Zimbabweans fell victim to waves of xenophobia that saw many of them returning home, some remained in South Africa where they improvised a surfeit of strategies to survive in a hostile environment rather than go back to Zimbabwe and wallow in abject poverty in a political dispensation characterised by violence, intimidation and other gross human rights abuses. In fact, even a significant percentage of the few Zimbabweans who initially fled home after the xenophobic attacks

returned to eke livelihoods in a hostile South African environment after finding the situation in Zimbabwe worse. After the xenophobic violence of May and June 2008, for example, “one would have expected to see (most of) the victims going back home...as some...did. This was not the case. Many...remained in South Africa, and some of those who left are coming back” (Amisi 2009: 16). They had to navigate the hostile terrain largely on their own because the South African government and non-governmental organisations had failed to adequately cater for their security and other needs (Polzer 2010).

The chapter further argues that xenophobic violence does not usually achieve the desired ends of the assailants, of chasing away immigrants, if the socio-economic and political conditions in their home countries are more threatening. Instead, the victims transform themselves into resilient agents who embark on a surfeit of strategies in order to salvage livelihood across national borders. In addition, this chapter asserts that the confrontational responses, some of which were collectively organised by groups of migrants, show that incidents of xenophobic violence are not always a one-way process in which the host citizens attack passive immigrants.

Zimbabwean migrants devised immediate and long-term mechanisms to cope with xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa. Their immediate responses included physical confrontations and retaliation after which most of them sought refuge at various institutions. The long-term responses can be classified into inclusive and exclusive categories as far as interactions with South African citizens were concerned. The exclusive mechanisms included spatial and residential seclusion and improvising social capital by forging various networks with fellow Zimbabwean migrants. The inclusive coping strategies involved, among other things, concealing foreigner identity by adapting some socio-cultural aspects of South African ethnic groups and seeking security by befriending and sometimes marrying some local individuals. The ingenuity of Zimbabweans in coping with an inhospitable South African environment is demonstrated by the manner in which they managed to forge a delicate dialectical balance

between inclusive and exclusive mechanisms since a one-sided approach could render them more vulnerable to xenophobic attacks.

Xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa

Xenophobic tendencies were highest among the self-employed South Africans in the informal sector who felt that foreigners were depriving them of various opportunities such as employment. This largely explains why informal immigrant entrepreneurs from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Somalia and Congo were mostly targeted during xenophobic attacks (Peberdy and Rogerson 2003). In addition, most incidents of xenophobia occurred in the poor and crowded townships of South Africa where the competition for scarce resources was fiercest (Vourlias 2015). This section will outline the incidents of xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa in order to illustrate how the security and livelihoods of Zimbabwean migrants were jeopardised.

Xenophobic violence began soon after South Africa attained independence in 1994. During December 1994 and January 1995, in Johannesburg's Alexandra Township, armed youth gangs ravaged the homes and belongings of suspected undocumented foreigners. They force-marched their captives to a local police station where they demanded that they be deported. In September 1998, three foreign nationals (two Senegalese and one Mozambican) were thrown out of a moving train in Johannesburg by a group of South Africans who were returning from a meeting convened by a pressure group that blamed foreigners for the escalating rate of unemployment, crime and the spread of HIV/AIDS in the country. This incident was immediately followed by riots in Johannesburg's Zandspruit Township where residents demolished shacks belonging to Zimbabwean immigrants (*South African History Online* 2015). In August 1997, foreign traders on the streets of Johannesburg were attacked and beaten up by South African mobs. Several street traders of foreign origin lost their goods and stalls (Peberdy and Rogerson 2003).

Xenophobic attacks escalated from the year 2000 largely as a result of unprecedented inflows of Zimbabweans fleeing socio-

economic hardships and political violence in their country. In the year 2000, seven people were killed during xenophobic attacks in Cape Town's Cape Flats District. The deceased included one Kenyan, two Nigerians and two Angolans (*South African History Online* 2015). In the year 2001, the residents of Zandspruit Township burnt down informal settlements belonging to Zimbabweans on the grounds that they were causing crime and stealing their jobs (Valji 2003). In Cape Town, within a period of three months during the year 2006, 29 Somalis were killed in xenophobic attacks (*Irin News*, 23 May 2008).

From the year 2008, xenophobic violence became rampant partly due to the increased inflows of Zimbabwean migrants as the socio-economic and political crisis in their country reached unprecedented levels. As well, the economic conditions in South Africa were worsening. This was the lead to the world financial crisis of the year 2009. On 11 May 2008, a wave of xenophobic violence that started off in Johannesburg's Alexandra Township spread to various parts of the country such as Durban, Cape Town and townships in the rural areas such as the Limpopo Province. The violence, which mainly targeted Zimbabweans and Mozambicans, resulted in 342 shops, most of them belonging to Pakistanis, Somalis, and Ethiopians, being looted and 213 being burnt down (*South African History Online* 2015). More than 342 homes belonging to foreigners were also ransacked (Amisi 2009). Over 400 people were seriously injured during the violence (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). When the violence subsided in June 2008, 62 people had been killed, among them 21 South Africans, and 150 000, mostly foreigners, were displaced (Smith 2015).

During the period stretching from mid-2009 to late 2010, more than 20 foreigners were killed and another 40 were seriously injured during xenophobic violence in various parts of the country (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). From 14 to 17 November 2009, for example, xenophobic attacks in the Western Cape Province specifically targeted Zimbabweans. During this period, 3 000 Zimbabweans living in the informal rural settlements in the Breede Valley Municipality were displaced as a result of the violence (*South African History Online* 2015). In Johannesburg's Kya Sands Township

on 19 July 2010, South African residents attacked African immigrants and injured four people who included a Zimbabwean and a Mozambican (*Africa International*, 20 July 2010).

Xenophobic violence persisted and Zimbabweans were often targeted. In the informal settlement of Diepsloot on 22nd of January 2011, for example, Farai Kujirichita was murdered “for being a Zimbabwean” (Hungwe 2012: 133). During mid-2011, 52 shops, mostly owned by foreigners, were torched in Motherwell. The situation worsened in the year 2012 when more than 700 shops were looted and destroyed and over 500 immigrants displaced in Botshabelo in the Free State Province. During the same year, three shops owned by Somalis in Cape Town’s Valhalla Park were looted and burnt (Crush and Ramachandran 2014).

In Port Elizabeth during mid-2013, approximately 150 shops run by immigrants were either destroyed or looted (Crush and Ramachandran 2014). On 26 May 2013, two Zimbabwean men were killed by a mob of South Africans during xenophobic violence in Diepsloot, north of Johannesburg (*South African History Online* 2015). The same year, 2013, also witnessed more than 200 foreign small-scale businesspeople being attacked in Delmas (Crush and Ramachandran 2014).

In mid-2014, the South African army was deployed to suppress xenophobic violence in Johannesburg’s Alexandra Township. From June to August 2014 in Pretoria, five foreigners were killed, several others injured and more than 100 shops, mostly foreign-owned, were plundered (Crush and Ramachandran 2014).

In January 2015, there was a wave of xenophobic attacks in Soweto during which shops, mostly owned by Somalis and Bangladeshis, were looted. Further, during early March 2015, xenophobic attacks were also reported in the Limpopo Province where ‘foreign’ shop-owners on the outskirts of the city of Polokwane were chased away by villagers (*South African History Online* 2015).

From 21 March 2015, following a speech by the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, that foreigners were depriving South Africans of their wealth, xenophobic attacks intensified in the KwaZulu-Natal Province. On 10 April 2015, a shop belonging to Ethiopian brothers

was put to flame. On 12 April 2015, attacks on foreigners in KwaZulu-Natal continued. The violence resulted in the death of five people while 2 000 foreigners, mostly Malawians, Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and Burundians, were displaced. On 14 April 2015, several foreign-owned shops were looted and destroyed in the northern part of Durban (Smith 2015; *South African History Online* 2015).

This section has illustrated how migrants, a significant number of whom were Zimbabweans, were subjected to orgies of xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa. It has illustrated how xenophobic attacks led to the death, injury and displacement of many migrants. In addition, many migrants lost their property during the violence. Despite the livelihood threats associated with this volatile environment, significant numbers of Zimbabwean migrants remained in South Africa where they devised a plethora of strategies in order to survive. The next section examines the factors behind this resilience.

Accounting for the resilience of Zimbabweans in South Africa

Despite the several threats posed to their livelihoods by the cyclic xenophobic violence, most Zimbabwean migrants opted to remain in South Africa. In addition, out of the small percentage of Zimbabwean migrants who had initially returned home following some rounds of xenophobic attacks on them, a significant number returned to eke livelihoods in South Africa despite the xenophobic violence.

As stated earlier on in this chapter, estimates on the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa in the year 2008 ranged from 1.5 million (Muzondidya 2010) to 3 million (McConnell 2009; Sibanda 2008). A very small percentage of migrants came forward when the Zimbabwean government sponsored repatriation programmes to rescue its citizens from the xenophobic violence. Out of the 1.5 million to 3 million Zimbabweans estimated to be living in South Africa during the xenophobic attacks of April 2015, for example, only about 2 400 opted to return home (*Irin News*, 27 April 2015). On 3 June 2008, the Zimbabwean government repatriated only 433 of its

citizens from various centres in Johannesburg following the traumatic xenophobic violence experienced during the previous month (Sibanda 2008).

On 5 October 2015, only 407 Zimbabweans who had fallen victim to xenophobic attacks in South Africa earlier on during the year returned home aboard a haulage truck and six buses provided by the Zimbabwean government. Most of them were traumatised and vowed never to return to South Africa (Ruwende and Muleya 2015). Below are expressions of their harrowing experiences: "...I watched my cousin...being beheaded by a group of rowdy Zulus armed with machetes, knives, knobkerries and guns who were...singing songs denouncing foreigners," reported Climate Mushanga at Beitbridge border post upon his return. Furthermore, he pointed out that: "It seemed that the South African Police were laughing while my relative was being killed. We were only helped by the Metro Police who took us to a camp where other Zimbabweans were. As a result, I left my wife whose life I do not fear for because she is South African. I fear for the lives of my children because these people were ruthless" (Ruwende and Muleya 2015: 1). Brenda Mavenge, who was also part of the group that was repatriated on 5 October 2015, expressed similar sentiments: "They travelled in groups armed with knives, knobkerries, machetes and guns...Those people are ruthless. We watched some children being beaten and thrown in storm drains full of water. I will never go back to that country again although my husband remained" (Ruwende and Muleya 2015: 1).

Significant numbers of migrants who sought repatriation in the wake of xenophobic attacks did not intend to leave South Africa for good, owing to the prevailing socio-economic and political hardships in Zimbabwe. To such Zimbabweans, the decision to be repatriated was merely a temporary spatial and residential relocation initiative. By consenting to be repatriated, such migrants became transnational actors who took advantage of government-sponsored transport to negotiate the border in order to take their material possessions to safety and also to guarantee their own security until the situation normalised in South Africa. Trynos Musumba, a 41-year-old man who fled to Zimbabwe during the xenophobic violence of April 2015, for example, expressed his wish to return to South Africa to

seek opportunities in safer areas, given the socio-economic challenges prevailing at home. As he narrated: “With my return, it means no one will be able to fend for my family here. My wife is not employed and she will find life tough. I may have to look at ways of going back to a safe city in South Africa, and looking for another job” (*Irin News*, 27 April 2015: 1). On 5 October 2015, 15 people who were part of the first group of 407 Zimbabweans who had volunteered to return home as a result of xenophobic attacks in Durban, disappeared in the South African town of Messina as their buses, hired for them by the government, approached the border which was 10 kilometres away (*The Herald*, 21 April 2015). It is quite apparent that these migrants did not want to go back to Zimbabwe and considered the border town of Messina to be a safer environment to seek opportunities than the South African interior.

Most Zimbabwean immigrants, therefore, remained within South Africa despite the xenophobic violence due to the unstable socio-economic and political environment at home. Zimbabwe’s socio-economic crisis originated in 1991 when the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government of President Robert Mugabe began implementing the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Hill 2003; Masunungure 2004). The programme severely eroded people’s livelihoods by, among other things, reducing government spending on social services, removing state subsidies on basic commodities, deregulating prices resulting in high costs of living, and raising unemployment levels through job rationalisations and retrenchments (Bond and Manyanya 2002; Hill 2003). The widespread discontentment that followed resulted in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai on 11 September 1999 (Masunungure 2004; Meredith 2002). In a desperate bid to remain in power in the face of fierce competition from the opposition MDC, ZANU-PF sanctioned the seizure of white-owned commercial farms from 26 February 2000 with the intention of redistributing them to blacks (Meredith 2002). This development plunged the country into an unprecedented socio-economic crisis.

Chronic hunger set in as the country became critically food-deficient largely as a result of the farm invasions and aggravated by droughts. The production of the staple grain, maize, for example, declined by 90% between the years 2000 and 2003 (Mamdani 2008). By the year 2004, the country's agricultural output had fallen by 75% largely as a result of land seizures (Cross 2004). In March 2008, the commercial farming sector was producing less than 10% of the maize it harvested in the 1990s, and less than 5% of the country's total maize production (*Irin News*, 13 March 2008).

In addition, the country's foreign currency reserves increasingly became depleted because of the decline in the production of export crops. The contribution of agriculture to the total exports fell from 39% in the year 2000 to only 13% in the year 2007 (Fischer 2010). This had several negative repercussions on the ordinary people. The decline of export earnings meant that the government faced increasing difficulties in procuring imports from abroad such as food and medicine that were critical in the survival of ordinary citizens.

As Zimbabwe became chronically food-deficient largely as a result of the disorderly land reform programme and periodic droughts, hunger characterised the lives of significant sections of the population. In May 2002, aid agencies reported that 25% of Zimbabweans were in critical need of food aid (*British Broadcasting Corporation*, 31 May 2002). In October 2003, 50% of the nearly 14 million people in Zimbabwe were food-insecure (Human Rights Watch, 25 October 2003; Mamdani 2008). In September 2007, the World Food Programme (WFP) indicated that at least 3.3 million Zimbabweans were in urgent need of emergency food aid (Manwere, 14 September 2007). From January to March 2013, about 19% of Zimbabwe's rural population, or around one in every five people, were in need of emergency food aid (WFP, 14 March 2013).

The land seizures also impoverished many former farm workers after the new owners, some of whom lacked the technical skills for both intensive and extensive commercial farming or were not interested at all, failed to reemploy them. By December 2001, about 30 000 farm workers had lost their jobs (Food and Agricultural Organisation, December 2001). The Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that 1 million farm

workers lost their jobs as a result of farm invasions during the period 2000-2010 (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2010). Over 50% of the permanent female farm workers lost their jobs while 60% of the seasonal female workers became jobless and 30% as well as 33% of their male counterparts respectively lost their jobs. This also left between 1.8 million and 2 million (approximately 20% of the total population of Zimbabwe) dependants of former farm workers destitute (Sachikonye, 2003).

The socio-economic hardships of ordinary Zimbabweans worsened during the period from 19 May to 27 July 2005 when the government launched Operation *Murambatsvina* (Operation Clean-up) supposedly to clear urban and peri-urban areas of vice and squalor. During the operation, squatter settlements, flea markets, tuck-shops, vending stalls and home industries were demolished (Duri 2010). The operation severely disrupted the informal sector which was sustaining the livelihood of more than 4 million citizens and contributing 25% to the Gross Domestic Product in a country where unemployment was more than 80% (Duri 2014). During the operation, 32 500 informal sector enterprises countrywide were demolished and an estimated 97 550 people, the majority of whom were women, lost their means of survival (United States Government, 2009). More than 700 000 people were left homeless and without sources of survival and over 2 million were reduced to paupers (Fuller 2012; United Nations, 12 August 2005). The livelihoods of more than 2 million people, or over 15% of the country's population, were critically eroded, directly or indirectly, by the demolitions and evictions (Schaefer, 23 March 2007).

The situation was compounded by the collapse of the industrial sector which resulted in high levels of unemployment, poverty and destitution among most Zimbabweans. The compulsory acquisition of farms was a flagrant violation of property rights and this had, among other things, negative implications on the investment climate in Zimbabwe (Richardson 2005). Many prospective foreign and domestic investors shied away. By the year 2001, more than 700 companies had shut down. Production in the manufacturing sector plunged by 10.5% in the year 2001 to about 17.5% during the following year (Richardson 2005). Foreign direct investment inflows

into the country fell from US\$103 million in the year 2001 to US\$40 million in the year 2005. While foreign direct investment inflows improved to US\$66 million in the year 2007, they slumped to US\$44 million in the year 2008 (*Scoop Independent News*, 15 January 2010). In addition, the collapse of the manufacturing sector, particularly clothing and textiles, partly emanated from the decline in agricultural production, their basic source of raw materials, which had been disrupted by farm seizures. Several companies downsized their operations and retrenched workers amid speculation while others shut down (Yarns and Fibres, 15 April 2011). In the year 2013 alone, 75 companies closed (*Harare 24 News*, 6 September 2014). Consequently, the country plunged into an inexorable phase of deindustrialisation.

The livelihoods of many ordinary Zimbabweans increasingly became jeopardised by escalating unemployment rates as a result of farm seizures and deindustrialisation. By the end of the year 2000, well over 300 000 employees out of the country's formal workforce of 1.3 million had lost their jobs (Hammar and Raftopoulos 2003). From late 2002 into early 2003, the country's unemployment rate was in the region of 50-60% (Watson, 1 March 2003; Zeilig 2002). By the end of the year 2003, only 30% of the population was in formal employment (Chiriga, 16 April 2011). Formal sector employment levels dipped from a peak of 1.4 million between 1981 and 1998 to about 998 000 in the year 2004 (*Bulawayo 24 News*, 22 April 2013). By the year 2005, unemployment was way beyond 80% (United States Government 2014; Women's Coalition of Zimbabwe 2005). It was estimated that only 8% of adult Zimbabweans were formally employed in the year 2005 (Mukaro, 3 June 2005). In November 2006, more than 8 million people, out of a total population of about 13 million, were unemployed (*ReliefWeb*, 22 November 2006). At the height of Zimbabwe's socio-economic malaise in the year 2008, only 6% of the population was employed in the formal sector. Thus, out of an estimated total population of more than 13 million people in the year 2008, only 480 000 were in formal employment (Chiriga, 16 April 2011). From the year 2009 into 2010, the unemployment rate spiked to around 94% (Chiriga, 16 April 2011; *Mail and Guardian*, 29 January 2009). In the year 2010, hardly 7% of the population was

employed in the formal sector (*Scoop Independent News*, 15 January 2010). In April 2011, only 850 000 people were formally employed (Chiriga, 16 April 2011). In the year 2013, the unemployment rate shot up to a record 95% (My Zimbabwe News, 25 August 2013; United States Government 2014).

The Zimbabwean government increasingly became bankrupt as a result of the poor performance of the economy. Revenue inflows into state coffers in the form of corporate and individual taxes, royalties and other sources related to the economy dwindled considerably as a result of farm seizures, deindustrialisation, high unemployment levels, and increasing international isolation. In addition, the international community became reluctant to bail out the government with balance-of-payment support owing to the repulsive investment climate. The bankrupt government became incapacitated to provide basic social services to the majority of its citizens. In a desperate bid to boost state revenue, the government started to print paper money, a situation that fuelled inflation (Bond and Manyanya 2002). As inflation rates escalated, the prices of basic commodities increasingly became unaffordable (Bulter, 1 July 2013).

In November 2005, the inflation rate hiked to 400% (Wines, 2 May 2006). Hardly a month later in mid-December 2005, it was pegged at 585% (*Cable News Network*, 19 December 2006). The rate shot up from 914% in March 2006 to 1000% in May during the same year (Wines, 2 May 2006). Inflation rates spiralled to 1 300% in February 2007 (Sithole, 7 February 2007), 1 700% in March 2007 (Schaefer, 23 March 2007), 2 200% in May 2007, 3 700% in June 2007, over 4 500% by 10 July 2007 (*Sokwanele*, 20 July 2007), 8 000% in November 2007 (Zimbabwe Institute, 13 November 2007), 100 000% in March 2008 (*Irin News*, 13 March 2008), 11.2 million percent in June 2008 (Berger, 9 October 2008), 231 million percent in October 2008 (Chibber, 26 July 2014), 79.6 billion percent in November 2008, second only to Hungary in 1946 (Fuller, 2012) and 500 billion percent in December 2008 (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014). As a result of hyperinflation, salaries increasingly became eroded and prices of goods became unaffordable to many citizens.

Poverty became endemic in Zimbabwe from the year 2000. In the year 2002, for example, about 76% of the population was living below the poverty line (Zeilig, 2002). By the end of the year 2006, over 80% of Zimbabweans were wallowing in poverty (Schaefer, 23 March 2007). By the end of the year 2008, Zimbabwe had become a factory for poverty with the majority of its people living on the margins of destitution (Moshenberg, 28 January 2009).

The hyperinflationary environment was considerably remedied by the introduction of a multi-currency fiscal system from February 2009 (Thomson Reuters Foundation 2014). Lamentably, the livelihoods of most ordinary Zimbabweans did not improve significantly. Unemployment rates remained high as potential investors remained speculative. Tight liquidity remained problematic for most ordinary Zimbabweans. Liquidity challenges also continued to incapacitate the government from implementing poverty-alleviation and other welfare programmes for its people. In April 2010, for example, at least 6.6 million Zimbabweans could not meet their basic needs and about 3.3 million children were chronically hungry. In addition, 78% of Zimbabweans were absolutely poor and 55% of the population were living under the food poverty line (Dube, 8 April 2010). By the end of October 2011, Zimbabwe had become one of the poorest countries in the world where at least one in every two people lived below the poverty line (*Humanium*, 6 November 2011). In November 2011, close to 15% of Zimbabwean children were not attending school and more than 30% of all children under the age of five were suffering from chronic malnutrition (*Humanium*, 6 November 2011). These developments forced many Zimbabweans to seek livelihoods across national borders at any cost (Moshenberg, 28 January 2009).

Zimbabwe's socio-economic challenges evolved in a turbulent political environment characterised by violence, largely meted by the ruling ZANU-PF party on MDC officials and its supporters. During the run-up to the June 2000 parliamentary elections, for example, ZANU-PF terror campaigns in the rural areas forced more than 10 000 people to flee to the towns (Feltoe 2004). From mid-February to June 2000, more than 35 000 incidents of politically-motivated violence were recorded and 91.2% of them were confirmed to have

been orchestrated by ZANU-PF supporters (Feltoe 2004). During the same period, more than 18 000 people, mostly MDC supporters and sympathisers, were subjected to a broad range of gross human rights violations (Masunungure 2004). The 2000 election violence resulted in the death of more than 120 people, most of who were opposition supporters (Hill 2003). Those killed included six white farmers and eleven black farm workers (Mamdani 2008).

Social violence by the ZANU-PF government, in the form of conditional food aid, prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections resulted in untold hardships for the already suffering majority of Zimbabweans. Countrywide protests against the deteriorating socio-economic conditions were brutally suppressed by the government. During a two-day protest in March 2003, for example, 250 demonstrators were severely injured by the police, 500 officials and supporters of the opposition MDC were arrested and more than 1 000 people were evicted from their homes (Hammar and Raftopoulos, 2003).

State-sponsored political violence characterised by beatings, unlawful arrests, torture, general intimidation and killings continued for the greater part of the year 2004. Between January and September 2004, 12 people were killed during incidents of politically-motivated violence, 2 002 were arrested unlawfully, 7 491 were subjected to various forms of torture and 329 were physically assaulted (Chimhete, 3 April 2005; Chimhete, 1 May 2005).

As the 31 March 2005 elections drew closer, violent incidents of political violence, mostly state-engineered, took place across the country during which several MDC supporters and officials were beaten up and arrested (Dongozi, 5 June 2005). Political violence, largely perpetrated by ZANU-PF, flared again during the aftermath of the March 2005 parliamentary elections. In April 2005, for example, reports abound of rural homes of opposition officials and supporters being put to flame in the provinces of Mashonaland West, Matebeleland South and Manicaland. In the rural areas of Mashonaland West, some villagers fled the violence and took refuge in the town of Karoi. In the Gwanda district of Matebeleland South province, 45 MDC supporters and sympathisers were beaten up and denied food-aid by the state-owned the Grain Marketing Board. In

early April, six MDC supporters were reported to have taken refuge at their party's provincial headquarters in the town of Mutare after their homes in Makoni East Rural Constituency had been demolished by ZANU-PF supporters (Muleya, 8 April 2005). In the districts of Guruve, Murehwa South and Shamva, former MDC polling agents were beaten up and their possessions destroyed (Chimhete, 3 April 2005; Chimhete, 1 May 2005). In May, ZANU-PF youths raided two schools in the Chihota Area of Marondera District in Mashonaland East Province and chased away nine teachers after accusing them of sympathising with the MDC (Manyukwe, 17 May 2005).

Incidents of overt political violence continued to escalate as the March 2008 harmonised elections neared (Fuller 2012). Reports indicated that over 3 463 people were tortured during the year 2007. The number of torture victims in the year 2008 more than doubled the figure of the previous year (United States Government 2009). In addition, thousands of women belonging to opposition political parties, mostly from the MDC, were reported to have fallen victim to politically-motivated rape perpetrated by unscrupulous men allegedly loyal to Robert Mugabe (*The Zimbabwean*, 22 August 2011).

Political violence became rampant ahead of a second-round vote pencilled for 27 June 2008 after Mugabe and Tsvangirai had both failed to secure an outright majority vote in the March presidential election (Scoones 2013). In April 2008, for example, a group of medical practitioners was reportedly treating 157 people suffering from severe floggings and other forms of brutal torture at the hands of ZANU-PF supporters. Between 29 March and 18 April, one person was killed and 240 were maimed during incidents of state-sponsored political violence (Amnesty International, 18 April 2008). By 27 June 2008, the death toll resulting from acts of political violence by ZANU-PF supporters had reached 193. During the same period, the MDC charged that more than 200 of its members and apologists were missing and presumed dead (United States Government 2009).

Politically-motivated violence continued even after the 'elections' of 27 June 2008 in which Mugabe declared himself winner after Tsvangirai had withdrawn citing high levels of violence against his supporters and various other electoral irregularities. Between

October and the end of December 2008, for example, about 32 people were abducted by state security agents and detained for up to 60 days before trial. By the end of the year 2008, 14 of the abductees were still missing (United States Government 2009). On the whole, political violence, largely propelled by ZANU-PF, resulted in more than 200 people losing their lives in 2008, over 5 000 were tortured and 36 000 were displaced (Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2011). In a study conducted during the year 2011 by the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), 52% of the female respondents reported having fallen victim to various forms of politically-motivated violence such as rape, beatings and torture during the 2008 elections (*Zimbabwean*, 22 August 2011).

Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the presidential run-off election and ZANU-PF's declaration of Mugabe as the winner resulted in a political stalemate. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervened and a Government of National Unity (GNU) comprising ZANU-PF and two MDC factions led by Tsvangirai, the Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Arthur Mutambara, the Movement for Democratic Change- Mutambara (MDC-M) was constituted in February 2009. Under the new arrangement, Mugabe remained President. Tsvangirai became Prime Minister with Mutambara as his deputy (Scoones 2013).

The formation of the GNU in February 2009 helped to reduce cases of overt political violence for the first 12 months of its existence. Incidents of overt violence resurfaced in the year 2010 during the constitutional outreach programme when public hearings in some parts of the country were prematurely ended by violent politically-motivated clashes between supporters of ZANU-PF and other political parties. During the outreach programme, more than 2 000 cases of political violence were documented by human rights organisations (*Africa Contact*, 26 May 2011). Even though the GNU reduced the incidence of overt political violence, it failed to effect major changes on both the macro and micro-economic environments that would significantly alleviate the plight of impoverished Zimbabweans. The fact that the GNU was a provisional political arrangement lasting from the year 2009 to 2013 marked a period of political uncertainty which had negative

implications on the economy. Both domestic and foreign investors remained sceptical until a final political solution was found (Chitemba, 1 November 2013). Thus, unemployment, deindustrialisation, liquidity problems and general poverty persisted during the tenure of the GNU (Ndlovu, 6 April 2014), forcing significant numbers of Zimbabweans to continue seeking livelihoods across national borders.

With the four-year tenure of the GNU ending in February 2013, and a general election due later during the year, uncertainty and anxiety gripped the Zimbabwean public, most of who were wallowing in poverty. The 2013 pre-election terrain was characterised more by covert than overt cases of political violence largely because of the peace efforts of the GNU and the supervisory roles of SADC and the African Union. Out of the recorded cases of politically-motivated violence during this period, 83.3% were instigated by ZANU-PF supporters (Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 28 July 2013). From January to July 2013, there was widespread intimidation across the country as ZANU-PF supporters indiscriminately forced the people to buy the party's membership cards and register as voters (Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 28 July 2013). Thus, it is also instructive to note that the ZANU-PF structures were not disbanded by the GNU as the party retained the coercive arms of the state.

Zimbabwe was plunged into political chaos, economic uncertainty and further international isolation after the 31 July 2013 general elections. ZANU-PF won a parliamentary majority and Mugabe was declared the winner with 61% of the vote against Tsvangirai's paltry 34% amid claims of electoral irregularities from the opposition MDC factions, non-governmental organisations, the United States and the European Union (Scoones 2013). The country remained largely isolated from the greater part of the international community and many Zimbabweans continued to seek opportunities abroad, particularly in South Africa, despite the xenophobic attacks.

It is now apparent that despite the orgy of terror brought about by xenophobia, many Zimbabweans were prepared to endure "frustrations and insecurities alongside opportunities" in South Africa (McGregor 2010: 3). In a study conducted in Johannesburg during the year 2009, over 66% of Zimbabweans interviewed said

they would consider returning home if Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political situation normalised while 30% preferred to stay in South Africa permanently (Crush and Tevera 2010). Arnold Nkala, a Zimbabwean in South Africa, confirmed that most Zimbabweans, who fled xenophobic attacks in the year 2008, came back because of the gnawing socio-economic hardships at home:

When they go back (to Zimbabwe), they find that the situation is still the same. It is still unstable, so they see themselves again coming back again to South Africa. So even if there can be two million people that can be killed and two million can go back to Zimbabwe (but) as long as the situation does not change, the same two million are going to come and risk being killed this side because there is a higher opportunity of living this side than on the other side of the border. Even if people go back, it is not like they want to come back to South Africa, but the environment that they find themselves in...and the instability of the economic situation are forcing them because people have to survive. If people are finding the environment not conducive for them to survive, they are forced naturally. It is a natural thing to look for greener pastures (Nhlapho 2015: 1).

In August 2015, Dumisani Nleya, a Zimbabwean who had lived in South Africa for many years, reiterated that going back home would not alleviate his plight because of Zimbabwe's inexorable economic meltdown:

Dying from xenophobia is a better way of dying than dying at the hands of the Zimbabwean government. Death has never stopped people from seeking a better life because they are looking for better economic opportunities. So the solution to the whole thing of Zimbabweans coming to South Africa is by improving the economic situation in Zimbabwe (Nhlapho 2015: 1).

Bigfoster Nkomose, another Zimbabwean refugee in South Africa, summed it up all when he noted in August 2015 that most Zimbabweans preferred to remain across national borders because of the critical erosion of people's livelihood back home. In his words: "They come silently, underground because they are running away from the government, corruption and everything. We know there is no clean government but they need to try. Not even an animal can

live there. There are animals that you cannot find anymore” (Nhlapho 2015: 1).

A considerable number of Zimbabweans in South Africa were political refugees who had fled the ruling ZANU-PF party’s violent onslaught on supporters of the opposition MDC. It therefore meant that most MDC supporters who fled to South Africa for these reasons could not return home as long as ZANU-PF remained in power. Jonathan Zirewa, for example, stated in January 2008 that he had fled to Pretoria after several threats had been made to his life by ZANU-PF supporters for being an MDC activist. Despite the xenophobic violence he had witnessed in South Africa, he stated that there was no way he was going to return to Zimbabwe for fear of being executed by the ZANU-PF government: “We no longer feel safe in South Africa but I do not have any other choice [...] because there is no hope for me in Zimbabwe anymore” (Kuthan 2008: 1). For him, Zimbabwe provided a double threat (political and economic) compared to one threat (xenophobia) from South Africa.

As such, unlike voluntary migrants, as Amisi (2009: 18-19) noted, forced migrants found it difficult to return home despite the several threats to their lives as a result of xenophobic violence in South Africa:

In fact, the forced migrants who come to South Africa for security and protection reasons will assess the risks of being killed by random xenophobic attacks in South Africa, often by individuals that they do not know, and compare these risks to systematic attacks organised and perpetrated by their government with little or no media coverage.

In addition to the above, owing to the debilitating socio-economic and political crisis at home, many Zimbabweans therefore opted to remain in post-apartheid South Africa despite the violent waves of xenophobia that they were subjected to. As Mangezvo (2015: ii) aptly stated: “...The threat of xenophobia does not deter Zimbabwean(s)...from migrating to South Africa. However, it compels them to map South African...spaces in very specific ways.” As the next section demonstrates, many Zimbabwean migrants,

therefore, devised a repertoire of mechanisms to negotiate the xenophobic terrain, given the failure by the South African government and private organisations to adequately cater for their security concerns (Polzer 2010).

Living with xenophobia in South Africa

Zimbabwean migrants improvised immediate and long-term mechanisms in coping with xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa. As this section will show, the ingenuity of Zimbabweans in coping with an inhospitable South African environment is demonstrated by the manner in which they managed to forge a delicate dialectical interaction between inclusive and exclusive initiatives, what Landau and Freemantle (2010: 375) call “tactical cosmopolitanism,” since a one-sided response could render them more vulnerable to xenophobic violence.

Short-term coping mechanisms

For most Zimbabwean migrants, one of the immediate responses to xenophobic attacks included retaliation in self-defence. This approach was in line with the approach suggested by Frantz Fanon (1961) that violence is the most effective way of combating violence. Mangezvo (2015: 9), in his PhD thesis, articulated “how the threat of xenophobia provides a platform for the construction of particular (migrant) masculine identities.”

On 25 May 2008, more than 2 000 Zimbabweans who had sought refuge at the Central Methodist Church in downtown Johannesburg after fleeing xenophobic attacks in various parts of the city threatened to retaliate if their assailants followed them up. George Nyagato, one of the refugees, said, “Let them come. They burnt our brothers alive. We are ready for them” (*Algeria.com*, 25 May 2008:1).

Laing (2015: 1) narrated how a Zimbabwean man in Durban reacted to an attack by South African assailants during the xenophobic violence of April 2015:

When a mob hammered on the door of Nkululeko Dlomo’s township home in Durban, South Africa, ordering him to leave

his possessions and go, his first instinct was to fight for the life he had built... But his resistance lasted for as long as it took the gang to pin him down and smash his head with a rock.

Dlomo also recounted: “They came inside and started hitting people. Some of us tried to fight back but they were too many. They hit me and one pulled out a gun and fired above my head. That is when we ran away” (Laing 2015: 1).

During the xenophobic violence of April 2015 in Durban, some foreigners organised themselves to retaliate in self-defence. Pitched battles between foreigners and South Africans erupted along the streets of Durban during the night of 16 April 2015. Riot police moved in to disperse the South African assailants and the retaliating immigrants, who included Congolese, Zimbabwean and Mozambican nationals, using tear smoke, water cannons and rubber bullets. Despite the presence of the police, most foreigners, some of who were armed with knobkerries, wood planks and golf clubs, remained defiant in protest and accused the government of failing to provide them with adequate protection (MacLean 2015). “Where is the government? Where is the United Nations? They are supposed to protect us; are they just in their offices?” protested Moses, a Congolese man, “How can you tell a Congo refugee to go back to the country he is running from?” (MacLean 2015: 1). Admire Savanhu, a Zimbabwean man, supported his Congolese colleague saying, “I have been here for 13 years. It is really my home. I have got a small business here; everything. It is beyond hate. My black South African brothers want to harm me. It is the enemy at work” (MacLean 2015: 1).

During the same month, again in Durban, Daniel Sungai, a 46-year-old man, narrated how he and other Zimbabweans had teamed up to fight off violent South African gangsters who had attacked them: “I ran for my life and mobilised other Zimbabweans so that we could fight back, but we were overpowered because they outnumbered us, so we ended up giving up and running...with our lives” (Ruwende and Muleya 2015: 1).

During the xenophobic attacks of mid-April 2015 in several parts of Johannesburg, Christopher Woolf (17 April 2015) reported that most African migrants blamed the police for failing to offer them protection and they went on to arm themselves with various home-made weapons in order to fend off anti-migrant assailants. "Immigrants say persecution is part of daily life," reiterated Vourlias (2015: 1) in April 2015, "and they are forming their own groups to monitor violence."

Since migrants were always overwhelmingly outnumbered by South African assailants during the xenophobic attacks, most of them fled and sought refuge at various state and non-state institutions in the neighbourhood. On 22 May 2008, xenophobic attacks in Cape Town's Du Noon informal settlement resulted in more than 500 foreigners, mostly Zimbabweans, taking refuge at the nearby Milnerton police station (Irin News, 23 May 2008). By 25 May 2008, more than 2 000 Zimbabweans who fled xenophobic violence in various parts of Johannesburg the previous weeks had taken refuge at the Central Methodist Church. They went on to lock and barricade the church doors against the marauding gangs (Algeria.com, 25 May 2008). Following xenophobic violence in Cleveland squatter camp, south of Johannesburg, in May 2008, more than 10 000 foreigners, mostly Zimbabweans, sought refuge at nearby police stations and churches (McGreal 2008). During the xenophobic violence that targeted Zimbabweans in the Western Cape's Breede Valley Municipality during the period 14 to 17 November 2009, most of the victims sought protection at the De Doorns Police Station (South African History Online 2015). When a wave of xenophobic attacks hit Durban in April 2015, thousands of Zimbabweans fled from their homesteads and took refuge at transit camps, such as Chatsworth, set up by the government and aid agencies (Smith 2015). By 20 April 2015, 600 Zimbabweans, more than 100 of them being children, had taken refuge at the camp (Kazunga 2015). There were also other short-term coping strategies including finding shelter with tolerant South Africans, or relatives living away from the townships. Some relatively well-to-do victims of xenophobic violence moved into hotels or slept in cars (Interview with Hakutangwi, 2010).

It is quite apparent that Zimbabwean migrants who took refuge at various institutions such as churches, refugee camps and police stations did not intend to stay there forever. They had come to South

Africa to seek livelihoods. Their stay at these places of refuge was a temporary tactical spatial mobility decision to seek shelter in relatively safe havens until xenophobic violence subsided.

Long-term coping strategies

Socio-spatial isolation was an important long-term coping mechanism for many migrants in a volatile South African society. This strategy largely emanated from the fear of “negative evaluation and discrimination” and “that close relations (with South Africans) could expose their disguise” (Hungwe 2013: 195). Many Zimbabweans in post-Apartheid South Africa exhibited the ability to “self-identify and map the urban spaces” in view of xenophobic threats (Mangezvo 2015: 11).

In the selection of recreational space, most migrants tactically sought to “reduce their visibility and thus increase their anonymity” by “avoiding potential trouble spots and staying close to relatives/fellow Zimbabweans” (Mangezvo 2015: 180). In Cape Town and Stellenbosch, for example, they carefully selected leisure centres (such as bars and sport-fields) to patronise where chances of mingling and clashing with hostile South Africans were very remote (Mangezvo 2015). In the town of Brakpan in East Rand, for example, most Shona-speaking migrants from Zimbabwe patronised a beer-hall nicknamed ‘MaShona’ while ‘Lagos’ was a popular drinking spot for Nigerians (Interview with Hakutangwi 2010).

The same applied for spatial residential patterns where most migrants tended to live together or closer to each other, in relatively large numbers while the well-to-do tended to reside in secluded and gated communities (Mangezvo 2015; Interviews with Mashizha and Nzombe 2010). Such “spatial enclaves” guaranteed relative safety and anonymity from marauding xenophobic assailants (Mangezvo 2015: 3). As Duponchel (2009: 4) noted, many foreign nationals in South Africa “stay as quiet and invisible as possible, fearing more violence.” Zimbabweans in South Africa usually avoided residing in neighbourhoods that had a history of violence against migrants. In Cape Town, such insecure settlements included Khayelitsha (Mangezvo 2015).

From the early 2000s, most poor Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg were concentrated in overcrowded dwellings on the northern margins of the city centre in areas such as Hillbrow, Joubert Park and the buildings close to Ellis Park Stadium. In November 2004, for example, a group of 31 blind Zimbabwean beggars, whose ages ranged from two to more than 60 years, was discovered occupying one room in Hillbrow. The occupants cooked on one double hot-plate stove. Their ablutions were in a communal bathroom (*Zimbabwe Situation*, 21 November 2004). In February 2005, Taimon Rukuni, a blind Zimbabwean man in Joubert Park, shared one room with 15 other visually-impaired beggars. Brighton Mkushi, another visually-impaired beggar, shared a room with 30 blind counterparts in the same area during the same period (SAMP, 5 February 2005). In February 2006, an average of eight blind Zimbabwean beggars shared a two-bed-roomed flat in Hillbrow and Joubert Park in Johannesburg's city centre (SAMP, 26 February 2006). By June 2011, most of the abandoned and neglected buildings in Johannesburg's city centre had become slum residences for thousands of foreigners, mostly unemployed Zimbabweans. One such building, near Ellis Park stadium, sheltered over 400 people, mostly Zimbabwean migrants, in rooms partitioned by cardboard or pieces of cloth hanging from washing lines (*Irin News*, 2 June 2011). Considerable numbers of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg also lived in five dilapidated buildings on the southern margins of the central business district. One such building was Doorfontein Chambers which was inhabited mostly by Zimbabwean beggars (Tolsi, 30 September 2011).

It can be noted that "safety and, or security considerations textured the migrants' decisions on where to stay or go for recreation" (Mangezvo 2015: 29). Among the surfeit of long-term strategies improvised by some Zimbabwean migrants to avoid being targeted in any future xenophobic attacks, was the ability "to navigate space, place and exclusion" in various parts of South Africa (Mangezvo 2010: 132).

Various social capital mechanisms constituted another critical long-term strategy employed by most Zimbabwean migrants to cope with insecurity and other threats posed by xenophobia in South

Africa. Social capital involves collective social networks improvised mostly by vulnerable people in order to cushion them from prevailing and anticipated threats to their livelihoods (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Such networks are usually organised outside family structures (Portes and Landolt, 2000). Migrant social networks provided various forms of material support to members such as food, security, accommodation, money and employment. Material support groups were also important in cushioning members in times need such as bereavement, repatriation of corpses and illness (McGregor 2010). They also offered emotional support in the form of counselling to members during crisis situations (Hungwe 2015). Mangezvo (2015) observed that most Zimbabwean male migrants in Stellenbosch formed various informal associations both at work and in the residential areas. They included money-lending groups, quasi-burial associations and church-affiliated groupings. Such networks constituted “a safety net” for the migrants (Amisi 2009: 17).

Owing to the prevalence of xenophobic attacks, significant numbers of Zimbabweans constituted “solidarity networks” in order to guarantee their safety in various ways (McGregor 2010: 4). Such “cultural politics of survival in new locations” involved formal and informal diasporic associations fulfilling a range of social, emotional, religious and other needs (Ibid: 5). They included regular gatherings with colleagues to relax, drink, listen to music, discuss and pray. The formation of such diasporic associations does not in any way suggest the existence of a utopian or homogenous Zimbabwean diasporic community. Muzondidya (2010) rightly noted that even though diasporic communities were often characterised by racial, class and ethnic cleavages, there was a tendency to forge a common purpose in times of insecurity.

Some Zimbabwean migrants formed revolving savings clubs in which they contributed a fixed amount of money every month. The money collected was an important security guarantee that secured the livelihoods of members in various ways. Burial societies, for example, were primarily concerned with meeting funeral expenses and repatriating corpses to Zimbabwe. Some clubs also disbursed funds to members to start capital projects and to cater for expenses in times of crisis such as illness and displacement (Hungwe 2013).

Church fellowships were another critical coping mechanism that afforded some element of secluded peace of mind from the hostile South African environment. As a Zimbabwean woman residing in Sebokeng Township said in July 2015, “I have joined a Zimbabwean church group here because I need to feel at home, express myself with those with whom I share a common culture, background and language. This group gives me a sense of belonging” (*Team Zimbabwe*, 10 July 2015: 1). By emphasising Christian universalism, religious networks also played a crucial role in “lessening social exclusion” by “creating alternative forms of belonging other than ethnic or kin groups” (Hungwe 2015: 3).

Research conducted in Johannesburg’s suburbs of Tembisa and Kempton Park during the year 2015 revealed that 90% of the adult Zimbabwean migrants were regular members of various churches, most of which were Zimbabwean in origin. The study also noted that that 31% of the migrants belonged to the Seventh Day Adventist Church, 7% to the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa, 9% to the Jesus Promotion Ministries and 5% to the Apostolic Faith Mission (Hungwe 2015). In Cape Town, as Mangezvo (2015) observed, Zimbabwean migrants belonging to the Seventh Day Adventist Church interacted on a regular basis. They held rotational meetings on a monthly basis at the residences of members during which scriptures were shared together with information pertaining to parental guidance, investment opportunities at home and employment issues in South Africa. As time went on, such gatherings were also attended by non-Adventist Zimbabwean immigrants.

While the long-term strategies discussed so far in this section constituted some form of calculated exclusion from the mainstream South African society, inclusionary mechanisms were sometimes necessary to guarantee security and protection in times of xenophobic violence. Such diplomatic manoeuvres sometimes involved befriending a few ‘liberal-minded’ and sympathetic South African individuals, some of who were their workmates, neighbours and fellow church congregants (Interviews with Hakutangwi and Mutanga 2010). Survival mechanisms in a volatile South African society, therefore, were a complex dynamic in which migrants were sometimes involved in crafting simultaneous and calculated

processes of exclusion and inclusion. This was the very essence of tactical cosmopolitanism in which migrants sometimes engaged in “partial inclusion in South Africa’s ever evolving society without being bounded by it” (Landau and Freemantle 2010: 375). In short, tactical cosmopolitanism is a broad concept which implies that a migrant had to be with the right people, at the right place and at the right time. Strategic inclusivity was, therefore, one of the long-term survival mechanisms adopted by Zimbabweans to cope with future incidents of xenophobic violence. It largely entailed “identity dialectics” that involved “the politics of repositioning” and counter-hegemonic discourses” (Muzondidya 2010).

Some Zimbabwean migrants sought to forge “a South African ‘insider’ identity” as an important survival dynamic (Hungwe 2012: 133). At times, they claimed common historical and cultural connections with some South African ethnic groups. Many Shona migrants, for example, claimed common ancestry with the Venda of South Africa while most Ndebele people from Zimbabwe claimed to be historically and culturally linked to the Zulu (McGregor 2010). Zimbabwean migrants sometimes mobilised history to identify past commonalities and reciprocities with South African groups such as cooperation during the anti-colonial struggle (Muzondidya 2010). Other Zimbabweans presented themselves as South Africans after acquiring fake identity documents (Hungwe 2012). Some migrants married South Africans “as a way of blending in and gaining acceptance among the locals” (Hungwe 2013: 174). As Hungwe (2013) found out in Johannesburg’s suburbs of Tembisa and Kempton Park, cohabitation and marriages of convenience with South African partners were sometimes forged by Zimbabwean migrants.

Disguising Zimbabwean identity by imitating South African dressing was another common long-term strategy of minimising the chances of being attacked (Muzondidya 2008). Many Zimbabwean female migrants abandoned the wearing of “loose fitting, formal ... and long clothes” in favour of tight-fitting and casual dressing put on by most South African women (Hungwe 2013: 191). Considerable numbers of migrant women abandoned long skirts for short ones and tight-fitting jean trousers worn by most South African women.

It was also common for most Zimbabwean men to imitate South African dressing by putting on tight-fitting jackets and T-shirts, and abandoning formal trousers for jeans as South Africans dressed. Most of them also imitated South Africans by putting on tight-fitting T-shirts with labels such as Jeep, Puma, Reebok, Adidas, Quicksilver, Roxy, Levi, Umbro and Nike (Hungwe 2013).

Some Zimbabweans also learnt the languages of some local ethnic groups in order to obtain access to South African space (McGregor 2010). Others even 'blended' themselves into local communities and the wider population by learning to speak two South African languages in order to conceal their foreignness (Maphosa 2010). Such strategies were premised against the xenophobic violence that gripped the Johannesburg city centre in mid-May 2008 when gangs of South African men stopped pedestrians along the streets and commuters in public transport vehicles to ask them about their countries of origin. Those who did not communicate in an indigenous South African language were severely assaulted (McGreal 2008). During the xenophobic attacks of May and June 2008, a Zimbabwean man in Cape Town stated that foreigners who could not speak local languages were more vulnerable: "If you shout out for help, but you do not shout out in Xhosa, no one will help you" (Culbertson 2009: 53). Tina, a Zimbabwean woman residing in Sebokeng Township, stated in July 2015: "The key problem is that of language, because many Shona people cannot speak Ndebele, let alone Zulu. However, Ndebeles have been able to learn the skill of adaptation quite easily because of speaking a language which is quite similar to Zulu" (*Team Zimbabwe*, 10 July 2015: 1). For many Zimbabwean migrants in the Western Cape Province, particularly in the cities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch, the speaking and understanding of Xhosa was "key to inserting oneself in the neighbourhoods" for purposes of "improved communication between the two groups" and ensuring that Zimbabwean migrants "are less conspicuous and do not attract needless attention to themselves through speaking a different language" (Mangezvo 2015: 209). Some innovative Zimbabwean migrants deliberately mispronounced English words in order to

“sound South African” and avoid being singled out as foreigners (*Team Zimbabwe*, 10 July 2015: 1).

The assimilation of various traditional and contemporary socio-cultural traits of some South African communities was, therefore, a critical long-term strategy employed by some Zimbabwean migrants to cope with xenophobia. As Hungwe (2012: 143) noted, “That whole experience...and the living conditions in South Africa change a Zimbabwean. Their need to fit in and integrate requires that they have to change everything from dressing, music, food and even their temperament. That way, they hope to deny the *makwerekwere* (foreigners) identity and pass as local Zulu or Xhosa men and women.” Such strategies should not be viewed as a contradiction to the social networks that bound Zimbabwean migrants together. Rather, they reflected creative versatility on the part of the migrants when negotiating space in a volatile South African environment.

Conclusion

This chapter noted that many ordinary Zimbabwean migrants remained in post-apartheid South Africa despite the waves of xenophobic attacks, owing to the socio-economic hardships and political violence that prevailed in their home country. It further demonstrated how migrants who were caught up in xenophobic violence devised a surfeit of mechanisms to eke livelihoods in a largely inhospitable environment, given the inability of the South African government and civil groups to adequately cater for their security and other needs. While the immediate reactions to xenophobic attacks were largely instinctive, often involving retaliation in self-defence and fleeing to seek refuge at various institutions, the long-term coping mechanisms often involved crafting a delicate balance between exclusive and inclusive dynamics as far as interactions with South African citizens were concerned. This clearly demonstrates that most Zimbabwean migrants in post-apartheid South Africa were not passive victims of xenophobic violence. Rather than return home to endure the debilitating socio-economic and political crisis, most Zimbabwean migrants became

resilient agents who improvised a broad range of mechanisms to survive in a volatile South African environment.

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Ethnicity, Xenophobic Attacks and Counter-attacks in Africa

Nkwazi Mhango

Introduction

Since the inception of colonialism in Africa, largely in the 19th century, the continent has experienced many violent intra- and inter-state conflicts. Many of these conflicts have been centred on serving and servicing anarchic and archaic colonial system that was enacted by the former colonial masters following the division and partitioning of the African continent. As Siracusa and Battersby (2009:18) argue, “Colonial regimes created incongruous colonial states designed to service the economic needs of the colonisers and not the communal or political interests of the colonized”. Ironically and surprisingly, the set colonial systems have gone on to perform the same roles even after acquisition of flag independences. From the foregoing discussion, it is therefore evident that many of the violent conflicts that Africa has faced—and is still facing can be traced back to the machinations of European colonialism. As such, arguably, whenever one wants to discuss the root causes of conflicts related to ethnic tensions, xenophobia and other forms of attacks and counter-attacks, *inter alia*, in Africa, one needs to go down the historical lane and interrogate colonialism and its effects on Africa. Generalizations aside, Africa since the 1884 Berlin Conference ceased to be what it was before. Africa that used to be a multicultural-but-harmonious and united one continental country—despite its traditional competitions and conflicts—was felled at the Berlin Conference. All this was done to enable the colonial administrators to unendingly exploit and occupy Africa to serve the needs of the time and the needs thereafter that were enhanced by the systems and institutions colonialism established among which is the division, partition and demarcation of Africa whose results, *inter alia*, was the creation of

antagonistic, fragmented and weak states we currently call Africa states. On top of creating weak and fragmented states, and thus nationalities, colonial administrators created ethnicity as a divisive and weakening tool in order to easily and swiftly plunder Africa. When it comes to negative ethnicities, Barman (2010: 2) argues that “Rather than atavistic survivals of stagnant primordial ‘tribal’ identities and communities, African ethnicities are new not old, part of complex responses to colonial modernity,” that have become a thorn in side to Africa’s development and prosperity. Essentially, when we talk about the evils of ethnicity, xenophobia, attacks and counterattacks, *inter alia*, among African countries, we directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously talk about the relics and effects of colonization of Africa. Broadly, this chapter will therefore explore these concepts and the way they contributed to the underdevelopment of Africa. So, too, the chapter will offer some nuggets on what should be done for Africa to get out of this impasse it has been in for over five decades even after acquiring as a contribution to the already existing literature on the issue.

Ethnicity and xenophobia

Ethnicity whatever its basis, is readily a definable way of expressing a real sense of group identity which links the members of “we” because it emphasizes the difference between ‘them’. What they actually have in common beyond being “them” is not clear especially today,” (Hobsbawm and Kertzer 1994:4).

In trying to tackle the four anomalies namely, ethnicities, xenophobia, attacks and counterattacks among African countries that have left Africa bleeding to death, we need to understand the terms. To begin with xenophobia, according to the Merriam Webster online dictionary, xenophobia is defined it as “fear or hatred of strangers or foreigners. In this case, xenophobia tends to denote Africans from other African groups or countries or other Africans from enemy groups in the case of ethnicity. Madood *et al* (2002: 420) tie xenophobia to another term namely racism arguing that, ‘racism’ and ‘racialization’, meaning the categorization of people on the basis of

their ‘race’, or ‘ethnicity’, that leads to, amongst other things, racial discrimination and attacks,” Due to the fact that the three concepts namely ethnicity, xenophobia and racism are connected, Hoyt (2012:225) argues that racism is the view that a certain race has specific and unique qualities which are superior that other inferior races do not have. Traditionally, xenophobia which, sometimes, is used synonymously with bigotry or racism, used to occur between people of different colour such in the United States (US) and South Africa where whites used to discriminate against blacks and Apartheid systems however the one in the US was not referred to as Apartheid. In practice and theory, the two shared the same nexus in that they divided and served people based on the pigments of their skin, history, and social status Ross (1982 cited in Isajiw (1993:3) defines ethnicity as “a group option in which resources are mobilized for the purpose of pressuring the political system to allocate public goods for the benefit of the members of a self-differentiating collectivity” (see also Ake 1993). This definition is narrow by meaning and scope. Because it basically considers economic gains as opposed to psycho-cultural gains and dominance which imply that those discriminating against others think they are better, thus superior than them based on the creation. Again, when we apply this rationale to these concepts, we must be cognisant of the fact that the current ethnicity, even racism, is a creature of colonialism. Barman (Ibid: 2) observes that:

[In]The pre-colonial world the most striking features of African identities and communities was their fluidity, heterogeneity and hybridity; a social world of multiple, overlapping and alternate identities with significant movement of peoples, intermingling of communities and cultural and linguistic borrowing.

According to Barman, the nature of African identity and coexistence did not make ethnicity a problem. This is why we call the current ethnicity negative and toxic one due to being new in nature and form. So, too, those discriminating against others or applying xenophobia as means of enjoying economic gains think they deserve

those rights as opposed to their perceived enemies whom they deem to be inferior to them. For African societies before colonialism, due to their collective nature and positive malleability, no enmity is recorded to the magnitude of causing a violent conflict based on ethnicity compared to other violent conflicts resulting from this vice. Popkin (1980:85 cited in Uzgalis 2002) traces racism in Spain in the year 1492. This means however that racism is a new phenomenon especially to Africa. Recorded conflicts among Africans were based on conquering whereby one group which in the main was an empire or a kingdom would take on another. This made these conflicts international wars between African states of the time rather than ethnic ones due to the fact that such groups regarded themselves as states. I would argue that ethnicity is perpetrated for many more gains and reasons than mere economic gains. I tend to concur with Merriam Webster dictionary that “fear of others” and, sometimes, ignorance is the driving force behind ethnicity that is negative and toxic. Although the boundary between racism and xenophobia is blurry, they both have the hallmarks of fear, inward looking or tunnel vision against others; and above all, they are all destructive by nature and outcomes not only to its victims but also to the perpetrators. However, what has recently been occurring and recurring in South Africa has redefined the whole concept of xenophobia based on colour differentials as opposed to other elements which harbour and encourage xenophobic feelings than the world has ever experienced before. Neocosmos (2008) concurs with this assertion arguing that, “xenophobia must be understood as a political discourse (see Neocosmos (2006: 587), the result of political ideologies and consciousnesses—in brief, political subjectivities—which have been allowed to arise in post-apartheid South Africa, as a result of a politics of fear prevalent in both state and society,”. For xenophobia attacks to prevail there must be political atmosphere that allows, and possibly consciously or unconsciously, systemic or otherwise support them to take place. Essentially, what has been happening in South Africa shows systemic inequality whereby those in power allow disadvantaged and disgruntled members of the society to wrongly take on foreigners thinking are they are the major causes of their miseries instead of taking on the ruling class that always enjoys the

national cake through exclusionary tactics embedded in the system, as it is the case in South Africa today. Despite being negative and destructive, there is still a lesson we can learn from the South African xenophobic attacks that is directed against the so-called foreigners. The lesson we get here is that the majority of poor South Africans need to be educated so that they can appreciate that the root causes of their poverty do not lie with those they presume to be foreigners, thus their enemies. Instead, the ruling class is to blame on almost all ills the majority poor South Africans are facing and experiencing today. For example, Neocosmos (Ibid) shows why the ruling class is to blame for the poverty the majority South Africans are facing arguing that the:

So-called Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has enabled the development of a new class of 'black diamonds' whose new-found wealth is not particularly geared towards national accumulation and development but primarily towards short-term, quick profits in a country where estimates put the poor at half the total population (p.587).

The so-called 'black diamonds' in South Africa seem to be at home with the phenomenon believing that it gives them a reprieve from being taken on by those they have pushed to the peripheral role and position as far as enjoying the national cake is concerned especially after dismantling Apartheid system. So, we can, arguably, say that South African xenophobia is an exception to the general rule as far as Africa is concerned given that such attacks were not experienced in any African country recently. For, discrimination, attacks, and hatred are not based on colour differentials in South Africa; however they are based on economic disparities and fears of others. Another element that differentiates ethnicity experienced in xenophobic attacks in South Africa is the fact that while ethnicity, in many cases, occurs between the people of the same country as it was in Burundi, Nigeria and Rwanda among others, South African xenophobic attacks revolve around nationalism which makes it a little bit different from other types of negative ethnicity Africa is used to. For, it revolves around the people of the different nationalities

namely foreigners and locals. We can, therefore, call South African xenophobic attacks ethno-nationalistic attempts as opposed to pure ethnicity that is experienced in one country involving the citizens, and sometimes when it involves ideological difference the people of the same group. However, there is a nexus that connects this type of ethno-nationalism with the one that is now experienced in Europe, and partly in the United States (US) in that it targets immigrants to these countries. In this xenophobic spat against immigrants, most right-wing parties labour under pluralistic doctrines (Rydren 2008). Another difference between South African xenophobic attacks and those carried out in the West is the organisational nature of the groups perpetrating this crime. While in the West such xenophobic attacks are perpetrated by organised parties which may be of course registered or not, in South Africa such attacks are carried out by mobs that appear to rise 'spontaneously' against indigenous Africans from beyond South African justice. While xenophobia is embedded in the manifestos of the right-wing parties and ironically, sometimes, even in the mainstream politics in some countries like the US and Holland; it is not the case in South Africa. How unconsciously, sometimes, West countries sanction racism based on creed can be seen in the US where there is the so-called *Bradley* or *wilder effect* which means that an African American who was leading in opinion polls lost simply because there were white people who did not vote in such opinion polls for the fear of being viewed as racists something they were due to the fact that when they voted Bradley lost not just because he was unfit; just because he was black. Again, when it comes to the reason why South Africans enacted the same crime they suffered from especially on the blacks but not Europeans or others, it can be viewed as the justification that some South Africans, did not learn from their throes so as to go out of ethos of their struggle; and victimise others. Indeed, if they had something they learned from their apartheid past, South Africans are supposed to be role models as far as racism is concerned today. Ironically, the same people who suffered under and complained about racism, are the same that are ones pointlessly and blindly brandishing it against others. Whatever the reasons they may have are wrong and contrary to what South Africans fought for. If there is anything a free South Africa would partake in lastly, it is

nothing other than xenophobia based on privileges and nationality. This is because the majority of those indigenous South Africans enacting this crime are the very victims of the same crime who survived it just yesterday after those they are dehumanizing and brutalizing offered to help and support them in getting rid of the same vice they are now employing against them.

There is another unique type of xenophobic attacks based on ethno-nationalistic mixed with religious propensities in Africa. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram provides an ideal example whereby xenophobia is experienced in the form of ultra-fundamentalism based on Islam. The organisational nature of Boko Haram is also distinct in that, it is neither a party nor a mob but a terrorist group whose agendas are purely discriminative based on a certain type of fundamental Islamic ideology. Essentially, this terrorist group strives to make political statements or gain under the banner of Islamic religion or ideology. This affirms Østebø's (2012: 2) arguments that "...Islamic militancy reflects a minority perspective within the spectrum of Islamic ideologies." Even the type of the nation which such Islamic militancy fights for is different from the one we know under international law. This can be observed in the fact that such groups do not claim particularly national frontiers. Instead, they would like to occupy as much bigger areas as possible through transnational activities apart from the borders of their countries of origin so as to create ethno-transnational conflict. Once such a thing occurs as it currently is in Nigeria, the conflict becomes very convoluted in nature and size so as to become harder to deal with due to its indiscriminately vicious nature *vis-à-vis* targeted the space to occupy and rule not to mention the issues behind such a drive. This has become the major *modus operandi* the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) has been applying recently whereby it attacks many fronts and countries.

Al Shabaab, is another fundamentalist Islamic group currently operating in Somalia and parts of east Africa. It presents another significantly distinct type of ethno-conflict in that it specifically fight for Somalia although it sometimes, ventures out of it and attacks other nations especially neighbouring and occasionally some distant ones that try to come in to take on the group. What makes this

interesting is the fact that, different from Boko Haram or ISIL, Al Shabaab does not seek to rule or occupy those countries it attacks. Instead, it seeks to discourage them from aiding the government in Somalia. Hansen (2013:146) argues that the major aim of Al Shabaab is to rule Somalia due to the fact that it has policies and strategies aimed at meeting this goal. While groups such as Hoodlums in South Africa and right-wing parties in the US aim at economic gains, fundamental Islamic terrorist groups aim at capturing the reins of power; and they are faceless, loosely and hegemonic, by nature. Such a tendency gives them the opportunity of morphing into something different beings when and if needs be. This is yet another difference. However, all xenophobic groups share the same nexus in that: 1) they invent, and define their enemies, 2) by spirit and deeds, they demonize, and dehumanize their enemies as a tactical strategy of potentially extenuating and legitimising their actions against their enemies, 3) they are opportunistic by nature, 4) they pose a danger to the states they are in or opposed to due to the fact that apart from being a security risk, they overstrain the resources of hosting and enemy countries that are spent of counterattacking them, 5) they rationalize everything they subscribe to even if it is illogical, and 6) they change strategies in reaching their goals.

To understand ethnicity, we need to venture out of it and trace the motives and motifs of the formation of an ethnic group. In trying to find the origin of ethnic wars that are prevalent in Africa, we need to go back to where it started, colonial era. When it comes to the definition of an ethnic group, Howard and Didham (2005: 3-5) observe that:

An ethnic group is made up of people who have some or all of the following characteristics, a common proper name, one or more elements of common culture which need not be specified, but may include religion, customs, or language, unique community of interests, feelings and actions and a shared sense of common origins or ancestry, and a common geographic origin.

We can add another element that in some cases like the one in South Africa, they share economic status.

What if the other group that is seen as an enemy of one ethnic group has the same characteristics as it is in Rwanda and Burundi?

This means that the group discriminating against another is ironically doing so to the people of the same pedigree which is interesting. The definition of an ethnic group which obvious, by extension, can lead us to the definition of ethnicity seems to have colonial hallmarks. For, some of ethnic groups define themselves as a nation, and before the introduction of colonialism such groups did not feel any danger from another. Before the German colonisation of Burundi and Rwanda, two communities or tribes in these countries used to live side by side in one empire and their enmity did not exist (see Rutayisire and Mulinda 2013:7). To understand this well, we must observe another definition of an ethnic group.

Modood *et al* (2002: 419) define ethnicity to include, “physical appearance as distinguishing markers; that there are important boundaries that separate ethnic groups; and that ethnic group membership can be based on the ‘objective’ criterion of family membership rather than simply chosen by the individuals concerned.” Arguably, an ethnic group looks like a “tribe”; however their definitions seem to be different due to some differentials in shape and the way they perceive each other after being reinvented by those who created them. Notably, the two groups had some difference; however they did not cause such animosities. So, the major challenge we face really is to draw the boundary between an ethnic group and a tribe that is involved in negative ethnicity resulting from artificial identities created and ascribed to them by colonial monsters as it is the case in Rwanda. What if a people who have the same physical appearance but do not necessarily belong to one ethnic group such as Koreans and Japanese even Chinese? Here is where divisive politics kicks in. North and South Korea provide an ideal example as far as ethnonationalism is concerned. And when it comes to ethno animosity, Hutus and Tutsis provide an ideal example of how colonial rule created a new problem that did not exist before. First of all, it must be noted that the definitions of an ethnic group are ambiguous. Evidence shows that before Rwanda and Burundi became nation states, ethnicity was not a problem. Carver *et al* (2009:134) note that “the Tutsi immigration, which began around 900A.D, occurred gradually and peacefully. Interaction with Hutus was based on exchange of cattle products for agricultural products.”

The commercial and political relationship between Hutus and Tutsis showed no animosity or fear of one another before they were colonised. However, Carter *et al* (Ibid) pin down the cause of animosity saying: “It took several military expeditions led by the German Schutztruppe, assisted by Tutsis from central Rwanda between 1910 and 1912 to defeat the Northern Hutus also known as Bakiga. The defeat left considerable bitterness toward both Tutsis and Southern Hutus” (Ibid). Arguably, we can confidently claim that animosity between Tutsis and Hutus was created and furthered by Germany invasion in order to divide; and easily rule them as it happened thereafter although it left many scars that culminated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Before the coming of colonisers, the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis was robust based on “economies of communities of fate” (Byrne & Irvin 2000: 10) which turned out to become the “communities of animosities” after Germany built onto what was existing in Rwanda as mentioned above that there were some differences however liminal they may seem to be.

More evidence shows that ethnicity—as a source and cause of conflicts especially in Africa—is basically the result of “late nineteenth-century European partition of Africa” (1884), (Koponen, 1993: 117). Koponen urges that the division of Africa that was done carelessly and dubiously increased political as well as economic rivalries among the communities that used to live harmoniously before. By dividing Africa in the modern states, old ones were erased; so, too the ties that existed before. This can be seen in Nigeria whereby British colonial rule amalgamated former nations into a new colonial entity known as Nigeria as Carter *et al* (2009:270) note that: “The British influenced extended gradually to northern part of the country, and in 1914 the British joined together two protectorates—South Nigeria and Northern Nigeria to form Nigeria of today,” that has become rose of bed for negative ethnicity. As it was in other cases observed above, British colonial rule joined Northern and Southern Nigeria so as to weaken them, and thus, easily rule them. British knew too well that Northern (dominantly Muslims) and Southern (dominantly Christians) were two different entities with two different and conflictual religions that would become a powder keg in the

future. The repercussions of this fusion would cause reactions that were witnessed in 1966 when “Muslims fearing Christian Igbo domination of local markets killed hundreds of Igbos” (ibid), just because they were different ethnically. From its inception, this coercive unity drove Nigeria to a metaphoric collision course. Had the two united willingly, maybe, just maybe, animosity would not have existed. For instance, Hausa in Nigeria feel that they are more a nation than an ethnic group. So are the Baganda in Uganda who still claim to have more power in Ugandan politics based on the fact that they were a nation before the coming of colonisation than others whom they think were not. So, when colonisers cobbled two different communities together in order to weaken them, the exacerbated animosity which helped the former to rule the latter.

The core of animosity, enmity and negative sorority

By cobbling countries together, colonial powers did not only create animosity, they also altered some identities which ethnic groups had or which they sometimes sought recapture through maintaining allegiance to other ethnic groups. In so doing, the groups re-enacted collective memories (Hirst and Echterhoff (2008) and glories which made them to feel as the “chosen ones” (Galtung 1990) Burkhardt 2005; Adams 2014; McCullam 1996). For instance, contestable this argument may be, the Hausa in Nigeria feel themselves to be more Hausa than Nigeria. The same, as indicated above, applies to Baganda in Uganda where they feel more Baganda than Ugandans. For such a people, when there is no person in power from their community, they feel threatened; and end up feeling besieged so as to need to fight for getting their person in power as an assurance for the protection of their right. Perdue *et al.*, (1990) argue that the perception of each group is based on the axis of “us versus them.” After disregarding the existing arrangement among African communities before the introduction of colonialism, many artificial enemies, alliances and structures were introduced. Brubaker (1996:81) argues that “especially in African colonies, territorial boundaries as established by the then colonial powers, and accepted, for the most part, as legitimate by anticolonial nationalists were not

even approximately congruent with cultural boundaries.” If anything, it is these congruent cultural boundaries most of those facing negative ethnicity seek to recapture and be safe in their colonial created country we have today. To thrive, according to European conditions of forming a nation has to conditionally observe some important things which is missing in the formation of African nations. Brubaker (Ibid) goes on arguing that, “a nationalizing state, I have suggested, is also one understood nationalizing to be the state of and for a particular ethnocultural “core nation” whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state” (p.103). While the colonial monster knew all this, they did oppositely as far as forming African modern states is concerned.

As argued in the introduction above, however debatable this argument may be, negative ethnicity is the product of colonialism whose aim was to create animosity among a certain people in order to weaken, and thereby, subdue, and occupy them for the purpose of exploiting them at the time and thereafter. Arguably, ethnicity—just like tribalism—is the product-cum-relic of colonial machinations that were purposely enacted to function during and after colonialism as the tools of enhancing swift and perpetual exploitation of the victims. Ethnicity is essentially the reinvention of a certain people aimed at weakening and causing animosity and enmity among them. What transpired in Rwanda in 1994 and Burundi before can shed light on how the reinvention of people can lead to calamities. So, too, what transpired in Kosovo in 1998-99 speaks to this however in different connotations. There is much evidence to prove this. No recorded literature of the existence of xenophobia among Africans outside the South African xenophobia attacks which are the exception to the general rule, as argued above. Even the definition of this type of xenophobia or racism is hard to define. Mhango (2016) defines this sort of racism as *intraracism* due to the fact that it involves people of the same race. Therefore, calling it racism becomes harder, and sometimes, long-drawn-out due to this essential and distinctly differential qualification of involving people of the same pedigree and colour. To cut the long story short, this chapter works with the definitions of Diffen which expressly define the two concepts namely

race and ethnicity as thus, “race refers to a person's physical characteristics, such as bone structure and skin, hair, or eye colour. Ethnicity, however, refers to cultural factors, including nationality, regional culture, ancestry, and language,” (page not provided. ([http://www.diffen.com/difference/Ethnicity vs Race](http://www.diffen.com/difference/Ethnicity%20vs%20Race)).

If anything, this is what happened in Burundi and Rwanda where nose structure and leg's and arm's lengths that the colonial monsters maliciously used to create schisms and hatred among the people of the same family and pedigree that used to live together peacefully and cooperatively since time before the introduction of colonialism in these countries. This is evident due to the fact that before the coming of European colonisers, there are no recorded conflicts amongst Rwandans that resulted from ethnicity that claimed as many lives as the 1994 genocide. If we consider how the current bastardised, and, of course, corrupted, misrepresented, and misused nationalities of Africa were created and the purposes of their creation, we will agree that they have their roots from the 1884 Berlin Conference at which colonial administrators congregated, carelessly and maliciously chopped and divided Africa into ridiculous and weak states we know of today. At this conference, colonial monsters—after experiencing infighting among themselves they found it reasonable and viable for their survival and success, to create and export this mess to Africa with the aim of exploiting and weakening it as it later perpetually happened. Colonial administrators envisaged the ways such ethnicity would function by drawing from their own experiences in Europe whereby history and religion became the tools of division as opposed to physiological features and history in Rwanda. Refer to how the Roman Catholic Church committed a lot of terrorist acts against those it deemed atheists or heretics not to mention the Protestants, Anabaptists, Mennonites and others it used to burn at stake among other ways of eliminating them. Another reason why colonial administrators and their agents invented the current nationalities based on negative ethnicity was to avoid conflict among them that could result from the situation in which every colonial administrators laid a claim on which part of Africa one was supposed to colonise. So, it was the colonial conflict resolution strategy that colonial monsters created in order to resolve the conflicts among themselves

that resulted resulting from various claims that threatened their cohesion. In so doing, colonial monsters were able to avoid conflict among them. Instead, they dispelled this looming danger by creating another conflict-creating strategy for the victims of their heinous crime of colonialism. What they did was like the war among hyenas. To make sure that everybody gets a kill, hyenas scuttle their preys as the means of weakening them and thereby killing them easily. It is unfortunate that despite knowing the history and purpose of the creation of African fake ethnonationalities and ethnostates or call them colonial-political ethnies, Africans have become harder to learn, and thereby change the very systems and structures that have held them at ransom pointlessly for their peril. Instead of demolishing colonial systems and reorganise Africa to the tune it was before being divided and partitioned, Africans seem to be at home with the idea especially those in power whose governments and understanding of the concepts are no different from those of its creators. This is why the OAU subscribed to this division of Africa without underscoring the fact that they were buying into colonial scheme to keep Africa divided; and thus becomes easy to exploit. Consequently, we can argue that the current nationalities of Africa have become barriers to the development and harmony of Africa. This has become the reality due to the fact that such fake ethnonationalities enable those in power to control and enjoy abundant power they command and the resources Africa is endowed with. For, the ethnonationalities dubiously created at Berlin conference are conceptually different from those Africans used to know of and live in before. Traditionally, almost all African nationalities were collectivistic as opposed to the current ones that are individualistic by nature and the purpose of their creation. By being collectivistic, Africans were able to function swiftly within their then original nationalities, setting, needs and aspirations without any large-scale conflict as it came to be thereafter they were reinvented and redefined. For, when it comes to ethnonationalism which has recently become a major stumbling block and the cause of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, and of course, violent conflict in various countries based on struggle for controlling resources, colonial ethnonationalism has become more hugely destructive and divisive than constructive. For, in doing whatever is done, colonial monsters

ended up, as they still are, being beneficiaries of the anathema as opposed to the victims that are affected even more.

Thirdly, the colonial administrators divided Africa so as to not only weaken it but also exploit it after handing over independence to these weak and fragmented states they dubiously and criminally created. What pains beyond comparison is the fact that when colonial monsters were dividing and partitioning Africa, they did it ruthlessly and carelessly. Like a person going to the village market to buy a goat or a fowl, they did not care about our connectivity, relationship, wellbeing and future of their victims. Do you ask the relatives of the goat when you buy it? This is exactly what happened to Africa and Africans when colonial monsters divided it. What mattered, at the time, was nothing but colonial interests but not the nature or the desire of the victims. If anything, this is where the root causes of xenophobia and negative ethnicity emanate. After being separated and colonised for many years, Africans—who used to be one—lost the bond that used to keep them cohesively intact before the Berlin Conference that ushered in the current artificial ethnonationalities Africa has that replaced one strong and natural nationality of Africa. However, Cooper (1994: 1527) argues that “The cultural edifice of the West could be taken apart brick by brick” to take back Africa to where it used to be as far as the definition and sense of nationality were concerned. If anything, whoever that wants to help Africa reclaim her lost sense of nationality that is currently obscured by fake and artificial ethnonationalities based on colonial politics as they were introduced to Africa, and still surface through xenophobia attacks and hatred or division based on them, must start with tearing apart colonial edifice. Mhango (2016) proposes the unification of Africa in all aspects to match the US, Canada and other united countries. We know when such toxic ethnonationality appeared. Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 1 cited in Eriksen 2012:4) argues that “Ethnicity seems to be a new term’ pointing to the fact that the word’s earliest dictionary appearance is in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1972.” This informs us how the term was fabricated by the West to suit its interests. Eriksen (Ibid) goes on noting that: “In the United States, ‘ethnics’ came to be used around the Second World War as a polite term referring to Jews, Italians, Irish and other people considered

inferior to the dominant ‘WASP’ group (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants)”. However polite or whatsoever the term used here is, its genealogy shows that it was concocted to mark the difference between two people who were thought to be distinct. Essentially, as any abuses, normally, the abuser is the one who creates words to use in defining and abusing others as it is in the case of ethnicity. Therefore, we can argue that ethnicity is not a good word however it may currently have positive and negative connotations and usages to it. And this is obvious. Experience testifies to the fact that when white people go to Africa to colonise it, Africans do not ask them about their tribes. Again, due, to colonial carryovers, Africans, ironically, ask each other about one’s tribe which essentially does not have any big difference from ethnicity which we are told is a polite way of discriminating against others regarded inferior to those doing so. When it comes to Africa, Berman (1998: 305) argues that, “recent research has revealed that modern African ethnicity is a social construction of the colonial period through the reactions of the pre-colonial societies to the social, economic, cultural and political forces of colonialism.” It is very true that when colonial monsters arrived in Africa, and destroyed all its spheres and ways of life, things started to change so much that Africans found themselves, confused, captivated, and hijacked in these new types of cultural, social, political and economic models. Just like any other creatures, Africans had to adapt in order to survive. And in so doing, they easily became preys to those who destroyed their ways of life. So, we can argue that ethnicity, however currently displayed based on economic gains, there are other hidden gains and motives such as cultural, political and social. For example, when, and if we examine xenophobic attacks in South Africa, the media report about attacks being as the means of venting the anger against foreigners that are accused of taking the jobs from South Africans. Again, if we consider economic and social status of those perpetrating bigotry, we find that they are the lowest of the lowest as far as social respect is concerned. Therefore, by gaining economically, the perpetrators want to synchronously gain socially as well as politically.

Even if we consider the recent ethnicity based on religion some terrorist groups use, Africa is currently facing, we find that it is the

product of colonialism; in that before the introduction and proselytisation of foreign religions, Africans had never fought over religions or the way one should observe religion. We can cite an example from the East Africa where Haynes (2007:309) argues that “religiously and ethnically diverse East Africa presents a different picture; after decades of European colonialism, following centuries of Arab and Islamic influence.” Arguably, religious ethnicity is currently becoming a growing problem starting with Somalia whose problems have recently been exported to Kenya as its president Uhuru Kenyatta argues that the war in Somalia is a proxy one (Kenyatta Cited in:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKKhma83zcg>).

In a word, conflicts resulting from new religious identities and ideologies are also now found in the Central Africa Republic (CAR). The BBC (30/09/2015) reported the clashes between Muslims and Christians that left over thirty people dead. The BBC wrote, “The capital of the Central African Republic is under a night-time curfew after days of intense fighting between Christian and Muslim groups.” The so-called Muslims, apart from being the citizens of the same country, sometimes, are from the same community in which, according to African customs, nobody was allowed to kill another especially a tribesman. Now they are killing each other just because they assumed new and pseudo identities. Nhalapo (1989:5) notes that right to life was prevalent in African traditional society; and it did not only prohibit killing but also stipulated the obligation for every individual to help in providing means of sustenance for others in the society one lived in. For such a society, there was no room for one to kill others as it currently is with terrorism or sectarian conflicts that target victims indiscriminately without being held accountable for such a crime.

Furthermore, Agulanna (2007) concurs with Nhalapo arguing that African culture strictly prohibited the killing of human being based on moral principles that were highly upheld. Agulanna uses the word “restrictability” to show how homicide was strictly prohibited. According to Agulanna, the prohibition of killing did not only apply to the members of the society but also to all human beings regardless whether they were members of the society or not. Again, after

Africans assumed new identities, it became a norm for one to kill another under the guise of the religion or religious sect or population as it is in the CAR cited above. Agulanna (Ibid) goes on observing that Africans' acceptance of Christianity and Islam as new and foreign faiths have geared Africans into killing one another whenever they command them to do so as means of adhering to their faiths and winning believers (p.74). This shift has a lot to do with African psyche and behaviourism as a society. Furthermore, due to the influence of foreign beliefs, it became easy for Africans to be colonised due to the fact that they believed that colonisers and their agents would behave trustworthily as they used to do. They took whatever they were told to be true even if it was not as it is in many cases of religious edicts. Agulanna goes on arguing that Africans were exposed to the culture of killing when they embraced foreign religions especially Christianity and Islam whose rivalries justified the killing of one another. At this time and point, African identity was altered, and thereby destroyed so as to carry other identities referring to themselves as Muslims or Christians instead of Africans. Agulanna goes on saying that the prevention to kill applied almost on all human societies, which is a bit controversial as far as colonialism, ethnicity, xenophobia and other colonial evils are concerned. By generalizing that all human societies sanctioned life, he does not tell why other non-African embarked on acts of violence that gave rise to terrorism we know today; that wants to unfettered kill innocent people simply because; they do not subscribe to its dogmatic ideology as it has been in the case of terrorist groups mentioned above. Agulanna, however, makes a good point by pointing out that Africans started killing each other when they embraced foreign religions especially Christianity and Islam. The current conflict in the Central Africa Republic (CAR) speaks volumes. When converts were blindly bundled into religious ethnicity groups they started to look at each other like less humans due to the trauma they got from the preaching of their religions that demonised Africans and their ways of life. This can explain why Muslims and Christians are now killing each other in the CAR. The Guardian, 25 April, 2014 reported that "the name—the Republic of Northern Central Africa—and a design for a national flag, are circulating by mobile phone in the dusty town of Bambari, which

divides the CAR's largely Christian south from a northern region now controlled by the mostly Muslim Seleka rebels." The people who used to be one nation and one people are now divided along sectarian lines. Argument can be made as to if the CAR was a nation or not. Again, looking at the membership the country has internationally, CAR is a nation however shaky or carbuncular it may seem.

Arguably, once a group or person regards others as inferior or as an obstacle to her or his wellbeing, be it economic, cultural, political or social, it becomes easy for such a person or a group to not only discriminate against them but also fear them so as to make them fair game for discrimination or other forms of xenophobic attacks. Rydgren (2008: 470) argues that, "xenophobia may be characterised as believing that it is 'natural' for people to live among others of 'their own kind'." Once such misconception is internalised and legitimised, chances are that perpetrators may tend to think that by discriminating against or attacking others they are claiming their rights even if doing so is done by committing crimes against others. Such thinking becomes a norm that the group defends unapologetically. The situation becomes worse when those in power turn a blind eye to this phenomenon or offer lip services as it has always been in South Africa since xenophobic attacks started. Essentially, what has been recurring in South Africa has all hallmarks of such anomaly and negative way of looking at others based on negative-ethnic lenses whereby Africans are seen as foreigners in their continent.

Furthermore, when it comes nationalism as a concept, had a different meaning from the one we know of today as far as Africans were concerned. Whatever type it was, Africans viewed themselves as nations or states however different from European ones. Buganda, Ethiopia and Luba-Lunda kingdoms, *inter alia*, provide an idea example of what of the nation or state meant to Africans before the coming of European colonialists (Green 2010). Austin (2008b), Berry (1992), Mamdani and (1996 cited in Fenske 2014:1) argue that there are empirical findings that prove that colonial rule expanded on African existing system to establish current nations or states. Had their version of nationality been accommodated, no dispute or blurriness would have been busying us today when ethnicity is one of the causes of violence conflict in Africa. This is very true due to

the fact that there are no recorded conflicts of high magnitude between, or among the empires or kingdoms of Africa that resulted from their natural nationalities as they knew and practised it as opposed to the superficial ethnonationalities that colonial monsters created. When it comes to the true nature of how pre-colonial African states, empires, kingdoms and whatnot operated, there were some skirmishes just like in any society among African empires and kingdoms. Hailemariam *et al* (1999:476) argue that “Among Africans, ‘nationality’ is taken to mean sub-national entity, and ‘nationalism’, a related concept, refers to ethnic solidarity and related sentiments.” For example, the East African city states were established along the coast to act as harbours for exporting produces from interior of the East Africa. Such commercial ties between East Africa and Asia and Middle East were established “from the tenth century onwards” (Wayne-Jones 2007: 368; also see Zhao 2012). Such states run their local and international affairs effectively. Once more, this proves that the concept of statehood or nationhood is not new to Africa. To the contrary, colonial conceptualization of the two concepts above is totally different. It is about economics and hegemony for the latter. Hailemariam *et al.* (Ibid) go on arguing that, “‘nation’ refers to politico-geographic notion, which African states inherited from colonialism.” From this nexus, we can tie the current concept of nationalism to colonialism in order to underscore the paradigm shift in creating, conceptualizing, organizing and managing the state. Again, what is obvious is that Africans were conscious of their nationality based on their conceptual underpinnings of their society. This is why entities such as Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda (Buganda), Angola (Ngola), Mali and others which used to be African powerful and larger empires are not new. So, to some Africans, especially, those who used to live under such powerful empires, their conceptualisation of nationalism was basically their empires something that existed even before some of European empires were not formed. Refer to the oldest civilisations such as that of Egypt and Sudan. So, we can argue that ethnicity we know today existed; save that colonial monsters expanded on it so as to create animosity by creating negative ethnicity aimed at weakening and destroying African people and their empires and the way they were organised

and managed. For others who were not under kingdoms or empires, had their ways of conceptualising their group identities based on their needs, aspirations, and the organisation of their societies. Importantly, it should be noted that most of African empires were formed based on conquests whereby those who were overpowered had to surrender their empire to the winning one. Such a move averted the need of exterminating a certain society or empire. All this was based on African traditions that saw killing of one another a taboo and unforgivable sin. Jaja (Year n.d: 9) notes that “in Africa, violence is eschewed. This is because blood shedding is abhorred. Life is sacred and this sanctity explains the rigidity with which the African hold and regards life.” I staunchly believe that this is the way to go if we accept the concept that if all human beings are equal, so, too, their values and ways of life are equal. Arguably, there is no human society that is made of angels or devils but immortal humans. All societies have good as well as bad things; and this is what humanity is all about, fallibility, trainability and malleability. With this approach, I am sure we can do something to cure, if not, to alleviate Africa’s negative ethnicity that has always been sick and sick of divisive politics and fear for the unknown as they were dubiously introduced and promoted by colonialism so as to hold Africa at ransom all aimed at exploiting Africa. In tackling how ethnicity worked in Africa, in *‘Tribalism’ and Ethnicity in Africa*, Lentz (1995:307) observes that “ethno-nationalisms see their own roots in primal attachments: it is by virtue of these attachments-and by effacing the traces of their historical construction”.

Moreover, although ethnic conflicts have become a problem to world peace, ethnicity which causes them is a social construction resulting from colonial strategies of antagonising one society against another as the easiest way of ruling colonies without necessarily spending much on armies. So, as aforementioned, it can be argued that negative ethnicity is the creature-cum-tool of colonialism that modern Africa needs to fight tooth and nail. We, can, therefore, comfortably state that negative ethnicity is the product of colonial politics based on exploitation, favouring, or pitting one against another, and unfair division of power and resources. For instance, colonial monsters favoured one group against another in almost all

important spheres of life such as education, employment, commerce and upholding and recognising their superimposed fake identities. Based on Basic Human Needs theory, unfair distribution of resources touches on a very foundation of livelihood of the groups that were not favoured. Byrne and Irvin (2000:66) note that “conflict is rooted in the denial of basic human needs such as identity-recognition and security.” Once a system purposely creates insecurity, poverty and vulnerability as it assures and provide the same to some of those who used to be the same society, intractable and protracted conflicts ensue as the results of such systemic organisation. By creating unfair and unequal treatment of some members of the same community, colonialism created fear and hatred which necessitated the creation of artificial and fake ethnic groups based on fear and hatred to counter exclusion from enjoying the rights in their communities. In other words, ethnic favouritism created unnecessary and unnatural schism that culminated in negative perception of what the society used to be. Under social exclusion theory, Sen (1995:5) argues that when one is excluded from social relations such an act can result into deprivations which limit our adds on to limiting our living opportunities as a society that used to live as one by guaranteeing security to all members of this particular society. Sen argues that under social exclusion, the victims are likely to feel vulnerable and precarious something that results in violent conflicts wantonly. Essentially, unfair, and unequal treatment of groups viewed and defined as ethnic ones enhanced their creation and surging altogether. For, before colonialism, groups which became hostile to each another used to comparatively live together harmoniously and cooperatively.

Conclusion

It is evident that negative ethnicity resulting from colonialism is an international issue-cum-problem. I am not trying to be an existentialistic or a dreamer. Again, I can apply existentialism to address the anomaly of ethnicity by turning it into something different and opposite as the means of creating opportunities for the victims as well as oppressors. I can tie everybody, victims and

oppressors together due to the fact that the consequences of ethnoconflict affect us all, although differently. Instead of some squawking while others are tittering, we must all share the blame so that we can share the burden; and thus work together to find the solution especially when and if we consider that we are all living in the same planet without any alternative accommodation shall one of us destroy it. Therefore, resolving ethnoconflicts needs concerted force, efforts, readiness and strategy intentionally and internationally. This being said, the international community, especially Western countries—that like to blame ethnic conflicts on ethnic groups which is wrong and debilitating—must seriously and practically come on board instead of acting as guarantors and external interveners while they actually are the ones that created; and thereafter exacerbated ethnicity in Africa driven by their need for resources Africa is endowed with. Blame games and face saving will not solve the problems ethnoconflicts pose to the peace of the world especially in modern times. When we consider how interdependent, globalised and interconnected the world is currently, anything that happens anywhere on earth affects the whole world. The current threat terrorism poses to the world can speak to this very plausibly and loudly altogether. We need to face it that ethnicity was dubiously and maliciously invented all aimed at benefiting some people on the expenses and perils of others. This is wrong. Although there are roles all groups play; those who created animosity among them also need to be blamed. To solve ethnic conflicts, we need to go beyond the groups in or parties to conflicts. Given that they are entrapped in the conflict, they need outsiders who view the conflict differently to help them sort out things so as to move forward. Such a cliché cannot be reached without the international community willing to truly do so.

Another way of addressing conflicts resulting from ethnicity is to impose fines on colonial powers that created the animosity among groups so that the money obtained from fines can help the groups to address some economic and systemic problems which essentially are the major causes of conflict in many regions due to inequality and poverty ethnicity has created to the victims. There is no way such fines can be imposed without the victims filing suits in the court of law locally and internationally. If possible, there must be created an

international court to look into the past as far as colonialism is concerned. Recently, Kenyan Mau Mau former fighters take on Britain provides an ideal example and a niche from which to start such a process. Reuters July 16, 2012 reported that, “Three elderly Kenyans who accuse British colonial forces of torturing them in the 1950s took their battle for damages to London's High Court on Monday in a case that has exposed dark secrets from the dying days of empire.” If individuals can sue the state that perpetrated crimes against them many years ago, what about the communities that suffered hugely from such divisive politics and systems? In the same footings the Britain sued for millions by Mau Mau *terrorists*. Telegraph, November 10, 2002 reported that, “British lawyers representing former Mau Mau fighters claim that they were tortured by the colonial authorities and are therefore entitled to millions of pounds in compensation. They plan to launch a High Court action to demand reparations.” Such cases set precedents victims of ethnicity in Africa can use to sue all countries that enacted and used and benefited from negative ethnicity. Even the language Western media use guarantees criminal liability. Were the Mau Mau freedom fighters or terrorists? Like it was in the case of the African National Congress (ANC) that was branded a terrorist group, colonial mentality is still going on even currently. The language used is derogative and misleading. We sometimes need to watch the type of language we use in referring or defining others. Traustadóttir (2001:15) argues that “if the othering is done through language then it can also be undone though the language”.

Also, colonial powers that fuelled the misunderstandings should be forced under international law to participate financially in rebuilding political institutions they destroyed in their former colonies through distributive justice which “is dependent on access to social, political and economic decision making institutions” (Byrne and Irvin , 2000: 71), which aims at empowering the parties to conflicts.

Finally, we cannot phenomenologically dispute the fact that there is deservedly need to give the victims the voice, at least, and to begin with, by admitting that the mess and sufferings are in is not of their making. Instead, it is the work of *powerful devils* of the world we are

still trusting despite knowing today how famous they have become famous as far as excoriating and stereotyping the victims for the same vice such criminals created. Therefore, African academics, activists, politicians and all members of the affected societies should impregnably re-educate themselves on how they were divided, antagonized, agonized and offended so as to turn against each other. By doing so they will be able to hide the cause of the impasse resulting from ethnoconflicts they are entrapped in without exploring the role African societies played in the same along with their colonisers.

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Social Support and the Violence of Individualistic Ontologies: Insights from Namibian Female and Male Youths' Experiences

Artwell Nhemachena

Introduction

The ideas of 'society' and 'culture' that are central to African social security are unfortunately getting increasingly troubled in western scholarly debates and in the various global individualistic forms of interventionism. As globalisation increases, notions of societies, families, kinship and cultures are symbolically and materially subjected to violence as they get supplanted by 'universalistic' ideas, ideals and concerns that span nations and continents. So, while promoting universalism at the (neo)imperial centres, globalisation processes paradoxically promote individualistic ontologies in the localities. However, even as they suffer the twin tempests of globalisation and individualism, social and cultural institutions in Africa are expected to act as cushions that provide social support for the individuals, on their ways to becoming 'global citizens' stressing individualism. This present chapter focuses on discussing some forms of support for youths in times of unemployment in Namibia. Broadly, it argues that contrary to individualism as stressed in some epistemologies especially from the West, youths rely on social, kin, family relationships, as well as on the government to survive the violence of unemployment. The chapter intends firstly to explore youths' job looking profiles; second, to relate lengths of unemployment to the sex of youths; third, to relate reasons for not working to the sex of youths and fourthly, and to compare means of support by the sex of youths. The chapter further argues that privileging the individualistic ontologies, in oblivion to antecedent

social support, amounts to violence akin to separating fish from water.

While violence is often assumed to be immanent to Africa, the violence of globalisation, *alias* empire, that informs this chapter transcends the continent and individual nation states within which it materialises and becomes visible. At a global level, Satgar, (2014) observes that about one billion people are living in perpetual hunger and two billion people are food insecure. Still at a global level, About 2, 6 billion people die every year from malnutrition. This kind of violence is also evidenced in Prontz (2004), who notes that 10 million die from preventable diseases every year, 16 000 die every day from lack of food alone, over 3 billion live in abject poverty without access to basic nutrition, employment, clean water, without adequate housing and with little or no medical care. The challenge, as Prontzos observes, is that there are some people, particularly at a global level, who create and benefit from the imploding of economies in peripheries that they subsequently use to justify wars against nationalists, on the pretext of 'responsibility to protect'. While globalisation is supposedly inclusive there is need to notice that it is a process that ultimately belongs to those that make trillions of United States dollars even as the rest of the world suffers; it belongs to those such as the three 'richest people' that according to the United Nations have assets larger than the combined GDP of all the least developed countries in the world (Dixon, 2001 and Lee, 2002 cited in Prontzos, 2004). In this sense the violence of globalisation should be properly seen as the violence of a minority in the world who, without subjecting themselves to planetary elections, have always deceived the world majority that what they do in the name of the fundamentalistic globalisation is to the benefit of everyone, everywhere. But, individualism is also evident on the African continent where individuals resort to corruption and where countries stand alone, divided, to face the forces of globalisation that in fact translate to forces unleashed by individuals at the helm of what is called globalisation. Individualism is equally noticeable among Africans deprived of their African institutions that would otherwise provide them with refuge from the vicissitudes of global capital that

creates and thrives on the individualistic ‘orientations’ and attendant vulnerabilities of underprivileged masses of the Global South.

African youths have become global (neo-)imperial ritual subjects being delivered to the (neo)imperial leviathan through imperial administration of shocks on African economic, social, cultural and political fabrics. Although scholars like Nochteff *et al.* (2000) call it ‘economic shock without vision’, there is need to notice that these ‘shocks of disaster capitalism’ (Klein, 2010) are designed with vision to generate super-profits for imperial capital. However, the counterpart, of the super-profits in imperial centres, is a conjunction of unemployment, poverty, regressive distribution of income and social disintegration in the peripheries (Nochteff *et al.* 2000). Like any other ritual subjects, African youths are kept in liminal positions where they are legalistically conferred with majority status but denied the economic material means to exercise the majority status. African youths are administered with western forms of education supposedly to enhance transition to adulthood and majority status but they are also administered with economic shocks that deny them the opportunities to move beyond the zones of ritual liminality. Unclear for the African youths are the natures of the gods and goddesses for which they are made to suffer current ritual flagellation.

Although African youths are exposed to the violence of unemployment and impoverishment not necessarily by their governments but by international institutions and interventions, such as the neoliberalism of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Prontzos, 2004; Amin, 2004; Mkandawire *et al.* 1999), the youths confront and are often encouraged by civil society organisations to confront their governments. The youths, who as Honwana, (2015) argues, are living in twilight zones or liminal spaces known as “waithood”, are often unable to see their challenges as emanating from the spectral metaphysical dance of global capital and thus they direct their frustration on quests to change governments as happened in Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal and Burkina Faso and the recently staged demonstrations in South Africa and the Republic of Congo. While the uprisings are often depicted as revolutions, they amount in so far as they challenge nation states to global politicians’ postmodern quests for ‘post-nation states’ (Aouragh, 2012) in their

projects for a 'New World Order' in which all other states in the world are destroyed (Hagger, 2013; Bedjaoui, 1994; Garcia, 2010). The uprisings do not necessarily challenge the hegemony of global capital and imperialism that in any case fund and control the civil society organisations that are leading the youths' uprisings against their nation states. In Africa where African forms of organisations and mobilisations are summarily demonised as tribalism, archaic, traditional and uncivil, it is cause for wonder why revolutions that are premised on western forms of civility [privileging individualism] must be called African revolutions; or must they properly be called corrupted African revolutions.

While corruption has conventionally been understood in relation to economies, it is traceable to the (neo-)colonial privileging of the individual and as far as Africa is concerned to the moment when colonists looted collective communally owned resources while at the same time inviting individual Africans to work in colonial factories and mines away from their disinherited families and kin. Some of the African leaders have turned to corruption (Mbaku, 2010), but African struggles that focus only on these local problems without also contextualising them within the general struggle against imperialism and against global coloniality will be irrelevant and incorrect (Ngugi wa Thiongo, 1997: 88; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013: 78). The challenge here is that youths who have lost their African social identity and social connectedness (Kralova, 2015), often due to the vicissitudes of (neo-)liberal global capital are labelled as global terrorists to be captured on millions of dollars bounty (Idriss *et al*, 2015), if they challenge imperial hegemony. Yet, if the youths challenge their nation states, some of which, though hamstrung by the invisible empire, have good intentions for their local African people (Chengu, 2013; 2014), the youths are celebrated as revolutionaries. Global civil society organisations celebrate uprisings by youths against their own states even if the revolutions facilitate the new scramble for Africa (Chipaike, 2012; Southall 2009); and even if the revolutions deplete the vitalities of African nation states' populist programs of free health care, free education, free electricity, interest free loans such as in Libya (Chengu, 2013; 2014).

Thus, Africans are encouraged by scholars like Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2013), Ngugi wa Thiongo, (1997), Schmidt, (2013) and Leech, (2006) to sift out dangerous (neo)colonial matrices embedded in global interventionism that appear as progressive, developmental, humanitarian, innocent and well-intended. The Africans are cautioned that many of the predicaments that plague the continent today are not solely the result of African decisions but a consequence of foreign intrusions and interferences into African affairs (Schmidt, 2013: 1). These foreign interferences can be understood in terms of global capitalist ‘ethics of vulnerability’ (see Shildrick, 2002), in which rendering the other vulnerable is seen as the mobilising feature of an ‘existent together’ in the global world. The interferences are seen in terms of (neo-)imperialism presenting itself as a cure for problems that it has caused (Ngugi wa Thiongo, 1997). The worry is that the theory and practice of rendering the other vulnerable is becoming popular in a world where the unabated suffering of the planetary majority has come to constitute capital for the (neo-)imperial project of the ‘New World Order’.

Like the rest of Africa, Namibia suffers the metaphysical dance of global capital that throws national, group and individual identities into disarray even as it professes the birth of a collective global community or global village. More than half of Namibians live in severe poverty, official unemployment was recorded in 2011 as over 52% and youth unemployment was between 70% to 80% (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011: 2; see also Mchombu and Mchombu, 2014). Namibia has structural unemployment and underemployment problems worsened by global recession; in spite of increased growth rates prior to 2009; long unemployment episodes worsened reaching unacceptable levels (Kanyenze *et al.* 2012). Formal employment has not offered security since between 1997 and 2008 the formal sector lost nearly 70 000 jobs at a time when an estimated 240 000-300 000 new job seekers entered the labour market (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2012). Thus, Namibian youths are confronted by precarious employment partly as a result of the 1990s global neoliberal free market policies that caused an increasing casualization of work, the increasing “flexible” forms of employment and a growing informalisation of the economy (National Youth Council, 2015). In spite of these

challenges including rising national debt, the Namibia state has put in place safety nets for the vulnerable and in 2010 the government pledged to create and retain about 104 000 jobs between 2011 and 2014 (Africa Economic Outlook, 2012).

In spite of challenges within formal institutions to provide social protection for Africans, African cultures including Namibian ones are being torn into shreds, families and marriages are visited with strains that have seen break ups, the emergence of street youths and street children (Mufune, 2014). Neoliberal individualism coupled with western instrumentalism has played havoc on kinship solidarity and so African forms of solidarity are finding it difficult to survive the opportunism that comes with western celebrated instrumentalism and greedy materialism. While western institutions have for centuries battered African collectivist communalist cultures on the basis of various pretexts, western institutions themselves have not been equal to the challenge of providing social and other forms of security to Africans. This has been evidenced for instance by the popularisation of home based care at moments when the western medical institutions could not care for those afflicted and affected by HIV/AIDS (Magezi, 2007). However, with neoliberalism, western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) forced African governments to roll back their social welfare and social security provisions effectively introducing austerity measures that have accounted for structural and other forms of violence on the African populace whose own African institutions have been battered for centuries. In spite of the fact that African populist nationalist programs provided security for individuals as well as for post-independence African states, these security programs have been hacked down by IMF and World Bank neoliberal reforms. African social security and state security are being replaced by notions of 'human security' that are individualistic and antithetical to state security in a global context where African states are increasingly under attack by global capitalists keen to establish an imperial New World Order ruled entirely by selected western states and governments (Garcia, 2010; Hagger, 2013).

Cognisant of the violence of (neo-)liberal individualist ontologies that caused havoc to African collectivist institutions, scholars now

argue for the constitution of ‘developmental states’ with authority to intervene in the economies (Mkandawire *et al*, 1999). Other scholars are calling for the constitution of ‘solidarity economies’ in which people at the grassroots are the major actors (Satgar, 2014). Contrary to anarchist arguments for removing the rulers, chiefs, states and governments in Africa, this chapter argues for solidarity but it extends arguments for solidarity to the levels of families, households, nations, regions and the continent. The arguments in the chapter are premised on observations that families, households and states provide social security for individuals particularly during unemployment and other economic hardships. It argues that though western epistemologies have promoted individualism among Africans Western institutions have failed to provide social security cover for all Africans who have been uprooted from their African institutions on the bait of individualism. Before presenting data on forms of social support for youths, it is necessary to embed the issues of unemployment, social security and individualism in theoretical lenses.

Individualism, Unemployment and Social Support in Africa: Embedding the issues in theories

Africa, which is seldom understood on its own terms (Nyamnjoh, 2012a; 2012b), has since the beginning of colonial scholarship been erroneously portrayed in terms of the violence of anarchist individualism of the Hobbesian theory of the state of nature. This Hobbesian theory of the state of nature postulated that there was no government, laws, ethics, culture and society prior to the advent of colonialism in Africa. Understood in terms of the Hobbesian theory of the state of nature, Africa has been denied the civilisation and honour of possessing its own institutions which it relied on to curb and to prevent violence. Thus theorised in terms of absence of government and other social institutions, precolonial Africa was erroneously understood in terms of individualistic and endemic violence. Thus, colonists violently pulled African individuals out of their institutional contexts converting some of them into the most ferocious and venomous warriors against their own cultural and

institutional foundations. This African venom and ferocity against own institutions, is still evident in contemporary impatience with anything African including African epistemologies (Nyamnjoh, 2012a). Interpreting Africa as a state of nature provided the rationale for the violence of colonisation where colonists postured as messiahs and as providers of [civilised] institutional frameworks to save Africa from its own 'destructive anarchist individualism' in the assumed absence of society and government. After independence, when the colonists were forced to withdraw from Africa, scholars of Eurocentric callings reemphasised deconstruction of African institutions viewing the institutions as uncivilised, dysfunctional and inadequate. There were instead popularisations of theorisations in terms of poststructuralism and deconstruction, that presupposed that African institutions particularly states and governments were dysfunctional and could thus be legitimately hacked down with joy. This theoretical shift made it possible to begin to deconstruct and undermine African institutions. There were also subtle presuppositions that the African postcolonial context has become synonymous with disorder borne of resurging anarchist individualism in the absence of the 'orderly' colonists some of who are mooting the re-colonisation of Africa in the 21st Century (*The Guardian*, 13 April 2016; *BusinessTime*, 18 March 2016; *New Zimbabwe*, 26 October 2015).

Increasingly, Africa has come to be theorised in terms of anarchism that is also used to demonise African states as having failed, as inherently violent and thus as requiring the guillotine. At no turn does the theorisation in terms of anarchism (Zenker 2012) contextualise whatever violence that occurs in Africa within the history of the Western project of (neo-)liberal individualism which is pushing African collective institutions into atrophy. Theories have been postulated to promote the view that African institutions including governments are harmful and unnecessary for Africans: theories that emphasise individual rights, to the literal neglect of correlative duties by the individuals to collectivities. Theories have been postulated for Africans purveying the view that African individuals have no obligations to obey the African state and African authority, more generally. These theories that promote individualist anarchism have been followed up with practical neoliberal projects

that, apart from retrenching African states and government from determining African economies, emphasised individualism unrestrained by the authority of African states and cultural institutions. Neoliberal projects have been carefully packaged by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank before such packages were imposed on African states and governments willy-nilly, on the pretext of economic reforms paradoxically designed to reduce the debts of the Africans to those that enslaved and colonised them (Nhemachena, 2015). The packages designed as Structural Adjustment programmes (SAPs) included conditionalities such as retrenchment of African workforces, devaluation of African currencies, removal of minimum wage regulations, and deregulation of prices of basic commodities, trade liberalisation, and introduction of cost recovery measures. On the whole, these packages have had the effects of deindustrialising African countries while at the same time introducing job and income insecurity for African workers so as to make Africa ungovernable.

While these neoliberal interventions have been analysed, including by African scholars, the broader theoretical garments within which they are generated has not been appreciated. It is important to unpack this broader theoretical trajectory of neoliberal projects that were imposed on Africa if African scholars are to properly and adequately glean the breadth of liberalism beyond the economic and political terrains. The harmful neoliberalism has not really been implemented to ensure African countries paid their debts to International Financial Institutions because in fact Africa is owed centuries-old debts by international firms and institutions that profited from enslaving and colonising Africans (Nhemachena, 2015). Similarly, neoliberalism was not introduced to help African countries to restructure their economies in order to be more profitable but rather the programmes were meant to wrest policy making space from the newly independent African countries. The effect has been to render African citizens vulnerable to global capital so as to weaken and dilute African popular nationalist politics. Thirdly, neoliberal projects were meant to generate anarchy by undercutting the authority and power of newly independent African governments and states that had hitherto become popular owing to

their populist post-independence social security programmes. In other words, the purpose was to expose and render vulnerable the African populace by weakening African states and governments, so that African authority and power would become bare without moral capital or material means of social security and cushioning for the populace. These social security and popular post-independence projects would have prevented the legitimisation crises that have become the basis of global capital's whip on post-independence African states and governments.

Undercutting the economic bases so as to weaken the social, political, cultural, religious institutions of Africans is a centuries old strategy of empire. Historically, looting and robbing Africans of their livestock and land weakened the cohesion and authority of African indigenous institutions. Coupled with the demonisation of the institutions and leaders, colonists managed to turn one generation of Africans against the other, further weakening them. In spite of the fact that colonists deprived Africans of their resources that had allowed youths to marry, perform their cultural and religious rituals in their own independent households, colonists turned African youths against the generations of their elders who were custodians of African institutions. This was done partly via ideologies of individualism that went further to portray African youths as exploited in household and family farm unpaid labour by their parents and kin. These ideologies had the effect of turning converted youths away from their own indigenous institutions and towards colonists who in fact exploited the youths in the *chibbaro* or cheap labour regimes (van Onselen, 1980; Arrighi, 1976). Blinded and corrupted by ideologies of individualism, youths have increasingly come to devalue families and marriages as institutions preferring individualistic often hedonistic pleasure even if it does violence to African institutional fabrics. Little notice is taken of the fact that colonial privileging of the individualistic ideologies serves to legitimise (neo-)colonists' intentions to pay single wages even to married family men and women. Colonial privileging of individualism was some form of lullaby for African men and women that would otherwise have demanded adequate wages to enable them to perform their social and cultural obligations to families and in-laws. Colonists' ideologies of

individualism in Africa have to be understood within the context where they were desirable for the colonial system to separate African families and spouses in order to retain African men on colonists' factories, in mines and on farms away from their wives and children and other kin (Masuko, 1995). Paid a single wage, they were encouraged to live as individuals while being fed with ideologies that African elders exploited them. Feeding colonised Africans with ideologies against African institutions including family, marriages, religion, spirituality, economies and politics served to enhance African dependence on colonists' institutions in spite of the thinness and unreliability of (neo-)colonial social security.

The (neo-)liberal stress on individualism should be viewed within this historical context where privileging individualism served to undercut African institutions while at the same time depriving Africans of the protection and social security of their own institutions. Stressing individualism served to enhance African dependence on colonists; it did not necessarily serve to free or liberate them but rather to deliver them into greater dependence on colonists while visiting anarchy on African institutions that they disowned and abandoned. Thus, stressing individualism served to facilitate legitimacy and order of the colonial establishment while generating legitimisation crises and disorder within African institutions from which African youths were pried. In this sense, the colonial logics are replicated in contemporary theories of complexity (Tschacher *et al*, 1999; Geyer *et al*, 2010; Mason, 2008) where disorder in one place is assumed to be compensated for by order in another place. Thus complexity is described by Mason, (2008) in terms of a sense of order where order and disorder are structurally intertwined. By extension, one can argue that global social and material insecurity in one place is compensated for by security in another place; and unemployment in one place is compensated for by employment in another place. Disunity in one part of the globe is compensated for by unity in another part. This appears to have been the logic of dialectics of development and underdevelopment in the world where underdevelopment in one part of the world is compensated for by development in another region. Similarly, violence in peripheral

regions of the world is compensated for by peace in metropolitan centres.

Although dependence and world systems theorists have explained the challenges in peripheral parts of the world in terms of what happens in metropolis of the world (Munck *et al* 1999; Rose 2002), there is hardly theorisation of (un-)employment and social (in-)security in a global historical holistic sense. Conceptualisations of (un-)employment and (in-)security focus narrowly on present local contexts, ignoring the historical global imports of (in-)security and (un-)employment challenges. Even the interdependence of local African aspects such as culture, family, households, religion, and spiritualities is hardly considered yet all these also have effects on (in-)security and (un-)employment issues. Unemployment and insecurity are often attributed simplistically to the failure of African states without giving due cognisance to the fact that capital, in spite of its history of expropriation in Africa, has propelled itself beyond the African states. Similarly unemployment and insecurity are attributed to the states without cognisance to imports of spiritualities, cultures, families, religions and households in the economic domains. In other words, simplistic theorisations of unemployment and insecurity in Africa have not addressed imperatives of complexity including the violent historicity of simplifying the African to an individual devoid of culture, society, spirituality, materialities, entitlements, and politics.

Thus, on the basis of the Hobbesian anarchist individualism of the state of nature that presumed the absence of society, state, governments and laws in Africa, colonists legitimised the destabilisation of African institutions as a way to stabilise the colonial establishment. While contemporary theorisations of the world in terms of productive chaos (Gosz, 2008; Knull *et al.* 2005) have not been linked to logics of the Hobbesian state of nature or to complexity, where disorder in one place is compensated for by order in another place, it is possible to link all these theorisations together. 'Productive chaos' according to Knull *et al.*, (2005) refers to period when there is disorganisation which generates excitement that something is emerging. The Hobbesian and chaos theorisations need to be linked together so as to glean the broader picture within which unemployment happens and within which violence materialises in

certain places and not in others. At a scientific level, logics of productive chaos and anarchism have been legitimised via western theorisations in terms of the big bang from which life supposedly emanated from Godless and amoral violence. In anarchism and productive chaos, certain individuals are assumed to benefit as they can extract from the chaos elements, substances or processes that they require; draw strength, force and material from the chaos in the world. Such individuals are argued to benefit from the chaos or anarchy. In other words some regions and individuals in the world benefit from exposing or from rendering others vulnerable to forces beyond them. Thus readers can benefit insights by linking this chapter to current theoretical postures by some scholars advocating for vulnerability, that is, for the 'ethics of vulnerability' that celebrate exposure of others to risks and chaos in the erroneous belief that chaos is productive to the world.

In a world where empire recruits multitudes in the peripheries for its project of 'one world government' where all other governments particularly in the peripheries are targeted for destruction, generating chaos in the peripheries would be productive to such an empire. Empire can only mobilise and deploy the peripheral multitude against their individual states by first of all creating privation, including poverty, that serves as tinder for the imperially envisaged planetary revolutionary chaos against governments and states in the peripheries. Deprived of the broader perspectives including about the meddlesomeness of empire, that spoils stately vessels of salvation, youths are made to believe they are engaging in their own Marxist revolutions against local states. Yet, empire that is keen to destroy all other governments and states stands to benefit from chaos that destroys the peripheral states as long as global capital is not challenged. In the same way, colonists recruited Africans as labourers for colonists' projects by depriving and starving them, empire continues to recruit via destructive (neo-)liberal projects on Africa. This logic of privation might not have been initially evident in the recent (neo-)liberal drive to privatisation but Africans should have been able to foresee it because the logic also constituted the historical foundations of colonial recruitment of African labour. If this logic is transposed onto the global level, the 'empire's multitude' that Hardt

and Negri (2000) write about can only be mobilised and recruited to enact empire's revolution on the basis of privation in the peripheries, such privations will generate sham Marxist revolutions that would hack down local states while leaving imperial capital not only intact but in a stronger unchallenged position over the planet.

The challenge for African politicians, scholars and policy makers is that they are left in an unenviable theoretical position because over time there appears to have been some convergence between Marxist and poststructuralist/postmodernist theorisations. The convergence revolves around shared antipathy to the [African] state and other institutions like the family, marriage, education, religion that in spite of their demonisations are crucial in providing social security for Africans. Thus in spite of not owning the material economic base or infrastructure in the Marxist sense, African states can be understood as being progressively pushed to the edges of cliffs where theoreticians from different vantage points have converged over time to conspire against the states. The point here is that revolutions in the peripheries are against the African states that, in spite of lack of material means, are expected to reconcile and cushion both citizens and global capital on an unwieldy terrain. Instead of fighting to own and control the means of production such as land that is still the bastion of global international capital, Africans' attention has been redirected such that they struggle instead for non-materialities and [materially vacuous] ideals of human rights, freedom, emancipation, equality, democracy (Nhemachena, 2015), for employment and poverty alleviation or eradication. So, both at a theoretical and empirical level Africans' attention has been directed away from struggles to own and control material means of production such that there are always efforts to pull down African hierarchies and structures that would otherwise provide the spine for genuine African revolutions for materiality. African scholarship needs to notice that to be without African hierarchy of structures is *ipso facto* to be without spine and life. Such spinelessness, structure-lessness, flatness and softness has been visited on Africa in many guises: witness the neoliberal prescription of the devaluation and softness of African currencies and the 'spinelessness', 'softness', sterility and impotence visited on Africans by the shipment of genetically

modified food (The *Guardian* 11 September 2015; Garber, 2013). So, African scholars need to reconceptualise Africa out of the contemporary *cul de sac* theorisations in terms of structure-lessness, flatness, horizontalness, statelessness, defencelessness. In their critiques of their states and institutions, Africans need to be as mindful as to consider what lies beyond the demise of the African states that they are incessantly tempted by want to strike and paralyse.

Thus, faced with massive youth unemployment in many of its countries such as South Africa (Dodds, 2015; Mago, 2014), Zimbabwe (Bhebhe *et al*, 2015), Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014), Namibia (Shingayamwe *et al*. 2014) and in a context where Africa's youths constitute 60% of the unemployed (World Bank cited in *AllAfrica*, 7 November 2014), Africa is sitting on a powder keg as some disaffected youths are already joining radical organisations such as Boko Haram (Onuoha, 2014). The wretchedness of African youths coupled with theoretical ideological convergence against African states, and African authority more generally, accounts for the increasing popularity of Marxist scholarship even by poststructuralists and postmodernists anxious to see African revolutions against African states. However, it is for the African youths and disaffected others revolutions in which freedom and emancipation have been carefully packaged in terms of ideals and opportunities against the African state rather than in terms of directly seizing actual materialities from [global] capital.

Theories that promote anarchism, from Greek *anarkos* meaning without chief and government (Abbasi *et al*, 2014) legitimise vulnerability in the absence of protective governments and other institutions. It is important to note that understandings of the notion of power that is often deployed to demonise African institutions differ depending on one's locus of enunciation. As Muchie *et al*, (2012) note, African centred notions of power imply the ability to do things, to shape things while Western notions of power imply domination and conquest of others. While African states have been demonised for alleged abuse of power, they have been denied power in the Afrocentric sense of abilities to shape postcolonial Africa, that remain dominated by Western Transnational Corporations and Multinational Corporations which retain the power to shape

postcolonial Africa. African states got independence without power (*Namibian*, 15 May 2015) and this could partly explain their inability to resolve unemployment and other challenges on the continent. The challenges of youths unemployment that have been the bases of uprisings in North Africa (Douglas-Bowers, 2011; *Institute for Security Studies* 5 November 2014) are likely to worsen in Africa should Africa's future be characterised by capital preferring to employ robots and other form of technology. The challenges of unemployment are likely to worsen in Africa where there are indications of the emergence of postmodernist immaterial economies as well as millennial capitalism that shifts from privileging production to privileging consumption. The fact that youths rely on social institutions for supports suggests the need to be sceptical about calls to anarchism, chaos and to worship individualism. It shows that privileging anarchism, chaos and individualism entails vulnerability and exposure to risks.

Despite global capital's privileges to cause global shocks including worldwide (neo)liberal crises (Satgar, 2014), there is little notice of its accountability for uprisings by the disaffected in Africa. Apart from directly generating the vulnerability that explains global youth unemployment, neoliberalism is linked to destruction of African communalism, mutual support and oneness within the African institutions. Globalisation and the culture of material individualism that it promotes have played havoc on African traditional families, marriages, and kinship systems. Individualism generates mutual suspicion, antagonism and it replaces senses of community that are necessary in institutions that provide refuge against the tempests of globalisation (Olasunkanmi, 2011; Obiola, 2010; Brown, 1999; Ogihara *et al*, 2014; Kanu, 2013). With stress on western individualism, the individual is more concerned with own success than communal success; the individual is encouraged to ignore the African institutions including families, cultures and marriage even if these would provide cushions, in times of unemployment, in between employment or when looking for employment, by way of relieving the distress of unemployment and to provide social security. The stress on individualism also makes it difficult to rule in Africa because individuals are concerned about

their own successes than communal national successes (Olasunkanmi, 2011: 63; Akokpari, 2001: 188).

While creating disorder in African marriages and families, globalisation creates employment for its globe-trotting NGOs and Civil Society Organisations' intellectuals who capitalise for instance on the break-up of African interfamily cultural child fosterage practices (Brown, 2007). Similarly the disorder and chaos created by individualism in African marriages (Stephanie, 2008; Pauli, 2015; O'Connor, 2014; *BBC News*, 22 September 2003) generate employment for globe-trotting intellectuals who chip in as experts. Thus the disunity, exposure and vulnerability of Africans who no longer have anywhere to hide (*Namibian*, 5 February 2016) is capitalised on to refashion [global] order on the basis of alien principles at a different level. Deprived of their Ubuntu, humbleness, generosity, social cohesion, altruism, interdependence, family, marital and community solidarity (Durlak, 2015; Bieseke, 2011), many youths act corruptly, dishonestly, immorally, violently, exploitatively and they justify these activities as an inevitable way to succeed in an unruly world (Erdmute *et al*, 2008; Van der Walt, 2003; *Science and Religion*, 15 September 2011).

With the disappearance of employment opportunities and the African communalism which was the basis of the saying that 'it takes a village to raise a child' (Ikuenobe, 2006; Nyamnjoh, 2002), African youths are increasingly joining the streets where they either stay or work (Mufune, 2000). As hinted above, these unemployment challenges are currently being theorised in terms of social economies and solidarity economies where economies are conceived in terms of cooperatives, community associations, historical, specific political, cultural issues that are deemed to assist in emancipation and transformation of grassroots practices using local knowledge and activist tools (Satgar, 2014). However, challenges in Africa must be understood beyond solidarity economies: solidarity necessarily has to extend beyond economies: there is need for solidarities in the political, national, regional, continental, social, familial, marital, cultural, epistemological and religious senses also, and all these forms impact on the economy.

Unemployment and social support in Namibia: Presenting the data

The data, which is derived from the Namibian Statistics Agency survey of 2015, in the tables and graphs below depict aspects of unemployment and social support networks for male and female youths. As indicated in the data below, Namibian youths are generally in contexts of “waithood” for employment even though some have given up, due to hardships, on seeking work.

This analysis of the data is premised on the following sets of hypotheses:


a) Alternate hypothesis: More female youths have longer periods of unemployment compared to male youths; null hypothesis: there is no difference between lengths of unemployment for female and male youths.

b) Alternate hypothesis: more female youths have reasons for not working compared to male youths; null hypothesis: there is no difference between reasons for not working for male and female youths.

c) Alternate hypothesis: More female youths as compared to male youths are supported while unemployed; null hypothesis: there is no difference between means of supports for female and male youths

The .05 level of significance was used in analysis of the data.

Graph 1: Main Reason for not looking for Work/Starting Business



Graph 1 show that the job looking profiles of the youths ranged from; I thought no work was available, waiting for replies, got tired of looking for work, already found a job to start within a month, waiting for busy season and so on. close to 40 000 youths did not look for work because they thought no work was available while 15000 youths had given up or got tired looking for work. Only about 2000 youths had already secured work and were waiting to assume duties.

Table 1
Length of unemployment/availability for work by Sex

	Sex		Total
	Female	Male	
Length of unemployment/availability for work < 1 month	2371 47.5%	2624 52.5%	4995 100.0%
1 month < 3 months	4421 43.6%	5715 56.4%	10136 100.0%
3 month < 6 months	4949 51.0%	4758 49.0%	9707 100.0%
6 months < 1 year	9541 55.6%	7630 44.4%	17171 100.0%
1 year < 2 years	22185 56.0%	17410 44.0%	39595 100.0%
2 years or more	69883 59.0%	48471 41.0%	118354 100.0%
Total	113350 56.7%	86608 43.3%	199958 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1290.706 ^a	5	.000

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.080	.000
	Cramer's V	.080	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.080	.000
N of Valid Cases		199958	

Table 1 which shows length of unemployment/availability for work by sex supports the hypothesis that more females (56.7%) compared to males (43.3%) had long periods of unemployment/availability for work. More females (59%) than males (41%) spent 2 years or more of unemployed availability for work. The chi-square value of 1290.7 and 5 degrees of freedom for that table shows there is a strong relationship between length of unemployment/availability for work and sex. The Phi value of .080 with an approximate significance of .001, the Cramer's V value of .080 with approximate significance of .001 and the Contingency Coefficient value of .080 with an approximate significance of .001 all show that there is a significant relationship between length of unemployment/availability for work and sex.

Table 2
Reasons for not working (previous 7 days) by Sex

	Sex		Total
	Female	Male	
Sick, injury	401 57.3%	299 42.7%	700 100.0%
Maternity, Parental Leave	1191 100.0%	0 0.0%	1191 100.0%
Holiday, vacation	888 42.3%	1211 57.7%	2099 100.0%

Education leave	124 43.8%	159 56.2%	283 100.0%
Temporary Lay-off	384 53.5%	334 46.5%	718 100.0%
Reduction in Economic Activity	196 39.4%	302 60.6%	498 100.0%
Temporary Reorganisation, Suspension of Work	0 0.0%	59 100.0%	59 100.0%
Personal, Family Responsibilities	683 67.0%	336 33.0%	1019 100.0%
Off Season	12444 69.8%	5388 30.2%	17832 100.0%
Other Reason	1293 63.1%	757 36.9%	2050 100.0%
Don't know	76 37.3%	128 62.7%	204 100.0%
Total	17680 66.3%	8973 33.7%	26653 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1750.975 ^a	10	.000

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.256	.000
	Cramer's V	.256	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.248	.000
N of Valid Cases		26653	

Table 2 confirms the hypothesis that more females (66.3%) compared to males (33.7%) had reasons for not working. More females (69.8%) compared to males (30.2%) were affected by seasonality of work. The chi-square value of 1750.98 and 10 degrees of freedom for that table confirms the relationship between reasons for not working by sex. The Phi value of .256, with approximate significance of .001; Cramer's V value of .256 with an approximate significance of .001 and Contingency Coefficient value of .248 with an approximate significance of .001 all show that there is a relationship between reason for not working and sex. The table shows that youths had many reasons for not working and these reasons included reduction in organisational economic activity, suspensions, lay-offs, maternity, sickness/injuries, and educational leave.

Table 3
Means of support while unemployed by Sex

	Sex		Total
	Female	Male	
Did odd jobs during the last seven days	0 0.0%	145 100.0%	145 100.0%
Supported by someone in the household	61585 54.8%	50882 45.2%	112467 100.0%
Supported by someone outside household	29340 59.3%	20106 40.7%	49446 100.0%
Old age/disability grant	1014 52.9%	903 47.1%	1917 100.0%

Supported by charity, church	269 59.4%	184 40.6%	453 100.0%
From savings	820 47.4%	911 52.6%	1731 100.0%
Child support/foster care grant	514 100.0%	0 0.0%	514 100.0%
Income from sale of property	315 49.6%	320 50.4%	635 100.0%
Other	1202 62.6%	717 37.4%	1919 100.0%
Total	95059 56.2%	74168 43.8%	169227 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests


	Value	Df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	987.847 ^a	8	.000

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.076	.000
	Cramer's V	.076	.000
	Contingency Coefficient	.076	.000
N of Valid Cases		169227	

Table 3 confirms the hypothesis that more females (56. 2%) compared to males (43.8%) are supported while unemployed. More females (59.3%) compared to males (40.7%) are supported by someone outside the households including kin living in other households. More females (54.8%) compared to males (45.2%) were supported by someone within the household. The chi-square value of 987.847 and 8 degrees of freedom showed that there is a relationship between the means of support and sex. The Phi value of .076 with an approximate significance of .001, Cramer's V value of .076 with approximate significance of .001 and Contingency Coefficient value of .076 with approximate significance of .001 show that there is a relationship between means of support and sex.

Graph 2: Means of Support while Unemployed



Graph 2 depicts that over 100 000 youths are supported by someone in the household and that over 40 000 youths had support systems beyond the household. The graph shows that the least support for unemployed youths came from charity/church, income from sale of property and income from child support/foster care grant.

Conclusion: A return to key issues

The data shows that the families, household and other social groupings are important in the resilience of youths in relation to unemployment. The fact that youths rely heavily on support from within and from people outside households indicates that the (neo-)liberal individualism is a myth in African settings. The fact that youths rely on social support in times of unemployment, while looking for employment, when they are temporarily laid off, when economic activities reduce, when they are suspended from work, when they are sick and injured underscores the significance of belonging to social, cultural, family and household groups. In this sense, there is need to revise policy positions particularly those that demonise the families, households, and more broadly the private sphere, while glorifying the public sphere. While the private sphere has often been portrayed in terms of restrictiveness, absence of liberation and emancipation, the great reliance by youths on the private sphere indicates that the value of the private spheres upon which they fall in times of unemployment hardships. Rather than demonise the institutions, there is need to strengthen family, household and state unity. In this sense (neo-)liberal policies that rolled back state provisions while also demonising the African families and households expose African youths. Global (neo-)liberal individualism renders youths vulnerable to global vicissitudes of the capital that has failed to provide the youths with employment security and other forms of social security particularly in the absence of family, household and state provisions.

It has been argued that institutions including African families, households and states have been unfairly assumed to be repressive as in fact critics underplay ways in which they assist youths with social

security. Thus, while western families, operating foundations or some civil society organisations, are celebrated as civil, African families and households are often denied residence in the domains of civility even as they provide social security that enable emancipation of youths. This is an area that future research could work on, conducting polls to garner youths' views on families, households and other African institutions, so as to desist from merely demonising the institutions. Future research could look into ways in which youths have found their families and households protective, emancipatory and liberating. Future research can look into connections between African youths' economic prosperity, and states of their families, households and other institutions in the private sphere.

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Enhancing Democracy and Surmounting the Challenges of Election Management in Africa: Insights from Nigeria

Johnson O. Olaniyi

Introduction

The era of electoral politics began in Nigeria in 1922 when the Clifford Constitution (the first Constitution not only in the history of Nigeria but also British West Africa, made up of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra-Leone and the Gambia) made provision for an 'elective principle' (system of electing representatives to represent certain constituencies). This marked the birth of what is commonly known today as democracy and democratic election. The first election that was conducted in October 1923 was however, managed by European (Colonial) officials who were directly appointed by the Governor-General. Between that time and 1954, all the elections held in the country were managed by the appointed colonial officials and not Election Management Bodies (EMBs). These included the elections of 1928, 1933, 1938, 1947 and 1951. Two major reasons can be advanced for the failure of the Colonial Government to establish EMBs and entrust the management of election in the then colonial territory to their care.

The first reason was that for some time, the management of elections in Nigeria was limited only to the Southern part of the country. In fact, franchise (right to vote and be voted for) was not extended to the Northern part of Nigeria until 1947. Consequently, the colonialists might have viewed it as uneconomical to establish EMBs. Added to this was the regionalization of the administration of the country which produced 'strong' units (regions) and 'weak' centre (Federal Government). The Richards Constitution of 1947 gave legal impetus to the creation of three political units in the country which Bernard Bourdillon had earlier created as

‘Administrative Units’ in 1939 to ease his administration’s teething problems, principal among which was the vastness of the territory (Nicolson, 1977). The Macpherson Constitution of 1951 further empowered Regional Governments at the expense of the centre. One of such empowerments was that they were to (which they did) establish their own Electoral Commissions to conduct elections in their respective regions to elect candidates into Regional Legislative Houses. The Commissions were therefore responsible for conducting elections into the Regional Legislative Houses in 1952 and 1954. However, worthy to note here is the fact that while Regional Governments had Electoral Commissions to organize and conduct elections, the Central Government had none. This study views this as a serious missing gap between the electoral activities of the Regional Government and the Central Government.

The second reason that can be advanced for the failure of the Colonial Government to put EMBs in place for a very long time was that what was paramount to it was how to consolidate its position in its empire. Therefore, establishing EMBs which ordinarily have statutory responsibility to organize and conduct credible polls would have been suicidal. It would have been suicidal because it could have precipitated further political agitation on the part of the Nationalists (those citizens of a country who were actively involved in the political emancipation of their State) and truncate their economic exploits.

The 1959 General Elections were the first to be supervised by an EMB. The Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) which managed the elections was established in August 1958 by the Colonial Government. Since that time till the period of this research, all the general elections that have been held in the country have been managed by different EMBs. They included the elections of: 1964, managed by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC); 1979, managed by the Federal Electoral Commission of Nigeria (FEDECO); 1983, managed by FEDECO; 1991-1993, managed by National Electoral Commission (NEC); 1997, managed by National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON); 1991, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015, managed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). These EMBs were confronted with myriads of challenges while managing different elections highlighted here. While

some of the challenges were peculiar in a way, others were ‘crisis-cutting’ in nature (recurring in all cases).

The objectives of this study are in three-fold:

- i. To present an historical analysis of how elections have been managed in Nigeria from 1959-2015.
- ii. To assess the challenges that faced successive Electoral Commissions in Nigeria in the management of Election in the country.
- iii. To proffer solutions to the challenges that have confronted Electoral Commissions in Nigeria with the view of preventing future reoccurrence.

This study has been divided into the following sections: introduction, conceptual analysis, challenges of Election Management in Nigeria, strategies for surmounting the challenges of election management in Nigeria and conclusion.

Election management in Nigeria

Election management can be explained as the activities of personnel of an Electoral Commission aimed at achieving its objective – organizing and conducting credible elections in a country. It also focuses on how the various resources at the disposal of an Election Management Body (EMB) are marshalled in a cohesive manner to achieve a credible election result. In essence, it is concerned with the manner in which election officials control their political environment to conduct elections that can be adjudged to be ‘free’, ‘fair’ and ‘credible’. As Guess and Gueorguieva (2010) tell us: Election management consists of a plethora of activities such as registering voters, providing voter information, ballot design, distributing and processing of ballots design, distributing and processing of ballots, security and reporting results and hearing and resolving election disputes.

All the activities identified by Guess and Gueorguieva (2010) as connoting ‘election management’ are crucial to the success of any electoral process. For instance, Voters’ registration represents the foundation of any electoral process. In fact, it can be posited that the

origin of any election rigging is traceable to it. When registration officers register voters by proxy or allow multiple registration, it gives room for multiple voting on the Election Day especially when voting is done manually.

Apart from the forms election management can take as espoused by Guess and Gueorguieva (2010), it may also differ from one political system to another. However, despite the differences, the International Foundation for Election System (IFES) (2007) asserts that “one of the keynotes in election administration is that the elections are managed in a consistent manner” (IFES, 2007:1). It further posits that election management process requires: Skills both in administration of the operational aspects of the election and in the management of a political process that frequently unfolds in a highly charged environment filled with suspicion and mistrust and in which political actors often take uncompromising and sometimes contradictory positions (Ibid).

The above provision advanced by IFES (2007) shows the importance of election management in any polity especially in developing States and plural societies of which Nigeria is one. However, the activities identified by Guess and Gueorguieva (2010) are usually carried out by different categories of personnel involved in any electoral process. This is in tune with the position of Nigeria’s ‘Human Relations School’ of Management which espoused that the organization is a social system (social set up) and that instead of the focus on work and the workplace technology, the “human side of enterprise” should be emphasized (Oshionebo, 1992). The different categories of personnel who carry out the activities of election management in Nigeria are principally; National Chairman of the Commission, National Commissioners, Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) (who head the body at the State level) and Electoral Officers (EOs) (who oversee the affairs of the Commission at the Local Government level). Others include: The Returning Officers (ROs) at various levels (Ward, Local, Federal, State, National) (who have the responsibility to collate and announce the results of elections) Presiding Officers (who man different Polling Units) Poll Clerks (who verify the authenticity of the claims of voters) and ‘Orderlies’ (who see to the orderliness of voters in Polling Units).

Perhaps, it was in view of the important roles played by the different categories of personnel in the electoral process that made Dorby and Persse (2006) to posit that: Election management are the activities of the personnel of an electoral commission aimed at achieving its objective of organizing and conducting a credible election. It also focuses attention on how the various resources are marshalled in a cohesive manner to achieve the objective of the EMB (p. 83).

What Dorby and Persse's (2006) position portends is the emphasis on the important role played by the different categories of Electoral Officers (EOs) who occupy strategic positions in an electoral commission. It is the contention of this study that the success of any EMB depends, to a large extent, on how each election manager discharges his/her responsibilities towards the enthronement of a credible poll. This is the focus of 'Centre for Democracy and Election Management' (CDEM) based in the United States of America (2009).

There usually exists a hierarchical structure in an electoral commission. In the case of INEC the superordinate organ of the Commission (Chairman and National Electoral Commissioners) that formulates policies and other cadres of Electoral Officers (EOs), Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) and others) who execute those policies. This was what Chandler and Plano, (1988) explained as "Participative Management". They explained it as "a process by which workers are brought into organizational decision-making processes to varying degrees, primarily on matters that directly affect them" (Chandler and Plano, 1988:150).

To achieve the objective of the Commission, election managers usually perform the functions of "planning, organizing and leading (integrating)". In planning, election managers define the objective of the Commission and maps out strategies to achieve them. Organizing connotes "assigning various tasks to different people and co-ordinating their efforts". The management of INEC assigns responsibilities to various departments, units and different categories of the Commission. It coordinates their affairs in this regard. "Leading" (integrating) means that the management staff of the INEC must provide leadership if other categories of staff in the

Commission must work together to achieve management of credible elections in Nigeria. Towards this end, the super-ordinate must reckon with the indispensability of the subordinate (vice-versa). However, when the reverse is the case they become challenges to the election managers.

Electoral Commissions of Nigeria and the Management of Elections

This section of the chapter discusses in an historical form how successive Electoral Commissions in Nigeria have managed general elections in the country and the challenges that confronted them while discharging responsibilities.

I. The 1959 Federal Elections

The elections held in the country before 1959 were managed by European officials and not EMBs. This raised the credibility question of such elections given that EMBs seem to be one if not the only organ that can organize and conduct elections devoid of impartiality. In fact the legal instrument that usually establish EMBs define them as neutral electoral umpires. For instance, the “Nigerian Electoral Provisions Order –in-Council, L.N. 117 of 1958” which gave birth to the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) the first EMB in the annals of electoral history in Nigeria, provided for the appointment of an Electoral Commission by his Excellency Governor-General “from amongst persons of neutral views” (Kurfi, 1983:7). Similarly, Section 152 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that the country’s Electoral Commission (in this case INEC) should be politically neutral. The foregoing explained why the nationalists in Nigeria pressed for reforms in the country’s electoral process in the mid-50s. This manifested in some of the decisions arrived at during the 1958 London Constitutional Conference, held in London between September 29 and October 27, 1958. One of the resolutions of the Conference that related to the ‘future’ electoral process in the country was that the Chairman and members of the Federal Electoral

Commission should, after independence, be appointed by the Governor-General in his discretion after consultation with the Prime Minister (Ojiako, 1981:64). This has turned out to be an endemic challenge that has been confronting successive Electoral Commissions in Nigeria.

The ECN was the EMB which managed the October 1959 Federal Election in Nigeria. The Commission came into being on August 7, 1958, when the Colonial government headed by Sir James Robertson (then the Governor-General of the Federation) inaugurated it. It was a five-man Commission. All the members were appointed by the Governor-General. They were Mr. R.E. Wraith, O.B.E (an expatriate) as Chairman, Alhaji Bello Makaman Kano (representative of Northern Region and Southern Cameroons) Mr. Anigolu (representative of Eastern Region) Mr. Sho-Silva (representative of Lagos, the Federal Capital Territory) and Mr. Orishejolomi (representative of Western Region) (Kurfi, 1983:7). The four Nigerians who were members of the Commission were therefore regional representatives whose main mission was to promote Regional interests as opposed to national interest. This later affected its activities because each representative saw himself as the representative of his region rather than the nation. The Electoral Commission did not enjoy independent status as it operated as an extension of the Colonial office. Consequently, its activities were dictated to it by the Colonial Government. This was made easy because its (ECN) Chairman was a Briton. It was also funded directly by the Colonial Government. In fact, its budgets used to be prepared for it by the colonial office. Although the Commission appointed a 'Chief Federal Electoral Officer' for each Region to provide a link between it and the Region, but he was not independent of the centre. In essence, the challenges of the ECN were seen in the way it was constituted; members of the Commission promoted Regional interests because each Region was governed by different political parties; it lacked independent funding; and independent decision-making process. All these affected the management of the 1959 Federal Election by the ECN because the finding of this research has shown that its activities were tailored towards favouring Northern

Peoples Congress (NPC) which was the regional Party in the North (Smith, 2005:34).

II. The Federal Electoral Commission and the Management of 1964 Federal Elections

The Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) was the EMB that conducted the 1964 Federal (General) Elections in Nigeria. It was constituted on May 1, 1964 by the administration of Sir Tafawa Balewa, the then Prime Minister of the Country. The five-man Commission was headed by a Nigerian, Mr. E. E. Esua. It is imperative to reiterate that the Commission was constituted at a time Nigeria was passing through a serious political imbroglio in the Western Region. Similarly, it came into being at a time when the NPC /National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) alliance at the centre had broken down and new alliances – Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) were formed. Therefore, the thinking of the opposition group (UPGA) in the country was that the Esua-led Commission would not be able to organize and conduct credible elections in the country in October 1964 because it was Sir Tafawa Balewa's administration that appointed its members. Later developments in the Commission proved this assertion to be correct. For instance, most of the members of the Commission who were from the UPGA -controlled Regions had to resign their membership at the peak of the electoral malpractices that characterized the 1964 elections. They were; Mr. Anigbolu, the representative of the Eastern Region, and Mr. Akenzua who represented the Mid-West. The foregoing revealed that FEC was not independent of the central government that constituted it. In fact, the elections it conducted were marred by malpractices like denying the members of opposition nomination forms, a development which made 88 of the 174 candidates of the NPC in the North to be returned unopposed in their constituencies (Dudley, 1982:68). Furthermore, the members of the Commission were nominated by various Regional Governments to serve in the Commission. In a similar vein, the members of the Commission with the exception of the Chairman, held their appointments on part-time

basis. This affected proper co-ordination of the election management. Like ECN, FEC did not enjoy independent funding. It was financed indirectly by the office of the Prime Minister of the Federation. This posed a serious challenge to it in its effort in managing credible polls in 1964. In fact, apart from giving the Commission a legal impetus and defining its few functions, the Republican Constitution (1963) of Nigeria was silent on the issue relating to its independence (Nwosu, Olaniyi and Oyedele, 1998:77).

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the challenges of FEC in managing the 1964 General Elections centred on the issue of independence. Therefore, the elections it conducted suffered from the credibility criterion. Added to this was that the Election Petitions Tribunal which was constituted to hear the complaints of the electoral stakeholders on the charred elections conducted by the FEC, became invisible. Since people who had complaints had no place to take their grievances to, they had to resort to jungle justice by way of causing a chaotic situation which eventually led to the collapse of the First Republic on January 15, 1966. In fact, the Military listed the poor management of the 1964 General Elections by the FEC as one of the major reasons that made it to then topple the civilian administration of the First Republic (Ademoyega, 1980).

III. The Federal Electoral Commission and the Management of 1979 and 1983 General Elections

The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) which managed the elections of 1979 and 1983 in the Second Republic was established by the Military administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd.) on October 22, 1976. The membership of the Commission was composed of the appointees of the Military Government. The Commission was first headed by Chief Michael Ani (1976-1980) and later Justice Ovie-Whisky (1980-1983). The enabling instrument of the Commission was Decree No. 41 of 1976. It however, later drew its Enabling Act from Section 140 of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 141 of the Constitution empowered the President to appoint the Chairman and other members of the Commission. However, before the

Constitution came into effect in 1979, the responsibility was carried out by the (military) Head of State. This was because the loyalty of the appointees would automatically be to their benefactor. The Michael Ani-led Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), as earlier stated, was constituted by the Military Government in 1976. However, in view of the fact that the Military do not (and did not) field candidates for elections, the assumption that pervaded the thinking of political actors in the country then was that it was an uninterested party in the transitional elections that ushered in the Second Republic in October 1979. But the Constitutional provision of 1979 as contained in Section 5 of the Third Schedule which provided that the Federal Government while constituting the membership of FEDECO should appoint a member from each of the nineteen States of the Federation and five other members who were to be appointed at the discretion of the President, totalling twenty-four, almost created dual loyalty as Kurfi (1983:74) noted. However, this was not pronounced then because they were posted to serve in States other than their States of origin as Resident Electoral Commissioners. Furthermore, Section 141 of the 1979 Constitution which also empowered the President (at that time the Head of State) as contained in Decree 41 of 1976 to appoint the Chairman and other members of the FEDECO posed the challenge of the neutrality of such members.

Despite the apolitical nature of the military regime, the greatest challenge to FEDECO in the management of the 1979 General Elections was that it was not independent. The Commission can be said to be an extension of the seat of power of the Military Government which then had its headquarters at Doddan Barracks, Lagos. Consequently, its finances used to be approved by the Military Government. In fact, it was the Military that drew the election timetable for the Commission. Furthermore, all its personnel were ad-hoc staff. This did not instil serious sense of commitment in the minds of election officials on one hand, and made FEDECO to lack control mechanisms on them on the other hand. But it must also be stated that FEDECO recruited its ad hoc staff through the States Governments and Local Councils but since they were not Party

representatives their involvement did not pose serious threat to the management of the elections.

Constitutionalism was another threat to the management of the 1979 polls as reflected in the litigation on the Presidential election. Section 125 (b) of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provided that for a candidate to be elected as the Nigerian President he must have “not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation.” The country then had nineteen States. At the end of the Presidential poll, Alhaji, Shehu Shagari the candidate of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) who was declared the winner of the election by FEDECO met the requirement in twelve States. His victory was however, challenged by the candidates of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), and Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri, respectively. Their contention was: What constituted the 2/3 of nineteen States? This study traced the problem to the inexplicitness of the provision of the Constitution.

The Voters Registration exercise conducted by FEDECO in the months of September and October, 1978 posed another challenge to FEDECO. Being the first ever election in the country in which the voting age was lowered to eighteen (18) the Commission had high number of voters to contend with. At the end of the exercise, it registered about 47.7 million prospective voters (Dudley, 1982:200). Dudley (1982) noted that the exercise was characterized by multiple registrations or over registration which was later confirmed in the voters’ turnout in the subsequent elections. According to him, the Presidential election of August 11, 1979 which recorded the highest voters turnout, recorded 16.8 million voters which represented about 34.05 per cent of the total registered voters. This study is of the view that this must have caused wastages of resources and logistic problems for the FEDECO while preparing for the elections. Furthermore, Dudley (1982:202) posited that the over bloated figures of the voters “contributed in no small way to the allegations of large scale electoral abuse” during the 1979 General Elections. From the foregoing, it can be argued that FEDECO had a number of challenges to contend with which from all intent and purpose did not

stand the elections it conducted in 1979, out of the previous elections held in the country.

The General Elections of 1983 which were the second phase of elections to be held in the Second Republic were equally managed by FEDECO. The only difference in the elections and those held in the country was that the leadership and membership of the FEDECO were over-hauled by the civilian administration of President Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Justice Ovie –Whisky was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission in place of Mr. Michael Ani in 1980. Consequently, it was Ovie-Whisky- led Commission that managed the 1983 General Elections. Worthy of note was the fact that all the other twenty four (24) Electoral Commissioners appointed by General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) Administration in 1976 were equally replaced by new set, all appointed by the administration of President Shehu Shagari. However, although the appointments were done in compliance with the Section 141 of the 1979 Constitution, the exercise had political undertone. Conscious of its desire to retain power at the centre and extend its electoral frontiers to some States which were then controlled by some opposition parties, the NPN government made sure, only those people it could trust were appointed as electoral officials. This was without regard to Section 145 (1) of the 1979 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria which provided that: “In exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons... the Federal Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction of any other authority or person.” In fact, by the time the 1983 General Elections were held in the months of July and August, the bulk of Electoral Officers (who were all ad-hoc staff) recruited by FEDECO for the purpose of organizing and conducting the elections, were imposed on the Commission by politicians especially, NPN members. This made it extremely difficult for FEDECO to have any control over them and as Olatundun (1985:49) noted, the only ticket to participate in the 1983 polls were: “you were either a card-carrying member of the National Party of Nigeria or even if you were a public servant, have a godfather in the party”. The foregoing affected the credibility of the 1983 elections as Electoral Officers were involved

in gross electoral malpractices as recorded in States like Oyo, Ondo, Borno, Bendel, and Anambra.

Like it experienced during the transitional elections of the Second Republic, FEDECO's 'Staff' did not enjoy security of tenure. They were all ad hoc staff whose services were dispensed with at the conclusion of the polls. This affected their morale. Similarly, this made them to be vulnerable to electoral malpractices and this explained why the purported victory of Chief Akin Omoboriowo as the Governor of (old) Ondo State was up-turned by the Election Petition Tribunal. The Tribunal indicted FEDECO for the sordid way it managed the election and for the electoral malpractices that characterized it (Olatundun, 1985). Consequently, it was not politically neutral because of the open ways it favoured the ruling Party (NPN) at the centre in its activities. In fact, the main reason for the coup of 31st December, 1983 given by the Military was the mismanagement of the 1983 elections by FEDECO (Otoghagua, 2009). The foregoing showed that FEDECO did not enjoy autonomous power as it was tied to the apron strings of its benefactor (NPN-controlled government).

IV. National Electoral Commission and Management of General Elections in the aborted Third Republic

The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was the Electoral Commission that managed the transitional elections in the aborted Third Republic. The Commission was established by the administration of General I. B. Babangida through the promulgation of Decree No. 23 of 1987. It came into being on 3 August 1987. The Commission was first headed by Professor Eme Awa (August 1987-February 1989) later Professor Humphrey Nwosu (March 1989-July 1993) and Professor Okon Edet Uya (August –November, 1993).

NEC operated under a pure or typical Military setting. This affected its activities to a large extent. However, unlike the previous Electoral Commissions in the country that were ephemeral in nature, the administration of General Babangida made it a permanent Federal Executive Body which made its staff to have pensionable appointments.

Despite the fact that NEC operated under a Military setting the report of the Political Bureau earlier set up in January 1986 by the Military Government which submitted its report in April 1987 identified “four prerequisites for the conduct of free and fair elections”. One of them which is relevant to the focus of this paper was the institutionalization of “an honest, competent, non-partisan administration to run elections” (Contained in Ibrahim, 1993:50). In other times, NEC appeared to have operated as an independent body under the administration of General Babangida in line with the provisions of paragraph 17 of the Third Schedule of the 1989 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This reflected in some of its major policies. For instance, it was then, the Commission’s administration was organized with its Chairman becoming the ‘accounting officer’ and many Departments /Units created to lessen the burden of the Chairman (Nwosu, 2008:82). Furthermore, the Commission was able to introduce a number of electoral reforms which checkmated electoral fraud during the transitional elections. They included ‘Open Ballot System’ (OBS) ‘Modified Open Ballot System’ (MOBs) and ‘Option A4’. However, these feats notwithstanding the Military Government, which originally gave the Commission a ‘free hand to operate’ eventually served as ‘the cog in the wheel of its progress’.

One of the challenges that confronted NEC in the aborted Third Republic was the diarchy (a mixture of military and civilian traits in a government) that was in place then. This gave rise to a situation where by the country was ruled by two parallel laws viz decrees and constitution; which used to run contrary to each other. In fact, the Constitution came into force through Decree No. 12 of 1989. Throughout the transition period lasted, all the electoral activities of NEC were promulgated even after the coming into force of the 1989 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Their examples included; Elections (Registration of Voters) Decree No. 35 of 1991; Participation in Politics and Elections (miscellaneous provisions) Amendment) Decree No. 6 of 1992; The National Assembly Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions Decree 37 of 1992; Transition to Civil Rule Programme Decree No. 52 of 1992 and Presidential Election (Basic Constitutional and Transitional

Provisions) Decree No. 13 of 1993. These Decrees contradicted the powers of NEC as contained in paragraph 17 of the Third Schedule of the 1989 Constitution.

Another challenge that confronted NEC was that it did not have a free hand in clearing candidates for the transitional elections. Although the 1989 Constitution empowered it (NEC) to 'screen' candidates for elections, the responsibility was hijacked by the Military. Four Decrees were promulgated at different intervals which announced the banning and unbanning of certain categories of politicians from participating in the transitional elections. They were: Transition to Civil Rule (Qualification to participate in politics and elections) Decree No. 39 of 1991; Participation in politics Elections (Prohibitions) (Amendment) Decree No. 54 of 1991; and State Government (Basic Constitutional Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Decree No. 35 of 1991 (Nwosu, 2008). These Decrees ran contrary to democratic tenets because the banned politicians were not given 'fair hearing' before the punishment was melted out against them. In fact, their crime was participation in the First and Second Republics' Politics. The exercise nonetheless posed a serious challenge to NEC in its preparations for the transitional elections as some of them were only unbanned very close to the periods of some elections. Again, it portrayed NEC as an appendage of the Military junta.

Unlike one of the traditional duties of Electoral Commissions which is that of registration of political associations that meet certain conditions as Political Parties, NEC's statutory responsibility was hijacked by the Military Government. The two political parties (Social Democratic Party – SDP and National Republican Convention – NRC) which participated in the botched transitional elections in the Third Republic were 'created' and 'registered' by the Military regime headed by General I. B. Babangida (rtd.) in October 1989 through Transition to Civil Rule Lifting of ban on Politics Decree No. 14 of 1989. In fact, the regime provided all the logistic supports for the Parties and appointed their national executive officers for them. This made it extremely difficult for the NEC to perform its regulatory role (as contained in Part 17 of the 'Third Schedule of the 1989 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria) on these Parties.

Consequently, the loyalty of their leadership was to the Federal Military Government.

The greatest challenge of NEC in the management of the transitional elections of the aborted Third Republic was in respect of the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election widely believed to have been won by Chief M. K. O Abiola who was the candidate of the SDP. The annulment was announced by General I. B. Babangida after NEC had declared twenty three (23) of the thirty (30) States election results. The announced results (and comprehensive results later released by Professor H. N. Nwosu, NEC Chairman) showed that Chief M. K. O Abiola was in a convincing lead (Nwosu, 2008:297-298). Although the Military Government adduced the reason that it took the action to counter conflicting Court injunctions, NEC and many Nigerians viewed the action as sheer insubordination. Nwosu claimed that some top Military Officers in the country at that time were opposed to the decision of the Military President (General Babangida) to allow NEC to conduct the Presidential election of June 12, 1993. This was reflected in the meeting of the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) earlier held. He summarized his position thus: Undoubtedly, with almost all the results known, the opposition against the election rose very high within the hierarchy of some senior military officials. While the majority of national Commissioners were already congratulating themselves and the Chairman for conducting the freest and fairest presidential election in Nigeria's electoral history, they were also looking forward to receiving national honours for a job well done. Then the tension in the military started filtering into the Commission. The generality of Nigerians were happy that the election was orderly, peaceful, free and fair. The tension in the armed forces and the restlessness of the civil society led to the spate of court injunctions (Nwosu, 2008:298-299).

Notwithstanding the fact that Nigeria was then under a military rule, this study is of the view that it should have been the responsibility of the Judiciary to cancel or annul any elections either partially or holistically. But this power was hijacked from it by an institution which ordinarily had nothing to do with democratization process. This therefore raised the poser of the Military having other

interests to safeguard other than the Court injunctions it alluded to. The foregoing explained why the electoral processes it began in 1985 crash –landed in 1993. In fact, the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election in Nigeria remains a contentious issue in the political cum electoral discourse in the country with its principal actors having Herculean task to justify their actions and the role they played in the impasse.

V. The National Electoral Commission of Nigeria and the Management of Transitional Elections of Abacha Regime

The National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) established in replacement of NEC in February 1994 by the administration of General (now late) Sani Abacha did not fare better. The Commission came into being via Decree No. 3 of 1994. Interestingly, the functions (powers) of the Commission as outlined by the Decree were the proto-types of the functions of an EMB in any democracy. However, the efforts of the Commission were thwarted by the dictatorial policies of the administration of General Sani Abacha. The administration did not allow the Commission to accomplish its statutory responsibilities to logical conclusions. Apart from the Local Government Election of March 1996 the Commission organized and conducted on non-party basis, all the other elections it managed on party basis, were inconclusive. Elections held into various political offices (States Houses of Assembly, Governorship and National Assembly) in the country, between 1997 and 1998, produced winners who were never inaugurated. This showed that NECON was pocketed by the Military dictator (General Abacha) at that time and in view of the fact that the Commission or any of the winners produced by the elections could not challenge his action, was an indication that independence eluded the electoral stakeholders in the country at that time.

VI. The Independent National Electoral Commission and the Management of Elections in the Fourth Republic

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established in August 1998 in replacement of NECON which was disbanded by the administration of General Abdulsalam Abubakar. The enabling instrument which originally gave legal impetus to the Commission was Decree No. 17 of August 11, 1998. The Decree, among other things empowered the Commission to organize, conduct and supervise all elections and matters pertaining to elections into all the elective offices provided for in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1979 as amended or any other enactment or law. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria later provided the Enabling Act for the Commission. Section 153(f) of the Constitution listed it as one of the “Federal Executive Bodies in the Country”.

INEC was the EMB that conducted the transitional elections into the Fourth Republic which came into being on May 29, 1999. It has also organized and conducted elections in the country in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. According to Onuoha (2002) one of the credibility problems of Babangida and Abacha transition programmes, the administration of General Abubakar addressed was that it allowed some greater measure of freedom to INEC. Onuoha (2002:328) posited that “one of the early demonstrations of this autonomy was the fact that it was INEC and the political associations, and not INEC and government, which discussed and agreed on the modalities for the formation and registration of political parties”. Despite this seemingly autonomy it is imperative to state at this juncture that the Commission faced different challenges during electoral epoch. Furthermore, the autonomy of INEC was also demonstrated in the form of it, drafting the time-table for the transition period. This took place on August 26, 1998. But the undemocratic aspect of it was that the time-table announced was given legal impetus by a number of Decrees, for example, ‘Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree 1998’ which gave details of the transition to civil rule programme; and ‘Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provision) Decree 1998’ which

made basic provisions for Local Government Councils and Area Councils.

The challenge that confronted INEC all through was that the 1999 Constitution made it an appendage of the Executive. Section 153 (f) of the Constitution listed it as one of the “Federal Executive Bodies”. Section 154 empowered the President of the country to constitute the membership of the Commission. In particular, he/she was empowered to appoint the Chairman, National Commissioners and Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) of the Commission acting on the advice of the Council of State, and the approval of the Senate. The danger which the provisions portended was that it was possible for the President to appoint his political surrogates and when appointed, the allegiance of such individuals would all things being equal, be to the person (President) who appointed them. Ibrahim and Garuba (2009:87) considered this anomaly as “fundamental stumbling block to the Commission’s (INEC) (bracket mine) quest to grow and develop the necessary resilience and institutional autonomy it requires”. They justified their positions on the following grounds: “Indeed there is the natural tendency of office holders to act in favour of those who appointed them even if just to secure their appointments” (Ibrahim and Garuba 2009:86-87). Furthermore, in a similar vein, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, the leader of the de-registered Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, expressed scepticism on the ability of the INEC to conduct credible elections in the country in 2015. He said as long as the Commission was not granted full autonomy, it would be unable to discharge its mandate without manipulation. He concluded that: “If the situation continues as it is today, INEC would be unable to conduct free, fair and transparent election leading to a legitimate government” (*Nigerian Tribune*, 16 July 2013: 47).

A case in point to demonstrate how the appointment of the Chief boss of an electoral commission can generate mixed reactions was seen in the case of Mrs. Aminat Bala Zakari as the Acting National Chairman (the Constitution has no preference for gender equation) of INEC. She was named in an acting capacity as the successor of Professor Attahiru Jega by President Muhammadu Buhari on 30th June, 2015. Her appointment generated mixed reactions. The

opposition parties, led by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) alleged that she is an in-law of President Buhari which makes her very close to him and argued that under her, there would be no free, fair and credible elections in the country. This is because her loyalty would be to President Buhari and not the nation. They therefore called for her removal from office. Although Mrs. Zakari denied being President Buhari's in-law, she admitted that he is one of her acquaintances (Odebode and Adepegba, 2015, 12).

Following from the above positions was the fact that apart from the appointments of Justice Ephraim Ayo Akpata, who was the first Chairman of INEC and Professor Attahiru Jega who was appointed by the administration of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in June 2010, the appointments of all other Chairmen/Chairpersons of INEC at different intervals had generated mixed reactions from electoral stakeholders. The opposition parties in particular doubted their neutrality in conducting free and fair elections in the country.

Related to the above challenge was funding. INEC lacked independent fund in managing all the elections it conducted between 1999 and 2011. The 1999 Constitution was silent on how INEC would be funded perhaps due to the fact that the Commission was placed under the executive arm of government. This was made easy in 1999 when the country was still under a Military rule. The Electoral Act of 2002 did not pay any special attention to the problem either. However, due to the opposition mounted by some groups (especially the Election Observers that monitored the 2003 elections) in the country, financial autonomy of INEC found its expression into the Electoral Act of 2006. Section 1(3) of the Act provided for the establishment of "Independent National Electoral Commission Fund". The Section provided that:

(1) There is established for the Commission a fund to be known as Independent National Electoral Commission Fund.

(2) There shall be paid into the fund established under sub section (1) of this Section:

a. such sums and payments available to the Commission carrying out its functions and purposes under the Constitution and

this Act and all other assets from time to time accruing to the Commission;

b. such sums as may, from time to time be credited to the fund by way of interest from investments made from the fund; and

c. aids, grants that may from time to time accrue to the Commission in order to carry out its functions

(3) Disbursements from the fund shall be made in accordance with rules established by the Commission (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, 2006: A27)

If implemented to the letter, the above provisions would have conferred a full financial autonomy on the INEC. This was because as long as INEC continues to draw its finances from the Executive, it cannot be independent. This is in tandem with the saying “he, who pays the piper dictates the tone”. In fact, it is possible for the Executive to cow an EMB financially in order to force it to do its biddings. During the periods under review (1999-2011) INEC was not financially independent. The inclusion of the clause in the Electoral Act 2006 was a deceit because it was not implemented. For instance, during the 2007 elections, funds appropriated to the INEC were not released to it in good time (Alli, 2007: 170) by the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPTU) otherwise known as the ‘Due Process Unit) of the House of Representatives. Releases were also made on piecemeal basis. This affected the Commission’s effort at conducting credible polls because most election materials could not be procured in good time by INEC. For instance, of the 33,000 Polling Booths ordered by the Commission, only 10,000 were delivered as at April 10, 2007 (Isine, 2007:7). Similarly, the elongation of the Voters’ Registration exercise of 2006-2007 was occasioned by the delay in the delivery of Direct Data Captured (DDC) Machines. In fact, the finding of this study has revealed that not all the machines were delivered as at the time the registration exercise ended on 2nd February, 2007.

INEC (2007) in its reports on the 2007 General Elections also appreciated the fact that it was confronted by inadequate funding during the 2007 electoral process. It stated that: there was a remarkable improvement in the funding of the 2007 General

Elections when compared with the previous elections. However, the benefit of increased appropriation of funds for the elections was offset by the late release of funds. At different critical stages of the electoral process, especially during the registration of voters, the Commission found it difficult to secure timely release of funds required to meet its contractual obligations. The difficulties were created in most cases by the Federal Ministry of Finance, and at other times, the Central Bank of Nigeria. These delays adversely impacted upon all the Commission's programs, projects and activities (INEC, 2007:50-51).

The problem of funding was also addressed by various Election Observers in their separate reports on the 2007 elections. They included: European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) Commonwealth Group and Independent Republican Institute (IRI). Both INEC (2011) and the various Election Observation Groups – EUEOM, IRI, TMG, etc.- which monitored the 2011 General Elections, noted that the problem of funding remained with the INEC during the 2011 General Elections. Although the elections of 2011 gulped about #125 bn (the highest so far in the electoral history of the country) the bone of contention remained lack of financial autonomy on the part of the INEC (Olayinka, 2011).

The Transition Monitoring Group which was one of the domestic Election Observers that monitored the 2003 elections in Nigeria, in its reports on the elections, also stated that lack of financial autonomy was one of the challenges that confronted INEC in its efforts at organizing and conducting credible elections in 2003. In its reports, the Group stated that it was the failure of the Federal Government in 2001 to release funds required for conducting the Voters' registration exercise that led to the inability of INEC to carry out the registration exercise in 2001, as planned (TMG, 2003:177). It concluded that the Government demonstrated a clear lack of will to fund the political process in 2003 and that: The Government's failure to adequately fund INEC and its activities left the Commission at the mercy of foreign governments to which it had to depend on to carry out many of its activities. But, for the financial support from foreign governments, INEC's ability to conduct the elections would have been seriously undermined (TMG, 2003:178).

In its report on the 'Campaign Finance and use of State Administrative Resources in the 2015 Presidential Election' in Nigeria, the 'Centre for Social Justice (CSJ)' noted that inadequate finance made the Presidential Candidates of political parties most especially All Progressives Congress (APC) and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to source for funds in unorthodox ways. Their examples include political parties, charging huge sums of money for candidates to express interest to contest Presidential primaries and to buy nomination forms; donations to candidates and political parties by companies which the centre noted run against the letter and spirit of Companies and Allied Matters Act; and Governors on behalf of State governments openly donated State money to the Presidential Candidates of their parties (Onyekpere, 2015:104).

Security was another major challenge of INEC in all the elections it had conducted in the Fourth Republic. Security is sacrosanct to the success of any electoral process. It includes the security of materials, personnel, candidates and electorate. This should cover the periods preceding any election, Election Day and post-election period. All the elections that have been held in Nigeria before 1999 were characterized by Security Challenges. However, the 1999 General Elections held in the country did not have serious security challenges perhaps due to the fact that the country was under Military rule. But pockets of security challenges were recorded in some parts of the country especially Lagos, Kano and Kaduna. On the other hand, the 2003 General Elections had Security Challenge to contend with. What aggravated the security challenge most was the fact that practically all the then occupants of various political offices in the country were seeking for second term in office. Furthermore, opposition Parties (All Nigerian Peoples Party-ANPP in particular) were desirous in wresting power from the Party-in-government (PDP) at the centre while the former also displayed power of incumbency to the fullest with the connivance of various security agencies in the country. This was corroborated by the TMG in its report on the 2003 elections. It noted among other things that there was lopsided distribution of Police personnel at polling centres; violence and disruption of voting in some polling centres; arson; killings; snatching of ballot boxes and other voting materials in some

voting centres; inadequate security for poll officials carrying voting materials in some areas; and intimidation of polling officials and voters in some voting centres (IMG, 2003:185-186). The security situation did not improve much during the 2007 and 2011 General Elections. All the security agencies (Police, Army, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps) in the country, partnered for the security challenge in both elections. However, although the Police Command announced in 2007 that all Police men in the country, then numbering about 280,000, would be on the alert during the exercise, higher incidents of security challenge were recorded in comparison to 2003 elections. Prior to the elections (especially before Party Primaries) high profile political killings were recorded across the country. This cut across the ruling party in the centre (PDP) and opposition parties most especially the ANPP. When the elections were eventually held on April 14 and 21, 2007 respectively, about two hundred (200) deaths were recorded in both elections across the country. Out of this figure, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) alone lost thirty –five (35) officers (Ojiabor 2007:7). This finding negated the position of Iwu (2008:34) who argued that “the level of violence was minimal in 2007 elections”. Comparatively, the elections of 2011 recorded higher incidents of security challenge. The pre-election period was marred by violence. For instance, the INEC office in Suleja, a suburb town of Abuja the Nation’s Federal Capital Territory [FCT] was bombed in April 2011 during which time about twelve INEC ad-hoc staff were killed. The post-election period of 2011 was also characterized by high scale of violence. The Presidential election was the most affected. Shortly after the result was announced violence erupted in some States of the Northern part of the country. Mostly affected were Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi and Niger States. At the end of the imbroglio, about five hundred (500) people (12 of who were Youth Corps members serving in Bauchi State) lost their lives. (*The Punch*, February, 12, 2012:2). This incident tainted the efforts of Jega-led INEC at conducting violence-free elections in 2011.

The 2015 General Elections equally had a number of security challenges that confronted it. These were recorded before, during and after the polls. However, in comparison to the 2011 elections, the incidents were at lowest ebb. What might be responsible for this

feat was that for the first time in the electoral history of Nigeria, contestants were made to sign non-violence pact by various groups. For instance, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan the incumbent President and the Presidential candidate of the PDP and Major – General Muhammad Buhari, the Presidential candidate of the APC signed a non-violence pact before, during and after elections on January 14, 2015 in Abuja. This was at the instance of a former General Secretary of the United Nations Kofi Annan and a former Secretary of Commonwealth of Nations, Anyaoku. Peace Accord was also signed by various political parties in Abuja at the instance of Inspector General of Police, Sulaiman Abba, on February 11, 2015. The accord was signed by the representatives of PDP, APC, APGA and Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA). It bordered on the agreement that no two parties will be allowed to campaign in the same area, the same day. Similarly, in all the States of the Federation, political parties were made to sign non-violence pact at the instance of INEC State Offices and Commissioners of Police. Furthermore, to complement the efforts of INEC and the Nigeria Police Force, the United States Embassy in Nigeria organized workshop on non-violence, free, fair and credible elections in the country for various electoral stakeholders on January 15, 2015 in Abuja. However, despite these efforts, the 2015 General Elections recorded pockets of violence. For instance, it was widely reported that some APC youths wielding brooms stoned the convoy of President Jonathan in Bauchi after his electioneering campaign in the town. Six officers of the Department of State Security (DSS) were reportedly wounded in the attack. In fact, the then Inspector General of Police Sulaiman Abba had to order a crackdown on political thugs on January 24, 2015 (Gbadamosi and Agbambu, 2015:3).

Furthermore, it was reported that ‘Rivers APC governorship Campaign Venue’ at the National School Field, Okrika was bombed on January 24, 2015 (*Sunday Tribune*, January 25, 2015:3). In a similar vein, bomb blast rocked the vicinity of the venue of where President Jonathan did his campaign in Gombe town of Bauchi State few hours after his departure on February 2, 2015. A more worrisome incident was reported on February 3, 2015 that eight APC members were killed by PDP supporters in Kaduna when they were caught

vandalizing PDP Yero (the then governor of Kaduna State) Jonathan Bill Board.

All the cases cited above were pointers to the claim that the 2015 polls were not violence free but as earliest annunciated in this study they were insignificant in comparison to the previously held general elections in the country. But worthy of note is President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's disposition to security and election outcome which helped the situation. One of his political slogans was that his ambition did not worth the blood of any Nigerian. Furthermore, his decision to accept defeat after the outcome of the Presidential election result was made public, forestalled post-election crisis as witnessed in 2011.

EMBs in Nigeria have also been confronted with the problem of personnel. In most cases, they (personnel) have been found wanting in the performance of their statutory responsibility. During any electoral dispensation, Electoral Officers are usually of two categories, namely, the EMB's regular staff and the ad-hoc staff. The regular staff is not always adequate to conduct elections in the country during any electoral dispensation. This explained why successive EMBs in the country had had to rely on the services of ad hoc staff that used to be in large numbers. For instance, as at the time the 2007 elections were conducted, INEC had staff strength of 9,000 (EUEOM, 2007). This figure was inadequate to man all the 120,000 Polling Units in the country. Consequently, the Commission had to recruit an additional hand of about 600,000 ad-hoc staff (INEC, 2007:22). The situation did not fare better during the 2011 and 2015 general elections as the Commission had to engage about 600,000 and 700,000 ad-hoc staff respectively, to complement the efforts of its regular staff during the April elections of both years (INEC, 2011; INEC, 2015).

The problems with the personnel of the successive EMBs in the country were mainly in two-fold. There was the issue of expertise. The most affected were the ad-hoc staff. Experiences revealed that no serious attention was paid to their capability perhaps due to the fact that most of them got the appointments through their political godfathers. In fact, as EUEOM (2007) reported, some of them could not fill election result form (Form EC8) correctly. This resulted to

careless alteration of election results by them. Candidates who lost elections capitalized on this and INEC had to admit that it altered some results in Oyo State during the gubernatorial poll, before Oyo State Election Petitions Tribunal (Oyedele, and Aborisade, 2008:11). In its reports on the 2007 elections INEC (2007) also reiterated that it had problem with some of ad-hoc staff in the area of “understanding of the layout of Polling Station”. The Commission concluded that “quite a number of the complaints by Voters against election personnel during the polls were mostly against ad-hoc staff” (INEC, 2007:22). This study has revealed that their incompetence was exposed the more, when INEC opted for Electronic Voter Registration System during the Voters Registration exercise of October, 2006 – February 2007. Most of them could not operate the Direct Data Captured (DDC) Machines used for the exercise. The long run side effect of this was that while many voters could not find their names in the Voters’ Register on the election day, quite a number of fictitious names (for example, Michael Tyson) were found in some Registers in some Polling Stations.

The other side of the problem posed by INEC personnel was the question of loyalty. While the regular staff members were made to swear to Oath of Allegiance, on their neutrality, ad-hoc staff did not have obligation to do this. This therefore raised the question of whom their loyalty was to. Ideally, their loyalty would be towards those people who facilitated their appointments. The foregoing explained why some of them eventually became a ready tool in the hands of desperate politicians who perpetrated electoral frauds through their connivance. This scenario was captured by the EUEOM (2007) in its final reports on the 2007 elections. It reported that: Recruitment of ad-hoc staff was conducted in a non-transparent manner, using inconsistent criteria, and depended on an impartiality check by INEC. The late recruitment reportedly for security reasons, left little time for challenge by political parties and delayed the cascade training, which varied in quality. Materials, including training manuals, were missing in many places (EUEOM, 2007:13).

The foregoing did not however, suggest that regular staff had untainted records during successive electoral processes in the country. Some of them have been found to have betrayed the Oath

of Allegiance they swore to protect and became enmeshed in electoral frauds on some occasions. For instance, some of them got involved in bribery scandal during the April 25, 2009 gubernatorial bye-election in Ekiti State (Fabiye, 2009:2). Furthermore, during the 2015 Voters Registration exercise, it was reported that INEC had to fire five officials for stealing Voters' cards (*New Telegraph*, January 16, 2015:1). The foregoing shows that the activities of election personnel can either make or mar the efforts of an electoral Commission in organizing and conducting credible polls in a country. This has become a recurring decimal in election management in Nigeria.

Litigation was another problem that has bedevilled election management in Nigeria. This was in two phases viz pre-election litigations and post-election litigations. Most of the elections conducted during the colonial era did not experience this challenge. The 1959 General Elections which was the first to record litigations that related to electoral activities only had record of three (Ojiako, 1981). However, events that preceded the 1964 Federal (General) Elections and post-election events, recorded high scale of litigations. What accounted for this were the breakdown of the coalition between Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) at the centre and the emergence of two broad-based coalitions, United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) (composed mainly of the opposition parties) and Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) (made up of the NPC and few opposition Parties). The NNA through Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) disqualified most of the candidates of UPGA from participating in the election. Some of the candidates of UPGA however, challenged the action in Courts. However, they did not get respite because the Election Tribunals later became invisible. The main litigation witnessed after the 1979 elections was in respect of the outcome of the Presidential Election won by Alhaji Shehu Shagari. His victory was challenged in Court by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the candidate of Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri the candidate of the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP). The 1983 General Elections also recorded a number of litigations prominent among which was the one instituted by Chief Adekunle Ajasin, the Governor of Ondo State against Chief Akin Omoboriowo, his erstwhile Deputy

Governor who became the candidate of the NPN. Some issues that related to the outcome of party primaries also precipitated litigations during the aborted Third Republic. Furthermore, during the transitional elections of 1999 about fifty (50) election-related petitions were filed by some candidates of the three parties (AD, APP and PDP) that contested the elections. However, the litigations did not pose serious threat to the electoral process then. But during 2003 General Elections the country witnessed high number of litigations for the first time due to the fact that while those who completed their first term in office were desirous to cling to power at all costs, their co-contestants (challengers) wanted to wrestle power from them. At the conclusion of the Polls, a total number of 527 petitions were filed by some contestants before the various Elections Petitions Tribunals across the country (Soniya, 2009:7). It is imperative to note that some of the petitions bordered on loopholes created by the INEC at the point of clearing candidates, designing ballot papers and collation /declaration of election results. This accounted for why some election results were up turned by either such Tribunals or Courts. Example was found in the nullification of the election victory of Dr. Chris Ngige in Anambra State an exercise which the Election Petition Tribunal berated the INEC for. (Ameh, 2006:5).

In view of the importance of the 2007 elections (transition from one civilian regime to another) Nigerian political actors appeared to be more aggressive than ever before. Some of the issues that precipitated litigations were traceable to political parties especially the way they tampered with the outcomes of Parties' Primaries. INEC also got itself enmeshed in the shoddy way it prepared for and conducted the elections. In some cases, it allowed some political parties to use it to achieve their undemocratic desires. Consequently, it substituted candidates' names with others without regard to electoral laws. Names or parties' logos of some cleared candidates for certain elections were missing on the ballot papers while there were allegations of over-voting in some Polling Centres (TMG, 2007 and EUEOM, 2007). All these eventually became issues of litigations before the various Elections Petitions Tribunals in the country. In fact, the elections recorded an unprecedented number of 1,527 petitions (Soniya, 2009:7). Consequently, at the close of the sittings of

the various Tribunals several electoral outcomes were upturned by them. For instance, fresh elections were ordered in some States (Cross River, Kogi, Sokoto, Bayelsa) where some gubernatorial candidates declared the winners by INEC had their purported victory up-turned by Tribunals. Also, there were outright nullifications of gubernatorial elections results of Edo, Osun, Ekiti, Ondo and Rivers States and petitioners were declared winners by various Tribunals. In their separate judgments, the Tribunals indicted INEC for the poor management of the elections.

The most celebrated litigation during the 2007 electoral process was the one that involved Vice-President, Atiku, Abubakar who had a running battle with his boss, President Olusegun Obasanjo. Most of the actions of his Party, PDP, and some government agencies- INEC and Economic Financial Crime Commissions (EFCC) against him, eventually became subjects of litigations in Courts. First, he challenged his expulsion from his party, PDP, and won the case. Second, he challenged his disqualifications from contesting elections in 2007 by the EFCC and later INEC (INEC disqualified him on 5th January, 2007) and he won. However, of interest to this study was the period the litigations lasted. The last respite he got from Court only came on 16th April, 2007, five days to the Presidential Election when INEC had already concluded preparations for the 2007 Presidential Election including printing of Ballot Papers. In the lead judgment that cleared Atiku for the election, Justice Aloysius Katsina-Alu (who later became the Chief Justice of the Federation) berated INEC when he held that: "I have no doubt in coming to the conclusion that the Court of Appeal was in error in holding that INEC has the power to disqualify any candidate" (Soniya and Fabiyi, 2007: 2).

In the reasons given by the Justice on 29th of June 2007, it was held that only a Court of competent jurisdiction could disqualify a candidate from standing for any election. Consequently, it can be posited that INEC was the cause of the challenge that confronted it five days to the election. The Commission had to discard about 70million ballot papers for the Presidential election which did not have the name of Vice-president Atiku Abubakar and the logo of his then new party, Action congress (AC) which he defected to, and print

another batch having his name and the logo of his party, AC, within four days. The hurried manner by which the Ballot Papers were printed made them not to have serial numbers. This was a serious flaw as the absence of serial numbers on Ballot Papers can precipitate electoral fraud. However, this position is without prejudice to the judgment of the appeal filed by Vice-President Atiku Abubakar against Alhaji Umar Musa Yar'adua's victory at the Supreme Court. The Court partly ruled that nonappearance of serial numbers on the Presidential Ballot Papers had no effect on the election results (*Saturday tribune, 13 December, 2008:6*). Furthermore, the late arrival of the Ballot Papers, from South Africa where they were printed caused the delay of their distribution to some polling units in the country.

With regard to the 2011 elections, there appeared to be a drop in the litigations as compared to the immediate past elections (2007) in the country. 733 petitions were filed by various electoral stakeholders against the outcomes of the elections (INEC, 2011). However, there was no major up-turn of election outcome by Tribunals. For instance, all the petitions relating to gubernatorial polls were decided in favour of the defendants (respondents). Similarly, the Presidential election litigation was decided in favour of the defendant, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan.

Logistics for elections has also posed as a serious challenge to election management in Nigeria. The finding of this study has shown that it has become a recurring issue in election management in the country. Some of the post-election litigations in the country have been found to be hinged on issues relating to logistics. In fact, like INEC (2007) also mentioned in its reports on the 2007 elections, the success of any election is contingent upon logistic plan.

Logistics resources during any electoral dispensation include Voters Registration Cards, printing of pamphlets, posters/leaflets and procurement and distribution of electoral materials such as ballot papers, forms for entering election results, Ballot Boxes, consumable items needed by election officials before and on the Election Day, communication network for declaring election results and for transportation facilities. However, the timely procurement and delivery of these logistics resources are dependent on adequate and timely funding of the activities of an EMB. Late release of funds to

an EMB when it is preparing for any election will have a band wagon effect on its plan. For instance, it will not be able to pay its contractors on time. Furthermore, when an EMB fails to transport electoral materials to collecting points or the various polling units timely, it will delay the take-off of voting in a constituency. In a similar vein, an EMB should study the geographical terrains of the various voting areas so as to know the right transportation facility to be used in transporting electoral materials to the constituencies.

In all the elections held in Nigeria before 1959, electoral materials were transported to various parts of the country mainly by road and rail. Yet, during the period there were no visible complaints of late start of voting during such elections. This study is however, of the view that the problem was not pronounced because there were no EMBs in place in the country then. And according to Kurfi (1983:119) the problem was not pronounced because the number of eligible voters was less due to the restriction on voting age to twenty-one years and over and the limitation of the franchise to males in the Northern Region. But beginning from 1959, when Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) conducted the election that heralded independence into the country, the idea of the desperation of politicians to win elections at all costs using the EMB, became pronounced. Consequently, at the conclusion of the 1959 polls, some political parties (for example, Action Group-A.G) accused the colonial government of having an 'anointed son' (Northern Peoples Congress NPC) it intended to hand over power to. But in the "Review of the Federal Elections, 1959" (Contained in Kurfi, 1983: 119), it was reported that one of the major administrative tasks in the organization of the conduct of the election was the supply of materials and equipment. Furthermore, Post (quoted in Kurfi, 1983:120) pointed out that ECN was also confronted with the problem of "rudimentary communications" for example, in the Creeks of Niger Delta.

The issue of logistics however, became a serious challenge during the 1964 Federal (General) elections when opposition parties which formed UPGA accused the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) of deliberately favouring the NNA in the distribution of electoral materials and its failure to transport ballot boxes to the designated

collation centre timely (Ojiako, 1981). On the transitional elections of 1979, Kurfi (1983) noted that the distribution of 'electoral materials' to over 100,000 Polling Stations was problematic because the money given to FEDECO by the government was inadequate. He said this problem did not however, pose a serious challenge. Difficulties were however, reported in transporting electoral materials to the riverine areas of Rivers State and mountainous areas of Gongola States (now broken into two states-Adamawa and Taraba). What was mainly responsible for the problem in the riverine areas was that the elections were held in the months of July and August when rainfall was at its peak. The effort of FEDECO in transporting electoral materials to the riverine areas via speed boats and to the mountainous areas through helicopters was not too successful. This was because voting commenced late in those areas while results of the areas were not announced until three to four days after the results of other parts of the country had been made public. Under this circumstance, there may be election rigging. Because having known the results of the other parts of the country a contestant, may with the connivance of election officials, upgrade his performance in such area to catch up with, or, beat his other contestant(s).

The transitional elections of the aborted Third Republic in Nigeria though well-funded had logistic problem. To guarantee 'effective' management of the elections, National Electoral Commission (NEC) took the form of 'decentralized EMB' (a form of EMB in which powers are devolved to the units of the Commission at the regional or state level) then. This arrangement notwithstanding, Nwosu (2008) reported that the Commission still had the challenge of logistics to contend with when the transitional elections were conducted. This was evident in the riverine areas especially elections conducted during the raining season.

With regard to the Fourth Republic, INEC retained the decentralized arrangement it inherited from the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) which was its predecessor. This was made possible because at that time, the country's EMB had become a permanent organization with its regular staff enjoying pensionable appointments. The INEC had conducted four general

elections in the Fourth Republic as at the time of carrying out this research. They were the elections of 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. All these elections had similar logistic challenge. The short pace of the transitional programmes did not allow INEC to make enough preparations for the elections of 1999. The Commission was established in August 1998 and conducted its first transitional election (Local Council Poll) in December 1998. The voter's registration exercise it earlier conducted in September and October 1998 was bedevilled with hiccups which eventually disenfranchised many Nigerians. When elections were eventually held in the months of February, March and April 1999, the Commission had to contend with similar logistic problems that confronted its predecessors (ECN, FEC, FEDECO, NEC and NECON). These manifested in the forms of late delivery of electoral materials by contractors caused by late release of funds to the Commission by the Military government, poor communication network and inadequate transportation facilities (Olayinka, 2011:34). In its report on the registration of voters of 12th-21st September 2002, TMG (2003) said the exercise was marred by logistic problems. It reported further that when the elections were held in the months of April and May 2003 shortages of election materials were reported in some Polling Stations. Ballot papers were inadequate in such Polling Stations. Also while some Polling Stations had one ballot box, others had two boxes. For instance during the gubernatorial election/presidential election, the same box was used for ballot papers for both elections, which created delays in the sorting of votes before counting. The election observer also reported late arrival of election materials in many centres. All these made opposition parties in the country to condemn the level of preparations made by the INEC in 2003. They also viewed the development as a deliberate action by NEC to favour the ruling party (PDP) at the centre (*Nigerian Tribune, 21 April, 2003*). In its reports on the 2007 elections INEC (2007) stated that the victory of Vice-president Atiku Abubakar at the Supreme Court on 16th April 2007 five days to the Presidential Election caused a major problem of logistic that almost marred the Presidential election. It reported further that the late release of funds to it caused a delay in the supply of election materials by contractors. This led to the mix-up of

sensitive materials on Election Day and elections had to be postponed in some parts of the country “due to missing party logos on ballot papers”. It also reported that “there was also late arrival and shortage of materials leading to late commencement of voting in some isolated parts of the country during the first set of elections especially in areas with difficult terrains” (INEC, 2007; 51-52). The reports of election observers on logistic problems also confirmed this position. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) reported that the delay in the supply of the DDC Machines almost marred the newly introduced Electronic Voters Register (EVR) (EUEOM, 2007:14). It further reported that “essential polling materials were missing in some Polling Stations its observers visited while in almost half of Polling Stations observed, the secrecy of the vote was not ensure due to a lack of polling booths” which were either not delivered to or not used in Polling Stations (EUEOM, 2007: 35-36). The foregoing explained why International Crisis Group (ICG) (2007) one of the Election Observers that monitored the 2007 elections concluded in its reports that “the elections in the view of Nigerians and the many international observers alike were the most poorly organized and massively rigged in the country’s history” (ICG,2007).

Despite the public opinion about the 2011 elections as being the most well organized and conducted, in recent time, INEC faced the challenge of logistics in its management of the elections. This came to the fore on April 2nd, 2011 when the first election (National Assembly) was held. The election was stopped mid-way due to what INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru Jega attributed to logistic problem. The election was postponed by one week and this altered the earlier published schedules of elections in 2011. When the re-scheduled elections were eventually held, the logistic challenge remained unabated although little improvements were observed vis-a-vis the 2007 elections.

The 2015 General Elections did not fare better in the area of logistics. In fact it caused election postponement. In January 2015, the National Security Adviser to President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, Colonel Sambo Dasuki had to canvass for postponement of Presidential election on the ground that many registered voters were

yet to collect their Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs). He also later hinged his call on security ground and argued that a section (North East) of the country was at war.

In his letter to the INEC on February 4, 2015, he canvassed for postponement of the 2015 General Elections by six weeks and that if elections were to be held on February 14 and 28, 2015, the security agencies in the country would not be able to guarantee the security of electoral stakeholders.

INEC had postponed collection of PVCs severally. The exercise dragged on till March 22, 2015 a week to the commencement of the General Election. The foregoing explained why the then INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru Jega at a meeting with representatives of registered political parties at the commission's head office, Abuja, on February 1, 2015 announced the time table for the 2015 re-scheduled polls. He said certain developments need to be addressed before 2015 polls. He therefore announced that the 2015 elections have been re-scheduled as follows: Presidential /National Assembly elections; 28/3/2015; Gubernatorial /House of Assembly elections; 11/4/2015. According to him, the decision on the shift in polls was arrived at after wide consultations with Civil Society groups, security agents and political parties.

The introduction of 'Card Readers' was another major milestone in the electoral epoch of the country. Card Reader is an electronic device which takes the finger print of a would-be voter so as to ascertain the authenticity of his claims. It was adopted by INEC to address electoral malpractices which often take the form of impersonation and multiple voting. But its good aspect notwithstanding, the device faced a number of teething problems like failure to capture the finger print of a prospective voter, low battery and outright malfunctioning. In fact, INEC had to direct electoral officers of polling units where the problems were predominant to resort to the use of manual voters register for accreditation and in some cases, to continue voting till the following day. Despite these teething problems this study is of the view that 'Card Reader' went a long way to check electoral corruption during the 2015 General Elections. But to its critics, it was not a 'card reader' but 'card rigger'.

All the challenges of election management in Nigeria discussed in this work can be regarded as endemic because virtually all successive Election Management Bodies (EMBs) that have conducted elections at different times in the electoral history of the country experienced them. With this premise, the study will now advance strategies that are aimed at surmounting them.

Strategies for Surmounting the Challenges of Election Management in Nigeria

The identified major challenges of election management that have confronted successive EMBs in Nigeria, in this study, include the following:

- (a) Constitutional provisions which empowered the executive to appoint certain categories of election officials;
- (b) Lack of independence of EMBs;
- (c) Lack of independent funds for EMBs to discharge their responsibilities;
- (d) Protracted litigations of election related issues; and contradictory court injunctions;
- (e) System of recruitment of Electoral Officers (Eos) ad-hoc staff in particular;
- (f) Ambiguous constitutional provisions/electoral laws/decrees;
- (g) Security;
- (h) Logistics.

Surmounting electoral challenges

Following from the above findings, this study advances the view that INEC will be able to surmount the challenges confronting it if the following suggestions are adopted as policy actions by various electoral stakeholders:

1. To guarantee the independence of the country's electoral commission, INEC should be removed from Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria as one of the Federal Executive Bodies and re-categorized as an autonomous body by the Country's National

Assembly. Listing it as one of the Federal Executive Bodies is tantamount to placing it under the direct control of the executive.

2. That in order to guarantee the financial independence of the country's EMB there should be a financial system that enables it to derive its funds from consolidated headings that is approved by the National Assembly. This is the practice in Ghana. This recommendation also addresses the issue of logistics. If INEC is well funded and timely funded too, it will have enough time to order for the electoral materials to be used in any election. Consequently, there will be prompt delivery of the materials by contractors. However, in order to guard against unwarranted or extravagant spending by the INEC, the body should be made accountable to the Auditor-General of the Federation who is to be auditing its accounts at regular intervals.

3. With regard to the power of the President to appoint the INEC Electoral Commission's Chairman, National Commissioners and Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) this study recommends that the power should be severed from the executive. It is the recommendation of this study that the Chairman of INEC should emerge from among the permanent staff of the Commission. The most senior staff of the Commission should rise to the position via promotion. This will also address the problem of the neutrality of the Chief Umpire of the Commission. As a public servant, his neutrality will not be doubted in comparison to someone coming from the civil society or political class. The appointments of National Commissioners and RECs have been largely politicized in Nigeria, as a remedy, National Commissioners and RECs should be appointed from amongst Civil Servants by the INEC through the advice of the Head of Service of the Federation. This study is of the view that those to be considered for appointments as National Commissioners should have attained the status of a Permanent Secretary in their Ministries. On the other hand, those to be considered for appointments as RECs must have attained the status of a Director (Grade level 16) in the Ministries where they work.

Quite related to the foregoing is the system of recruitment of the ad-hoc staff of INEC. Although the current arrangement places the responsibility on the shoulder of the Commission, but as Donald

Duke, the former Governor of Cross River State rightly mentioned in an interview, the responsibility is always hijacked by state Governors and other top politicians in their States (Duke, 2012:3 &31). Consequently, their neutrality cannot be guaranteed at the level of the performance of their national duty. Therefore, to guard against this anomaly, the power to appoint the ad-hoc staff should still be wielded by INEC. However, such ad-hoc staff should be drawn from amongst public servants. As experimented by INEC during the 2011 and 2015 General Elections, this study also recommends the engagement of Youth Corpsers (N.Y.S.C members) in the conduct of future general elections in the country. They will see the calling as a national duty. However, they should be provided adequate security so that they will not fall victim of the attack of political thugs during and after the election as was the experience of some of them after the 2011 General Elections in Bauchi State.

4. Following from the above is the issue of security. The security agencies in the country should provide adequate security for not only the electoral officers, but also electoral materials. Electorate should also be protected against the intimidation of contestants and politicians. To ward-off unnecessary attacks on them, the secrecy of their votes should be guaranteed. Consequently, adequate polling booths should be provided at Polling Stations unlike the experience during the 2011 General Elections when many Polling Stations had none. Furthermore, to prevent un-necessary fraternity between security agents and politicians/contestants, this study recommends that top security agents (for example, Commissioner of Police, Assistant Inspector General of Police-AIG-in charge of different zones in the country) should be swapped across the country two weeks to the commencement of any General Election.

5. The National Assembly should harvest the opinions of public (electoral stakeholders in particular) on the ambiguous sections of the Electoral Act; and the country's Constitution dealing with electoral matters and amends them accordingly. This recommendation also relates to litigations. This study considers the time-lag relating to electoral litigations as contained in Section 285 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended in 2011, which stipulated the period judgment should be delivered on

electoral matters as within 180 days from the date of filling of the petition; and 60 days for appeal, as being on the high side. Rather, this study recommends 90 days for the petition and 30 days for the appeal. This will prevent situations of having illegal governments in power for more than necessary and check the corruption of some judicial officials.

6. Electoral Commissions in the country should continue to enjoy the same conditions of service with other categories of public servants in the country as the case since 1998. This will instil sense of confidence in them in the performance of their duties. Even in a situation where by a regime changes the name and or the composition of the management cadre of the Commission, its organogram should be maintained. This will go a long way to attract the best brain to the Commission since they know they have security of tenure. In addition to this, the regular staff of the Commission should be exposed to training programmes in the Electoral Institute while training collaborations should exist between Judicial Officials and Electoral Officers. In order to address the problem of the incompetence of some ad hoc staff, INEC should adopt the policy of engaging those of them who discharge their responsibilities well in future elections. This will reduce the rigor of training new set of people each time an election is to be held in the country. It will also checkmate the undue interference of politicians in the appointments of ad hoc Electoral Officers.

7. The adoption of 'Card Reader' in the verification exercise during elections should be sustained. This is because its introduction during the 2015 General Elections reduced the incidents of electoral malpractices such as impersonation and multiple voting. However, its teething problems like low battery and rejection of the finger prints of prospective voters should be addressed before 2019 General Elections so as to erase the fears of opposition parties /candidates that it is usually deliberately tampered with in their (opposition parties/ candidates) in their strongholds by the power that be.

Conclusion

This study has carried out a prognosis of the challenges of election management in Nigeria. It started with the introduction which served as an expository of the problem area. The study thereafter examined the literature definitions of election management where the idea of election management was linked to the field of management. The challenges of election management in Nigeria over the years were the next focus of the work. This took historical cum comparative analysis. The challenges that have confronted various EMBs in the country in reference to the elections that they have managed were x-rayed. The study however, observed that apart from the 1959 General elections, all other elections held in the country during colonial time were organized and conducted by colonial (European) officials whose activities were shrouded in secrecy thus making it practically impossible to assess their efficiency in the management of such elections.

Furthermore, another finding of this work is that the organizational structures of EMBs in the country had effect on their manner of management of elections. Until 1987 when NEC was established, all the previous EMBs in the country were ephemeral in nature. This did not augur well for proper planning for the elections they managed. As revealed by this study, beginning from 1987 when NEC was established, the personnel of the Electoral Commissions started enjoying the same conditions of service with their counterparts in Civil Service. This augured well for continuity in election management. This study concludes that if the various strategies advanced in this study are adopted as policy actions by electoral stakeholders in the country in future, the challenges of election management will be ameliorated if not surmounted.

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Violence and the Politics of the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai's (MDC-T) Mobilisation and Continued Survival, 1999-2014

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Introduction

On Sunday the 16th of February 2014, Zimbabweans woke to the news headlines that the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) deputy treasurer general, Elton Mangoma; the secretary general, Tendai Biti; and the Youth Assembly leader Solomon Madzore had either been severely lynched or had a narrow escape from attacks by unclaimed MDC-T youths at the MDC-T headquarters, Harvest House (*The Standard*, 16/02/14; *The Sunday Mail*, 16-22/02/14). The attacks on these senior MDC-T leaders at Harvest House where the party's national executive had been having a meeting brought concurrently a sad and interesting reading to many. Much of the evidence of the attack pointed to divisive factional fighting pitting the sitting president of the party, Morgan Tsvangirai, and the then party's secretary general Tendai Biti. What seemed to have immediately triggered the violent attack was the letter that Mangoma wrote to Tsvangirai in January 2014 imploring him to resign for allegedly persistently failing to unseat Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front ZANU-PF's President, Robert Mugabe from power. There had also been earlier calls from the party's treasurer general, Roy Bennett and from a National Executive Committee (NEC) member, Ian Kay, again calling for Tsvangirai to resign. There were also rumours that the MDC-T executive had offered Tsvangirai some United States three million dollars (US\$ 3 000 000) to step down and allow for a leadership renewal in the party. What also emerged was that the attack in 2014 on the MDC leaders was not the first as there had been earlier attacks in 2004 and in 2005 leading up to and following the first major acrimonious split. At one

level, the questions that could be [re]raised and which may never be fully answered are: who attacked them, and, to what end? Although instructive, we do not seek to respond to these. Rather, our foundational question is: What is the place of violence¹ and other coercive tactics in the MDC-T's politics of mobilisation, survival and, possibly, its implosion? The latter question is significant, especially for a country whose landscape is defined by violence either for liberation, mobilisation, to thwart insurgents and/or to correct social wrongs. The question is also significant for the potential implosion of the MDC-T based on the culture of splitting that has a genealogical existence in the party, and, thus, which has potentially significant implications for the future of the MDC-T and opposition politics in Zimbabwe, in general. The splits have more often been preceded by or subsequently followed by violence. As such, we also seek to ask: What is the place of violence in the MDC splits? The discussion is also significant in the sense that the apparent weakening of the MDC-T provides a sense of disappointment to the multitudes of its supporters who had hoped for an MDC-T-led democratic political transition and a political solution to the long-term Zimbabwean crisis.

At another level, we need to understand the culture of violence within political parties in Zimbabwe because if and when they eventually capture state power that violence could pervade structures of the state potentially generating negative implications on national

¹In this chapter, we are guided by the definition of violence as given by the World Health Organisation as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (<http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/evophp-URLID=36790&URL>). Our primary concern will be on the holistic understanding of violence as incorporative of physical and psychological attributes and how these have shaped the MDC-T's organisational framework, survival and mobilisation. As such, we deploy the scholarly articulation of the manifestations and potential effects of violence by Dageener (1990) and the discursive framing of violence as given by Žižek (2009) that articulate violence, among others, as structural, instrumentalised and emancipatory. On the whole, we seek to render a more complex analysis of the working of the phenomenon of violence in the MDC-T, between its inception in 1999 and 2014.

socio-economic development. As such we pose the questions: What is the source of the culture of violence in the MDC-T?" Is this culture the same as in ZANU-PF? The chapter also argues that while violence has played a critical role in the decline of the MDC-T, the impacts of other factors like the negative influences of the Morgan Tsvangirai personality cult, reduced foreign funding and the discontentment of the MDC-T supporters at the electoral failures of the MDC-T against its long-time rival, ZANU-PF, should not be minimised.

Formation, growth, history and place of the MDC[s] in Zimbabwean politics

The MDC was formally launched on 11 September 1999 as a broad coalition involving the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and a loose grouping of ninety-six (96) civic and human rights organisations couched as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) that included the Zimbabwe National Association of Students Unions (ZINASU), women's rights movements, urban whites, commercial "white" farmers, the middle class civil servants, residents' associations, industrialists and university lecturers, and church-based organisations (Huddleston 2005: 54-60 & Dansereau 2001:404). Its launch was on the back of the ZCTU-led and NCA supported National Working People's Convention (NWPC) of February 1999 that resolved, among others, to form a labour-led political movement (Dansereau, 2001: 406), to challenge "the [ZANU-PF] government, particularly on its economic policies and human rights record" (MDC, 2003:1). In part, this transition from shop floor tactics to the overt oppositional politics drew much on the growing sense of power in the ZCTU that built on the relative successes of the strikes and demonstrations of 1996 and 1997 that served to undercut government authority and to push the ZCTU to withdraw from the Tripartite Negotiating Forum and to convene the NWPC (Dansereau, 2001). It was, thus, little surprise that the dominant positions in the early days of the MDC were taken up by the labour unionists, including the positions of president and vice-president of the MDC who were former secretary general and

president of the ZCTU, respectively, and a further eight national leaders drawn from the ZCTU ranks who were joined in the national leadership portfolios by other members drawn from the different NCA affiliates (Dansereau, 2001: 407).

The MDC's immediate (and unenviable) task was to coordinate workers' grievances and articulate them alongside the rising larger urban and rural socio-economic challenges, the need for constitutional reforms and the provision of an alternative democratic politics to the authoritarian and unresponsive Mugabe and ZANU-PF rule (Dansereau, 2001: 406). To this end, the MDC was to mobilise around the broader issues of rising poverty levels, rampant joblessness, increased social vulnerability, growing food shortages or food insecurities, mounting cost of living, escalating Human Immuno Deficiency virus HIV and Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome AIDS infections, a surging political intolerance and against an authoritarian ZANU-PF hegemony (Sachikonye, ND:15).

On the whole, this coalescence rode on and strengthened a soaring anti-Mugabe and anti-ZANU-PF feeling. As Raftopoulos (2009a) observes, the loose coalition provided for broad-based mobilisation, a sense of hope and a serious challenge to ZANU-PF. In his words:

The combination ... provided a national organisational reach and an expansive discursive opportunity that radically challenged the increasingly moribund exclusivity of ZANU-PF nationalism. The politics of possibility dominated the discussions of thousands of activists around the country, and the sense of imminent victory, often of Panglossian dimensions, was everywhere apparent. The huge weight of a political monolith appeared to be lifting, and opportunities to pose new questions not only about the present and future, but also about the legacies of the past, began to appear (Ibid: n.p).

The MDC (in the various multiple formations) has continued to be an active and dominant political force in Zimbabwe. It played a key role as an ally of the National Constitutional Assembly NCA to successfully campaign for a 'NO vote' in the February 2000 Constitutional Referendum which, in a serious sense, heralded the first loss of ZANU-PF in any plebiscite since 1980. Besides marking

the first defeat of ZANU-PF at the ballot, the Constitutional Referendum symbolically served as a sort of a “plebiscite on ZANU-PF rule since 1980” (Raftopoulos, 2009b: 212). At another level, this defeat actualised the dwindling electoral fortunes of the ruling party and it inauspiciously pointed towards subsequent election defeats for ZANU-PF while simultaneously visibilising the widespread and growing support for the MDC (Madhuku, 2004:137-141) and opposition politics, more generally.

Furthermore, more than remaining the official opposition, the MDC, according to Sachikonye (ND: 17) generated a “seismic shift in Zimbabwe's post-independence politics to the extent that the 2000 election result marked a decisive shift from ‘a dominant party system’ such as is still found in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania, where one major party has an overwhelming majority in Parliament.” The dominant party system was directly resulted from the role these main political movements played in the liberation struggles of their respective countries. This unprecedented and remarkable feat by the MDC was showcased by the strong showing of the then one-year-old MDC which won fifty-seven seats compared to the sixty-two seats that ZANU-PF won in the 2000 parliamentary plebiscite (Maroleng, 2004:1). What was also astounding was that the MDC won the seats across the breadth of the country, both in urban and rural areas, an accomplishment which separated it from the other earlier opposition parties including Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga (ZANU-Ndonga) or the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) that had demonstrated either regional or urban appeals. Critically, like the earlier opposition parties, the MDC's strong existence was against the vindictive and throttling strong arm tactics of the ruling ZANU-PF. The combination of a national appeal and the high number of seats in parliament “made the MDC Zimbabwe's most successful opposition party in the country's independence history” (Maroleng, 2004:2). The strong showing in elections was replicated in subsequent elections. For example, in the 2002 Presidential election, Tsvangirai, the MDC presidential candidate got 42 percent of the vote to the ruling ZANU-PF's Mugabe's 56 percent (EISA, 2007). In the harmonised elections held in March 2008 jointly the two MDCs

nearly spelt the ominous end for ZANU-PF, by winning the lower house parliamentary majority, while the MDC-T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai won the first round of the Presidential ballot, officially by 47.12 percent compared to 42.56 per cent for Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF (Kubatana.net, 2008). President Mugabe was only able to reclaim office following the deeply disputed and bloody 27 June 2008 re-run.

MDC and the trail of breakaways

One defining characteristic of the MDC has been its tendency to split into numerous breakaway parties which has led the original organisation to mutate into several weaker movements. While the parent organisation has remained as the larger organisation called MDC-Tsvangirai, under the founding leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, there has over the years emerged a series of splinter groups, all retaining the prefix of MDC. However, the two breakaways that were engineered by the two former secretary-generals, Welshman Ncube and Tendai Biti in 2005 and 2014, respectively, remain the greatest ruptures that the MDC has ever experienced in its history as a political party. The first split of 2005 led to the creation of the smaller MDC first led by Arthur Mutambara called the MDC-Mutambara up to 2013 thenceforth led by Welshman Ncube, transforming it to MDC-Ncube and the MDC-T led by Tsvangirai. In 2014 the MDC-T further split into two, giving birth to the MDC Renewal Team (later the People's Democratic Party) led by former secretary general, Tendai Biti though fronted by Sekai Holland who was chosen as its interim leader. Outside of these two major breakaways, there was also the smaller and rather insignificant MDC breakaway trading as MDC 99 led by Job Sikhala until he rejoined the MDC-T in 2014.

In this section we draw on the theoretical guidance of breakaway parties as discussed by Simutanyi to make sense of the splits in the MDC and the MDC-T. According to Simutanyi (2009:6) cited in Nuvunga (2014: 139):

A breakaway group or party can be defined as one where, due to irreconcilable differences between the party's leaders and some

of its officials or members, the latter decide to resign and form another group or party. In many instances those perceived to be a threat to party leadership are purged, forcing them to form parties of their own to settle old scores. However, the circumstances that lead to breakaway groups can often be found in the nature of the African parties themselves, in particular the *entrenched authoritarian and undemocratic tendencies of most parties* in the region [our emphasis].

Simutanyi's analysis is cogent to the understanding of the splits in the MDC that have largely been based on party leadership differences, such as participation in the 2005 Senatorial elections and on the 2014 calls for the party leader to step down. As well, there is a strong imprint of the purging of internal dissent in the MDC-T, as will be discussed in the next section.

The question then is what was the impact of these splits? And, how were these influenced by violence? First, the splits weakened the MDC internally as they reduced the internal cohesion and promoted the loss of technical skills that was necessary for the party's viable continuity. Among others, the first split took nearly an ethnic-regional dimension as Ncube, the secretary general, broke away and took along most leaders from Matabeleland. This feature made the larger MDC-T to fail to make electoral inroads in some parts of (especially) rural Matabeleland Provinces that were dominated by the MDC-M (later MDC-N). Furthermore, the 2014 split served also to alienate from the MDC-T, Tendai Biti, who was held in high esteem for his frugal financial management as Minister of Finance under the Government of National Unity from 2009 to 2013 that helped to sustain fiscal stability after the many years of the debilitating Zimbabwean crisis. At another level, as the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI) (2014) avers, the splits were negative as they "scatter[ed] the party's energy" by contributing to the splitting of supporters some of whom were left confused, demoralised and dejected by the breakaways. In addition, some MDC-T supporters were lost to ZANU-PF, the MDCs arch-nemesis. The same conclusion was also reiterated by Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC-T leader who posited that "when we [MDC-T] fragment into little

pieces the goal is undermined” (*Newsday*, 10 April 2015). In support of this, the ZDI survey of December 2014 revealed that the 2014 split, among others, had weakened the MDC-T, was perceived as not necessary, harmful towards the recruitment of new supporters and was projected to result in a weakened showing by the MDC-T in the 2018 elections (ZDI, 2014). Furthermore, and broadly, as Roger Southall (2014) observes, the 2014 breakaway contributed to a loss of MDCs appeal. To Southall (2014:146):

the MDC had to a considerable extent lost its lustre, as both wings of the party had been affected by a progressive decline in the organisational strength while participating in the GPA, this in significant measure a result of their intra-party and inter-party squabbling, as well as the acrimonious relations between the two leaders.

Tsvangirai: A rusty bolt that sings *handiende*.²

The figure of Morgan Tsvangirai has been venerated in opposition politics and especially in MDC opposition politics and has been raised nearly to saintly and messianic statuses with his biography equated to that of the MDC-T. Among others, Tsvangirai has been deified by his followers as “the commander of the struggle ... the founding father of democracy in Zimbabwe, the doyen of constitutionalism, a [leader] chosen by God”, irreplaceable, a Moses and a Mandela of the MDC-T (*Southern Eye*, 04/03/2014). In this regard, among others, there is increased reference by his supporters to his totemic name ‘Save’ of the Dzivaguru ethnic group. Among the Shona of south-east Zimbabwe Save, a big river that empties in the Indian Ocean is significant as a sustainer of livelihoods. This importance is underscored in one traditional song that is usually sung to induce the spirits, *Mhondoro dzinomwa muna Save*, which alleges that the *mhondoros* which are national spirits drink from the Save River. The symbolic meaning of this is that Tsvangirai, like the mighty Save River, is a sustainer and hope for Zimbabweans. The other Messianic

² *Handiende* is a Shona word that describes the attitude by politicians to not want to pass on the button of leadership.

appropriation of the person of Morgan Tsvangirai can be noticed in how a certain prayer meeting was coded as: ‘Save Zimbabwe Prayer Meeting’, which potentially could have two meanings ascribed to it. ‘Save’ can literally be taken as an English word meaning redeeming. On the other hand, ‘Save’ can, as given above already, be used to refer to Tsvangirai’s totem. In the latter sense therefore, it transforms the call in the prayer line to ‘Tsvangirai’s Zimbabwe prayer meeting’. There have also been songs composed by, among others, Madzore, Dread Reckless, Francia Chikunguru and Sister Fearless that have helped to [re]construct and extol the personality cult of Tsvangirai (Sibanda, 2012). An example of this is encapsulated in the song that was adulterated from the Shona Christian song “Ndi Jesu chete” and sung at Trymore Midzi’s funeral in 2001 that went as follows:

<i>Chinja, chinja chete</i>	Change Change alone	
<i>Ndofamba ne/nabato/Tsvangi,</i>	I walk with MDC/Tsvangi	
<i>bato chete/Tsvangi chete</i>	MDC only/Tsvangi alone	
<i>Hakuna rimwe/mumwe,</i>	There is no one else/no other	
	party	
<i>Chinja/Tsvangi chete ...</i>	Change/Tsvangi	alone

(Mawere, 2015).

This cult status appropriated to Tsvangirai has had detrimental consequences for the succession and democratisation of the MDC or the MDC-T formation that he has led from 1999 to 2005, and from 2005 to the present (2016), respectively. This domineering personality is clearly illustrated by the naming of his formation as the MDC-Tsvangirai from 2005. While this was, however, not peculiar to his formation as other breakaway formations from the MDC were subsequently identified with the surnames of their leaders, for example MDC-Ncube and MDC-Mutambara, this worked to engrave a certain kind of immortality of Tsvangirai in the MDC-T formation and generally in opposition politics in Zimbabwe. Importantly, as Tinhu (cited in *Newsday*, 2 May 2014) correctly observes, it “illustrates the entrenchment of his personal power” within his party. Due to this hold over the party, it has been difficult to criticise him without drawing parallels with President Mugabe

policies in ZANU-PF and in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it has prevented the open discussion of his succession among the aspirants within MDC-T senior ranks. This has resulted in the constant plots within the MDC hierarchy, the emergence of factionalism and power struggles which have resulted in the weakening of the MDC and MDC-T. The October 2005 split led by the secretary general, Welshman Ncube, the formation of MDC 99 by Job Sikhala and the April 2014 split led by another secretary general, Tendai Biti, speak volumes of the plots, subplots and factional fighting within the ranks of the MDC/MDC-T. It can also be debated that Tsvangirai's *handiende* (I will not leave office) stance is also informed by his perceived self-importance that when he leaves the leadership of the MDC-T, the party will collapse. While such a notion of his centrality to the MDC-T project is valid to a significant extent, the case of Nelson Mandela who relinquished power at the height of his popularity and at a crucial time in the difficult transition from Apartheid to majoritarian democracy demonstrates that dynamic internal democracy within movements is more important than personalities. This also speaks to the adage that leaders alone cannot fight struggles. Rather they require principles and people to lead.

For Tsvangirai, and the MDC-T, the *handiende* phenomenon was clearly evinced in 2014 when calls for leadership renewal were taken as dissent by Tsvangirai. Among those who called for leadership renewal was Elton Mangoma who alleged that the MDC-T was "...grieving from a crisis of leadership legitimacy, crisis of expectation and above all a crisis of confidence, externally and internally" (cited in Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 2014). He also called for leadership renewal in order to avoid a "succession conundrum affecting ZANU-PF" and as "the only avenue to restoring the credibility of the party lest it risks being confined to history" (cited in Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 2014: NP). Mangoma's views echoed similar sentiments, though less direct, expressed by Ian Kay who called the replacement of Tsvangirai through the analogies of replacing a failing soccer coach and "a rusty bolt" (cf. Saunyama, 2013). Because of the *handiende* attitude by Tsvangirai, those who called for leadership renewal were physically attacked or were brutally attacked in media. These attacks speak to the purging of the

dissenters that Simutanyi (2009) as discussed earlier alludes to. Following the disagreements and/ or the purging, the disgruntled members, including the secretary general, Biti, the treasurer general, Roy Bennett, and other national leaders such as Elton Mangoma, Ian Kay, Sekai Holland broke away to form the MDC Renewal Team.

One of the key results of Tsvangirai's over domineering personality has also been to monopolise power and decision making within the MDC or the MDC-T, often in undemocratic fashion. In a huge way, this speaks to Tsvangirai retaining power without legitimation or authority, in the Max Weber sense (Weber, 1946) at least in the face of the senior party leaders who led the breakaways. As a result of Tsvangirai retaining power, that is, "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber, 1946: 80), this generated a "series of suspensions, expulsions and counter-measures" including splits of the party like the ones witnessed in 2005 and in 2014 (Crisis International Group cited in Asylum Research Consultancy 2014:22). This was not surprising because according to Weber (1946), the reliance on power, which is individualistic, without authority results in conflict. In the above context, Tsvangirai is accused of drawing on selfish individual goals that worked at cross purposes with the democratic structures of the MDC-T.

As Ncube cited in Good Governance Africa (n.d: n.p) pointed out, he led the split from the MDC-T in 2005 because Tsvangirai used "authoritarianism and lethargy" to govern the MDC. The same view was reiterated by Tendai Biti (*Daily News*, 27 April 2014) who argued that Tsvangirai and his allies had become "a dangerous fascist clique" that made "use of parallel structures, including the use of vigilantes, kitchen cabinets and other informal means of transacting the business of the democratic party". The clique, according to Biti had disregarded the MDC-T foundational principles of "social democracy, justice, equality, liberty, transparency, non-violence, constitutionalism and servant leadership" (Ibid). Such tendencies towards one man-centred autocratic rule violated one of the core values of the MDC on democratic leadership. Under this value, the MDC leadership was supposed to be "transparent, accessible, reliable

and hardworking, clear on issues, accepting criticism and sensitive to views of the people” (MDC, 2003:5).

Violence and tales of splits in MDC

In this section we turn to looking at the nexus between the instrumentalisation of violence and the splits in the MDCs. We find this to be instructive because the MDC politics of survival and mobilisation seem to have been shaped and influenced in a big way by the seemingly genealogical thread of the instrumentalisation of violence on its structures and on the Zimbabwean landscape at large. As Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009: 190) has established, there is an established genealogy of the deployment of violence for certain pre-determined political ends in Zimbabwe. In his words:

One of the common problems running through the continuum of Zimbabwean history across the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs is that of violence, its memory and impunity. This violence has been given names and justified through various euphemisms that cast it as a positive attribute of human progress ... Forms of violence that have afflicted... [Zimbabwe]....have ranged widely from raiding and conquest in the pre-colonial period; civilising mission/whiteman’s burden/conquest/pacification of barbarous tribes under imperialism and colonialism; African resistance/First Chimurenga/Second Chimurenga/Liberation war under African nationalism; various military style operations such as *Gukurahundi*, *Chinyavada*, *Murambatsvina*, *Mavhoterapapi* and *Chimukumumu* under the post-colonial state.”

Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s argumentation opens us to the importance of the purposive deployment of violence by those in power or those seeking power in Zimbabwe to solicit intended responses from the general populace. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s sentiments on the existence of genealogies of the targeted use of violence in Zimbabwe are echoed by Nhongo Simbanegavi (2000) who traces ZANU-PF’s current violence to its liberation war history. As well Sachikonye (2011) supports this view and provides a long genealogy of political violence from pre-colonial Zimbabwe to present. The question, regarding the MDC-T then is, to what extent has the party leadership adopted the

instrumentalisation of violence to acquire desired outcomes, including retaining power and to stifle the democratisation process within the party leading to several splinter movements, and more dangerously, to the end of the MDC formations as a political force in Zimbabwe.

To begin to answer the question on the role of violence in the MDC politics, we may start by looking at the adoption of violence as a strategy of retaliation by the MDC in the face of increased onslaught by the ruling ZANU-PF that at various moments deployed tactics of coercion and threats to thwart the MDC outreach activities, intimidate the leaders and supporters or to disperse MDC rallies (Huddleston, 2005). Faced with increased state-led ZANU-PF violence, the MDC responded by threatening to employ similar strategies in the speeches by the party leadership, in slogans and in motivational songs to defend its interests and structures. Among other cases that illustrate an inclination towards this *modus operandi*, Morgan Tsvangirai, following the controversial death of Tichaona Chiminya, alleged that “ [w]e [MDC] will take violence to the doorstep of those responsible for violence against MDC supporters” (Huddleston, 2005: 62). On another occasion, Tsvangirai is also said to have said that if President Mugabe did not leave office peacefully, they (MDC) would remove him violently (Huddleston, 2005: 73). While the statements, slogans and songs did not necessarily result in violence against ZANU-PF structures, or were statements of desperation and at times reactionary proclamations to ZANU-PF provocation, they nonetheless were inciting dangerous proposals and were inviting of the MDC structures to militarise, reshape and to consider violence as an alternative tool of mobilisation. To demonstrate the increased resort towards the militarisation of the MDC, at the funeral of Tonderai Ndira the mourners who were predominantly MDC supporters made use of placards and T shirts with messages such as that Ndira was a ‘hero’ who had been ‘assassinated’. In addition, a number of songs were also factored during funerals of MDC activists such as Tonderai Ndira, Cain Nyeve, Better Chokururama which also reflected a militarised and violent MDC. Some of the common songs were *Tochibvondora here*/Shall we start the war, *Amai nababa musandichema kana ndafa*/My

parents don't cry for me when I die, *Angari komandar*/He or she was a commander, *Dzorera ukarohwa*/Fight back and *Baya tiende*/Kill them (Mawere, 2015).

In terms of slogans that were illustrative of the need to adopt confrontation against ZANU-PF, we could refer to the MDC-T's popular slogan:

<i>Chinja maitiro</i>	Change Your ways
<i>Chinja</i>	Change
<i>Mugabe mudenga</i>	Lift Mugabe High
<i>Uyoo</i>	There he is
<i>Mudenga mudenga</i>	Higher higher
<i>Uyoo</i>	There he is
<i>Tenderedza</i>	Spin him
<i>Uyoo</i>	There he is
<i>Rovera Pasi</i>	Drop him down
<i>Pwaaaaa</i>	Pwaaaa (Mawere 2015:124)

On the whole, as Mawere (2015:124) avers, this slogan represents “a merciless act that aims to totally break one's enemy with no hope of the enemy rising again ... [because] the enemy is raised high up so as to be brought down to the hard ground with a fatal thud ... *pwaaa* ...” The adoption of a language of violence was also captured in some MDC-T songs. One of the songs that showcases this was sung during Trymore Midzi's funeral, which was couched in the war language of stabbing the enemies and venerating war and the spilling of the adversaries blood, who in this case were ZANU-PF supporters. It went as follows:

<i>Baya tiende Trymore</i>	Stab and let us go Trymore
<i>Hondo, Usambotya</i>	Do not fear war
<i>Baya tiende Trymore</i>	Stab and let us go Trymore
<i>Hondo, Usambotya</i>	Do not fear war (Mawere, 2015:124).

The above songs and slogans were complemented by the adoption of military inspired or military coded programmes of action for the MDC-T. Among these was the proclamation of the “Final

Push”. In the so-called Final Push, the target was to force Mugabe out of power through street marches and (violent) protests, akin to the Munich *Putsch* that propelled Hitler to power in Germany and claim the Holy Grail of the State House. What, therefore, emerges in the end is a certain appellation of MDC-T heroism that is based on those who violently confront the ZANU-PF enemy. One cannot escape to think that such kind of heroism for the MDC-T resonates with the ZANU-PF heroism that is founded on one’s ability to also fight the enemy, the imperialist enemy (Marongwe and Magadzike, 2016). Critically, what also appears is that the MDC-T like ZANU-PF had transformed politics from a peaceful democratic feat into a physical battle. This speaks to the inversion of the Clausewitz aphorism of war as politics by other means to politics as war by other means in the Foucault (1980) formulation.

The initial MDC response to the ZANU-PF tactics of confrontation was to internally reorganise itself by constituting the “Kitchen Cabinet”, which was “a parallel structure within the party” (Raftopoulos, 2009a) that is a “shadowy party structure, which [was] designed to facilitate top-down organising and speedy response to orders from national leadership” (LeBas cited in Raftopoulos, 2009a: n.p). Among the problems brought by this parallel structure was to create discord between the president and the secretary general, generate accountability issues and to foment violence because it deployed quasi-military strategies in dealing with ZANU-PF violence or in solving intraparty squabbles (Raftopoulos, 2009a). The creation of this “kitchen cabinet” was blamed for the 2004-2005 president-secretary general struggles and acrimony, which eventually culminated in the violent division of November 2005 (Raftopoulos, 2009a).

At another level, and drawing from the above we also see the start of the deployment of intra-MDC violence. In 2004, there was the targeted violence against certain key MDC officials, including the head of Security of the party, at Harvest House (Raftopoulos, 2009a). As observed by Raftopoulos (2009a), this marked the process of the instrumentalisation of violence by Tsvangirai against those within the MDC against his policies or style of leadership. It also left a lot of

aggrieved individuals, including the secretary general, which led to their breakaway in November 2005.

As Raftopoulos contends, because of the unsatisfactory conclusion and the unfinished business of the 2004 intraparty violence, another round of violence was witnessed in May 2005, for example at party offices in Harvest House, Bulawayo and Gwanda (Raftopoulos, 2009a). Further and later, this latter violence was also related to the jostling for power towards the impending elective MDC congress in the later part of 2005 (Ibid). Importantly, Raftopoulos notes that the office of the MDC President was fingered in fomenting the violence as “once again aides in the President’s office were accused of directing the activities of the youth” with “the objective of the violence ... relate[d] to the political battles leading up to the forthcoming national party congress. The allegations of the youth were that the secretary general, the deputy secretary general, members of staff were working to replace the President” (Ibid, n.p). Further intra-MDC violence occurred in late 2005 as a direct contestation by the two factions over whether or not to participate in the Senate elections. To this extent, according to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (October 2005: 2 & 10), in October 2005, three MDC senate candidates from the Midlands Province were assaulted in Gweru and the Manicaland MDC executive council members were attacked by MDC youths for defying the party president, Morgan Tsvangirai not to participate in the Senate elections.

More intra-MDC-T violence was reported between 2011 and 2014. There were reports of widespread intra-party violence in the run up to the May 2011 MDC-T elective congress in Bulawayo, Manicaland and the Midlands Provinces as the jostling for positions heated up (Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, MMPZ, 2011). To exemplify, the 2011 intra-MDC-T violence in Bulawayo allegedly involved the opposing factions led by Matson Hlalo and Gordon Moyo who were vying for the chairmanship of the MDC Bulawayo Province (*ZBC News*, 22/04/2011). Further intra-MDC-T violence was witnessed again in primaries to choose representatives for the 2013 elections. These resulted in some of the victims having properties such as houses burnt down or to the postponement of the

primary elections (*ZBC News*, 14/06/2013). In 2014, the place of violence was, to a serious extent, defined by the attacks of Mangoma and Biti outlined in the introduction. However, there were other executive members, national or provincial who also received lynchings and/ or physical attacks. Some of these include, MDC-T Chitungwiza provincial chairperson and Zengeza East National Assembly legislator, Mr Alexio Musundire, the Chitungwiza provincial secretary Mr Chari Parirenyatwa as well as MDC-T Harare North youth secretary for information Ms Angela Hwanyanya, who were attacked in quick succession at the MDC-T headquarters, Harvest House, in March 2014 (*The Herald*, 25 March 2014). Further and more ominous MDC-T intra-party violence was recorded in September 2014 where the “MDC-T had 36 cases of intra-party violence” as it restructured its district and provincial structures ahead of the party’s congress. Besides the use of hate speech, some officials from Chitungwiza, Harare and Bulawayo exchanged blows and or broke party property (Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2014). After this discussion of the place of violence in the MDC, the chapter turns to a discussion of other factors that have contributed to the waning of the MDC/MDC-T.

An all-embracing organisation: Difficult consensus

One of the reasons for the violence and potential cause for the MDC-T implosion is that it is a grouping of diverse and occasionally contradictory interests. These divergent interests include those of workers, intellectuals, business people, blacks and whites, and the unemployed. While there could be a façade of a “total package” (Zuze, 2016, n.p) in the broad coalescence, what cannot escape attention is that these categories had different objectives they wanted addressed by the organisation. Notwithstanding the fact that this broadness initially allowed for a broad-based reach of the MDC, which fed on the diverse socio-economic-political disillusionments across many sections of society to build a broad-based anti-Mugabe coalition, over time cracks began to emerge along the same fault lines.

According to Sachikonye (ND: 17):

The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was woven out of the broad coalition of social forces including civil society and its various components such as labour, youth, students, the middle classes and business. It remains a broad movement whose immediate objective has been to dislodge ZANU-PF from power; it possesses both the strengths and weaknesses of a coalition of interests temporarily united to achieve that over-riding objective.

The same observation was corroborated by Maroleng (2004: 3) who averred that “the MDC [could] struggle to keep these different social forces unified under its leadership, and that it may, in future, become divided on ideological grounds and fundamental differences in policy”, that “the various constituencies would clash either on ideological lines or on policy” akin to the Masipula Sithole’s (1999) struggles within struggles. Indeed, as noted by the ZDI (2014), the disparate group interests that were governed by a shared dislike of Mugabe and ZANU-PF and the shared desire “to protect individual and corporate interests” have persisted. This speaks to the observation by Dansereau (2001: 404) that these divergent interests have over the years prevented the MDC/MDC-T from transfiguring from being a movement into a coherent political party, with a shared vision and programme of action. To Dansereau (2001: 404), these organisational challenges presented:

The difficulty in forging the basis of unity needed to put forward a national project out of a set of diverse platforms and special interests ...the challenge ... [of] putting forward the interests of its members within the context of an alliance made up of groups historically opposed to each other. At issue is, first, the challenge posed by political action, organised in the form of a broad-based alliance; and second, the nature of that alliance which brings together labour and the private sector.

As Raftopoulos (2009a) avers, the violence of 2004 and 2005 was fought along the fault line pitting the president and the secretary general, who in a significant way represented the workers’ and intellectuals’ interests, respectively. Moreover, the unemployed began to be used as tools to fight the battles for sustenance of power. The

same can also be advanced for the eventual split in November 2005, which again pitted the president against the secretary general. This is, however, not discounting other factors such as ethnicity and the authoritarian stance by Tsvangirai who disregarded the MDC executive resolution to participate in the senatorial elections, among others.

The other weakness that has been highlighted by the broad coalition is the presence of the whites in the organisation, including white farmers and others. The presence of the white element has led to the caricaturing of the MDC as an imperial front by ZANU-PF. Although simplistically constructed by ZANU-PF, the characterisation had purchase among the simple villagers who were forced to imbibe the doctrine in daily dosages of jingles of the same to which they were exposed by a dominant state media. One factor that brought this tension to the fore was the farm takeovers led by the ZANU-PF, under the *Jambanja* of the new millennium. The question for the MDC became: what stance to take regarding the farm takeovers? The essence of this predicament was succinctly captured by Maroleng 2004: 3) who stated that “the MDC ... found itself in a quandary: how to question the motives for the policy [of land redistribution] and criticise its execution without being associated with the sectional interests of the white commercial farmers and their overseas sympathisers.” This was compounded by the articulation of the MDC by ZANU-PF as a front for the imperialists, which cost it a regional SADC and pan-African appeal that was won by ZANU-PF whose articulation was a virulent attack on the West’s machinations against recolonisation (see Maroleng, 2004: 4). What made this fabrication to bear more semblance of credibility were some reckless statements by some western government officials. For example, the United states of America (USA) former Secretary of State Collin Powell (in Maroleng’s, 2004: 5) once stated that Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s “time has come and gone and that new leadership respectful of human rights was needed.” In many circles, these utterances were taken to imply machinations towards regime change, which was fronted by the MDC. Critically, some reports emerged in 2014 that the white farmers who were unhappy with Tsvangirai’s leadership began to

sponsor an alternative and more radical leadership of the MDC-T (*Daily News*, 27 April 2014). They had allegedly mobilised:

huge amounts of money which [would be] channeled through clandestine structures to oust Tsvangirai and take over control of the party, in subversive initiatives that effectively compliment other anti-Tsvangirai ‘missions’ allegedly involving ZANU-PF, Central Intelligence Organisation operatives and some Western donors (*Daily News*, 27 April 2014).

Opposition politics as an end in itself

Building from the previous section on the MDC as a loose formation of disparate groups and interests, this section broadly contends that what brought these ‘strange bed fellows’ together was the desire to end the ZANU-PF rule. Notwithstanding the fact that “all opposition movements begin in such ways [and that] it also generated the release of new energies and possibilities and the construction of a novel democratic discourse in the Zimbabwean context” this was akin to an “anti-Mugabe reaction” that was bred out of “the glaring shortcomings of the ruling party” with no clear or “positive alternatives” (Raftopoulos 2009a; see also Gumede 2014 for similar sentiments). However, as the goal of removing Mugabe and ZANU-PF from power has proved elusive with the passage of many elections and time, cracks in the loose coalitions have widened. One result of these differing group opinions based on interests was the emergence of differences in terms of strategy. Among others, the breakups of the party in 2005, for example occurred on the back of sharp differences over whether or not to participate in the senatorial elections, which at face value spoke to the issues of how to proceed in an atmosphere that was not conducive to the holding of free elections. However, this spoke to the larger question of how to remove Mugabe and ZANU-PF from power. This was emanating from the successive losses of the MDC against ZANU-PF, which was contributing to some frustrations on the part of some supporters, including some in the leadership. It also speaks to the nature of the flawed MDC democratic culture wherein Morgan

Tsvangirai overruled an internal executive decision that called on the MDC to participate in the October 2005 senatorial elections, and declared instead that the MDC would not participate. It is enlightening to note that the split of 2005 was more of a split between the workers represented by Morgan Tsvangirai and the intellectuals who were led by Welshman Ncube and later by Arthur Mutambara. While the foregoing is largely true, the split also had ethnic dimensions in which the Ncube-led split took more of an Ndebele ethnic identity, while the Tsvangirai led group while retaining a more national outlook struggled for assertion in some parts of Matabeleland outside of Bulawayo. Again, the split of 2014 also had a class dimension to it. Again Tsvangirai, as in the 2005 split, symbolised the ordinary workers interests, while the Biti-led group, the Renewal Team, largely represented the intellectuals and the white sponsors.

State-led violence and the weakening of the MDCs

Outside the politics of fragmentation within the MDCs, one key factor in the decline of the MDC-T has been the rather incessant attacks from the ZANU-PF state. Since its formation, the MDC/MDC-T structures have suffered a lot of battering from the state and ZANU-PF structures (Sachikonye 2011; Raftopoulos 2009b). The major effect of this include the denial of state power by ZANU-PF through the ballot, the scattering of MDCs supporters both internally and externally, loss of supporters who out of fear of the violence withdrew their support or began to vote for ZANU-PF. From the start of this section, it has to be mentioned that the violence against the MDC[s] structures at times involved the use of state bodies, including the hegemonic apparatus of the state media as well as military and quasi-military institutions (Sachikonye 2011). Among others, the use of the military and semi-military units, such as the National Youth Service graduates presented several advantages to ZANU-PF and seriously disadvantaged the MDC formations. Many scholarly works (Sachikonye 2011; Raftopoulos 2009b; Rupiya 2004) and numerous human rights reports (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 2009; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011; &

Solidarity Peace Trust, 2008) have discussed the roles of national security forces and quasi-military bodies in the commission of violence on behalf of ZANU-PF against the MDCs structures. As Finer, cited in Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes the military, for example, has three distinct advantages over civilians. These are: it has a superior organisational unity; a highly emotional symbolic status; and it has superiority in the means of applying force (Finer cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, n.d: 53). Besides physical violence the MDC[s] was also subjected to a lot of hate and caricaturing language, where, among others, it was labelled as either a front for the forces that wanted to recolonise Zimbabwe, as imperialists stooges, Blair's running dogs or Blair's tea boys. The essence of this is neatly encapsulated in President Mugabe's words on the MDC. In a speech captured in *Inside the Third Chimurenga* (Mugabe, 2001: 88), he said:

the MDC should never be judged by its black trade union face; by its youthful student face; by its salaried black suburban junior professionals; never by its rough and violent high density lumpen elements. It is much deeper than these human superficialities; for it is immovably and implacably moored in the colonial yesteryear and embraces wittingly or unwittingly the repulsive ideology of a return to white settler colonial rule. MDC is as old and as strong as the forces that control it; that converge on it and control it; that drive and direct; indeed sponsor and spot it. It is a counter revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people yesterday.

The violence also involved the MDC[s] supporters being denied access to basic goods that were in short supply during Zimbabwe's crisis, being denied access to social services or from accessing land and from food for work programmes (Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark, 2002 :11-22). Broadly, this led to the weakening of the MDC[s] structures, some of whose members went underground or were browbeaten into supporting ZANU-PF.

Conclusion

On the whole, this chapter has argued that violence has played a central role in the politics of the MDC-T formation, survival and decline. Among others, violence has enabled the MDC-T formation to survive against the onslaught from the ZANU-PF government and against other MDC formations. Simultaneously, the deployment of violence within the MDC-T against internal dissenting voices has allowed some in leadership positions of the MDC-T, especially Morgan Tsvangirai, to entrench themselves beyond their constitutionally mandated terms in office. Because of its effects on the internal democratic and dynamic workings of the MDC-T, the same violence, nonetheless, threatens the continued existence of the MDC-T and destruction from within. *Inter alia*, this has led to further fractionalisation, fragmentation, confusion and discontentment within the ranks of the leadership and ordinary supporters. Critically, it has led to the flight of funding as donors withdrew funding on the back of escalating divisions and tensions in the movement. Notwithstanding this critical role of the violence within the party, it is vital to acknowledge the place of other factors in the decline and potential demise of the MDC-T. First, is the damaging role of state violence on the MDC-T that has tended to target the rank and file of the party. As well, there is a certain level in which the MDC-T has failed over the years to overcome internal fissures born out of the myriad interests that coalesced on the back of a desire to remove President Mugabe from power to transform into a coherent political party. These disparate interests have failed to gel and have continued to be the fissures upon which the breakaways of the party have emerged. These dichotomies have particularly worsened with the rise in the number of electoral defeats of the MDC-T by ZANU-PF.

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‘Mere Paper Covering the Cracks?’ The Case of South Africa’s Mediation Role in Zimbabwe’s crisis, 2008-2013

James Hlongwana and Tasara Muguti

Introduction

Following the disputed and polarizing 2008 Presidential elections in Zimbabwe in which the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC- T), Morgan Tsvangirai polled more votes than the incumbent Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe slid into an unprecedented socio-economic and political crisis. In spite of Tsvangirai getting more votes than Mugabe, he did not reach the constitutional benchmark of 51% plus one to assume the presidency, hence the election did not produce an outright winner. A re-run that was conducted was marred by serious violence which forced Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidature. The result of the re-run in which Mugabe participated uncontested in the end, did not win international approval. This worsened the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe, which in turn deepened the country’s economic meltdown in which the state failed to deliver basic services. Resultantly, the desperate situation in the country forced millions of Zimbabweans to migrate as economic and political refugees to some neighbouring and overseas countries. In order to find a lasting solution to the unfolding situation, South Africa, was therefore, appointed by the African Union (AU) through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to mediate in the Zimbabwean crisis. At differing moments, the two succeeding presidents of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, shuttled between Pretoria and Harare in overtures designed to build bridges between the feuding parties in Zimbabwe, namely the Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriot Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations.

Indeed, it should be noted that the South African mediation role dates to the year 2000 when president Thabo Mbeki was appointed by the regional body SADC to resolve the political impasse between Zanu-PF and MDC after a disputed election result (*The Zimbabwean*, 22 June 2008). The same mediating role did not also end with the consummation of the GNU in 2009. Rather it continued till the eventual demise of the GNU in July 2013. This present chapter attempts to interrogate the achievements of the South African mediation role in Zimbabwe and to analyse the constraints which undermined the same mediation process. Broadly, the growing calls internally and globally that Zimbabwe's 2018 general elections should be run either by the United Nations (UN) or Southern African Development Community (SADC) to prevent a disputed election result vindicate the authors' argument that South Africa's mediation effort did not get to the core of the Zimbabwean crisis. The chapter will be qualitative in nature and will largely depend on oral interviews, print and electronic media, internet sources, primary and secondary sources. The study is also based on the lived experiences of the authors who followed the harmonized March 2008 vote and June presidential runoff with keen interest by virtue of being Zimbabweans, and Zimbabwean-based academics, who were equally affected by the final election outcome and were keenly following the South African mediation role in post-millennium Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwean Political Landscape since Independence

This section seeks to interrogate the Zimbabwe's political terrain since independence. Since the country attained independence from British colonial rule in 1980, the country had been under the uninterrupted rule of ZANU- PF. Between 1980 and the late 1990's many political formations including Zimbabwe African People's Union, Patriot Front (ZAPU-PF), United African National Congress (UANC), ZUPO, Zimbabwe African National Union (NDONGA), Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), Forum and the Democratic Party (DP) tried to challenge ZANU-PF hegemony on Zimbabwean politics with limited success. Some of these political formations such as PF-ZAPU, the UANC and ZUPO had been in existence prior to

Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The Joshua Nkomo-led PF-ZAPU which seemed to offer a serious threat to ZANU dominance on Zimbabwean politics was eventually forced into a coalition government with the ruling ZANU after signing the Unity Accord of 1987. This was after an almost decade long civil war pitting the North Korean trained government forces, the Fifth Brigade, and former ZIPRA combatants which resulted in the unwarranted massacring of over 20 000 civilians in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces (Bhebe,2004). The other opposition parties that survived after 1987 continued to participate in national elections that have always been characterized by intimidation, violence and political intolerance by ZANU-PF since independence (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000, Makumbe 2012). However, the Zimbabwean political terrain has been hotly contested since the beginning of 2000. The year 1999 was a watershed in the Zimbabwean political landscape as it witnessed the formation of a labour backed political movement, the Movement For Democratic Change (MDC), which posed a serious threat to ZANU PF's unchallenged dominance in politics since independence in 1980 (Maposa, Hlongwana and Gamira, 2010). The MDC, led by the former Secretary General of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Morgan Tsvangirai, backed by the white community, workers and the generality of the Zimbabwean populace enjoyed wide cross-sectional support because it promised to end ZANU-PF hegemony and to revive the economy which had been dislocated by Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and ZANU-PF economic mismanagement. This was not surprising since by 1999, many Zimbabweans across the racial divide were experiencing a myriad of socio-economic challenges which made life very difficult for the majority of the people. ESAP had wiped out most of the socio-economic achievements that had been achieved by the black government during the 1980's (Ballies 1993). The other factors that compounded the socio-economic challenges confronting the country were bureaucratic corruption, awarding of gratuities to war veterans in 1997 and the country's involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo war from 1998 to 2003 (Muguti, 2016, forthcoming).

By the late 1990s basic social services such as health and education were no longer affordable for the generality of the populace. Unemployment due to retrenchment precipitated by company closures was rife and many Zimbabweans increasingly resorted to informal livelihoods for survival (Hlongwana 2016). It was under these conditions that the MDC was formed. The MDC, unlike its predecessors, seemed to offer viable alternative policies to the ZANU-PF government policies. Besides its feasible policies, the MDC founding president, Morgan Tsvangirai had an outstanding traceable track record (Makumbe 2012). After the establishment of the MDC in 1999, the new labour party successfully pressurized ZANU-PF into crafting a new constitution. Despite ZANU-PF accepting to come up with a new constitution, the constitution was heavily flawed and was resoundly rejected by the people when it was put to a referendum (Hammar, 2003).

The MDC, civic organizations and churches mobilized the people against the new constitution. Makumbe (2012: 8) opined that 'the resounding "No" vote in the constitutional referendum served to confirm the regime's worst fears with regard to its waning popularity among the people of Zimbabwe. The fact that the MDC had attracted virtually all forces that were opposed to Mugabe regime, including white commercial farmers, infuriated the beleaguered Mugabe regime, and forced it to resort to drastic means of staying in power'. Fearing defeat in the coming Parliamentary and Presidential Elections on the back of a strong MDC presence, ZANU PF carried out the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (2000) as a gimmick to revive its waning political fortunes (Hammar, 2003). The Fast Track Land Reform Programme resulted in more than 4 000 white commercial farmers losing their land to the black majority government (Hlongwana, forthcoming). The violent nature of the land reform programme that was spearheaded by former guerrilla fighters also resulted in the perpetration of gross human rights violations on the white commercial farmers, their farm workers and other citizens who were perceived as antagonistic to the programme.

In 2000, the newly formed labour backed political party, the MDC participated in a national election and the outcome was disputed as ZANU-PF was accused of rigging the vote, among other

factors. From then on, the socio-economic and political situation has continued to deteriorate. From the time it was formed in 1999, the MDC unsuccessfully tried to dislodge ZANU-PF from power democratically through the ballot in 2000, 2002 and 2005 before the watershed parliamentary and presidential elections of March 2008. While the 2005 parliamentary elections were generally viewed as free and fair, the playing field was not even as the opposition could not openly campaign in some areas and there was also widespread harassment, violence and intimidation of opposition party supporters by the ruling party supporters (Mukoma, 2008). Repressive pieces of legislation such as Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA) were constantly used by the ruling party to suppress and restrict fundamental freedoms of the generality of the citizenry and to limit the democratic space for the MDC structures in new millennium Zimbabwe. These pieces of legislation considerably diminished democratic space in the country.

The 2008 March elections

The March 2008 harmonized elections were hotly contested though they were largely peaceful and rated free and fair by both SADC and the AU. The elections were carried out in an environment which was largely in conformity with democratic tenets for holding free and fair elections. For the first time, opposition parties were accorded the privilege to campaign in the country side including areas that had been previously regarded as no-go areas for opposition parties in the previous elections (Matyszak, 2010). The MDC was also allowed to flight campaign material in the state controlled public media which was significant in that the MDC was able to reach a wide audience. This was probably made possible by the intervention of South African president Thabo Mbeki in the run-up to the 29 March 2008 elections. Mbeki had brokered negotiations between ZANU-PF and the MDC prior to the holding of elections. This was after the violence that had erupted at a 'prayer meeting' organized by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, a grouping of civil society, churches and political parties at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfields, Harare in

March 2007. The police surrounded the venue and brutalized MDC supporters, civil society activists and church leaders. Morgan Tsvangirai was severely assaulted later detained in prison. The police brutality was widely condemned across the globe and SADC was forced to convene an emergency meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania a week after the police massacre. It was at this summit that Mbeki was tasked by SADC to facilitate mediation between ZANU-PF and the MDCs (Makumbe 2012). As argued by Matyszak (2010) Mbeki had perhaps convinced Mugabe that the best way to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis was to make the poll appear free and fair in order to gain regional and international acceptance.

The harmonised March 2008 election was historic in that for the first time in independent Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF lost to the MDC-T in both the Parliamentary and Presidential vote. As succinctly advanced by Makumbe (2012: 23), ‘the defeat of ZANU-PF in both the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2008 effectively forced former liberators into a corner where they had to confirm the truism that the DNA of liberation political parties in Southern Africa makes them allergic to handing over political power to civilian political parties’. In the parliamentary elections, the main opposition party, MDC-T won the majority of the parliamentary seats and the election result was accepted and endorsed by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). In the 207 out of the 210 constituencies where parliamentary elections were held, MDC-T won 99 seats, ZANU-PF 97 and Arthur Mutambara’s MDC garnered 10 seats. By-elections were to be held in the remaining three constituencies following the deaths of three parliamentary candidates in the run up to the harmonized March 2008 elections (Human Rights Watch World Report 2010). However, the presidential election results were not announced together with the parliamentary results.

Also, for the first time in the political history of Zimbabwe, the presidential elections results took much longer to be announced than previously. The delay of up to six weeks to announce the results created a lot of curiosity and anxiety among ordinary Zimbabweans (Shakespeare and Chinyere, 2013). There was widespread speculation that Tsvangirai had won resoundingly and that the delay by ZEC in announcing the results was a deliberate ploy to manipulate the vote

hence the outcome. Others argued that the ZANU-PF leadership was in secret talks with the MDC to negotiate for immunity and an honourable exit package for its leader as it was felt that Tsvangirai (MDC) was going to take over. Besides, the anxiety, the delay also kept political tensions high and the country remained in election mood. Pockets of violence between the major political protagonists were witnessed with accusations and counter accusations as to who was behind the political violence. When the results were eventually announced, the leader of the MDC-T Morgan Tsvangirai was declared the winner capturing 47% of the total vote, followed by ZANU-PF's Robert Mugabe with 43% (Gwenzi, 2016). In spite of Tsvangirai winning the vote, he could not automatically take over the presidency because of a constitutional constraint and this eventually turned out to work in favour of the loser. The situation following Tsvangirai's victory was very tense. The MDC felt that they had been robbed of election victory and they tried to seek recourse from the courts of law with very limited success.

The Presidential election rerun and outcome

Following the failure by the leader of the MDC-T Morgan Tsvangirai to garner the mandatory constitutional 51% plus one vote required, a runoff of the presidential elections was declared by the ZEC. The rerun was characterized by unprecedented levels of intimidation and violence never witnessed before in post independent Zimbabwe. Documented evidence by reputable civil society groups and human rights organizations revealed that the election was marred by the use of excessive force and political persecution hitherto witnessed before (The Zimbabwe Election Support Network 2008 and Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum 2008). There were widespread human rights violations perpetrated on opposition supporters as people were tortured, assaulted, arrested arbitrarily and detained (Sachikonye 2011). Indeed, no one was spared from the violence from the opposition supporters, party activists, opposition leaders, civil servants, civic society activists and human rights activists including doctors and lawyers who tried to assist the political victims. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO

forum postulated that, 'Although violence has characterized most political events, the 2008 presidential runoff election violence was probably the worst ever' (Zimbabwe Human Right Forum 2009: 9). The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) described the runoff period as 'days of Armageddon for the Zimbabwean populace' (Plutter 2013: 1). It is widely believed that the 'warlike' strategy adopted was a product of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) which largely spearheaded the ZANU-PF campaign trail during the presidential runoff. Sachikonye (2011) states that the bloody onslaught was reportedly orchestrated systematically by the armed forces, CIO, police, ZANU-PF militia and the war veterans who had participated in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. There is no doubt that the military effectively took over the ZANU-PF campaign in order to win support for President Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF militia, war veterans (who have always been ZANU-PF storm troopers in all previous elections) and youth complemented the military efforts in mobilizing support for the ruling ZANU-PF party. The majority of youth who had purportedly been converted to ZANU-PF after the March elections were kept in 'bases' where they were indoctrinated about the importance of protecting the country's sovereignty through voting for the ZANU-PF presidential candidate. From these 'bases', they descended on the defenseless people whom they terrorized by perpetrating different forms of violence across the country. They turned against their kith and kin and became very brutal and ruthless. In the end, it appeared like the runoff contest was figuratively between the bullet and the ballot. Furthermore, some government officials and members of parliament were also involved fuelling the perpetration of violence (Interview with Rukeshu, Mashava 2016). In Masholand West, well-known ZANU-PF officials were reportedly accused of having informed ZANU-PF supporters at a rally after the March elections that 'people voted the wrong way, so people must be beaten thoroughly so that no one will ever vote MDC again' (Human Rights Watch 2008: 34).

A headman from Zaka who preferred anonymity for fear of victimization postulated that at the height of the presidential campaign they were invited for a national chiefs' convention in Harare and by the time they came back to their areas of domain they

found the military firmly in control of the ZANU-PF presidential runoff campaign (Interview with a headman in Zaka 20 February 2016). Senior serving army officials directed the election campaigns at provincial and districts levels. The campaigns were also taken to tertiary institutions where students and academics alike were also intimidated and lectured on how ZANU-PF had liberated the country and on the pitfalls of voting Tsvangirai into power whom they alleged was a puppet of the West. At the height of the runoff campaign, the authors had the privilege of attending one of the gatherings at Great Zimbabwe University. Lecturers and students at the institution, and those from Masvingo Teachers' College were delivered a lengthy lecture by the officer commanding operations in Masvingo on what he referred to as 'symmetrical and asymmetrical' warfare that was being waged against ZANU-PF by the British and Americans through 'sellout' parties like the MDC (Muguti and Hlongwana 2008). The presidential runoff was a completely different affair from the first round in March 2008. While people were generally excited then that the elections could finally bring about change, the June 2008 vote generated a lot of fear as Mugabe battled for political survival. Referring to the ensuing violence McGreal (2008: 1) commented, thus:

Zimbabweans have not seen anything like this since the Matabeleland massacres by Mugabe's army more than two decades ago. That violence was limited to the south. This time, as Mugabe, 84, fights for his political life, it is nationwide. If this is the endgame, the brutality of the tactics employed reveals his determination to win at any cost. There has been election violence. Beatings and intimidation were part of every ballot since the opposition emerged as a coherent force in 1999. But never before has it generated such widespread fear that even urban critics of the government have gone into hiding.

As the presidential campaign trail, spearheaded by the military unfolded, it became increasingly clear that a second defeat would not be acceptable to ZANU-PF. The military-led strategy which had begun with the beating of ruling voters who were accused of having deserted the ruling party during the March elections equally affected opposition supporters and activists who were purged from the

country side. Independent officials were systematically removed from election administration and replaced by military personnel. Tsvangirai's support base in Harare and other urban areas was grossly undermined as his supporters were jailed on flimsy charges, beaten up and thousands more displaced from their homes. It became very difficult for Tsvangirai to campaign due to the persecution of his supporters and refusal by the police to grant him permission to hold rallies and when permission was granted Zanu-PF militia men and women would disrupt the meetings. Often times Tsvangirai could not even get to the venue as he would be deliberately delayed and police roadblocks that were mounted on all main roads and roads leading into towns. His campaign buses were at times confiscated at the roadblocks (McGreal 2008: 2).

Some of the worst victims of the violence were the teachers especially in the rural areas due to their perceived influence on the communities they lived in. Many teachers were forced to abandon their work stations and either went back to their homes, migrated to towns or to some locations in and outside the country due to fear of political victimization. Some of the teachers who were interviewed in Mashava confirmed that they were even afraid to take part in the runoff elections as polling officers (Kechi, 2016). They argued, it was better to just vote and go home than participating as polling officers. The informants further indicated that in and around Mashava, most of the teachers who participated in the presidential runoff were known ZANU-PF supporters. People in rural areas were forced to attend rallies by the ZANU-PF militia and war veterans from morning to evening. At times, they were forced to attend night meetings (*pungwes*). At these gatherings they were threatened that if they voted for Tsvangirai, there was going to be war. The same was also taking place in Harare townships and even in the up markets suburbs where domestic workers were forced to attend '*pungwes*' which were normally accompanied by threats and beatings (Sachikonye 2011; McGreal 2008).

It is important to note that the opposition supporters did not always stand with hands at akimbo when all these things were taking place. At times they retaliated by killing war veterans but the violence perpetrated by MDC supporters could not match ZANU-PF

violence which was state sponsored. As part of its propaganda, ZANU-PF used the state controlled media to blame the MDC for the violence was taking place at the time. The state claimed that the MDC was being used by the British to sow chaos and make the country ungovernable. In order to avoid a lot of public scrutiny from the conduct of presidential runoff, the government kept the number of local and foreign observers and monitors at a minimum. Western observers were barred from taking part in the presidential runoff as observers. While the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, a reputable election monitoring group was allowed to dispatch 8 800 observers to supervise the March vote, it was only allowed to deploy 500 monitors to watch over more than 9 000 polling stations dotted around the country (McGreal, 2008). Noel Katutwa, the network's chairman pointed out that their local observers in the rural areas had been intimidated to the extent that they had to recruit observers from Harare (McGreal, 2008). Acknowledging the daunting task that also confronted them ahead of the presidential runoff, Ian Makone, the MDC national director of elections lamented that:

We thought the March election campaign was difficult to plan, but by comparison it was a piece of cake, because we had relative peace. We had 54 000 thousand polling agents, six at each polling station. We could recruit locally' he said 'This time, possibly half the country has been terrified. We have to ship party agents from Harare into these areas. 'We are going to be beaten, there are going to be deaths, but we have to try to minimize it. The first challenge is to find the people to go to the polling stations as election agents and then to get them there. The risks involved are enormous (cited in McGreal 2008).

Furthermore, it was also very difficult to transport election agents as party supporters and other well wishers were reluctant to lend their vehicles due to the enormous risks involved that included the burning of cars or even threats of deaths. The build up to the presidential runoff was characterized by what Rupiya dismissed as 'a protracted internal political crisis' while Hammerstad labeled it 'a humanitarian crisis' (cited in Walker 2013: 9). It was a political crisis in that, the rule of law had almost disappeared and a humanitarian crisis in that massive state controlled violence displaced, injured and traumatized

people. There was an uncontrolled massive destruction of property, houses burnt, shops looted, intimidations and all associated evils.

Base camps were established by war veterans and youths throughout the country where interrogations and intimidations of various sorts were carried out. MDC supporters were forced to come forward, confess, repent and/ or rejoin ZANU-PF. Tsvangirai's campaign was consistently blocked or frustrated and he was detained on several occasions. Furthermore, Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested repeatedly and the MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti was even charged with treason. The intimidation and violence eventually forced Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw from the presidential race in order to save lives. Justifying his decision to withdraw his candidature from the presidential race, Tsvangirai formally delivered a letter to ZEC stating that 'In my considered view, the conditions presently obtaining throughout the country make it virtually impossible for a proper election...we cannot ask them (the electorate) to cast their vote on the 27th (of June) when it could well cost their lives' (*Irish Sun*, 2008). That the situation had gone out of hand was reflected by the fact that Tsvangirai wrote the letter from the Dutch embassy where he had sought asylum. As Plutter (2005: 1) notes, 'boycotting elections is a peaceful manner in which people may powerfully demonstrate their dissatisfaction'. Indeed, this was not surprising because even some of the regional leaders who once sympathized with Robert Mugabe such as Thabo Mbeki were urging him to call off the election due to their revulsion towards the escalating violence countrywide. Thabo Mbeki had been squarely debriefed by an assemblage of South African generals whom he had dispatched to assess the situation that ZANU-PF was behind the violence. This was also corroborated by the head of an African parliamentarians' mission in Zimbabwe who had confirmed having received horrific accounts about the violence and that it was going to be difficult for the team to endorse the election outcome if the violence continued unabated (McGreal 2008). However, in spite of Tsvangirai's withdrawal and protests by regional and other African leaders, the rerun was eventually held on the 27th June 2008 and Mugabe emerged the uncontested winner.

Broadly speaking, though the election outcome was remotely endorsed by SADC and the AU, it generally failed to garner international approval and acceptance. In a preliminary statement on the outcome of the presidential run off, the head of the the SADC Elections Observer Mission (SEOM), Jose Marcos Barrica noted that ‘the process leading up to the presidential run-off elections held on 27 June 2008 did not conform to SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic elections. Based on the above mentioned observations, the Mission is of the view that the prevailing environment impringed on the credibility of the electoral process. The elections did not represent the will of the people’ (Jose Marcos Barrica 2008: 5-6). The Mission further highlighted that in some spoiled ballot papers, voters had expressed sentiments like ‘God bless this country’, ‘Let there be free and fair elections’, ‘No to dictatorship’ and this was reflective of the voters’ general dissatisfaction with the way the elections had been conducted (Jose Marcos Barrica 2008: 5-6).

The United States (US), which had earlier imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe for its land grabbing policy, swiftly called for more sanctions against the country following the disputed presidential elections. Canada and France declared that they would only recognize the 29th March, 2008 Presidential elections which had been won by the opposition while Germany encouraged its companies to pull-out of Zimbabwe. But while the reaction by the international community or the West in calling for smart sanctions against President Mugabe and key government officials were encouraging in signaling the international community’s unwillingness to countenance blatant human right violations as a means to retaining political power, the African Union’s (AU) voice was muted (Kebonang, 2012).

In 2008 for instance, when some AU member states such as Gabon, Botswana, Liberia and Nigeria questioned the legitimacy of President Mugabe and the country’s right to participate in African forums, the AU at its Summit held at Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt, opted instead to call for the formation of a government of national unity (Abwao and Cowell, 2008). In failing to condemn President Mugabe, the AU effectively endorsed his legitimacy as the President of Zimbabwe. This endorsement flew in the face of reports by observer

teams such as the Pan African Parliament (PAP) which had stated that the run-off presidential elections did not represent the will of the Zimbabwean people as these were marred by high levels of intimidation, violence, displacement of people, abductions and loss of life (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The resolution by the AU only confirmed its ineffectiveness in dealing with its member states and revealed the premium it attached to group solidarity. By empathizing with ZANU-PF, the AU gave ammunition to the notion that the AU, just like its predecessor, the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), is in fact, purely a place where African dictators go to find solace. Surprisingly, even the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which was hailed as representing new beginnings for the African continent in terms of holding states accountable to internationally acceptable and agreed standards of governance was silent on the Zimbabwean crisis (Abwao and Cowell, 2008).

After the presidential runoff, the impasse remained unresolved as micro instability persisted while political retribution continued making Zimbabwe a '... a near failed state' (Muguti, Tavuyanago and Hlongwana, 2012: 152). A disturbing trend was that the partisan violence, human rights violations and persecution on perceived opposition supporters did not subsidize but continued unabated after the election rerun. To the older generations, the violence that engulfed the country during the presidential runoff was reminiscent of the violent acts that were perpetrated by the Rhodesian forces on the Zimbabwean 'masses' during the '*Second Chimurenga*' of the 1970's. The violence that accompanied the presidential runoff was in stark contrast to the near peaceful elections that had been conducted in March 2008. The political violence accompanied by the general economic meltdown forced many Zimbabwean to turn back on the country and became political and economic refugees outside the country, particularly in neighbouring South Africa. Fearing for his life, Tsvangirai eventually skipped the border into Botswana where he sought political asylum. It is telling to note that at the height of the 'dissident' war in Midlands and Matabeleland during the 1980's, Joshua Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU also sought refuge in that country (Maposa, Hlongwana, and Moyo, 2011).

Towards South African mediation

Moore defines mediation 'as an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable and implementable settlement' (Moore 2011: 17). It is in the above context that the South African mediation task in Zimbabwe will be interrogated. Following the disputed presidential runoff of June 2008 which was characterized by vote buying, violence, serious human rights violations and an eventual boycott by the MDC-T, the AU, through SADC was forced to intervene in order to deal with the socio-economic and political impasse. Indeed, the Zimbabwean crisis had dominated events in Southern Africa since 2000. That democracy and human rights were actively decomposing since 2000 could not be denied. Besides, by July 2008, the economy was in serious doldrums with inflation hovering around 231 000 000%, collapsing infrastructure, unemployment, skills flight, a collapsing health delivery system which was exacerbated by a deadly cholera outbreak and a general shortage of basic commodities. Schools, institutions of higher learning and major hospitals had closed down (Chimhowu, *et al* 2010; Nyazema 2010; Chibango 2013; Muguti 2015; Zimbabwe: Country Analysis Working Document, October 2014). Makumbe further notes that between three to four million Zimbabweans emigrated to other countries by 2009 while Mukandawira encapsulated that 4 287 people died as a result of cholera outbreak (cited in Mukuhlani, 2014: 2). It was in such a situation in which the Zimbabwean main political protagonists were forced into a negotiated settlement which eventually gave birth to the Government of National Unity (GNU). The regional grouping (SADC) then appointed South Africa, represented by its President Thabo Mbeki to act as facilitator between the Zimbabwean feuding parties, ZANU-PF and the MDC's in forming an inclusive government comprising the three major political entities. The Zimbabwean situation had become so bad that the international community could not ignore it any more. The choice of South Africa to mediate in the Zimbabwean crisis was

based on well considered merits. South Africa's economic and military might made it a suitable broker in the Zimbabwean political problem (Shakespeare and Chinyere, 2013). As it latter turned out, the mediation process was no walk in the park as the mediators had to constantly grapple with irreconcilable differences between the Zimbabwe political players.

The process to find an everlasting solution to the unfolding political crisis seriously gathered momentum from July 2008 where the chief negotiators from the major political parties met in Harare and agreed to a negotiated settlement. The preliminary talks stipulating parameters for the negotiations started on the 10th July between the leading negotiators from ZANU-PF and MDC's. This was followed by a meeting among the leaders of the three parties (referred to as the principals) when they met for the first time on the 22nd July 2008 to 'express their support for a negotiated settlement of disputes arising out of the presidential and parliamentary elections' (Cowell and Bowley, 2008). After the principals had set the tone for the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis, negotiations between the major Zimbabwean political parties began in earnest on the 25th July 2008 in Pretoria under the mediation of South African President Thabo Mbeki. From then on until the final signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) the negotiators and their principals (Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Mutambara) met regularly in Harare and Pretoria to deliberate on the initiative. The final deal to the negotiating process was reached on the 11th September and the agreement signed on the 15th September 2008. However, even as the negotiations were taking place, the violence between the main political parties continued, albeit slightly subdued (Human Rights Watch World Report, 2010).

Signing of the GPA and formation of GNU

As highlighted above, ZANU-PF and the MDCs signed a political agreement, the GPA on the 15th September 2008 that was brokered by Thabo Mbeki. The GPA was a culmination of a process by African leaders which dated back to 2000 to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe (Raptouplous 2008). In the words of Raptouplous,

‘the central aim of the agreement was to find a power sharing arrangement that would reflect the balance of political power in the country after March 2008 Harmonised elections, which, together with the abortive presidential run-off in June, left the issue of the presidential election unresolved’. In spite of the fact that the Agreement did not adequately address important issues such as the allocation of ministries to the parties in the agreement, it nevertheless established a workable framework to move the political situation forward.

Despite the complex situation that confronted the protagonists as articulated above, the GNU eventually came to life on the 11th February 2009. ZANU-PF acceded to a coalition government due to the economic collapse, mounting international criticism and pressure from the AU and SADC. The intrinsic impetus for the GNU was propelled by internal party interests. Muguti, *et al*, argued that Zanu-PF gave in for political legitimacy, to have a retreat and reorganize while subjecting the MDC to deal with the harder issues of economic retrieval (Muguti, *et al* 2012). Also, as ZANU-PF’s all political options had been exhausted the pact provided the opportunity to manage the MDC leadership from within and to strategise against it while the MDCs were preoccupied with their new found government posts (Bratton, 2010). Furthermore, ZANU-PF sought an appearance of a born again member of the international community. ZANU-PF thought that participation in the GNU politics would make it acceptable to international creditors and politically the West would lift the sanctions (Bratton 2010). Conversely, the main MDC-T formation viewed the GNU as a possible avenue to power. It wanted to demonstrate its political and economic capabilities in governance. The MDC further hoped that the GNU would break the siege that ZANU-PF had mounted around the MDC-T and that would bring relief to its leadership and followers. Also the MDC welcomed the Global Political Agreement as a transitional phase leading to an election it hoped to win (Cawthra 2010). Furthermore, they had learnt that from experience that as opposition they could win elections and still not accede to office. Thus, a half a loaf was better than nothing. Also, Tsvangirai’s motivation to agree to the power sharing deal could be understood from the options that remained to

him. Mutambara, a man of untraceable political origins was ready to form a government with Mugabe if Tsvangirai continued to be intransigent. The MDC splinter group led by Arthur Mutambara perceived it as an opportunity to maintain political relevance. Besides, the Zimbabwean socio-economic crisis was also heavily impacting on its neighbours. Gavin cited by Mutisi (2011:2) estimated that the Zimbabwean crisis had contagious regional effects as the economic and political refugees from Zimbabwe flooded South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Tanzania, hence Zimbabwe had turned out to be, 'a sick man of SADC'. Thus, the humanitarian crisis emanating from the economic meltdown due to hyper inflation and state sponsored violence endangered human security and human rights and democracy to breaking point levels which exerted much pressure on neighbouring governments to take steps through SADC in order to resolve the unfolding crisis. These conditions pressurized the regional grouping SADC and the AU to bring together Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai together and the leader of the smaller MDC Arthur Mutambara to settle for a power sharing deal that was sponsored by South Africa President Thabo Mbeki and later Jacob Zuma.

Reflections on GNU

In spite of the weaknesses associated with the South African mediation teams, they posted notable achievements. It should be known that economic, social and political reforms which were instituted in Zimbabwe could only be implemented where a government was in place. It was South Africa's determined effort to break the political impasse which resulted in the formation of a government of national. This was the second best option for ending the Zimbabwean sticky political situation (Mathye, 2013). The 2008-2013 Zimbabwean government was clearly a South African progeny and minus omissions and miscalculations in the mediation process South Africa in this regard did not fail the people of Zimbabwe. With its provision for power sharing, the GNU was a balancing act in that it conferred some legitimacy to Zanu-PF which purportedly had lost without discrediting the opposition MDC.

Notwithstanding the problems, the GPA registered considerable progress. With the inception of GNU a multicurrency system was introduced to replace the worthless paper money printed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. A degree of stabilisation in the economy and the drastic disappearance of hyper-inflation became features of a post- crisis economy. Important services which had ceased to function such as medical and insurance and pension schemes sprang back into life. Basic commodities which had disappeared from the supermarkets reappeared and the strong currencies which were adopted such as the South African Rand and United States Dollar wiped hyper-inflation which had become a salient feature of the Zimbabwean economic life during the crisis (Muguti, Tavuyanago and Hlongwana, 2012). Also, government institutions including schools, colleges, universities and hospitals made noticeable recovery. Moreover, the politics of inclusivity forced the government of Zimbabwe to become more accountable to parliament and cabinet decisions than ever before (Mukuhlani, 2014). The Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), which was created to evaluate progress in the implementation of the policies which the GPA principals had undertaken to introduce during the negotiation stages provided important platform for continued negotiation and engagement between the parties. Furthermore, the power sharing arrangement was followed by relative air of stability as political violence considerably subsided across the country (CM Briefing, Zimbabwe Multilayered crisis 2010).

Solemnising an imperfect deal

One of the things which exposed Thabo Mbeki to the gaze of critics was his failure to walk a tight rope in the mediation process. The power sharing deal was far from being fair as executive authority was made to reside in the office of the President (Chigora and Guzura, 2011). Tsvangirai was appointed Prime minister while Mugabe retained the presidency. A cursory look at the so called power sharing deal indicated that Tsvangirai was a junior partner in the inclusive government. The mediator gave in to Mugabe's indifference to making concessions which would culminate in

equitable sharing of executive authority between him and the Prime Minister. Throughout the life of the GNU Mugabe treated his colleague in the inclusive government with contempt and as a junior even refusing him a chance to preside over cabinet meetings when he had engagements elsewhere. To make matters worse the President did not admonish army generals who openly undermined the office of the Prime Minister. Time and again and without being provoked they argued that they would not salute Tsvangirai because he lacked liberation war credentials (Human Rights Watch 2008; Masunungure 2009; Bratton 2010; and Rupiya 2011; Kebonang 2012).

The mediator was supposed to be guided by the realisation that Tsvangirai was not an invited guest in the inclusive government but a man who carried the votes of many Zimbabweans. Kobayasha (2010) asserts that ‘while votes...won MDC a seat at the table (of the power sharing government), ZANU-PF’s guns...kept Robert Mugabe at its head...(and) MDC remains unlikely to displace Mugabe as long as ZANU-PF controls the state security organs’ (cited in Kebonang 2012: 13). Mbeki should have ensured that executive power was not surrendered to one man. Two options could have been pursued in the interest to strike a better deal: rotational presidency or two-headed executive of directors comprising Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Because the office of Prime Minister was deprived of well meaning executive authority, Tsvangirai’s role in the inclusive government was merely to gloss over an illegitimate government. Since the mediator either by default or design left executive authority in the office of the President, Mugabe made capital of the Presidential powers to frustrate the implementation of some of the policies which the principals had been tasked to implement (Mathye 2013).

As Chigora and Guzura (2011) argue one of the features of power sharing is equal control of state apparatus and important ministries in government. However, the sharing of ministries between ZANU PF and the MDC formations left much to be desired and it was clear that the Zimbabwean toxic politics were far from being over. ZANU PF retained the control of coercive ministries such as defence, justice, foreign affairs, state security and home affairs. According to a Human Rights Watch (2010), ‘...the deal left ZANU-PF with its power intact, effectively maintaining the status quo ante: it kept control of

all the senior ministries including justice, security and defence'. Thus, the MDCs were left with egg on the face as it was deprived of any real power. Other ministries such as the Lands ministry could not be parted with basically for two reasons. The Lands Ministry had become popular with the peasants because of the Land Reform Programme and even election results indicated that ZANU PF was now rural based. Furthermore, the ministry could not be given to the MDC because the opposition would expose the irregularities that had been associated with the Land Reform Programme. The MDC however, gained the leadership of peripheral ministries in government. The only significant ministry that ZANU PF surrendered to the MDC was the finance ministry for the strategic reason that an MDC minister at the helm of the finance ministry was functionally a bait to win the confidence of international financiers. This would lead to improved inflow of funds from benevolent donors and international lending institutions into the country (Muguti, Tavuyanago and Hlongwana, 2012).

The South African mediation effort was partly handicapped by the fact in some instances its decisions were based on weak assumptions which defied logic. It was assumed that a quick return to the election would be a panacea to the Zimbabwean crisis hence an expiry date for the GNU was fixed. That section of the GPA document had far reaching consequences. Instead of focussing on rebuilding the country the parties became more concerned with political survival. ZANU PF in particular showed little enthusiasm in the implementation of reforms measures (CM Briefing, 2010). ZANU PF adopted procrastination as a methodological political tool so as to preserve the unreformed electoral laws which would give it advantage in the die or do 2013 general elections. Contrary to proving term limits to the GNU, the mediator should have included a binding clause in the policy document underlining full compliance with the terms of the GPA as a precondition for the dissolution of GNU and conduct of future elections. Such a clause could have forced the belligerents to become forward looking in pursuit of national interests.

The security sector reform question also betrayed the mediator's sense of sincerity in the mediation business. Security sector reform

during the unity government era and clarity on the role of the military in the new constitution were necessitated by the army's interference in politics, especially during elections periods (Mpofu 2016). The MDC argued that the goal of security under ZANU PF government was to perpetuate their rule against domestic resistance. It further claimed that ZANU PF pursued that goal through extensive use of military, police force and members of the intelligence service. According to the MDC, the society had been militarised as the defence forces had been drawn into spheres of life (Movement for Democratic Change 2013). The MDC's allegations were vindicated by the army generals' utterances that they would not accept an MDC electoral victory and that they would not salute Morgan Tsvangirai (Country of Origin Information Report, 2010). The opposition and the public argued therefore that security sector reform was supposed to focus on the depoliticisation of the defence forces to ensure that they conducted their constitutional duties in a non partisan manner. Sadly, the mediator did not put pressure on ZANU PF to reform the security sector. The result was that the uniformed forces remained a key ally of ZANU PF, helping it to win elections against the opposition (Mpofu, 2016).

Additionally, a comprehensive land audit was deferred for selfish reasons. The parties agreed that the nation deserved feedback after Zimbabwe had undertaken the new millennium agrarian reform. However, the idea to undertake a land audit found little purchase from ZANU PF and the reasons were not far to seek. While there is no disagreement that the Fast Trek Land Reform Programme attempted to even out imbalances in land ownership it was chaotic and it changed the political and economic landscape of the country. ZANU PF feared that a well-meaning land audit would open up a can of worms. Among others, it was feared that the audit would reveal that the colonial land ownership structure was replicated with black ruling elites and land was allocated on the basis of patronage and clientelism. Also, the audit would point to the failure to support the new farmers with equipment, skills, finance and marketing opportunities (Hlongwana, Muguti and Maposa, 2013). Furthermore, the exercise would expose the prevalence of multiple farm owners and widespread looting and destruction of property in the farming

communities. Overall, the land audit would provide a picture that the chaotic land reform programme set in motion processes that led to the fall of the Zimbabwean economy (Movement for Democratic Change, 2013). The reluctance by the ZANU-PF leadership to carry out the land audit was clearly motivated by a desire to protect the image of the party from public scrutiny. ZANU-PF's disinclination was aptly articulated by Nathaniel Manheru. He threatened that an audit of the land reform, as stipulated in the GPA would 'draw blood redder than the setting sun' (*International Herald Tribune*, 2008).

The proclamation of election dates by President Mugabe in 2013 in spite of the fact that not all reforms had been implemented exposed the mediator's incapacity to contain the ZANU PF leader (Mathye, 2013). When President Zuma assumed the role of mediator, he made it clear that Zimbabwean elections would be held after all the reforms had been implemented and that commitment by the incoming mediator was sweet news to pro-democracy activists (Shakespeare and Chinyere, 2013). However, armed with executive authority and also exploiting divisions within SADC, Mugabe dared the mediator and unilaterally announced the election dates. A regional summit was convened in Maputo to persuade Mugabe to attend to the outstanding reforms. However, Mugabe did not bow down to the regional diplomatic pressure and proceeded to conduct the election which ZANU-PF won resoundingly. Mathye (2013) laments that, had South Africa and the regional bloc managed to goad Mugabe into line all the outstanding issues could have been addressed and resolved.

Constraints

As it turned out the mediation was fraught with numerous challenges and constraints. It is to this section that the chapter turns. To begin with, Thabo Mbeki was not very amiable to the two MDC formations and his facilitation was found wanting in many respects. While Zanu PF welcomed the appointment of Mbeki, the MDCs had their reservations as they believed that Mbeki had double standards on the Zimbabwean crisis. The MDC viewed Mbeki's mediation with suspicion. It further saw Mbeki's quiet diplomacy and approach to

the political impasse as heavily tilted in favour of ZANU-PF which undoubtedly compromised his facilitation to a greater extent (Mukhlani, 2014). This had even been highlighted to him by Morgan Tsvangirai in a letter dated 13 May 2008 even before he had assumed the mediation role (*The Zimbabwean*, 22 June 2008). At one stage during the mediation process, Tsvangirai even hinted that Mbeki was supposed to step down as, according to Tsvangirai 'he does not appear to understand how desperate the problem in Zimbabwe is, and the solutions he proposes are too small' (<http://google.com/hostednews/afp/article>). Such utterances by the MDC-T leader had the obvious effect of straining relations between him and the mediator. However, it was no secret that Thabo Mbeki had had long standing relations with the Zimbabwean ruling oligarchy since the time of South Africa's liberation struggle. It was also a fact that Thabo Mbeki had been accommodated in Zimbabwe during South Africa's liberation's struggle. This then raised doubts among the opposition that his mediation role could not be neutral but biased in favour of Zanu PF. As noted earlier on, Mbeki's mediation role to the Zimbabwean crisis dates back to 2000 (Shakespeare and Chinyerere, 2013). Indeed, in previous disputed elections in 2000, 2002, 2005, and 29 March 2008 elections, Thabo Mbeki had paid a blind eye to the unfolding political crises in the country or had taken a partisan stance. In fact, as early as 2000 Mbeki had promised the regional and international leaders that he would resolve the Zimbabwean crises in six months but the situation was much worse by mid 2008 (*The Zimbabwean*, 22 June 2008). Expressing the MDC reservations on having Mbeki as a mediator to the Zimbabwean political impasse then, the MDC South Africa Chairman Malcolm Mutandiro cited Mbeki's 'no crises' statement on Zimbabwe that was roundly condemned by many individuals and organizations across the globe. He further cited South Africa's refusal to have the Zimbabwe crisis tabled before for discussion at the UN, harsh letter by Thabo Mbeki to President Bush of United States of America (USA) and Mbeki's lobbying for a Government of national unity whilst a constitutional electoral process was pending (Veritas, 2008). In spite of the fact that Zimbabwe did not allow African National Congress (ANC) fighters to launch offensives from its

territory against the apartheid regime for fear of reprisals, ANC officials had offices in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, during the liberation struggle ANC cadres and ZIPRA combatants crossed together into Rhodesia from Zambia and before reaching their destination they fought alongside ZIPRA combatants against the Rhodesian forces (Mudhaniso, 2016). This explains why white South African defence forces assisted the Rhodesian army in the war against Zimbabwean freedom fighters. Also, Mbeki was equally aware that Mugabe was part of the uncompromising trio (Kenneth Kaunda, Samora Machel and Robert Mugabe) in the Frontline states which was critical of the apartheid regime in South Africa (Mudhaniso 2016). More to it, Zimbabwe and South Africa shared a lot in common since they were still under the leadership of former liberation movements ZANU-PF and ANC. Other countries in the region that were still under the stewardship of former liberation movements were Mozambique, Namibia and Angola (Mathye 2013). Furthermore, some scholars argue that Mbeki's support for Mugabe was a gimmick to prevent the rise of a labour related government in Zimbabwe. It also stands to sound reason that potentially Mbeki feared that an MDC government in Zimbabwe would inspire the Congress of South African Trade Union South African Union (COSATU) to galvanise into opposition politics in South Africa, (Phimster, 2014). Mbeki had genuine fear as a labour government was already in office in Zambia following Fredreck Chiluba's victory over Kaunda.

Also, it is worth noting that Mbeki pursued an Africanist agenda whose tenets were good governance and solidarity with African leaders during his term of office (Cawthra, 2010). Thus, it was unAfrican to lift a finger against fellow statesman no matter how bad their governance was. Mbeki very clearly demonstrated this stance when he responded to Tsvangirai's utterances that SADC leaders lacked the stamina to confront Mugabe in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. Mbeki retorted that Tsvangirai 'describe(d) us in a manner that is most offensive in terms of African culture'. He further mockingly said that Tsvangirai mistakenly believed 'that others further away, in Western Europe and North America, are of greater importance' to Zimbabwe than the other African countries across the continent (<http://www.google.com.hostednews/afp/article>). This philosophy

protected Africa's worst dictators like Hastings Banda of Malawi, Mobutu Seseseko of Zaire, Bokassa of the Central Republic, among others (Decalo 1991). Mbeki would have been out of step indeed to condemn and isolate the Zimbabwean leader. The only African leader who did the unthinkable to oppose and remove a dictator from power was Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who invaded Uganda and chased away Idi Amin (Mudhaniso, 2016). Therefore Mbeki worked to ensure that Mugabe returned to the Zimbabwe House by all means possible.

The mediation process was further undermined by the rivalry between ZANU-PF and the MDC formations. This resulted in the unnecessary delays in the finalization of the deal between the feuding parties as this complicated the whole mediation process for the mediators. ZANU-PF among other factors, argued that the MDC had lobbied for the sanctions that were eventually imposed on Zimbabwe by the United States of America and the European Union. For ZANU-PF, the sanctions were a political mobilisation tool for the MDC as the sanctions induced economic and social hardships would engender people's disaffection with ZANU-PF (ZANU-PF 2008, Maposa, *et al*, 2013). Mugabe branded the MDC as terrorists bent on causing regime change in Zimbabwe. Mugabe's accusation of the MDC was to a degree justified because the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair had openly admitted to the House of Commons in 2004 admitted that he was working in cahoots with the MDC to effect a regime change in Zimbabwe (Maposa, *et al*, 2013; Moyo, *et al*, 2013). Furthermore, the British position was affirmed by the USA President Barak Obama who postulated that the internal problems in Zimbabwe were a perpetual extraordinary threat to the US foreign policy (Maposa, *et al*, 2013). The rift between ZANU-PF and the MDC was further widened by the fact that the MDC formations maintained a completely different stance about the sanctions and other issues. The MDC position was that the sanctions were an issue that was entirely between the British and the Americans as this was firmly grounded on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (2000) which had resulted in over 4 000 white commercial farmers losing land to indigenous people. It also argued that it was about the abuse of human rights, dwindling democratic

space and disregard of the rule of law by ZANU-PF (for detailed information on different perspective on sanctions by the belligerents, see Maposa, Muguti and Tobias, 2013). Suffice here to opinion that while ZANU-PF perceived the sanctions issue as vital in setting the tone for an everlasting resolution to the Zimbabwean crisis, the MDC viewed it differently.

Furthermore, in the eyes of the MDC, Zimbabwe was a nation in need of justice. It argued that the trauma and wounds of human rights violations committed in Zimbabwe could not be ignored. Particular dark periods in the history of Zimbabwe such as the *Gukurahundi* campaign in the 1980s, violent farm invasions in the 2000s, operation *Murambatsina* and the brutal June 2008 Presidential run-off were constantly referred to (Movement for Democratic Change Policy Handbook, 2013). This MDC human rights agenda frightened ZANU PF to the bone marrow. In short ZANU-PF feared persecution from an MDC government. The result was that ZANU PF resolved to rule in perpetuity to avert arrest and persecution. Kebonang (2012) proffers three interesting perspectives on ZANU-PF and its leader's refusal to relinquish power; the self preservation, the apologetic and neo-patrimonial perspectives. The self preservation perspective interrogates the deep involvement of the military in state institutions, politics and perpetration of human rights violations (Makumbe, 2012) on partisan utilisation of state institutions). The apologetic perspective examines government's behaviour from a colonial or historical point of view and the neo-patrimonial perspective elucidates post colonial leadership and the connotation of state power. According to Sachikonye (2003: 101), in patrimonial politics, '...a leader rules by dint of of personal power while ordinary folk are treated as extensions of the big man's household with no rights other than those bestowed by the ruler. Authority is entirely personalized and shaped by the ruler's preferences rather than any codified system of laws. However, one of the major silences in the Agreement was around the area of Transitional Justice. This was not surprising given the fact that ZANU-PF, the major perpetrator of human rights offences in the post-colonial period, was not likely to support such a process. Moreover the MDC for its part, though not without its own

problematic history of intra-party violence, neither sought to make this issue a deal breaker in the negotiations, nor had the political muscle to enforce such an inclusion (Raptouplos, 2008).

The lack of unity of purpose between two MDCs also complicated the mediation process. Their working relationship was characterised mistrust and hatred. The two opposition political parties traded hostilities as a result of the 2005 split in which the Secretary General of the party Welshman Ncube walked out from the mainstream MDC together with several members of parliament. The fall out was a result of differences of opinion over the party's participation in the senatorial elections. The group which became known as the pro senate group saw value in participating in the elections while Tsvangirai argued that it did not make sense to have such elections because the country did not have the wherewithal for such. Tsvangirai could have seen that the elections were a trap for his party as urban constituencies had been joined with rural parts of the country where ZANU PF enjoyed support. Ncube and others, however, citing Tsvangirai's dictatorial tendencies left the MDC to form their own MDC-N (Moyo, Gonye and Hlongwana, 2013). The split had far reaching results. Arguably, had the MDC participated as a united opposition in the 2008 Presidential elections Mugabe could have been resoundingly defeated by Tsvangirai and parliament could have fallen to the opposition. Indeed, it does not take a rocket scientist to conclude that if the presidential votes garnered by the opposition had not been split, Tsvangirai could have easily obtained the 50 plus one per cent vote. However this was not possible because the two formations divided the opposition vote (Makumbe, 2012). Mugabe made capital of the opposition differences in the GNU government. For example while Ncube spoke strongly in favour of devolution of powers Tsvangirai teamed up with Mugabe in opposing the idea arguing that devolution would in the final analysis engender separatist politics in the country. The basis for Tsvangirai and Ncube's divergent opinions could have been influenced by ethnic inclinations. The divergence of interests in the opposition camp complicated the mediation process as the mediator had to care of interests of three unwilling partners in the government of national unity.

The fact that ZANU-PF was not willing to make reasonable concessions to the MDCs during the life of the GNU further complicated the South African mediation. As Chamisa, the MDC spokesman at the time of the negotiations said, ZANU-PF seemed to have a 'take, take and take mentality' and wanted to monopolise all important portfolios while the MDC was willing to 'give and take' so that the important portfolios could be divided fairly (<http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?>). This created deadlocks on critical issues and derailed the whole mediation process.

The crisis in which Mugabe was a player created problems for the mediator. Mugabe's political credentials are well known. He led a successful guerrilla movement that toppled the white settler government in Rhodesia. After independence Mugabe offered military support to the Mozambican government which was fighting against Afonso Dlakama led Renamo rebels. Also, in the company of Namibia and Angola, Zimbabwe intervened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to defend that country against the Rwanda and Uganda backed rebel group (Mudhaniso, 2016). Furthermore, Zimbabwean army and police personnel has taken part in peace keeping missions in hot spots of the continent such Somalia, Angola, Liberia, South Sudan and many other areas. His involvement in these countries resulted in improved regional security and stability. Clearly, Zimbabweans have paid supreme sacrifice in defence of territorial integrity of other countries in Africa (Gwenzi, 2016). He also enjoyed continental respect as a pan-Africanist par excellence who had challenged world leaders such as Tony Blair of Britain and George Bush of the United States of America. In spite of presiding over the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy and condoning violence against the opposition his stature and record on the African continent are unparalleled (Mudhaniso, 2016). Nonetheless, though countries like Botswana and Zambia under Khama and Mwanawasa respectively have demonstrated their displeasure with President Mugabe dictatorial tendencies, Mugabe continues to command respect on the African continent. Therefore in this regard Mugabe was an eagle which could not be tamed by a sparrow (South Africa) (Mughaniso, 2016). Moreover, Mugabe is so clever that when pushed to the ropes he does not leave fate to his gods but fights to get out

of the corner. When the region for example appeared to gravitate towards the MDC he threatened to pull out of the regional organisation. This was after Zuma had hinted that no elections were going to take place in Zimbabwe before security and media reforms, among other pertinent issues highlighted above had been addressed. Mugabe publicly attacked Zuma's international relations advisor, Lindiwe Zulu for suggesting that Zimbabwe had to postpone the holding of elections until outstanding reforms had been implemented. Mugabe labeled her 'an ordinary stupid and idiotic street woman' (*Daily News* 5, July 2013). For some, this was a direct attack on Zuma as Zulu was speaking on behalf of the mediator. Zuma and his regional peers were made to fear that history would judge them harshly for spearheading the withdrawal of Zimbabwe from SADC. Indeed, Mugabe was perfectly capable of withdrawing from SADC as he had withdrawn from the Commonwealth club before. Thus from the foregoing, it can be argued Mugabe's imposing status was in itself a serious impediment to the work of the facilitators and ended up leaving a lot of issues unresolved. These include media reforms, security sector reforms, the issue of the Attorney General, the issue of the Reserve Bank Governor, the issue of Provincial Governors, disrespect of the rule of law, abuse of human rights, etc. The result was that they left the Zimbabwean Problem to fate. In announcing that the role of the mediator had come to an end after the Zimbabwe 2013 elections, Lindiwe Zulu stated that 'if you read the GPA..., the role of the facilitator started where it started until elections. We don't have anything to do ... That elections were whatever, it's no longer our responsibility anymore. We did our job and it's now up to those who observed the elections and said they were free and fair'. Thus, she could not confidently state that the South African mediation role had brought the Zimbabwean issue to finality.

Conclusion

The chapter has examined the South African mediation role in the Zimbabwean political impasse after the June 2008 presidential runoff. It has been argued that the South African mediation role in

breaking the political impasse in Zimbabwe, though more pronounced after the violent and disputed June 2008 vote, spans back to the year 2000 when the national election outcome between ZANU-PF and the MDC have always been contested and disputed. It has been highlighted that the South African mediation role achieved mixed fortunes as the mediators were viewed with suspicion by the Zimbabwean feuding parties. The MDCs were always skeptical about South African mediators whom they largely perceived to be biased in favour of ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF generally perceived Zuma as sympathetic to the MDC formations. Nevertheless, following the disputed June presidential runoff, South Africa's most notable achievement was to bring together the three parties to a negotiating table which resulted in the signing of the GPA leading to the birth of a power sharing deal, the GNU which undoubtedly stabilized the economy and provided a framework for building national emotional healing and stress management. Nevertheless, the South African mediation failed to provide a permanent solution to the Zimbabwean crisis as the GNU was constantly haunted by sticking issues such as security sector reforms, media reforms, human rights violations and lack of respect for the rule of law by ZANU-PF which assumed the role of senior partner or big brother in the unity government. Viewed from this perspective, it can then be argued that the South African mediation sabotaged Zimbabwe's transition to democracy. A free and fair election under strict international supervision was all the country needed. This was not possible because South Africa shielded Zimbabwe from international pressure thereby presenting a lifeline to Mugabe's regime.

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Two Party '*de facto*' and the Future of Democracy in Africa: The Nigerian Experience

Abdulrasheed Alada Muhammad

Introduction

In most democracies, political parties are vital agents in the democratisation project. In the least, they serve as viable means of political succession through competitive elections (Yaqub, 2002; Ujo, 2001). Aside of serving as a critical agent of political succession, studies by scholars (Ogundiya, 2010; Matlosa, 2007; Mato, 2006; Muhammad, 2006; Matlosa, 2004; Janda, 1993; Janda 1980) reveal that political parties play the role of interest articulation, aggregation and many others that are vital for the sustenance of the democratic system. Although Ancker and Ancker (2000) have noted some exceptional cases of democracies without parties, the pivotal place of political parties in a democracy is not lost to many African countries that tend to adopt multi-party democracies at moments of transition from authoritarian regime to democratic administration. While many of these countries such as Tanzania under Nyerere; Ivory Coast which was ruled by Félix Houphouët-Boigny as a one-party state since independence in 1960 until 1990 and Ghana under Nkrumah where the Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) later became the only legal party were once one-party states, global realities especially with the democratisation wave have compelled the embracing of the multi-party system. According to Southhall (2003), 'Africa's second democratisation' phase which began in the early 1990s, cannot be divorced from the wave of democratization which was already sweeping across the whole world. Similarly, Isaac (1998) and Hadenius (1997) in different studies noted that there were decisive changes in the democratic direction in Spain and other Mediterranean Western Europe countries in the second half of

1970s, in Latin America in the 1980s, though less far reaching, as well as in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991. These developments within the contemporary international system coupled with the resilience of African people made the democratization ferment inevitable on the African continent (Rakner and Skage, 2011; Jega 2007; Saliu, 2004; Bratton and de Wall, 1997; Olowu, 1995).

Nigeria is a vast country both in terms of population (170 million people according to projections of the 2005 population census) and land mass which is about 923,708 square miles. It is the 10th most populous country in the world (Gulrez, 2002) and among five most populous in the tropics (Adelemo and Baba, 1993). These credentials make it a significant force in the African continent. Perhaps this informed the conclusion of Chadian President, Idris Derby, that when Nigeria sneezes, other countries catch a cold (quoted in Opeyemi, n.d.). In addition, being the most populous in Africa, it currently operates the largest democracy and as well is Africa's largest economy by volume having recently rebased its economy. With this, it overtook South Africa in terms of largeness of its economy. It began its own series of democratic transition in the early 1990s under the Babangida military regime after prolonged years of military autocracy. The series of 'transitions without end' (Diamond, Kirk-Greene, Oyediran, 2007) or what Bratton and De Wall (1997) referred to as 'Blocked Transition[s]' that is, situations in which rulers made insincere and tactical concessions aimed at buying time to shore up collapsing authority with no sincere intention of handing over, owing to failure of several attempts became successful in May 1999 with the successful conduct of multi-party elections in April and consequent assumption of power by an elected civilian President. Noteworthy is that Nigeria had been operating [a failing] multi-party system since independence, except for the period of the moribund Third Republic (1992 – 1995) when two parties were decreed by the state. While multi-party politics, as recognised by law, had continued into the current Fourth Republic, the Republic has witnessed the emergence of two out of the many parties becoming domineering on the political process, especially in the period before the 2015 general elections thereby constituting two party *de facto*. These are the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC).

The character and activities of these two dominant parties in the build up to the 2015 general elections in the country is not without attendant implications for the future of democratic process in the country and indeed, for the entire African continent. In specific terms, what is the impact of these two parties on the democratisation process? It is against this background that this chapter examines the phenomenon of two party '*de facto*' and the future of democracy in Africa noting Nigeria's experience. Through a content analysis of observed trends in party politics, the chapter highlights the implications of this development for Nigeria's democratisation process.

Party System and Two-Party '*de facto*': A Global Survey

The party system implies the number or strength of political parties existing in a political system. As Anifowose and Enemuo (1999 cited in Muheeb, undated) noted, a network of relationships through which parties interact and influence the political process. The general trend in the literature is to classify political party systems as one party, two parties or multi-party system. Another discernible trend is to equate multi-party system with the practice of liberal democracy. This is more so given the fact that the demise of one party system has always been accompanied by the ascendancy of the liberal democratic practice which recognises the divergences of political interests competing in the state. Such divergences are reflected in the institution of multi-party democracy.

In Africa as at 1989, only four countries in sub-Saharan Africa - Botswana, Gambia, Senegal and Mauritius - could be accurately described as competitive electoral democracies (Manning, 2005). But by 1994, not a single *de jure* one party state remained in Africa (Bratton and Van de Wall, 1997). This reflects the fact that while one party system is no longer the fad, multi-party system is gaining currency within the African political environment. Apart from this, there have been attempts to justify the nature of party system within the democratic context. While many have seen multi-party system as being in line with democratic practice, some others have seen one party system as more compatible with especially African democratic

practices. For instance, Julius Nyerere (cited in Rupert, 1966) opined that where there is one party and the party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community. It is on the basis of the above that Nyerere saw no wisdom in two or multi-party systems. However, when one takes into cognizance the fact that it is practically impossible for a single party to accommodate and satisfy all interests at any particular point in time, the above nationalistic justification becomes nothing but farce more especially with increasing global popularity of multi-party democracy in the post bi-polar world.

Beyond the issue of popularity of multi-party systems or their relative advantages, comparative literature has revealed that in spite of the popularity of multi-party democracy, many countries in practice tend to have domineering parties out of the multitude of parties in existence. In other words, while the constitutions or electoral laws may allow for the existence of multi-party systems, the obtaining reality in several countries, be it Presidential, Parliamentary or Hybrid; has been the emergence of few and in most cases two parties as capable of winning elections or exercising profound influence on the electioneering process. In this instance, while one constitutes the ruling party, the other forms the major opposition party. In the United States for instance, which is usually flaunted as the bulwark of multi-partyism, though the law recognises the existence of many political parties, only the Democratic Party and the Republican Party seem to be strong enough as to exercise profound influence on the American electioneering process. Indeed, since the mid-19th Century, power (in terms of control of the executive arm) has oscillated between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The implication of this is the existence of two-party *de facto* within the American political system.

The same scenario also obtains in the United Kingdom (UK). In the United Kingdom (UK), the Electoral Commission gives the number of registered parties in the UK and Northern Ireland as at 2015 as 492 (www.electoralcommission.org.uk). Notwithstanding this massive number of political parties, , since 1945 power has oscillated between the Conservative Party whose origins go back to

the Eighteenth Century and the Labour Party which emerged in the last decade of the Nineteenth Century. Although other parties have at different moments grown -up their support base by winning more seats in general elections, they have been unable to match the two dominant parties in electoral outcomes. In France, which is operating a hybrid of the Parliamentary system, there exist a multi-party arrangement but since the early 1980s, power has oscillated between two major coalitions. That is, the Centre-Left led by the Socialist Party (Party *Sociale*, SP) and the Centre-Right led by the Republicans. Both parties obtain support from other smaller parties. In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) has been the ruling party since the end of Apartheid in the early 1990s. Its closest rival is the Democratic Alliance (DA). Thus, despite the existence of many political parties in the country, the ANC has remained as the ruling party, while the DA constitutes the main and official opposition party. What can be inferred from this comparative experience is that although there are other parties in existence, two parties seem to be dominant in terms of electoral strength not only in Africa but across the world. This is not without its attendant implications for democratic processes in such countries.

Overview of Party System and Party Politics in Nigeria

It has been established that the democratic process in Nigeria took place at two epochs. The first which occurred before independence witnessed struggles for liberation from the colonialists and attainment of self-rule by the country in October 1960. The second was the series of tenuous attempts after independence to enthrone a lasting democratic process. This second epoch had been characterised by fluctuations emanating from military interventions in the governance of the country and several, unsuccessful, attempts to transit to a sustaining democracy. This is not to suggest that military intervention in governance is peculiar to Nigeria alone, rather, it is a phenomenon that was pervasive in most African countries between 1970s to the early 1990s. Equally, some scholars (Jega, 2007; Osaghae, 1998) have advanced reasons for such pervasiveness noting both the peculiar and general circumstances

that were receptive to military intervention in Nigerian governance. It is worthy of note that, attempts at transiting to democracy in the country have always been marked by the need to allow for greater participation by the people through their political parties. Hence, there is always a preference for multi-party system. For instance, while the constitution of 1922 blazed the trail for the emergence of party politics in Nigeria through introduction of the elective principle, it did not limit the number of parties that were to be in existence. However, circumstances of the period led to the emergence of only one party. That is, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) which was formed by Nigerian nationalist elements in 1922. The Lagos Youth Movement (LYM), also formed by some Nigerian nationalists, and that later transformed into the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) later joined the list of political parties in the country. Both parties, however, later died a natural death.

This attempt at multi-party democracy continued till the period of independence in 1960 as more parties emerged on the political terrain especially with increased tempo of nationalist agitations. Other parties that later emerged included the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), Action Group (AG), National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) – formerly National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon, United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). These later parties existed till the end of the First Republic in 1966. The implication of this is that Nigeria had a multi-party system throughout the first epoch of its democratisation process up to the end of the First Republic. It is also worthy to note that of all the parties that remained in existence, the NPC, AG and NCNC became dominant in terms of electoral strength as reflected in the outcome of both the 1959 and 1963 general elections. The outcome of the 1959 elections showed that out of 312 seats in Parliament, the NPC was able to garner 134 making it possible to align with its closest rival, the NCNC which had 89 seats in order to have majority in parliament and form the government while the Action group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo remained the major opposition party having won 73 seats while the remaining seats were not occupied by any political party. Although

the national government was the result of party alliance, all the three major parties had a very strong hold of their respective regions especially, in terms of voting pattern by the citizens. That is, the NPC controlled the Northern Region, the NCNC controlled the East while the AG was in absolute control of the Western Region (Muhammad, 2015).

The Second Republic which lasted from 1979 – 1983 also saw the practice of multi-party system in the country. Following intentions of the then military government to transfer power to elected civilians, the democratisation process witnessed the emergence of five political parties. That is, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigerian Peoples' Party (NPP), Peoples' Redemption Party (PRP), Great Nigeria Peoples' Party (GNPP). Later in 1983, the Nigeria Advance Party (NAP) joined the array of parties in the country. This was the situation of Nigeria's multi-party politics before the military intervened again and regained government control on December 31, 1983.

Military rule in Nigeria following termination of the Second Republic lasted from 1983 to 1999. Throughout this period, there were series of unsuccessful attempts by successive military governments to return Nigeria to democratic politics. Although the series of attempts were not successful, the process always involved attempts at the [re]introduction of multi-party politics. For instance, General Babangida (1985 – 1993) who first instituted a transition programme initially allowed for multi-party system to exist. According to him in his Independence day broadcast in October 1985 (cited in Eleazu, 1988), the administration would begin a vigorous search for a new political order capable of ensuring sustained socio-economic growth and political development of the country. This effort produced according to Yaqub (2004) produced thirteen political associations that included All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), The Ideal Peoples Party (IPP), The Nigerian National Congress (NNC), Nigerian Peoples Welfare Party (NPWP), The National Union Party (NUP), Peoples Front of Nigeria (PFN), Patriotic Nigerians Party (PNP), Peoples Solidarity Party (PSP), Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN), United National Democratic

Party (UNDP), Peoples Patriotic Party (PPP), The Liberal Convention (LC) and The Nigerian Labour Party (NLP). However, all were decreed out of existence and in their place, the government established two political parties in the country. These are, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) with the ideological inclination of ‘a little to the right’ and ‘a little to the left’ respectively (Qouted in Yaqub, 2004). In addition, the two parties had their manifestoes and constitutions prepared by the government which also appointed interim officers to run their affairs. The two parties eventually contested the June 1993 Presidential election which climaxed the attempt at establishing a Third Nigerian Republic.

Earlier in 1992, the two parties contested for seats in the National Legislative Houses. The results of the elections according to data from African Elections Data Base indicated that the SDP had an edge over the NRC in both the legislative and presidential elections.

Table 1: Results of 1992 Legislative and 1993 Presidential Elections

Party	Presidential Election (% of Total)	Number of Seat in Senate (Total is 91)	Number of Seats in the House of Representatives (Total is 593)
SDP	58.36%	52	314
NRC	41.64%	37	275
Vacant	-	2	4
Total	100.00%	91	593

Source: Computed by author from: African Elections Data Base

It is significant to mention that this endeavour to decree two parties into existence by the General Babangida military regime was the first and perhaps the only attempt so far at establishing a two-party *de jure* in the country. Previous and even subsequent attempts have been on multi-party system. It is also instructive to note that although two parties were decreed, the transition exercise was inconclusive as the result of the presidential election contested by the two parties was annulled by the military regime. In the midst of the

resulting impasse, the regime of General Babangida stepped aside in 1993 after putting in place, an Interim National Government (ING) led by a civilian, Chief Ernest Shonekan. The ING was again sacked in another military *coup* which saw the emergence of General Sani Abacha as Head of State. According to Abacha, his military government given the circumstances of its emergence was, a child of necessity with a strong determination to restore peace and stability on the basis of which to enthrone a lasting and true democracy (Abacha, 1993). He also established a transition to civilian rule anchored on multi-party system and consequently, recognised five political parties. These were the Congress for National Consensus (CNC), United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), and the National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN). In spite of public scepticism, low public ratings and high resentment to these parties, they all featured in the National Assembly (NASS) election of April, 1998, the result of which was later cancelled by the regime. Also, General Abacha died in office in June 1998 and following this was the swearing-in of General Abdulsalam Abubakar as the new military Head of State.

General Abubakar also instituted another transition to civilian rule programme anchored on multi-party politics. Out of the about 30 political associations that signified interest, only nine were short-listed for provisional registration. Indeed, the final registration of parties was designed to take place through a phased process of self-extermination (Muhammad, 2015). This was made possible with the provision in the electoral guideline that for any association to qualify for permanent registration as a political party, such must win no less than 5 per cent (initially 10 per cent) of total votes in at least 24 of the 36 states of the federation. The December 1998 local government election provided the litmus test after which only the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Peoples Party (APP) which later became All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP) got past the benchmark. The eventual registration of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) was only to satisfy some politically exigent factors (Muhammad, 2015). First, it was a way of assuaging the south-westerners who were still aggrieved by the June 12, 1993 election imbroglio. Second, a

provision of the electoral law stated that the third party with the highest score would also be registered in the event of only two parties meeting the requirements. Based on this modified criteria and the fact that AD was in the third position in electoral strength after the 1998 local government election, only the trio AD, APP and PDP were registered to contest the 1999 general elections. The outcome of the elections shows that the PDP won majority in the Presidential and parliamentary election thus, the PDP candidate, Olusegun Obasanjo, was sworn-in on May, 29 1999 as the democratically elected President of Nigeria. Obasanjo's election signalled the commencement of a new democratic administration and dispensation in Nigeria.

From the above overview, certain observations become compelling about Nigeria's democracy. First, there seems to be a general preference for multi-party system in the country. This is evident in the series of attempts at transitions which have been anchored on multi-party systems. Second, while Nigeria prefers multi-party democracy, previous endeavours have not resulted in only two parties becoming dominant. Rather, there is always a tilt towards three parties dominating the political process. This can partly be explained by the socio-cultural make-up of the country which makes parties to be more or less regionally based. For instance, while the NPC, NEPU and AG of the First Republic were products of Socio-cultural organisations in the North and Western parts respectively, the NPN, PRP and UPN of the Second Republic were seen as reincarnates of the NPC, NEPU and AG of the First Republic. Although the NCNC of the First Republic did not emerge from any socio- cultural grouping, its popularity later waned as it became identified with the Eastern region. Thus, ethnic and religious considerations have prevented the emergence of two party *de facto* in Nigeria's First, Second and perhaps, Third Republics.

Trajectory of Nigeria's Two Party in the Fourth Republic

Nigeria's Fourth Republic began in 1999 with the swearing-in of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The Republic was finally consummated with the inauguration of the National Assembly NASS

in June of the same year. Like previous democratic attempts, it started on a multi-party level. Although the Republic commenced in 1999, party activities had started earlier in 1998. As noted earlier in this chapter, the PDP, APP and AD emerged as political parties of the Fourth Republic through some processes that involved some level of compromise and concession by the government and political actors. Noteworthy is that emergence of these three parties is a reflection of the Nigerian state's preference for multi-party system. Following agitations for increase in the number of political parties and a court of Appeal verdict in 2002, the election monitoring body, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had to allow the existence of more parties in the country (www.dawodu.com). Consequently, Nigeria became a multi-party democracy par excellence with the existence of over 50 political associations.

It is important to stress, however, that prelude to Nigeria's 2003 election; the AD was faced with series of internal crisis which grossly reduced its strength in electioneering. For instance, most of the states controlled by the AD were shared between the PDP and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) which was registered shortly before the 2003 election. At the national level, the AD could not win much seats at the NASS compared to 1999. Although the ruling PDP had the ACN to contend with at the states, it had the ANPP to contend with at the national level. This development signalled the trend towards a two-party *de facto* in Nigeria. However, this trend towards a two-party *de facto* was reversed with the emergence of many parties controlling seats at the national level since 1999. Although the PDP won the Presidential election and the majority of seats at the NASS, other parties nonetheless won seats for themselves at the NASS. This is presented in table 2.

Table 2: April 1999 and April 2003 NASS Election Results

Party	Senate (Number of Seats)	House of Representatives
	1999 2003	1999 2003
Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)	59 76	206 223
All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP)	29 27	74 96
Alliance for Democracy (AD)	20 6	68 34
United Nigeria peoples Party	- -	- 2
National Democratic Party (NDP)	- -	- 1
All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)	- -	- 2
Peoples Redemption Party (PRP)	- -	- 1
Others	- -	- -
Vacant	- -	- 1
Total	109 109	360 360

***Source:** Adapted from: African Elections Data Base.*

This multi-party character continued during the 2007 and 2011 elections. After the 2011 elections, the PDP was controlling the executive arm as well as majority in the NASS. Outcome of the 2011 elections reveal that the PDP polled 58.89 per cent while the closest rival, newly registered Committee for Progressive Change (CPC) polled 31.98 per cent. All other parties put together polled the remaining 9 per cent. Similarly in the NASS elections, the PDP dominated both the Senate and House of Representatives by having 76 Senators out of 109 and 223 out of 360 members in the House of Representatives (African Elections Data Base, undated). The remainder was shared among all the other parties. The implication of this is that the PDP was domineering while all other parties in opposition may be said to have lacked the stamina of constituting effective opposition. This is because, by having an overwhelming two-third majority of votes, the PDP was the decider on all issues of joint deliberation among the parties. It was the desire to avoid this

situation and to constitute a formidable opposition to the PDP that led some other parties to merge so as to gain more numerical strength.

Following recognition of the need to challenge the dominance of the PDP, especially in the NASS, the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Committee for Progressive Change (CPC), All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP) and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) applied to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for merger into a new political party, the All Progressives' Party (APC). This desire of theirs was eventually granted on 31 July, 2013 when INEC withdrew the certificates of the parties and recognised the APC as their new party. Thus, the two parties emerged as the dominant parties in Nigerian politics. It is instructive to note that while other parties were in existence in line with the multiparty aspirations of the country, the PDP and APC became dominant and, therefore, constituted the *de facto* parties in the country. This became manifest in the build up to the 2015 general elections when in spite of the existence of other political parties, the contest was generally believed to be between the PDP and the APC. At the end of the March, 2015 elections, the two parties, PDP and APC, together won over 98 per cent of valid votes cast in the presidential election while other parties put together (about 12) won less than two per cent. This is graphically illustrated in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Parties and Votes Received during 2015 Presidential Election

S/N	Name of Political Party	Number of Votes Received	Percentage of Votes Received
1	All Progressives' Party (APC)	15,424, 921	53.96
2	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)	12,853,164	44.96
3	All Peoples' Alliance (APA)	53,537	0.19
4	Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN)	40,311	0.14

5	Citizens' Popular Party (CPP)	36,300	0.13
6	Alliance for Democracy (AD)	30,673	0.11
7	Africa Democratic Congress (ADC)	29,666	0.09
8	Peoples' Party of Nigeria	24,475	0.09
9	National Conscience Party (NCP)	24,455	0.09
10	Accord Alliance (AA)	22,125	0.08
11	United Progressive Party (UPP)	18,220	0.06
12	KOWA Party (KP)	13,076	0.05
13	United Democratic Party (UDP)	9,208	0.03
14	Hope Party (HP)	7,435	0.03
	Invalid / Blank Votes	844,519	-
	Total Voters' Turnout	29,432,083	100

Source: INEC database, 2015

From Table 3 above, the APC won majority in the presidential election while the PDP was in second place. The electoral strength of both parties shows that they are the two main parties existing in the post-2015 election Nigeria. This is because, while there were other parties recognised by law, they were not as strong as the APC and the PDP in electoral strength. Similarly in the NASS election, the APC won the majority of seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Its closest rival is the PDP which also had 44 out of 109 Senate seats. The implication of this is that both the APC and the PDP have emerged as two-party *de facto* in the Nigerian political system. This is not without some implications for democratic process in the country.

Implications for Democratic Sustenance

Democratic sustenance implies sustaining the democratic ferment. By transiting to a democratically elected Government in

1999 and conducting a series of elections in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 aimed at transiting from one civilian government to another, Nigeria can be said to have emerged as a democratic country. However, it is not enough to emerge as a democracy, conscious effort must be made towards its sustenance in order to avoid democratic reversals. For Nigeria, against the background of its experiences with military authoritarianism, sustaining the democratic ferment is a matter of no choice. Moreover, it has been noted that decisive changes in the democratic direction in Europe (Isaac, 1998; Hadenius, 1997) coupled with resilience of most Africans to democratic rule (Rakner and Skage, 2011; Jega 2007; Saliu, 2004; Bratton and De Wall, 1997; Olowu, 1995) are what inspired changes in the democratic direction on the continent. This is against the backdrop of their experiences under different forms of autocratic rule. Having gone through such experience, therefore, sustaining democracy on the continent is a matter of categorical necessity.

It must be pointed out that in sustaining democracy on the African continent and indeed Nigeria, the role of political parties cannot be wished away. Aside of the fact that they perform other functions in the political system geared towards democratic sustenance, the conduct and activities of these parties also have implications for the sustenance of democracy. In Nigeria, for instance, the unbridled competition between the two major political parties, based on the 2015 elections, has implications for the polity as a whole and the work of the electoral umpire, INEC. On the one hand, the country was inflamed especially with actions and utterances from parties and their supporters. For this reason, there was palpable trepidation across the land and more than a few were worried about what February 2015 (the initial election month) had in its underbelly (Eju, 2015). Such actions and utterances include, death-wish advertorials of the APC Presidential candidate by PDP's Governor of Ekiti state, Ayo Fayose, comments on the confusion and uncertainty that beclouded collection of Permanent Voters Card (PVC) from INEC, invasion of the APC data centre in Lagos by operatives of the Directorate of Security Service (SSS), threat of starting a war by Mujahid Asari Dokubo, leader of the militant group, Niger Delta Volunteer Force, if President Jonathan was not re-

elected by whatever means and the threat by APC to form a parallel government if it was not declared winner in the Presidential election, among others.

On the other hand, it resulted in tough situations for INEC as political parties often besieged the commission with petitions and counter petitions. There were also occasional outbursts from both the APC and the PDP that INEC may have been compromised. Also, the website of the Independent National Electoral Commission was hacked on Election Day by a group calling itself the Nigerian Cyber Army (*Premium Times*, 28 March, 2015). Although INEC later announced that it had recovered its website back, the event is, nonetheless, a reflection of the extent of desperation by some political party supporters.

Apart from the above, the emergence of two strong parties polarised the citizens along bifurcated party lines thereby leading to an escalation of violence before and during the 2015 elections. For example, in spite of the existence of enabling laws that prohibited election related violence, on 10 January 2015, youths in Jos burnt cars belonging to PDP Goodluck Jonathan campaign organization, chanting Buhari slogans "Sai Buhari", which is Hausa for "It has to be Buhari", in reference to the presidential candidate of the APC and Jonathan's main opponent, Muhammadu Buhari (www.naij.com). This violent situation repeated itself in states like Bauchi and Katsina among others. Also, On January 24th, alleged thugs belonging to the PDP attacked the venue of the APC governorship rally in Okrika local Government Area of Delta state (www.naij.com). According to Nigeria's Human Rights Commission, between January and February, 2015, election violence occurred in 22 states with 58 people killed (www.naij.com). This suggests rising cases of violence prelude to the 2015 elections. Similarly, during the elections which observers adjudged to be peaceful on a general note, violence was recorded in some states. Mujeeb (n.d.) captures this scenario when he observed that:

INEC's records show that there were 66 reports of violent incidents targeted at polling units, the Commission's officials, voters and election materials. These were in Rivers State (16 incidents), Ondo (8), Cross River and Ebonyi (6 each), Akwa Ibom (5) Bayelsa

(4), Lagos and Kaduna (3 each), Jigawa, Enugu, Ekiti and Osun (2 each), Katsina, Plateau, Kogi, Abia, Imo, Kano and Ogun (one each).

While it must be acknowledged that elections in Nigeria and indeed, most developing countries have not been free from violence and other forms of coercive mobilisation, the 2015 election violence in Nigeria was accentuated by the dominant role of two parties. Apart from polarising the citizens along party lines, places of worship and religious groups are not left out in the polarisation. For example, in one context, many Muslims, especially in the northern part of the country, seems to pitch their tent with opposition APC. In another context, Christian leaders seem to be divided on who to support. Oikelome (2015) writes that after a meeting by President Jonathan with pastors of some Pentecostal churches to solicit their support for his presidential ambition bid, the pastors became divided with Bishops David Oyedepo of Winners Chapel and Felix Omobude, the Pentecostal Federation of Nigeria (PFN) president in the tent of Mr. President and by extension, the PDP political strategists, while Pastor Enoch Adeboye, of Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) and his teeming followers, including fans and admirers were in the tent of the APC and its political gladiators. The heated situation also led to proliferation of hate speeches at campaign venues, media and at every opportunity available to the parties to address Nigerians. For example, the wife of the former President, Mrs Patience Jonathan was alleged to have asked supporters of the PDP to throw stones at supporters of the rival APC (<https://www.naij.com>).

Related to the above are disputes after the elections. While this is not a new phenomenon as politicians are known to always dispute outcomes of elections that is not in their favour, the militant and vociferous manner of the electioneering during and after the 2015 elections in Nigeria creates a source of worry for democratic sustenance in the country. The open and militant disputations by a former Minister of the Federation, Elder Peter Godsdai Orubebe, during collation of the 2015 presidential election result at the International conference centre, Abuja, Nigeria reflects the mind-set and attitude of politicians to the elections.

The emergence of two-party *de facto* in Nigeria also helps to increase the political consciousness of Nigerians before and after the

elections. In fact, so charged was the terrain that the aphorism ‘change’ became a popular slogan among Nigerians especially those in support of APC while ‘transformation’ was popular among supporters of the PDP. This was in apparent reference to desire of APC supporters to effect change to the national leadership through voting their preferred candidates. In fact, before the elections, several concerts were held in various parts of the country with the slogan, RSVP – Register to Vote; Select your preferred candidate; Vote during election and not fight; Protect your vote after voting.

Conclusion

Nigeria’s democracy is founded on multi-party system but realities have made two parties (APC and PDP) to be dominant in the political system. Thus, there is two-party *de facto* operating in Nigeria. This situation is not peculiar to Nigeria as comparative experience from other countries have shown. Among the factors that are receptive to the emergence of two-party *de facto* in Nigeria’s current Fourth Republic is the desire to form a credible opposition to the ruling party which manifests in the formation of APC by some group of parties. The emergence of these two-party *de facto* is not without its positive and negative implications for democracy in the country and by extension, the African continent. Averting the negative consequences require that the emergence of dominant parties be accompanied by moderation in actions and sincere desires for the sustenance of democracy from both political actors, civil society groups as well as citizens at large.

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Xenophobic Violence and the future of intra-African Relations: The Case of post-apartheid South Africa

Tasara Muguti

Introduction

Xenophobia in its various forms has been a characteristic feature of many post-independent African states since the late 1950s. Nevertheless, xenophobia is not unique to Africa. Xenophobia and other related bias-aggravated violence is a global phenomenon which cuts across the world as it has been frequently witnessed in Europe, North America and Asia (<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org>.2011). However, in Africa it has resulted, among others, in some extreme forms of violence that have resulted in the deaths, displacement of thousands of people and destruction of their businesses and properties. In more recent times, South Africa has experienced more xenophobic violence largely directed on other African immigrants compared to other African countries. This present chapter seeks to interrogate the likely implications of these recurrent xenophobic outbreaks in the context of intra-African relations. Contemporary scholarly works have devoted a lot of attention to the underlying causes of xenophobia without examining the likely implications on future intra-African relations (Hungwe 2012, Koenane 2013, Dononchel 2013, Skinner and Crush 2015, Mafukuta 2015 and Marongwe and Mawere in this volume). It is within this gap that this current study is located. Examining the likely implications of the xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals in fellow African countries seems to be a necessary imperative if the spirit of Ubuntu and the goal of African Renaissance can be achieved in a globalizing world. Creating an environment which is conducive to the promotion of and the facilitation of African brotherhood and cooperation among Africans seems to be a viable option to counter the effects of

neocolonialism and globalization. A critical interrogation of the likely impact of xenophobic reactions on intra-African relations also seems to be vital in view of the fact that transnational movements across the continent are generally becoming a characteristic feature of post-colonial Africa. While the study will largely focus on South Africa, it will intermittently scrutinize earlier xenophobic outbreaks in other parts of the continent in order to have a holistic picture. The study will be qualitative in nature. Internet sources, the media, primary and secondary sources will be used to collect and interpret the data collected.

A Brief Overview of Xenophobia

The term xenophobia largely refers to a general resentment towards foreign nationals in a particular locality. It is the perceived fear, hatred or dislike of foreigners or alien nationals in a particular country (Centre for Human Rights 2009). In the African context, it is closely related to Afro phobia which also denotes the fear, hatred and dislike of Africans and other African descendants. The word xenophobia originated from two Greek words *xenos* and *phobos* which referred to ‘fear of a foreigner’ (Bordeau 2010: 4). According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Intolerance (Rapporteur), xenophobia can be viewed as ‘a rejection of the outsider’ (United Nations General Assembly, 1994, para 29). The Rapporteur further stated that xenophobia is nourished by such theories and movements based on national preferences and ethnic cleansing premised on exclusivity of communities and the desire to monopolize resources among people of the same culture in a particular locality. In general terms, xenophobia strongly resembles concepts such as racism and ethnic intolerances though its semantic distinctiveness is derived from its deep rootedness in national identity, citizenship and a rejection of the foreigners or ‘aliens’ as defined by the borders demarcated by nation states and in the case of Africa as drawn by the imperialist whites during the time of colonialism in Africa. As is now a truism, the borders were arbitrarily imposed on the African continent with no input from the African people themselves.

Xenophobic manifestations generally comprise of prejudices, attitudinal orientations and behaviours against people of foreign origin which in most cases in post colonial Africa have been triggered by political agitations, contracting economic space or threats of national security, among a host of other factors. In most xenophobic attacks, while foreigners are generally affected, asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented immigrants are usually the most prone to the explosions (Adeola 2015). In other instances, xenophobic and other bias-induced reactions are directed against specific individuals and communities distinguished by religious beliefs, race, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, among other characteristics (<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org>. 2011).

As aptly articulated by several scholars, the causes of xenophobia are multi-dimensional and vary from one context to the other (Crush 2001, Neocosmos 2008, Duponchel 2009, Hungwe 2013, Crush and Ramachadram 2014, Adeola 2015, Muguti and Makanyisa 2016 forthcoming). Some scholars' link xenophobia to historical past experiences which may have exposed a local people to past violence which then becomes endemic in their lives. Moreover, xenophobia can also be associated with the need by a people to protect their national sovereignty and political space. Neo- Marxists' scholars on their part view xenophobia as an attempt by the proletariat to fight against bourgeoisie domination in a specific locality (Bond, *et al*, 2011 and Heckel 2014).

Interrogating xenophobia in South Africa from a Marxist perspective

This study finds the Marxist perspective to be the most appropriate in interrogating xenophobic violence in South Africa due to the fact that xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals that have become common place in recent years in post-apartheid South Africa, are a reflection of the deep seated dissatisfaction by the proletariats at the neo liberal policies that have been followed by the black African National Congress (ANC) led government since it took over power from the supremacist white minority in 1994. In the eyes of South African proletariats, the neo liberal economic policies are a

negation of the Freedom Charter of 1955 which underlined the need for the redistribution of wealth, equality before the law, fair wages and nationalization of industries as part of its core values (<http://www.anc.org.za.show.phd?id=72>). Indeed, adding a Marxist dimension to this discussion will bring more scholarly robustness to this study. In his book, 'Das Kapital', Karl Marx advanced the doctrine of dialectical materialism in which he articulated the linear progression of communities from primitive communalism to communism (Medema and Samuels 2000, <http://www.sociology.org.uk2005>). The foundation of his dialectics was the application of history to the evolution of societies through dialectics or forces which he referred to as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In his view, the transition would result in changes in the relationship between the ruling and the oppressed classes. Marx envisaged inherent conflict between the forces of production, social relations of production, and organization of production. Based on this theoretical framework, Marx predicted capitalist cycles that would ultimately result in the demise of capitalism. In his judgment, the capitalist cycles would be epitomized by a large reserve army of the unemployed, declining rates of profits, business crises, increasing concentration of industry into a few hands, and mounting misery and alienation of the proletariat (Landreth and Colander 2001). Marx argued that as the bourgeoisie class pursued its economic advantage, it was bound to inevitably see the seeds of its own downfall. In Marx's view, a fundamental revolutionary in society was inevitable due to the inherent exploitation of labour, oppression and the general economic injustice of capitalism. This was based on Marx's views on the labour value, income distribution, and surplus value and how profit was accumulated by the bourgeoisie. He concluded that the nature of the production relations and social production relations that evolved in the process were bound to create grievances among the proletariats as they became more and more aware of their exploitation and oppression (Medema and Samuels 2000). His ideas were widely adopted as political and economic systems in Eastern Europe, Cuba, China, North Korea, East Germany and in some Third World countries.

Neo-Marxist scholars would argue that the xenophobic reactions in post-apartheid South Africa and other African countries are a response to the huge income disparities that exist between the ordinary people, the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie (Hackel 2014, Bond, *et al*, 2014). The huge disparities in mean incomes and wages have resulted in transnational migrations across the continent and beyond as workers seek better opportunities in the globalizing world. By-products of globalization such as the internet and social media have facilitated the dissemination of information on contemporary trends in wages hence the movements of people from the developing to the developed world as they negotiate for better wages. While the conditions in the individual African states may not be conducive to worker's revolutions in the true Marxist rhetoric, the African workers would rather migrate from their original home countries to foreign lands that offer better opportunities in order to escape from exploitation and grinding devaluation of their labour power. For most African nationals, South Africa seems to be the most favoured destination due to its relative economic prosperity and political stability. That's the challenge therefore is for African countries to create attractive working conditions for their people and retain labour supplies and also magnetize back the victims of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. Turning to South Africa in particular, the neo-liberal policies pursued by the ANC government since independence have meant that the means of production are controlled and concentrated in the hands of a few individuals while the majority of the people wallow in abject poverty. The marginalized South Africans feel that they are not enjoying the fruits of independence. After independence, many South Africans had hoped that the new democratic dispensation was going to fundamentally change their lives by bringing about social and economic justice and freedom. As such, they were generally angered with the emergence of a small group of highly skilled and politically well connected people who seem to be monopolizing the national cake. The World Development Report of 2006 noted that income inequalities in South Africa were among some of the highest in the world as just under half of South African population of 47 million was poverty-stricken. The black South Africans were estimated to

constitute about 90% of the 22 million poor people in the country (Abrahams 2010). In 2008, the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) indicated that;

...in places such as Khayelitsha in Western Cape, almost 48% of the adult population are said to be economically inactive...Arguably, income inequality ranks highly among the structural determinants of the recent wave of community protests, including the ongoing attacks on migrants. In all community conversations, across the 5 target provinces, participants identified poverty and unemployment as the most pronounced barriers to social cohesion. Participants spoke of the growing inequalities in South African society, where the “rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer (Abrahams 2010: 03).

The income and economic inequality coupled with rampant poverty levels and widespread unemployment seem to be the major drivers of frustrations among impoverished sections of the South African population. These have triggered a plethora of other social challenges such as unbridled crime levels, proliferation of shebeens, drug and alcohol abuse among the youth (Abrahams 2010). According to Statistics South Africa, by 2015, due to the sluggish economic growth, about 20% of the South African population lived below the poverty datum line and an incredible 14.6 million survived largely on state social services (Ikalafeng 2015). As the gap between the rich and the poor continuous to widen in the country, the ordinary poor South Africans wrongly direct their anger on African foreigners whom they perceive as leeches who indirectly contribute to South Africa’s inability to deal with challenges posed by rampant unemployment, poverty and rising inequality, hence the violent attacks on foreign nationals (Marongwe and Mawere, 2015). In his contribution to the theory of xenophobic violence based on researches carried out in informal settlements surrounding the city of Durban, Hickel (2014) argues that marginalized South Africans routinely attack foreign African nationals whom they accuse of practicing witchcraft which in the Marxist perspective, produces a

crisis of social reproduction. In these communities, the rising levels of unemployment, the critical shortage of housing, and the wide ranging crisis of social reproduction are all associated with witchcraft practiced by foreign African nationals. The South African workers are equally disturbed by the attitude of desperate foreign nationals who accept low wages and work in sometimes inhuman conditions (HSRC 2008). They argue that this perpetuates exploitation of the workers by the South African bourgeoisie class. Even the biggest labour movement in South Africa, the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), bears a lot of resentment against African foreigners who are accused of undermining its achievements by accepting to work as cheap labour in South Africa (Abrahams 2010). Indubitably, as the proletariats fight for the improvement of their working conditions and other basic needs, they also fight for the exclusion of others whom they perceive as competitors in their struggle. Thus, problematising xenophobic attacks in the Marxist perceptive brings an interesting dimension to the study in that these xenophobic reactions are likely to continue in Africa and South Africa in particular, for as long as there are wide disparities in access to the means of production and income distribution between the workers and the bourgeoisie class. These in the South African scenario have resulted in a crisis of social reproduction which in turn has triggered xenophobic reactions against other foreign African nationals as the locals protest against the government's failure to address their concerns. As one South African remarked, 'the government will come running' when foreigners were attacked in order to avoid bad publicity (Bond, *et al*, 2009: 37).

While in other African countries xenophobic attacks have been state driven, in the South African context they seem to be largely propelled by the poor black South Africans who are concentrated in poor stricken townships where the competition for inadequate socio-economic resources is intense. Up to about the second decade of the new millennium, xenophobic attacks have largely been confined to poor black South African townships such as Tembisa, Kempton, Alexandra in Johannesburg, among others (Human Sciences Research Council 2008, Muguti and Makanyisa, 2016 forthcoming). It is important to note that in the South African context, the

xenophobic or exclusionary impulse is not necessarily directed against black foreign nationals. It is also occasionally directed at other black South Africans from the former Bantustans (rural areas) and Chinese who are also both viewed as the 'outsiders' just like other black non South Africans (Human Sciences Research Council 2008). It is also directed against other local minority ethnic groups like the Shangaan, Pedi and Venda who are also viewed as 'outsiders'. In this case, these attacks sometimes become ethnic attacks or afro phobia. The marginalized South African vent their anger on these other vulnerable groups as they cannot do it on their political leadership which is well protected by the state security machinery. Thus the struggles in South Africa may be seen as attempts by the proletariat to fight against the restoration and the advancement of the power of capital over society (Bond, *et al*, 2009). Bond, *et al*, remarked that the spate of community uprisings and protests characterizing contemporary South Africa should be applauded since;

They represent the continuation of the tradition of mass action, they also reflect the renewal and awakening of the working class. But the occasional degeneration into xenophobia shows, there is dearth of visionary politics in the protests...Rather than finding the solidarity and generosity of the struggle, the sharing and caring that comes with collectivism, we sometimes find a capitalistic competitiveness: "it must be us who gets, not them. Why do they get – we were supposed to get before them. They were not supposed to get – we are. We were here before them. They do not belong here. If they get, they are taking away from us" (Bond, *et al*, 2009: 39).

Therefore, examining xenophobic attacks on other foreign African nationals from a Marxist perspective persuades one to conclude that as the proletariats feel that the revolution has lost its way in post-apartheid South Africa, they wrongly direct their venom on the 'other' whom they blame for challenges that continue to bedevil them. It is actually a struggle against the post-apartheid leadership reflecting that the new post-colonial socio-economic and political dispensation (neo liberalism) has betrayed the workers'

vision and aspirations of a socialist future. Therefore, the struggles and protests among marginalized communities in South Africa that occasionally trigger xenophobic reactions, though largely localized in specific communities in their scope, are a reflection of the struggle by the marginalized to eradicate capitalist exploitation and oppression in South Africa.

However, the author hastens to acknowledge the valence of other factors in accounting for xenophobic violence in South Africa in spite of the conflicts (in Marxist doctrine) emanating from the deep seated class struggles in the country. Nonetheless, as earlier indicated, the author strongly feels that the causes of xenophobic reactions in South Africa have been extensively explored by several scholars across the academic disciplines (See Crush 2001, Human Sciences Research Council 2008, Neocosmos 2008, Duponchel 2009, Hungwe 2012/13, Koenane 2013, Dononchel 2013, Skinner and Crush 2015, Crush and Ramachadram 2014 Adeola 2015, Mafukuta 2015, Marongwe and Mawere in this volume, Muguti and Makanyisa 2016, forthcoming. For a brief outline on some of drivers of xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa see section on attacks foreign nationals below). As such, there is voluminous literature in that regard and there is little need to devote a lot of attention to it here except to underscore the fact that xenophobia has the serious potential of threatening harmonious interaction between African states. Elsewhere in this volume, Marongwe and Mawere (2016) trouble the occurrence of xenophobic violence by discussing the purchase of, among other factors, a Third Force, the institutionalization of foreigners' hatred, and scape goating narratives. The scapegoating narratives on xenophobic reactions across the continent seem to be the most subscribed to by several scholars.

Xenophobia across the Continent

As mentioned earlier on, xenophobia is not unique to South Africa. Many African nations have been exposed to different forms of xenophobic manifestations at different times in their history since they attained independence from the 1950's. In post colonial Africa,

xenophobic tendencies have been manifested through the expulsion of foreign nationals, threats of expulsion and in extreme cases violent attacks. Manifestations of xenophobia in African can be traced back to the 1960's. Perhaps, it is prudent at this juncture to chronicle some of the xenophobic outbreaks that have affected different parts of the continent since the attainment of independence. This broad approach reinforces the point that it is really imperative for African states, particularly through the African Union (AU) and other regional bodies, to urgently address the issue of xenophobic manifestations as they are a widespread phenomenon across the continent. These undoubtedly have the potential to damage future intra-African relations. Manifestations of xenophobia have been witnessed in Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Uganda, Chad, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville, Congo Kinshasa, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, and South Africa (Lim 2011, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org> 2011, Aremu & Ajayi 2014, and Adeola 2015). In all these instances, various factors have been attributed to the xenophobic reactions ranging from economic, political and religious considerations and the rhetoric that foreigners practice witchcraft and commit crime (Hackel 2014 and Adeola 2015). These outbreaks have always negatively impacted on the relations between different African countries whenever they reared their ugly head.

In 1969 for instance, the newly appointed Ghanaian Prime Minister Kosi Busia enacted the Aliens Compliance Order (the Aliens order) which was meant to purge undocumented aliens. Gocking (2015: 156) advanced that 'the Aliens Order required aliens who lacked work permits [to] get them within a period of two weeks or leave the country'. At the time there were growing sentiments in the country that foreigners were behind the widespread unemployment affecting the country then (Aremu and Ajayi 2014: 176). The majority of the foreign nationals were from West Africa states; Nigeria, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso and the Nigerians were in the majority. Some Nigerians nationals had been able to successfully establish flourishing business enterprises in Ghana since 1931 which then led to an influx of Nigerians into that country. This led to

tensions between the foreigners and locals due to grim socio-economic challenges facing the Ghanaians. The government was then forced to come up with measures that were designed to curtail the entry of foreigners' into the country. Besides the Aliens Order, the government came up with the Ghanaian Business Promotion which reserved selected businesses for Ghanaians (Asamoah 2014: 187). Asamoah (2014: 187) further postulated that '[t]o facilitate Ghanaian business promotion, aliens would be allowed to engage in certain economic activity only if they put in capital of determined amounts'. This led to a mass exodus of between 900 000 and 1 200 000 foreign nationals from Ghana which was praised by locals as a nationalistic initiative which guaranteed employment opportunities for Ghanaian nationals (Aremu and Ajayi 2014: 176).

In 1972, at the time of the brutal Idi Amin's dictatorship in Uganda, thousands of Asians were ejected from that country as it was faced with crippling economic challenges. They were given just three months to vacate the country and their businesses were confiscated by the state. However, the expulsion of the Asians from that country failed to salvage the country from the daunting economic problems confronting it (Hansen 2000, Stokes 2009, Adeola 2015). In 1978, Gabon expelled 9 000 Beninese from the country following allegations by the President of Benin, Kerekou that officials from Gabon had been involved in a foiled mercenary *coup de tat* aimed to remove him from power (Henckaerts 1995, Gray 1998). Henckaerts observed that 'the sole factor of being a Benin national triggered the expulsion decisions without an examination of individual behavior' (Henckaerts 1995: 17). Nigeria has also been no exception to xenophobic reactions. While the 1970s were characterized by a massive economic boom in Nigeria, the situation was different during the 1980s when the economy was in rapid economic decline. Due to the economic challenges, Nigeria was forced to expel more than 2 million foreign nationals from that country and more than one million of these foreigners were Ghanaians (Otoghile and Obakhado 2011, Adeola 2015). That the majority of the expelled foreigners were Ghanaians aptly demonstrated that Nigerian had not forgotten that its citizens had once been subjected to expulsions earlier on during

the 1960s. In that context, the expulsions were reprisal xenophobic reactions.

Faced with mounting economic challenges in Cote d'Ivoire during the 1990s, the then President, Bedie promoted the notion of the *ivoirite* which was calculated to interlace Ivorian identity into political and economic access (Adeola 2015). The institutionalization of Ivorian identity triggered a lot of resentment against foreign nationals and as a result more than 8 000 nationals from Burkina Faso were expelled in 1999 due to tensions between Ivoirians and Burkinabe farmers (Human Rights Watch 2001). Following an unsuccessful attempted *coup*, allegedly led by a mercenary Simon Mann against the Equatorial Guinea President, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasongo in 2004, there was a widespread clampdown on foreign nationals in that country. Foreign nationals from many African countries were subjected to intimidation, detainment and in extreme cases, to expulsions. Tensions between locals and foreigners were heightened as the authorities encouraged Equatorial Guineans to be 'vigilant with foreigners, regardless of colour, because [their] target [...] was] the wealth of Equatorial Guinea, the oil' (Roberts 2009: 192-193). More than 1 000 African foreign nationals were ejected from the country. The majority of them were Cameroonians (Human Rights Watch 2000: 81, cited in Adeola 2015). During the persecution of foreign nationals even ordinary Equatorial Guineans were allowed to arbitrarily arrest people suspected to be illegal foreign immigrants (Ibid). This was also followed by a government ban in 2007 on West African nationals from operating grocery stores in the country. The stores were either confiscated by the state or closed (IRIN News, 2008, cited in Adeola 2015).

Since the beginning of the new millennium, several Congolese have been expelled from Angola following largely unfounded allegations that they were stealing natural resources. By 2009, more than 260 000 Congolese had been expelled from Angola due to this rhetoric (Siegel 2009: 23, Adebajo 2011: 91). The Angolan Foreign Affairs Minister, for example proffered institutionalized support for this in 2009 when he categorically stated that 'Angola will never give up its right to protect its natural resources and its right to repatriate citizens who are acting in a way which does not benefit the country'

(Reliefweb 2009 cited in Adeola 2015). In retaliation, the government of Congo Kinshasa expelled 50 000 Angolans in 2009 amid a rising popular anger against the humiliation and treatment of the Congolese who were expelled from Angola (Human Rights Watch 2012: 11).

Xenophobic reactions were also witnessed in Burundi in 2009 when over 800 foreign nationals were expelled from the country. Most of the affected nationals were from Rwanda and Congo Kinshasa though Ugandans, Tanzanians and Senegalese were equally affected. The rationale was to cleanse the country of illegal foreign immigrants who were accused of perpetrating crimes in the country (Adeola 2015). In 2013, Tanzania also carried out a similar exercise which resulting in the expulsion of around 11 000 illegal immigrants, purportedly to get rid of criminals from the country (Ghosh 2013). The Tanzanian President gave the 'alien' nationals a two-week ultimatum to vacate the country. The illegal immigrants were accused by Tanzanian villagers in Karega area of committing a spate of crimes ranging from armed robbery, kidnappings to bus attacks. They were further accused of overstressing the government's capacity to provide social services to its citizens (Naluyaga 2013). According to Ghosh (2013) the exercise resulted in the ejection of 6 400 Rwandans, 4 100 Ugandans and 300 Burundians.

The terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab in Kenya, a Somali group, have generated a lot of resentment against Somalis in the country (Harper 2010, Adeola 2015 and Hatcher 2015). After the 2013 Westgate attacks, the Kenyan government threatened to close down the Dadaab refugee camp which was home to over half a million Somalis (Adeola 2015). During the course of 2014, the government launched Operation *Usalama* Watch. The operation was instituted to counter terrorism and around 4 000 Somalis were arrested during the operation. This demonstrated that the Somali Kenyans were stigmatized as the government moved in to deal with the threat of violent extremism. Tensions have also erupted between The Republic of Congo (Congo Brazzaville) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in spite of the close cultural and ethnic ties that exist between the two countries. In 2014, more than 50 000 Democratic Republic of Congo citizens were expelled from Congo Brazzaville in an operation that was meant to deal with crime in the

country (Reuters 2015, Amnesty International 2015). Commenting on the repatriations, a government spokesperson underlined the fact that repatriations would continue until all the criminal elements were flushed out (Amnesty International 2015: 17). In June 2015, 27 people died and about 100 people were injured in suicide bombs attacks in N' Djamena, Chad. The government responded by expelling undocumented Cameroonian and Nigerian nationals (Adeola 2015, Ernest 2015 and Telegraph 2015).

In Egypt, immigrants and refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia have been subjected to racist violence and harassment by Egyptian authorities since President Hosni Mubarak was ousted from power (Yeargain 2011). In Libya foreign immigrants such as asylum seekers, refugees and migrants have been exposed to xenophobic hostility, resentment and racist violence especially at the time when the Gaddafi regime was accused of hiring mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa to fight on its behalf. Most of these foreign nationals were from Chad, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia. Some of the victims were accused of criminality. In 2011, it was reported that several nationals from Niger, Chad, Sudan, Mali and black Libyans were abused and arrested by the security forces (Human Rights Watch 2011). Foreign immigrants and refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa have also been victims of physical assaults, verbal abuse and racist violence in Morocco. Most of the victims were from DRC, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. It was also revealed that several victims of the xenophobic and racist reactions who had reported their cases to the authorities did not get any form of assistance and that there were numerous instances in which victims would not seek recourse to the law due to fear of further reprisals (Bauwens, D 2009).

In Zambia, xenophobic sentiments against South Africans were also expressed by former acting Zambian president Guy Scot when he intimated that he disliked South Africans for their backwardness in terms of Africanness. Though Guy Scot's assertions were ultimately addressed diplomatically between Zambia and South Africa, the diplomatic process was not completely able to erase the damage caused by the utterances against South Africans (Mafukuta 2015). In Zambia anti-Chinese sentiments among the generality of Zambians are very pronounced because of the 'hatred' of the Chinese

who are accused by the locals of being arrogant, exploitative, cruel, brutal, inhuman, among a host of other accusations. These perceptions were exacerbated by the then opposition presidential candidate, Michael Sata, who routinely blasted the Chinese for invading Zambia and for their labour practices in the mining sector which were exploitative and also for committing other human rights abuses in the country. The resentment against the Chinese draws from their unpopularity for bring into the country their people to undertake even very simple tasks that can be performed by locals leaving the locals unemployed (Lim 2011). Again in April 2016, there an outbreak of widespread attacks directed at African foreign nationals, including Zimbabweans, in Lusaka, Zambia. The attacks were triggered by accusations that Rwandans were responsible for the spate of ritual killings that had plagued the city then. Many foreign owned shops were looted and ransacked during the attacks and African foreign nationals sought refuge in police stations. However, swift intervention by the Zambian authorities quickly broke the violence to an end (*The Chronicle*, 20/04/2016). In other parts of Southern Africa, xenophobic resentment against foreigners has also been largely witnessed in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Crush 2001, Nyamnjoh 2006. Marongwe and Mawere (2016) have adequately explored xenophobic reactions in Zimbabwe while elsewhere in this volume, Duri provides an interesting dimension on xenophobia in Botswana.

From the above articulated cases of xenophobic reactions, what cannot escape one's attention is that most of the attacks have been directed at fellow Africans speaking to afro phobia. It can further be discerned that many African countries have experienced periodic xenophobic manifestations in their history since the time they attained independence. The major factors that account for xenophobic reactions vary from one state to the other, but in general terms, terrorism, crime and socio-economic and political constraints seem to be gaining currency in post colonial Africa. Xenophobia is propelled by both myths and realities obtaining in specific localities. In most African states, it has become trendy for the national leadership and locals in general to blame the presence of foreign nationals whenever a country is confronted with challenges that seem

to threaten its national security, socio-economic and political stability. This gives credence to the scapegoating hypothesis that has been propounded by several scholars in accounting for the widespread xenophobic reactions across the African continent. Thus, while the factors that stimulate xenophobic reactions seem to be multi-faceted, a fundamental theme that reverberates in the highlighted cases is that xenophobic manifestations are not a new phenomenon in Africa and indeed, are not unique to specific African countries.

South Africa and the liberation Struggle

During its anti-colonial struggle, South Africa, like other Africans countries received various forms of support from fellow African nations as it waged its anti-colonial struggle against the white apartheid regime. South African liberation movements received financial, military and logical support from several African countries particularly those in Southern Africa. Both the ANC and the Pan African Congress (PAC) had military bases in Zambia. The ANC also enjoyed radio broadcasting services from Tanzania from the 1960s where it was accorded the platform to communicate with its supporters, mobilize international support for the liberation struggle and also churn out propaganda against the white apartheid regime in South Africa (Mosiya, *et al*, 1994). This was because one of Tanzania's major foreign policy priorities then was to support nationalist movements in Southern Africa in the spirit of Pan Africanism. Many South African political leaders, activists and refugees were accommodated in Zimbabwe, Zambia and other African countries. As highlighted by President Jacob Zuma at a briefing at the ANC headquarters, 'these nations paid more than lip service to the struggle, providing our cadres with weapons, transporting them across borders at great risk to themselves and accommodating exiles in their homes and communities' (Thebe Ikafeng 2015). Some of the notable political leaders and activists who were hosted in Zimbabwe were Moaletsi Mbeki, Thabo Mbeki, Baleka Mbete, Hugh Masakela, Sparks Moloi, Jackson Mbali, Tsitsi Chiliza, Hlatswayo, Arthur Sithole and Zuma himself (*CAJ News Online*, 2015). Thabo Mbeki and

Jacob Zuma went on to respectively succeed the first black legendary and iconic post-apartheid South African president Nelson Mandela as the country's presidents. The military wing of the ANC, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* fought side by side with ZIPRA forces in Matabeleland during Zimbabwe's liberation struggle and would carry out occasionally incursions into apartheid South Africa. The same was also true for the military wing of PAC, Azania People's Liberation Army (APLA), which maintained very strong ties with ZANLA combatants. All this was done to promote the spirit of Pan Africanism which had largely been advocated and championed by independent Ghana's first black president Nkrumah. In Nkrumah's opinion, the independence of Ghana which was the first black African country to attain independence in 1956 was incomplete and meaningless for as long as other African countries remained under colonial bondage. In his own words, he opined that 'our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent' (Ikafeng 2015). With the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, an organ, called the Liberation Committee, was established to superintend the activities of the liberation movements in Africa in the different parts of the continent. It was under such circumstances that Southern African countries, under the umbrella of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) then, played host to South African liberation movements and political refugees. Regional leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania invested in the struggle for South Africa's freedom at great cost to their national economies.

Most, if not all, Southern African countries incurred heavy debts from international financial institutions running into several millions of British pounds in defending themselves against apartheid, in compensating for the costs emanating from the apartheid South Africa's destabilization and in repairing the damage inflicted by the apartheid regime. The loans were not used for development or productive purposes but for saving lives. Mozambique and Angola were the worst affected as the apartheid regime waged a full scale war against them as according to Minter (1994), rebel movements in these countries, RENAMO and UNITA acted as apartheid's contras (also

refer to Cement 1997, Ekwe-Ekwe 1990 and Dinerman 2006). Around 2 million people in the two states lost their lives and many others were displaced from their homes. It is estimated that the cost of the apartheid war to Mozambique was in excess of 11 billion pounds in damage and lost production. South Africa and the Renamo rebel group it backed targeted business ventures and other infrastructure such as sawmills, mines, factories, sugar mills and bridges in a desperate attempt to paralyze the Mozambique economy (<http://www.africafocus.org/doc98/debt9807.php>). Most notable was the blowing up of the bridge over the Zambezi River which connected Malawi to the port of Beira in Mozambique. 30 miles of the railway near Inhamitanga in Mozambique were also destroyed and five years after the war came to an end, the railway line was still closed because Mozambique did not have the money to repair it. More than half of the schools and hospitals in Mozambique were either closed or destroyed. Mozambique had to delay the introduction of universal primary education in order to meet its financial obligations of apartheid induced debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank until 2010 (<http://www.africafocus.org/doc98/debt9807.php>). The apartheid regime also carried out periodic raids into all the other neighbouring countries. Transport disruptions by the apartheid regime on landlocked countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi were a frequent occurrence and these resulted in increased costs and loss of markets by these countries. Tanzania, Lesotho and Botswana were neither spared as the apartheid regime also imposed an economic blockade on them. It is noted that the apartheid-induced debt for these countries was in excess of 11 billion pounds (Ibid). Apartheid wrought unprecedented destruction in the region. Indeed:

[t]he suffering was immense. This was a war against ordinary people, in which schools and health posts were primary targets and the civilians were massacred on buses and trains...The people of Southern Africa paid a terrible price in blood and suffering. A whole generation never went to school because of apartheid. Mothers and children died because the apartheid state destroyed health centres in Mozambique [...] Apartheid is ended,

but the people of the region cannot celebrate because they are being asked to pay again

(<http://www.africafocus.org/doc98/debt9807.php>).

Nevertheless, through the sustained support of the OAU, SADCC and other international sympathizers, South Africa eventually achieved majority rule in 1994. This section largely underlined the spirit of Ubuntu that was extended to South Africans by other African countries in their time of need. It is baffling how this spirit of Ubuntu was debunked by South Africans in the post-apartheid era as they unleashed unprecedented xenophobic violence against fellow Africans who had made enormous sacrifice to the struggle in South Africa until independence was achieved. It is against this background that xenophobic violence unleashed against foreign African nationals in South Africa should be understood which is what the next section turns to.

Xenophobic Attacks on Foreign Nationals in South Africa since Independence

While South Africa is widely viewed as a flourishing example of a fledgling democracy on the continent, its Achilles heel has been the recurrent xenophobic manifestations that have been perpetrated on largely foreign non black South Africans since 1994. By 2016, South Africa had been exposed to two major violent xenophobic outbreaks in 2008 and 2015 respectively. However, manifestations of xenophobic attitudes have always been characteristic of post-apartheid South Africa. The xenophobic resentments by South Africans in recent years are largely due to the fact that South Africa has been inordinate to an excessive numbers of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from many African countries and other parts of the world. Most of the foreigners come from Zimbabwe with estimates ranging between one to three million Zimbabwean foreign nationals in South Africa. South Africa is also a favourable destination for asylum seekers and refugees from the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi and DRC), and the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and other migrants from several

Southern African states (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2011). Estimates are that before the 2008 xenophobic attacks, about 78 foreigners had been killed in xenophobic and bias motivated attacks in the country (<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org.2011>). Though some of the attacks did not translate into widespread violence, they nevertheless demonstrated that some South Africans, especially the subaltern, hold strong anti-foreign feelings against other African other nationals. For instance, since South Africa attained independence, there has been a general widespread resentment against the presence of Malawians among ordinary South Africans who routinely accused them of accepting lowly paid jobs as housemaids and domestic workers (Human Science Research Council, 2008). In 1996, South African fisherman clashed with Namibians and Angolans whom they accused of taking over their jobs and also of being used as cheap labour. Furthermore, more than 20 Somali traders were murdered in Cape Town in 2005/6 (Human Science Research Council, 2008). However, most of the earlier attacks were generally brief and geographically constrained hence they did not attract the attention of the international media, civic society and the international community at large.

The year 2008 witnessed the first major xenophobic outbreak against foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa. The attacks on foreigners started in Alexandra and quickly spread to other areas surrounding Johannesburg such as Cleveland, Diepsloot, Hillbrow, Tembisa, Primrose, Ivory Park and Thokoza. The violence also affected Kwazulu- Natal, Mpumalanga and Cape Town. By the end of May 2008, about 62 foreign nationals had lost their lives during the horrific attacks and more than 20 000 foreign nationals had been displaced in Gauteng alone (Human Sciences Research Council 2008; Mafukuta 2015). Besides the killings and displacements, the violence also led to the destruction of property and businesses belonging to foreign nationals. It is argued that the attacks broke out in 135 different locations in the country and that besides the death of 62 foreigners, over a hundred thousand others were displaced during the violence. A disturbing phenomenon was the shocking levels of impunity from prosecution by the perpetrators of the violence

(Misago, *et al*, 2010). There was also a similar violent xenophobic outbreak in April 2015 in which 7 foreign nationals were killed, thousands others were displaced and property and business belonging to foreigners destroyed (Mafukuta 2015, Muguti and Makanyisa, 2016 forthcoming). However, between the two major xenophobic violent outbreaks of 2008 and 2015 numerous accounts in which immigrants were attacked were reported. In 2009, a building occupied by refugees, asylum seekers and migrants was raided in Kwa Zulu-Natal by a gang of about 150 knife wielding South Africans. Two foreign nationals died during the stampede and one was seriously injured. It is alleged that though the attackers went past a police station before the attack, the police did not intervene during the attack. The foreigners were accused of committing crimes by local South Africans in the area (Amnesty International 2010). During the same period, shacks belonging to Zimbabwean workers at De Doorns, Western Cape were attacked and destroyed by local residents. The attacks had been triggered by tensions in accessing jobs at the local wine farms between the locals and Zimbabweans. Though 24 people were arrested in connection with the attacks, 12 were latter discharged for lack of incriminating evidence (*IRIN*, 2009). The year 2010 witnessed several attacks on foreigners resulting in the injury of 4 foreign nationals and looting of African foreign owned shops (*BBC NEWS* 20 July 2010). In 2011 widespread serious xenophobic incidents were purportedly perpetrated against Somalis and Zimbabweans (<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org> 2011).

The rhetoric that propelled the 2008 xenophobic attacks; that foreigners stole local jobs, committed crimes, were drug dealers and prostitutes, snatched South African women, were a drain to social services also seemed to resonate in the April 2015 wave of attacks. The attacks affected several South African townships. Following the xenophobic violence, Zimbabwe and Malawi repatriated some of their nationals back home. Nigeria responded by recalling its ambassador in protest of the xenophobic violence that was perpetrated on its citizens (Muguti and Makanyisa, forthcoming). Enormous interdisciplinary research, both qualitative and quantitative has been carried out by several scholars and civic society organizations in the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic violence on

the factors behind the violence (Steinberg 2008, Hanekon and Webster 2009/10, Hungwe 2012, Isike and Isike 2012, Duponchel 2013, Adam and Moodley 2013, Mafukuta 2015, Skinner and Crush 2015, and Adeola 2015). Though some of the researches are well supported by empirical evidence, they seem to be compromised due to inherent biases. The bias drives from their activist and advocacy inclinations. For instance, Mafukuta (2015) argues that xenophobic violence by South Africans against foreign nationals is a reaction to criminality which is generally attributed to foreigners (also see Hanekon and Webster 2009/10 on biases based on activism and advocacy). However, such an argument is not very convincing since crime has always been part and parcel of the South African life. Disputing the fact that foreigners were behind the several crimes committed in South Africa, a South African national categorically opined in a focused discussion with Human Sciences Research Council (2008: 21) that “They found crime here and maybe realized that this is probably how most people make a living here in South Africa, so they joined what was already there. It’s a rumour [that crime is committed by ‘foreigners’] these crimes are performed by locals, if you could only see how poor looking our foreigners are...shame’. In community conversations facilitated by the Nelson Mandela Foundation 2010, a resident of Khayelitsha argued;

...So, until we, who think we want our society to be perfect, try as much as possible to get rid of these illegal firearms, we are hauling in our homes; if we do not succeed in that, violence will always be in our communities. We also see that it is all in because of that people find themselves in little gangs and to commit a crime it is like they hale you for having committed a crime. And they will say “Hey! You did it! That was nice. I saw, you just shot him, he died. This is the type of person we want in our group”. And if we do not stop that gangsterism and stopping to hailing people who commit crimes, we will not go any further (Abrahams 2010: 10).

Maybe Chen’s augment is a bit more plausible. Chen (2015) states that ‘the lack of jobs and a deep sense of disappointment by South

Africans of non-delivery of promises by the government, has created the frustration which is at the root cause of these attacks as the perception is that foreigners are taking opportunities from South Africans (Chen 2015). There is a general perception by some ordinary South African Africans, especially the marginalized and subaltern that foreigners enjoy favourable status in the country. As one South African retorted, 'the constitution favors the foreigners...the foreign nationals come in and they can, before we know it...have shops all over. So these guys are doing well' (Abrahams 2010: 18-190. Hackel (2014) adds another interesting dimension to the theories on xenophobic violence when he adumbrated that in South Africa, African foreigners are routinely accused of practicing witchcraft which makes them thrive in their businesses, undermine local people's business enterprises and also inducing sterility among South African men. Registering her displeasure about the presence of foreign nationals whom she accused of practicing witchcraft in their communities, a disgruntled South African middle aged woman Thandile, retorted;

When the makwerekwere come here we no longer develop, and our children no longer progress. If we reached 80 percent then we fall back to 10 or 0 percent. For example, if I have a shop and a foreigner comes here and sets up a shop nearby, then his shop will succeed and my shop will fail. They will go up and we will go down. The only way to explain this is that they are using something...that they are using *ubuthakathi*. You see how they come here, they are poor, they come from a poor country and they come across the border with nothing but a passport. There's no way that they can become rich after only three years or so here! There must be something behind it...There is no other way to explain it (<http://www.culanth.org/articles/728>).

This belief in what some scholars refer to as zero sum economics is prevalent among certain segments of the South African communities which make the people conceptualize foreigners as witches who are morally unacceptable as they are viewed as mysterious anti-social agents that can stall productive and

reproductive processes among the locals (<http://www.culanth.org/articles/728>). Immigrants are accused of using immoral and anti-social forms of accumulation at the expense of the locals which in the Marxist dictum can be interpreted to portray that the unpopularity of immigrants among locals is due to the stiff competition for scarce resources in certain communities.

In general terms, there are certain widespread myths, stereotypes and biases that are associated with the presence of foreign African nationals in South Africa. These feed into the scapegoating theory that foreigners are responsible for most of the socio-economic ills that affect the ordinary citizens, hence the hardening of attitudes by locals at the grassroots towards foreigners which in turn trigger xenophobic violence against foreign nationals. The insider/outsider concept is very strong among certain segments of the South African population. Even language is at times used to define the insider and outsider. In certain provinces where isiZulu and IsiXhosa are the prevailing languages, even South Africans who hail from other provinces experience some form of exclusion because of their inability to communicate in these dominant languages (Melisa Khumalo, 20 April 2016). In other community discussions spearheaded by the Nelson Mandela Foundation (2010), participants in several communities revealed the lack of cohesion among South Africans by indicating that they were actually bothered by the TVBS states (Transkei, Venda, Bophututswana, and Ciskei). Participants proffered that relations between some different ethnic groups had always been characterized by a lot of hostility as South Africans never liked each other. In a community conversation in Khayelitsha, one respondent highlighted that, 'I am a foreigner from Limpopo, since I came here I can still feel some of the challenges that my brothers and sisters from other parts of the continent are experiencing. I have been asked several times where I come from even when there is no requirement for me to do so' (Abrahams 2010: 8). This underlines the sometimes afro phobic nature of the xenophobic resentment among the multiple and diversified communities in South Africa who, it appears, remained largely intolerant of each other in the post-apartheid era. However, while scholars do not seem to agree on the fundamental causes of the xenophobic outbreaks, their point of

convergence is that there are certain fundamental issues that need to be addressed urgently in South Africa and Africa in general, if a long lasting solution to the problem is to be found.

Violence in South Africa

Xenophobic reactions in South Africa are unique in that they are normally accompanied by unbridled violence and brutality which is a bit different from other countries across the globe. Spirited efforts have been made to account for this by linking the violence to the legacies of apartheid. In apartheid South Africa, violence was expressively used to articulate grievances and dissatisfaction towards the system. Some scholars such as Haneker and Webster (2009) and Adam and Moodley (2013:37) cited by Adeola (2015) argue that apartheid resulted in moral and social decay among ordinary South Africans and as such they have very little respect for human life. Besides the inequalities which dominated apartheid South Africa, the prejudices and biases on which it flourished have continued to dominate post-apartheid South Africa resulting in the perpetuation of hostility towards foreigners and one another. This hostility, at times translates into open violence against fellow African nationals. Gumede (2015) avers that this culture of violence is deeply rooted in the violence of apartheid and how the oppressed people responded to it. As he puts it ‘Apartheid has not only left a deep legacy of white-against-black racism. The apartheid system, by forcefully ghettoizing ethnic groups, those with different shades of skin or languages, has left a legacy of not only interracial and colour prejudice, but also prejudice against Africans from outside the country’...As a result, both black and white South Africans are deeply suspicious of Africans from north of the Limpopo. African immigrants are violently attacked because perpetrators believe the police will not prosecute them with the same zeal because the victims are foreign, not “like us” (<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree>).

Xenophobic violence is also fuelled by reckless and irresponsible statements by national leaders. For instance, the 2015 wave of attacks was to some extent triggered by the utterances of the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini, who insinuated that foreigners should vacate

the country following the death of a South African teenager killed by a Somali national. He accused foreigners of taking jobs and public resources meant for foreigners (Adeola 2015, Gumede 2015). In 2014 President Jacob Zuma advised South Africans to refrain from behaving as if they were “typical” blacks from “Africa”. At the beginning of 2015, Lindiwe Zulu, the small business development minister attacked foreign African business people operating in townships for refusing to share their trade “secrets” and stated that this threatened their peaceful future coexistence with local business entrepreneurs (Gumede 2015). Indeed, during the April 2015 attacks, the whole continent was astounded by the shocking images of South Africans revealing the brutalizing of fellow Africans in different parts of the country. This was in stark contrast to the notion of African brotherhood which the founding father of South Africa’s independence Nelson Mandela had advocated for. The brotherhood was premised on the belief that just by virtue of being Africans with a shared historical background; we should always identify with one another and continue to find each other irrespective of one’s nationality. Needless to say that the xenophobic attacks perpetrated on fellow Africans were also a negation of the core values of the Freedom Charter (1955), on which South Africa’s liberation struggle was to some extent anchored on. The Freedom Charter unequivocally stated that South Africa belonged to all who lived in it, whether black or white (<http://www.anc.org.za.show.php?id=72>). After South Africa attained independence, the ANC led government incorporated most of the core values of the Freedom Charter in the country’s new constitution.

Xenophobia and the future of inter-African Relations

Xenophobia, in all its manifestations, if not managed appropriately, has the potential to have an incalculable damage on South Africa and its international relations in general and intra-African relations in particular. Broadly speaking, xenophobic violence has the potential to negatively impact on the continent in critical areas such as trade, tourism, international relations and citizenship. It is a potential threat to the free movement of goods,

people and services across the continent. In the globalizing world, the free movements would facilitate the transfer of skills and immensely contribute to the economic growth and development of the continent. With specific reference to Southern Africa, xenophobic violence exposes the nature of challenges that confront the region in its vision to facilitate the free movement of services, goods and people within the region. SADC's long term vision is to promote peace, unite and enhanced integration in Southern Africa. Attacks on foreign nationals are therefore a hindrance to SADC's objectives of promoting socio-economic and political interdependence for the sustainable economic development of the region and ensure an improvement in the people's standards of living. Following the 2008 xenophobic outbreak, former South African president Mbeki emphasized the need for Africans to work together as they shared a common future. He opined 'We have always known that regardless of the boundaries drawn by others to define us as different and separate from our kith and kin, and even despite our occupation of different spaces across the divides occasioned by the existence of the oceans that nature has formed, we share with those of whom we are part, a common destiny' (SANF April 2015).

The xenophobic violence in South Africa should also be examined in the context of its likely impact on the much proclaimed notion of African brotherhood premised on a shared past experience of colonial servitude, the spirit of Ubuntu, Pan Africanism and African Renaissance. Indeed, the xenophobic outbreaks are *ultra virus* the much trumpeted notion of African brotherhood anchored on skin pigmentation and a common background of colonial servitude of the African race. Ironically, one of the major proponents, if not passionate advocate, of African Renaissance has been former South African President Tambo Mbeki. During his tenure of office as South African president in the first decade of the 21st century Mbeki, popularized the need for a pan-Africanist institutional engagement and a pan-Africanist vision of economic development (HSRC 2008). The impact of recurrent xenophobic violence in South Africa will be explored in the context of the above notions and through its impact on the social, economic and political relations of South Africa and other African states. This type of approach is appropriate for this

study in the sense that the numerous challenges which confront some African countries today may one day spill over into South Africa which may also force thousands of its citizens to seek refuge in fellow African nations. Should this happen, it will then be exceedingly difficult for South African nationals to expect a warm welcome beyond their borders. Today, many African countries are confronted with a plethora of challenges which have culminated in many foreign nationals seeking economic and political refuge in South Africa. These challenges involve terrorism and consequent genocides perpetrated by religious-cultural groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Kenya, for instance, environmental deficiencies, ethnic-tribal wars, droughts and famines, mounting debts, dictatorships, endemic political and bureaucratic corruption. These various challenges and calamities have undoubtedly slowed down economic growth and industrial development in most Sub-Saharan African countries. They have also threatened civil cohesion, endangered food production and also affected the region's technological and infrastructural development (Mafukuta 2015; Lim, 2011).

In a globalizing world, labour, capital and goods invariably tend to flow where they reap the most benefits. Viewed from this perspective, there is no doubt that xenophobic reactions will perpetuate tensions among African states because this trend seems to be irreversible. Locals as defined by the national boundaries, will always resent the presence of foreign nationals as they compete to access basic social services, employment and business opportunities. As Mafukuta (2015) argues it is illusionary, utopian and wishful thinking that South Africa could continue to cater for its citizens and other nationals wanting to come into the country on a 'free-for-all' immigration system. Thus, tensions are bound to arise between foreigners and nationals as they compete for scarce social and economic opportunities. The 2015 xenophobic violence in South Africa affected regional flow of trade in SADC and has exposed the dangers of over relying on South Africa by some Southern African countries in terms of trade. This has made other countries in SADC to seriously explore other avenues of trade within the region with the potential to alter trade dynamics with detrimental effects on South

Africa. For instance, Zimbabwe has for the longest enjoyed more trade with South Africa and many analysts were questioning the wisdom of continued reliance on a single trade partner at the height of the attacks. Following the xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals, a Zimbabwean analyst, Brains Muchemwa argued that in spite of the huge investments by the two countries' firms on either side of the border, the future lied in drastically curtailing the over reliance on South Africa as a trading partner. This was collaborated by Chamu Musanhu, the president of the Affirmative Action Group (AAG), who underlined the need for Zimbabwe to strive to establish alternative strong economic networks with other countries in the region to reduce over dependence on South Africa (Zimbabwe' Largest Classifieds Online, 21 April 2015). South Africa enjoys a positive balance of trade with its neighbours which some analysts argue is enough to sustain basic social services in that country (Zimbabwe' Largest Classifieds Online, 21 April 2015). The xenophobic attacks undermine the role of South Africa as one of Africa's leading economies which should also provide the foundation for Africa's socio-economic integration as promised under the NEPAD that former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, sponsored. In the new millennium, African nations should focus on economic prosperity through improved intra-African trade and local investment. Xenophobia has the potential to undermine African initiatives such as NEPAD which was established to speed up continental development. During the second decade of the new millennium, NEPAD and the African Union (AU) launched Africa's 2063. This is a 50 year blueprint envisaged to accelerate 'Africa's economic success and envision a continent united in its identity, vision and progression' (<http://nepadbusinessfoundation.org/index.phpd>).

Thus, viewed from this perspective, there is no doubt that xenophobic manifestations will have negative impacts on intra-regional trade in Southern Africa and the continent at large. For South Africa in particular, the South African Economic Development Minister, Ibrahim Patel, categorically stated that as Africa's leading beneficiary of foreign direct investment, the country stood to lose immensely from the xenophobic violence as it received

well in access of R160 billion in goods sold to other African countries, supporting over 160 000 jobs (Thebe Ikalafeng 2015). South African business giants such as MTN and Shoprite had widespread investments across Africa. For instance, by 2015, MTN had over 215 million subscribers across its 22 markets in Africa and the Middle East, with international operations accounting for 74% of its turnover. Shoprite had around 1 400 corporate and franchise in 16 African nations and the Indian Ocean Islands (Thebe Ikalafeng 2015). Furthermore, two major telecommunications and satellite companies in Nigeria, arguably Africa's largest economy were run by South Africans (youth.org/en/posts 2015). Examined from this standpoint, xenophobic violence has the potential to have an immense negative effect on the South African economy as it could suffocate expansion initiatives by South African companies into other African countries. For South African business, this was worrisome as a report by PwC (2015) demonstrated that at the time of the outbreak of the xenophobic attacks in 2015, many South African companies were already expanding or considering expanding their business tentacles across the continent. In the wake of the attacks, South African firms operating in Malawi and Mozambique were forced to repatriate some of their workers due to fears of reprisal xenophobic attacks. For instance, a South African company operating in Mozambique had to repatriate 300 employees from that country (Muguti and Makanyisa, forthcoming). The report further highlighted that many foreign multinational companies that sought to invest across the continent preferred to use South Africa as their base in exploring business opportunities in other African countries. Chen, the head of NEPAD Foundation concluded that the attacks therefore threatened and lowered foreigner investor confidence not only with regards to South Africa but the whole continent (Chen 2015).

For South Africa, the impact of xenophobic manifestations could be immense on its tourist industry. Tourism is one of South Africa's major foreign currency earners and has great potential to create employment opportunities for many South Africans. For instance, in 2014, 70% of the 9.6 million tourists were from Africa and direct tourism contributed about 3% of the gross domestic product and

creating employment opportunities for more than 600 000 people which in essence amounted to about 4,6% of direct employment in the country (Ikalafeng 2015). Brand South Africa acknowledged that a negative reputation for South Africa was likely to have a very strong bearing on potential investment and tourism in that country (Brandsouthafrica 2015). Xenophobic violence results in visitors cancelling their travel arrangements to South Africa with negative impact on the country's economic growth and development. Internationally, post-apartheid is well represented. It enjoys representation in 282 states in the world including 47 in the 54 African countries, second only to the US. In turn, there are 309 foreign missions in South Africa (Ikalafeng 2015). Following the xenophobic violence in South Africa, threats were directed against South African businesses and people in other countries and the South African foreign missions in leading countries such as Nigeria and Ghana were temporarily closed. This bears testimony to the fact that the attacks compromised South Africa's relations with her fellow African states (Ikalafeng 2015). The treatment of other African nationals in South Africa radiated negative perceptions about South Africans' identification with fellow Africans. There was widespread discernment that the South African people lacked gratitude for the selfless sacrifices made by other African countries during South Africa's anti-colonial struggle. There were feelings that South Africans have to remain cognisant of the fact that African countries united to fight against the apartheid regime and that it was through the support of fellow African compatriots that South Africa attained independence in 1994. In 1961, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) now the AU, under pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah imposed sanctions, which closed Africa's harbours and airports to South Africa because of the atrocities committed by the apartheid regime. Neighbouring nations, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Tanzania and Namibia supported South Africa's liberation movements as they hosted South African exiles and the country owes much of its freedom to the support provided by other African nations during this period. Urging South Africans to uphold the values of Ubuntu during the 2015 violence, Maponya, the chairperson of Brand South Africa reiterated that:

Our struggle was a collective struggle as the people of the continent and the wider international community joined us. When we attained...freedom, we knew our success was due to the efforts of the citizens of our continent and the world...Heads of countries took up our struggle at international fora, they joined the broader international community in calling for sanctions against apartheid...

(<http://www.brandsouthafrica.com/news/1200>).

At the climax of the xenophobic violence, some of the African countries repatriated their traumatized and displaced citizens and were even planning on boycotting South African products, businesses and retailers that have set up operations in their countries. Chen argued that it was disheartening to note that while other countries welcomed the presence of South Africans the same courtesy was not extended to foreign nationals in South Africa (Chen 2015). As such, xenophobia can be considered as a threat to African Renaissance, notions of democracy, social cohesion, sustainable economic rebuilding, globalisation and growth through cooperation among African nations. It is also a threat to initiatives by African states to establish Africa as a significant player in the international geo-political affairs as it constantly ferments tensions between African nations.

Viewed from the globalization perspective, xenophobic violence negatively affects interaction between African states in the sense that it militates against the free movement of people and goods which could produce reciprocal benefits for both sending and receiving countries. Immigrants across the continent supply critical skills and enhance knowledge transfer which is critical for the transformation of technology, educational and health deliveries systems across the continent. They also contribute to the national fiscus of individual states through paying taxes and other remittances. For South Africa in particular, Brand South Africa (2015) argued that 'many nationals from neighbouring countries travel to South Africa daily, weekly and monthly to buy groceries and other goods from our retail shops to sell in their countries, paying toll fees on our roads and thus contributing towards the country's revenue'. In light of the above,

xenophobic violence has negative implications on potential trade interaction between states. Xenophobic violence pauses the threat of stifling the movement of people across the continent. This threatens to prohibit cultural diversity not only of people from Africa but from other parts of the world. As communities become more cosmopolitan through the intermingling of people and cultures across the continent, social cohesion is enhanced and deepened among Africans through an appreciation of who we are as a people. Figures from the last South African census in 2013 revealed that the country was home to nationals from 53 African countries giving the country a wider range of ethnic variety than the rest of the continent (Chen 2015).

Indeed, in pre-colonial Africa and colonial Africa, Africans mixed freely regardless of their ethnic backgrounds (Arthur 2000). Xenophobia threatens to militate against intermingling among the African people as the narrative of the 'foreign other' as defined by the colonial borders and boundaries arbitrarily imposed on the continent by the colonialists at the time of colonization with no input from the African people have become a powerful rhetoric for defining ethnicity in post colonial Africa. The boundaries influence how people access social security and basic services. This is so ingrained in the minds of some African people to the extent that they have little regard for those they classify as the outsiders. However, in the context of the globalizing world, foreign immigrants are actually good for African nations as they actually help them to integrate into the global community. For instance, while South Africa is home to a large number of foreigners, there are also many South Africans in fellow African countries which have undoubtedly made South Africa an integral part of the development of the continent. In the aftermath of the 2015 xenophobic attacks on foreigners, Brand South Africa underlined that the attacks were in through bad taste since 'South Africans are better and more humane because of fellow Africans and peoples from other countries in the world who have chosen to live amongst us and make South Africa their permanent home. The only country that their children know is South Africa (Brandsouthafrica 2015).

Cross-examining xenophobic attacks on foreign black nationals in South Africa in the context of African brotherhood, there is no doubt that, the phenomenon has potentially dreadful likely implications on the future of intra-African relations. Brothers are under normal circumstances expected to be each other's keeper. As enunciated earlier on in the chapter, African countries across the continent contributed in one way or the other during South Africa's protracted liberation struggle against apartheid. And they did this at great risk to their economies and people as they were frequently subjected to numerous attacks and bombings by the white apartheid regime in South Africa. The bombings were normally accompanied by significant loss of life, destruction of property and infrastructure in these countries. For black South Africans to now turn their backs on their fellow African compatriots and treat them in this manner obviously revokes back memories of the South African liberation struggle in which that country's liberation movements were hosted on foreign soil. History and memory are like zygotic twins. They are inseparable and have a very strong influence on each other. The xenophobic attacks on foreigners seemed to suggest that the South African citizens and to some extent the leaders seem to have a short memory. Indeed, a short memory in that South Africa was among the last colonial posts to fall and the whole African continent and the international community rallied behind it in its quest to achieve independence. As Maponya (2015) enunciates, the other African countries and people 'hosted South Africans who escaped the horrors of our country, they provided our people, inside and outside with food and clothing. Citizens of the continent accepted and integrated our people into communities...some even lost their lives for supporting our struggle when they were targeted by the then South African Defense Force. Some countries even provided travel documents to our people so that they could garner more international support for our fight for liberation' (<http://www.brandsouthafrica.com/news/1200>). This was all done in the spirit of African brotherhood and in the spirit of Ubuntu. Undoubtedly, xenophobic reactions on other African nationals by South Africans have the effect of revoking all these memories which

will undoubtedly undermine social, economic and political cohesion in the continent thus undermining intra-African relations.

Another disturbing observable fact about post apartheid South Africa is that it has most of the ingredients for the eruption of future internal conflicts; high poverty levels in South African townships, crime, many ethnic formations which at times view each other with suspicion, marked inequalities in income distribution and access to the means of production, corruption and a contracting economy in recent years. These, among other factors, have the potential to make South Africa slide into the same direction that other African countries have taken. Indeed, the increasing frequency in outbreaks of mass actions, protests against non service delivery by government and violence against immigrants in some poverty stricken townships in South Africa bear testimony to this. Should this happen, then South Africa will find itself in the same dilemma with other African countries in which its citizens will also seek sanctuary in other parts of the continent. How then will they be perceived and treated by their fellow African compatriots? The Shona people of Zimbabwe would succinctly put it this way, '*chindiro chinopfumba kunobva chimwe*' (one good term deserves another). Thus, xenophobia in all its manifestations across the continent has the potential to have a permanent imprint on intra-African relations. It has the potential to permanently damage all initiatives by the African people to integrate in the different spheres of life in order to achieve sustainable development in the continent.

Initiatives by South Africans to fight Xenophobia

Perhaps, it is prudent at this juncture to underscore the fact that while there are widespread xenophobic sentiments among South Africans against foreigners in that country, particularly the marginalized, not all South Africans are xenophobic in nature. Following the widespread xenophobic violence in April 2015, while the government initially procrastinated in dealing with the violence and its response was sluggish as it remained in stuck denial of the xenophobic outbreak, it was eventually galvanized into action. The initial official position was that the violence was not xenophobic but

those were just isolated incidents of criminal violence. However, as the violence continued to spread across the cities like wildfire and amid mounting pressure from international and local civic society groups, the government was forced to step in and institute corrective measures. The South African government, civic society and ordinary citizens condemned the attacks in the strongest terms. Besides condemning the violence, the different stakeholders instituted means that were meant to deal with the conflict and also re-integrate the affected foreigners. This was in recognition of the fact that there was need to keep South Africa in the global family.

The South African government deployed the army in full force in the affected areas to calm down the situation and stop the violence. President Zuma deployed the Ministers of Police, State Security and Home Affairs to work with the KwaZulu- Natal government to stamp out the violence and restore peace in the province. The President also appointed an inter-ministerial committee to thoroughly explore issues related to migration of foreign nationals into the country. The government instructed all the ministers to engage with the affected communities, organizations representing foreigners, civic society and other stakeholders to comprehensively deal with the issue (Brandsouthafrica 2015). The initiatives were meant to address the immediate challenges faced by the other African foreigners due to the attacks and also to come up with permanent mechanisms that would prevent a recurrence of similar incidents. The objective was also to promote peaceful coexistence among citizens regardless of nationality. The South African government also sought the support and cooperation of affected foreign missions based in South Africa and the Ministers of Home Affairs and International Relations and Cooperation had audience with Heads of Missions in South Africa (Brandsouthafrica 2015). Brand South Africa appealed for tolerance across the communities (Brand South Africa 2015). For instance, the South African Football Association (SAFA) and the Premier Soccer League (PLS) organized two international friendly matches against neighbouring countries to create unity in the wake of the attacks on foreigners. In support of the initiative by the sports associations, the Minister of Sport and Recreation, Fikile Mbalala, noted that 'Xenophobia is wrong...It's

inhuman and it does not belong in South Africa or anywhere in the world. Just yesterday, we found refuge in other African countries when apartheid was in full force. Governments of other African countries gave us a home, fed us and most importantly helped in the liberation of all South Africans. Imagine if, when we were in pain, they told us to go home. The freedom we have today would have never been achieved' (<http://www.southafrica.info/news>).

The Minister of Science and Technology, Naledi Pandor, speaking on behalf of the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and other entities under her jurisdiction underlined how partnership with other African countries had made possible the rapid development of science, technology and innovation in the country. She reiterated that South Africa was only able to host the major segment of the world's largest radio telescope through the support of its African partners. She further expressed concern on how the xenophobic attacks could damage the country's national system of innovation, since the country's initiatives to develop human capital for research and innovation had significantly been augmented by eminent scientists from across the continent 'who have taken up senior positions in South Africa's universities and national science councils' (Brandsouthafrica, 2015). In her own words, she remarked that:

Without the experience and expertise of these esteemed colleagues, who also fulfill the valuable role of mentors and guides to young South Africans, science and technology in our country would be very much the poorer. Let us also not forget that during their exile from South Africa, due to the denial of access to education opportunities by the apartheid regime, many South African scientists benefited from training and education in other African states...The outbreak of xenophobic attacks in our society violates the ethos of science as a force for global good. We are shamed by these incidents, and condemn them in the strongest possible terms (Brandsouthafrica 2015).

She concluded that the 'generation of new knowledge through research and its applications for the benefit of society was a universal pursuit, and that the scientific enterprise was by its nature international. The values of partnership and solidarity among nations

were essential for sustainable and equitable global development, and all discrimination based on nationality, gender, race or religion should be rejected outright' (Brandsouthafrica 2015).

Communities and community leaders also played a part in dealing with the structural factors that breed xenophobic reactions in their areas and in assisting the victims. In 2008 violence was prevented in Masiphumelele in the Western Cape as the community instituted mechanisms that countered divisive narratives (Abrahams 2010). Khioticsong did not experience xenophobic violence in May 2008 as the local leadership preached tolerance and unity between South Africans and other African nationals (Bond, *et al*, 2009). It is further noted that some community organizations in Soweto were instrumental in preventing large sections of their constituencies from attacking immigrants and encouraged them instead to actually provide moral and material support to the affected immigrant communities (Bond, *et al*, 2009). Social capital has been effectively used in some communities such as Khayelitsha Development Forum in enhancing community participation in addressing community needs that have the potential to stimulate tensions between locals and immigrants. Such intermediaries have made it possible for the communities and government agencies to establish a strong working relationship in which community issues could be easily dealt with (Abrahams 2010). Furthermore, since the May 2008 xenophobic violence, some provinces in South Africa have crafted contingency measures to deal with xenophobic violence. Civic organizations and the media have also continued to document and report numerous incidents of xenophobic or bias motivated violence against non South African nationals (<http://www.humanrightsfirst> 2011).

However, it is important to note despite the various mitigatory strategies that have been embraced and implemented by the South African government, civic organizations, community leaders and their respective community organizations, no strategy can work and guarantee a future of peace and tolerance among the different communities. What is really needed across the continent is to deal with the fundamental dynamics that stimulate xenophobic reactions between and among people of different nationalities. No amount of border control, monitoring and immigration control will resolve the

xenophobic challenges. What African states need to do is to deal with governance issues, deal with bureaucratic corruption, and reduce inequalities between their citizens and also to deal with other challenges that affect the delivery of socio-economic services to their citizens. Only then will tensions that fuel xenophobic reactions that may lead to violence be minimized and intra-African relations normalize. It is also important for the South Africans and the other Africans across the continent to appreciate that despite the colonial boundaries that separate us, our Africaness should provide the glue for the identification of the African people as one. As aptly acknowledged by Ikaleng (2015), ‘our African bonds are stronger than the borders that divide us’.

Perhaps, the following sums it all:

Xenophobia must be discussed in the corridors of power and government, in the board rooms of big business, in the kraals and assemblies of royal and traditional leaders, in the lecture halls of institutions of higher learning and factory floors of vehicle assembly plants. It must be discussed amongst labourers working in fields across the country – churches – mosques – and the classrooms where young minds are receptive and shaped – and every other place in between (www.sfonsa.org).

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that xenophobic reactions that have accompanied many post colonial African countries, if unchecked, are a serious threat to continental unity and integration. As such, while the scholars who joined the academic scrimmage on the underlying causes of xenophobia in South Africa in particular, and Africa at large seem to operate at variance, they generally agree that xenophobic reactions have the potential to have a permanent imprint on intra-African relations if not addressed as a matter of urgency. Xenophobia has the potential to rubbish and obliterate all the trumpeted notions about African brotherhood, Ubuntu, African Renaissance and Pan Africanism. It has the latent effect of tearing the continent apart as it is a threat to the social

cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good neighbourliness and the much desired sustainable economic development of the continent at large. Hence, the urgent need across the continent for the African countries to deal with the issues that ferment and trigger xenophobic reactions between them. These, among others include, threats of terrorism, bureaucratic corruption, dictatorships, misgovernance, ever mounting debts, rising inequalities between citizens and failure to deliver basic social services to the ordinary people.

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‘Third World’ Elections, Peace and Democracy: Lessons from Selected African Countries

Jacob Tagarirofa & Tobias David

Introduction

This chapter is an analysis of the nature and aftermath of election processes in developing countries towards the installation of peace and democracy. It seeks to authenticate the long held belief that elections are a harbinger for democracy and peace in any African contemporary society. The chapter holds that the multifarious empirical evidence across the continent seems to query the credence of elections as an epitome of democracy and as a framework for peace. Rather, the elections provide an elementary function of violence and postelection conflicts if improperly managed. In terms of methodology, a multi-case study approach was used as a way of establishing some of the realities of socio-political organisation under which elections have been conceived as framework for peace building and democratisation of most developing countries. This multi-case study approach was based on the classical cases of the so-called third world elections that have been controversial and some of which entailed Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya Tunisia and Libya. Theoretically, the research adopted sociological and political theories as conceptual frameworks for the analysis of the role of elections and incidental factors impacting on the development of permanent infrastructure for peace and democracy in Africa. It further established that the synchronisation of the Eurocentric and Afrocentric ideologies on democracy has not only been a recipe for incidences of post-election violence, but has culminated in the superimposition of western democratic traits over African democratic philosophy resulting in the reconfiguration of African democratic principles which were strongly hinged on peace, respect, togetherness and egalitarianism. On the basis of these and other organisational and

structural vicissitudes, the chapter recommends the need to hybridise these divergent democratic ideologies to come up with one which best suits the African context in order for peace and democracy to be realised.

Democracy in a complex modern society can be conceptualised as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and as a social mechanism which permits the largest possible portion of the population to influence major decisions that affect their lives, interests and rights (Giddens, 2000:12). It can be in the form of participation or representation in order to protect the interests of the citizens. The contemporary conceptualisation of democracy entails such pervasive traits as multi-partism, periodic free and fair elections, press freedom, respect of human rights, and respect of the rule of law. It has also been understood to have three broad spectrums, namely, moral imperative, social process, and political development (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1989). It is paradoxical that in a bid to qualify this typology of democracy, post-election conflicts and violence has evidently been the order of the day in most developing countries such as Zimbabwe, Egypt, Kenya, Tunisia and Libya, among others. Third world countries have been structurally and systematically coerced to reconfigure their political systems in line with the seemingly western or Eurocentric notions of democracy to the extent that electoral processes in most the third world countries have been judged as free and fair or otherwise on the basis of these western parameters. The failure of third world elections and other political processes to qualify these given variables has rendered third world democracies to be branded a facade or as based on false and unfair proceedings. Paradoxically, such conclusions are deficient of the appreciation of the implications of this philosophical superimposition on peace in general and conflicts and violence in particular.

The chapter notes that the allegation of absence of fairness in third world electoral processes is as subjective in its disregard of the heterogeneous nature of third world countries as is the deficiency characterising the Eurocentric notion of labelling developing countries as 'third world countries'. The same denigratory convictions seem to have cascaded to the socio-political and

economic spheres in which economic and political processes of developing countries have been unjustifiably criticised for not complying with western standards. Periodic elections based on universal suffrage have been regarded as the hallmark of democracy yet the legitimization of election processes has emerged to be a discourse of mass contestation from different actors. The quality of elections is very important to democratic consolidation and installation on peace for societies in transition from dictatorship to liberal democracy. Box (2004) says that elections provide citizens with the opportunity of choosing between competing policies and parties; holding elected officers accountable for their official actions, and; translating the symbolic notion that ‘power or sovereignty resides in or belongs to the people’, into political reality. Since the wave of democratic transition started in Africa in the late 1960s, several countries have conducted rounds of elections though they were characterized by both peace and violence in some instances. However, a majority of them has been judged as “elections without choice” (Ibrahim 2003:16). It is from the above notions that this paper seeks to ascertain the credibility of the assertion that elections in ‘third world countries’ have neither been fair or an antidote for consolidating peace and democracy.

The Multi-partism Rhetoric

The adoption of neoliberal ideology by most developing countries especially African states has seen the opening up of economic markets and the political playing fields to numerous interested contestants (Green: 2008). These democratisation processes have been vindicated as the avenues through which elections of governing officials could be legitimised as free and fair especially where the electorate was accorded a fair chance of choosing whom they deemed appropriate from a variety of options available. Nguni (2010) notes that this saw the emergency of the so-called multiparty system where many political parties were allowed to freely compete for political offices with the revolutionary parties especially in African former colonial states. The writers note that the fruition of this anticipation has since remained utopian insofar as the

notion of multi-partism has been a mere rhetoric considering the conditions and restrictions created by revolutionary parties in most African independent states. A cross-examination of the previous elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe validates this submission. The political stalemate declared as a result of the electoral victory of opposition parties not only precipitated unprecedented violence and conflicts between supporters of different parties, but culminated in the formation of tumultuous unity governments. Broadly, this was a polite way of admitting that the elections were not fair since they have resulted in the unexpected, which has often been expectedly the victory of losing ruling parties. There is also evidence that in many African countries, second round elections after transitions tended to be characterized by downward drift of electoral integrity and political legitimacy due to the high incidence of violence and conflicts that often degenerated into deaths and bloodshed. The Nigeria's 2003 election was adjudged flawed by both domestic and international observers. After the election, the trust in the president and political institutions plummeted (Lewis and Alemika: 2005). In contrast, alternation has sustained political trust and satisfaction with democracy in Ghana, Senegal and Mali (Bratton: 2004). The import of alternation, according to Bratton (2004: 147) is that "a peaceful vote and the subsequent transfer of power from one group to another should serve in the public mind to validate "rule by the people"". These developments, across the continent have been a precedent which affirms the notion that elections are fair especially if they dethrone the revolutionary parties. Paradoxically, they have not only been unfair to the opposition political parties but even to the revolutionary parties themselves. As such, it should be noted that, in developing countries' elections have never brought peace and in most cases since violence and conflicts have been occurred and witnessed either openly or in latent forms. Rather, it is the opposition parties which suffer and democracy and peace of the country in the long run.

Funding of political parties

The financing of political parties is generally considered to be one of the critical factors for the success of multiparty democracy and also indulgence in violence and conflicts. In the case of the public funding of political parties, Friedman states that as African states attempt efforts to move towards democracy, public funding of political parties has become an important issue in some of the continent's politics. He says that several African States which are attempting democratisation do so in a context which makes political party funding a vital issue, for two reasons. Firstly, the widespread perception in some societies that the ruling parties use State funds to support its activities to the disadvantage of opposition parties which do not have access to such resources; and secondly, the reality that many African societies lack a strong private economy meaning that opposition political parties cannot rely on contributions from wealthy supporters to make up for any resource advantage which the ruling party may have. In most instances, opposition parties may, therefore, demand that they also enjoy state support if they are to compete on a relatively equal footing with the ruling party or other parties with considerable private funding. Apart from public funding, political parties may raise funds from private sources, such as membership fees, subscriptions and contributions, dues such as members of parliament of the party may be levied a certain percentage of their government salary while ordinary members pay a stipulated monthly or annual subscription, donations by individuals or corporations in cash or kind, fund raising activities such as sale of party regalia, economic activities for instance establishing party newspapers, investing in property, or forming profit making companies, and loans. Some political parties may even rely on foreign funding. For instance, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) has received considerable funding, material and other support since inception though prior to independence it was considered more as a liberation movement than as a political party (Friedman: 2009). Indications are that it continues to benefit from foreign funding and other support, despite the ban on foreign funding such as from China and Russia following the introduction of

the Political Parties (Finance) Act [Chapter 2:11] of 2001. ZANU PF has never convincingly denied that it continues to enjoy foreign funding and other support (Masunungure: 2010). The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has also enjoyed considerable foreign funding and other support since inception, although now in the light of the prohibition of foreign funding from western countries such as Britain and United State of America, it is unclear if it continues to receive that support. Masunungure (2010) suggests that chances are that it still does. The issues of funding of political parties is significant in determining the credibility of peace during and in the aftermath of elections insofar as it squarely puts political parties on an equal footing for them to participate freely and fairly in any election process. This is the reason why for instance in Zimbabwe, the MDCs has always been accused of being agents of foreign agenda, a deliberation which has somehow worked against the legitimization of opposition political parties as its inclination to the West has always come under spotlight. These allegations have not only warranted involvement of state security agents, but have qualified MDC as a threat to national security in the eyes of ZANU PF and this stalemate has been a born of contention culminating in ideological and political confrontations that have characteristically exhibited violence. Ironically, ZANU PF has also related much to the East than to the West and this has not at all attracted any attention as to possibilities of funding. Nevertheless, the ways that parties get access to money can influence the outcome of elections, determine the relationship between party leaders and members, affect the number of women elected and conditions the level of public trust as a whole. As well, this has a significant bearing on the fairness of the election processes and ultimately peace in the aftermath of the elections.

Repressive and ideological State apparatus and electoral violence

Althusser's theory of hegemony and Harbamers' concept of legitimization crisis can be used to understand institutional dynamics in election processes in developing countries. Harbamers notes that, if a political system has lost its worthiness and recognition from the electorate, it resorts to hegemonic strategies through the use of

repressive state apparatus and ideological state apparatus to affirm its throne (Giddens:2008). This notion can best be exemplified by the case of Zimbabwe during both the pre and post independence epochs. This is substantiated by Mutwira (2000) who notes that, the Smith regime in colonial Zimbabwe resorted to various tactics through legislation and repression to quash political competition. For instance, they enacted laws that prohibited other political parties to freely participate and in the event that the Black Nationalist movements embarked on counter strategies, the government criminalised political activism. This saw a number of nationalist leaders such as Robert Mugabe, Enos Nkala, Edgar Tekere, Morris Nyagumbo, among others being incarcerated for long periods of times. The same has characterised the post independence epoch as evidenced by numerous opposition political leaders who have allegedly been incersated and detained during and after the 2008 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. All these efforts have done nothing less except to undermine the credibility of electoral processes whether in one-party state or multiparty state democracies. It is pathetic to note that the independent Zimbabwean government has also adopted the same strategies by enacting draconian laws such as Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) which was meant to throttle the operations of media institutions which were allegedly aligned to MDC since this was thought to enlighten the electorate about the political ills characterising ZANU PF (Ndanga: 2012). Ndanga (2012) further notes that, the independent government has also replicated the imprisonment syndrome whereby many political activists from opposition political parties have been framed and arrested. It is imperative to note that, in Zimbabwe the use of repressive and ideological apparatus has been well documented in the post 2008 election era where the environment characteristically exhibited gross brutality mainly from state security agents against civilians and opposition supporters (Moi: 2010). Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo have not been exceptions to this incidence of violent electoral processes in as much as the elections have been bloody and chaotic. In the context of this paper, the question of who perpetrated these violent actions against who are less important relative to the ultimate consequences of repression

which in turn tarnishes the credibility of whatever election endeavours under these circumstances thereby rendering the election outcome violent and therefore less legitimate. This does not only substantiate the tenability of Althusser's submissions on the negative ramifications of repressive and ideological state apparatus on the legitimation of elections; but, this also qualifies the intricate relationship between electoral processes and post election peace.

Composition and affiliation of electoral institutions

It is unfortunate that in most developing countries, it has been the prerogative of sitting governments to choose electoral institutions and their composition. Kruger (2010) notes that such a move downplays the potential for fair execution of their offices, especially considering their questionable loyalty. The writers concur with this observation and affirm that this stems from the criteria for selecting these office bearers. For instance in Zimbabwe, the appointment of Electoral Court and Constitutional Court judges sorely lies in the powers of the President. The media institutions which also cover election proceedings are also manned by executives who happen to be presidential appointees. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is also chaired by a ZANU PF affiliate who has been a High Court judge and ZANU PF member of parliament and minister. Without romanticizing professionalism, the writers note that the possibility of one being neutral and fair under these circumstances is hardly likely especially given the ideological inclinations and political affiliation of the office bearers. This is even complemented by Ndanga (2012) who notes that appointment of representatives in electoral boards has always been instigated by patronage, where the selected individuals are coerced to qualify the interests of their masters in order to maintain such beneficial relationships. The Nigeria's 2003 election was adjudged flawed by both domestic and international observers. After the election, the trust in the president and political institutions plummeted (Lewis and Alemika 2005). These writers note that these relational dynamics have done more harm than good in the light of instituting fair electoral processes in Zimbabwe in particular and most developing

countries with the same constitutional provision of vesting the selection and appointment of judges and election personnel in the sole hands of the president. This could be the very reason why the Southern African Development Community (SADC) election observer mission has been criticised by the international community as being unfairly representing the election process and outcome of Zimbabwe's 2013 harmonised elections. It could be that the same SADC community which is glorifying Zimbabwean elections as fair and free would want the same positive comments when they also embark on their 'unfair elections' in the future and if so, this deliberation sets a bad electoral precedent which sanctions the holding of free and fair elections in Africa as a mirage.

Susceptibility of the electoral process

The electoral processes of most developing countries have been evidently flawed insofar as the referees operate within the realms of patronage. This observation has been witnessed in Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo DRC, Nigeria and Ghana. Norris (1997) notes that ruling governments have always favoured electoral systems which give them advantages and this is the very reason why electoral reforms have been notoriously responded by deaf ears in most developing countries. Where reforms have been accepted, they have been adopted on condition that they accord more advantages than disadvantages to the current ruling parties. In Zimbabwe for instance, electoral reforms have much been hypothetical than practical except for instances where they benefited the ruling party. This deliberation has been sustained by the absence of checks and balances to the efficiency of electoral processes which in turn has rendered the electoral processes vulnerable to manipulation. For example in Zimbabwe, the availing of the voter's roll to opposition political parties in the just ended July 2013 harmonised elections was been riddled in controversy since it was just made available a night before the election day against the constitutional provision of a two week period. Whether its unavailability was a deliberate endeavour to curtail the inherent glitches or it was just an error of inadvertence, the fact that the

responsibility of ensuring its provision solely rested on ZEC and its partner the Registrar General's office, points to the susceptibility of electoral systems and institutions to manipulation by ruling political parties to their benefit and disenfranchisement of opposition political parties. This, in a way constitutes unfair electoral practices which render election processes and outcomes deficient of fairness lack of peace.

Eurocentric versus Afrocentric notions on elections

At international level, the legitimization of 'third world' elections by Western and European countries has been an ideological battle for supremacy. The neoliberal discourse has vindicated European and Western values as superior than African values, thus, the economic, social and political spheres have been defined by Eurocentric eyes and expectations. Hence the liberalisation of the economy has simultaneously occurred with the liberalisation of the political playfield (Kanyenze: 2004). It is in this milieu where democracy transformed its meaning from African to European democracy where multi-partism was elementary as a defining aspect of democratic and peaceful electoral processes. Gatre (2008) notes that, the adoption of Western democracy by African countries does not imply democracy as an alien concept to Africa, but, qualifies the hegemonic orientation of the western body of knowledge which seeks to reign supreme over others. It follows therefore that if democracy implies free participation of all citizens in the selection of governing officials of their choice, African democracy has always embodied such participation which was even more sincere than the Western one insofar as it was based on mechanical solidarity relative to the organic solidarity characterizing the western society. The individualistic tendencies of Western capitalist society probes the need to query the sincerity of Western democratic principles in their advocacy for electoral processes which are defined in terms of Western values even in an African society. Therefore, on a global scale, the validation of African elections as peaceful and fair by Western standards has always culminated in erroneous judgements which are based on the West's crude determinism. This justifies the

logic why for instance in Zimbabwe, the West and Europe are nullifying election results and the African Union and SADC seem to glorify them yet the former had no observers which the latter had on the ground. As such, this ideological contestation has always ensured savoury relations between Africa and Europe in which election processes of the former have never seen exaltation in the eyes of the latter.

Conclusion

In summation, the discourse of election and the peace is a contested terrain insofar as it is always a battlefield for power and position both at micro and macro levels. It should be noted however that if elections are properly executed they should precipitate the appointment of accountable, responsive and legitimate governing officials in a peaceful and non-violent manner. The issue of fairness has also been controversial given the different circumstances in which such judgements have been drawn. It is rather imperative to appreciate the need for context specific evaluations of fairness of elections rather than the ethnocentric inclinations epitomising the European values of democratic processes which are in them egocentric. In the interests of peace and political stability, 'third world' countries should demonstrate political will to ensure their commitment towards efforts to level the political playfield for the legitimisation of the outcomes of their electoral processes and unnecessary violence and conflicts which taint the consolidation of democracy and ultimately throttling peace and development prospects in the long run.

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A Phenomenological Impact and Legacy of the Military on Africa Democratic Experiment: The Nigeria's Example since 1966

Paul Ilesanmi Akanmidu

Introduction

Many countries in Africa have differentially witnessed military interventions on their politics across the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial historical epochs. Resultantly, many scholars and commentators have expended energies on examining the different aspects and consequences of this phenomenon on economic, political instability and moral development of the continent. Despite the exponential attraction of scholars and their engendered ideas on this subject matter, there seems to be no end to the key debates regarding the military involvement in African societies. The footprints of the military interventions on the theatre of Africa political environment continue to manifest in different forms. Using the case of Nigeria, this study seeks to evaluate the impact and legacies of militarisms on Africa's democratic processes after their disengagement from power. It is noteworthy that after independence from foreign domination, many African countries glided into political convulsions that attracted the military interventions. While it remains debatable, the assumptions of power by the military were rather perceived as welcome development in many quarters. However, the question is, having stayed in power for such a long period, what impact and legacies were bequeathed to the African countries, writ large? This article uses historical apparatus to examine the military and its engagements on Nigeria political scene and its impact and legacies on the Democratic process after their disengagement from political scene. Nigerian's democracy has been experiencing a perennially tortuous military intervention to its democratisation process, which manifest in the grave socio-political and economic

challenges that have been threatening the stability of its corporate existence as a nation since the end of military-based governance in 1999. The military first came into power in 1966 and claimed to be the umpire of redemption to salvage the nation from the orgy of political quagmire that characterized the nation. However, they turned around to become social vampires through their leaders' unbridled corruption and bastardization of the culture of due process. The three decades of military rules in Nigeria have sown the culture of militarized way of life, indiscriminate killing, maiming, unbridled corruption, gangsterism, civil militia and boko haram insurgency in Nigeria. All these effects have continued to act as clogs that have forestalled the wheel of the ongoing democratic experiment. This chapter concludes with a strong argument that it will require not less than fifty years of vigorous attitudinal and political orientation of Nigerians before the culture of democracy can be fully [r]established in Nigeria.

An overview of Nigeria's political environment before 1966

Geographically, Nigeria is located in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa. The country is bordered to the north by the Niger Republic, the Atlantic Ocean to the south, Cameroon and Benin Republics to the east and west, respectively. The country is an agglomeration of different political ethnic nationalities. Paul (2011:57) argued that over 250 independent ethnic groups were brought together as an entity by the British Colonial Administration. This came to being on 1 January 1914 when the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated by Sir, Frederick Lord Lugard into [...]. The Colonial Authority set in motion their indirect rule which largely alienated the native population. This pattern of administration was detested by the Nigerian educated elite because they were alienated from the system. We can, thus, argue conveniently that the socio-political and economic alienation of the Nigerian population contributed largely to the early nationalists' agitation for self-determination as far back as 1920s (Coleman, 1973:75-86). The agitation continued to gather momentum over the years as more and more educated Nigerians were becoming exposed to the outside world. They made use of

violent protests, newspapers, peaceful demonstrations and strikes among others to make their resentments to foreign rule known (Coleman, *ibid*). However, it was at the London Conference of October 1958 that Nigeria's independent date was agreed. The conference was presided over by the Colonial Secretary of State, Mr. Allan Lennox Boyd (Nicolson, 1977:102-106). The independence, which was preceded by the Federal election for an enlarged House of Representatives was keenly contested among various political parties amidst petty squabbles in December 1959. The results were as follows - The Northern People Congress (NPC) won 148 seats; the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) alliance won 89 seats and the Action Group (AG) and its alliance – Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers States Movement and the Middle-Belt Congress won 75 seats (Dudley, 1973:97-107). The NPC and NCNC then formed a coalition government with Alhaji Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister and Nnamdi Azikiwe as the Governor General of the cabinet.

The AG became opposition with Chief Awolowo resigning his Premiership position of the Western Region to become leader of the opposition in the House of Representatives in Lagos (Awolowo, 1987:23-25). Chief S.L Akintola, the Deputy Leader of the AG became the Premier of the Western Region automatically after the departure of the former. Azikiwe, who was also the Premier of the Eastern Region resigned to become member of Senate in Lagos. This was in preparation for him to become the country's first indigenous Governor-General after independence. He was then succeeded by Dr. Okpara as the Premier of Eastern Nigeria. Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sarkuna of Sokoto preferred rather to remain as the Premier of the Northern Region while Alhaji Tafawa Balewa was presented as the Premier instead of Alhaji Bello. This probably explained why Balarabe (2000) referred to Alhaji Bello as a grass-root democrat. Nigeria formerly became independence on October 1st 1960. Sir James Robertson, the last British Governor-General of Nigeria, remained in office until November 16, 1960 when he was succeeded by Dr. Azikiwe (Sklar, 1963:17). Nigeria became a Republic on October 1, 1963 and Azikiwe was sworn in as the President. He was succeeded by Chief D.C. Osadebey, a National Vice President of NCNC as the Premier of Eastern Region. The peaceful atmosphere

that preceded the independence despite the pressure of the nationalists without shedding of blood accounts partly for the reasons many scholars and political commentators argued that Nigeria attained independence without much struggle.

One would have thought with the above arrangements coupled with the enormous responsibility before the Nigerian politicians, they would be tactful to build a strong and virile nation. It was rather paradoxical that the joy of liberation from the colonial rule was short-lived as the nation was plunged into unmanageable political crises. Foremost of the crises was the Western Region crisis, which developed out of personality and ideological clash between Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Action Group (AG) and his lieutenant, Chief S.L. Akintola who succeeded him as the Premier of the Western Region. Retrospectively, Chief Awolowo served as the Premier of the Western Region from 1954 to 1959 before resigning his position in order to contest election into the Federal House of Representatives where he eventually hoped to vie for the Post of Prime Minister (Awolowo 1987:5-8). Even though Chief Awolowo won the election into the Federal House of Assembly, his Party, AG could not win the majority seats that could allow him to form the Government at the center. This accounts for the reason he became the opposition leader in the House (Awolowo, 1987:14-17).

Chief Akintola who took over the Premiership position in the western Region wanted absolute freedom to discharge his duties as the Chief Executive of his region. Chief Awolowo thought as the National Chairman of the Party, he had the right to advise the Premier on important matters affecting the region but Akintola was of the opinion that as the Chief Executive of the region, he should be given free hands to exercise his constitutional duties without undue interference from ...Awolowo?. This culminated in the personality clash between the two political juggernauts (Dudley, 1973:53-54). The protracted melee became more or less political as the Northern People Congress (NPC) saw the crisis as an opportunity to fish in the troubled water of Western Region by throwing hands of political friendship in order to gain popularity in the region. The situation between Akintola and Awolowo on the one hand and with the party on the other hand was synonymous to a cold

war. The crisis dragged on unresolved until the party convention, which was held in Jos in January 1962. The party at the convention indicted Chief Akintola, principally for anti-party activities, which warranted his removal as the Premier of the Western Region. He was then replaced by Alhaji Adegbenro. This event graduated into serious political crisis in the Western Region. There was mysterious disappearance of many people, assassinations and burning of houses and cars. The general atmosphere was that of insecurity of lives and properties. The Federal Government had to intervene in the impasse. On the 29th May, 1962, the Prime Minister moved a motion in the Parliament in which he declared a state of emergency on Western Region (Post, 1965:103).

Similarly, the census crises of 1962/63 posed another serious problem to the new independent state. There was a general census from 13 to 31 May 1962. The results of the population census were seriously disputed and eventually rejected because the figures were perceived to have been unnecessarily inflated. This led to another census in November 1963 (Post, 1965:120). When the figures were published in February 1964, they, too, generated heated controversies. The Eastern and Mid-West Regions rejected them saying that the figures for the Northern Region were inflated. The census controversies speeded the formation of new political alliances for the Federal election of December 30, 1964 as examined below. The NPC, which was in coalition with the NCNC, teamed up with the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), which was formed by Chief Akintola immediately he broke away from A.G. to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), under the leadership of Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (Post, 1965:107). The NCNC and the AG formed the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), under the leadership of Dr. Okpara. As the general election drew near, the UPGA made an appeal to the Electoral Commission to postpone the election because its members had not been allowed to campaign freely in the North and West. The rejection of the appeal by the Electoral Commission accounts for the reason UPGA boycotted the election. In the event, the NNA won decisively, but there was no election in the East and the turnout was low in Lagos and Mid-West region, which had been carved out from Western Region in 1963 of which the AG loyalists

described as political demystification of the West (Ojo: 2006). Even though, NNA won, the President could not form a broad-based government because of political turmoil that followed the elections until a compromise was reached, and Alhaji Tafawa Balewa was reappointed as the Prime Minister to form a broad-based national government after elections were held in the East.

Similarly, on October 11, 1965, the Western Region went to the polls to elect new House of Assembly members, the first regional election since the A.G. crisis. The election was generally believed to have been rigged in order to retain the NNDP in power, and it caused widespread anger, which resulted in so many incidents of arson, murder and general insecurity in so much that the army would have to be sent there in order to maintain peace (Kirk-Green, 1971:95-101). In spite the high spate of political instability, corruption was still going steadily among the politicians unchecked. It was largely these problems that brought the collapse of the First Republic in Nigeria, (1960-1966) and also warranted the military incursion in Nigerian politics in January 15, 1966.

Historical background of the military in Nigeria before 1966

The origin of the military in Nigeria is traceable to the innovation of Lieutenant-General John Glover of the Royal Navy (RN) in 1863 (Nigerian Army, 1992:8-9). Lt. Glover, (later Sir John Glover and Governor of Lagos), was in the company of Dr. Baikie on a voyage of exploration on the Niger River when their ship, the 'Day Spring' was wrecked at Jebba in Nigeria (Nigerian Army, 1992:10-12). He had to go to Lagos by road. It was on his way that he met some group of people from the Northern part of the country who were escaping from slave dealers. He requested some of them to accompany him to Lagos. Because of the valor, strength and endurance they demonstrated in spite of the difficulties during their long journey to Lagos, Lt. Glover organized them to form a nucleus of the Local Force known as the "Glover Hausas" or "Hausa Militia" (Nigerian Army, 1992:13). The initial capacity of the force was about 18 men but was increased to about 100 in June of 1863 and by October they were about 600 (Nigerian Army, 1992:15-20). The force was used to

protect British trade routes around Lagos and to mount punitive expeditions in the hinterland of Lagos. In 1865, the British Government recognized the Glover Hausas as a regular force and it was officially referred to as “Hausa Constabulary” later the “Lagos Constabulary”. This branch of the army, was charged with both military and police duties (Haywood and Clarke, 1964:36-42). Some of the military engagements of this force include participating in the Wesley’s Ashanti Campaign of 1873/74, during which one hundred Hausas from Lagos constabulary were drafted to the Gold Coast army to assist some twelve thousand British Troops (Haywood and Clarke, 1964:40-45). Subsequently, a number of expeditions were conducted by this force to consolidate the authority of Lagos Government over a large of Yorubaland. The most notable of such expeditions was the Ijebu expedition of 1892 and the bombardment of Oyo in 1895 (Johnson, 1973:109-111).

It is important to note that the National African Company was granted charter in 1886 but soon became the Royal Niger Company chartered and limited (Flint, 1960:51-53). Sir George Goldie, the moving force behind the company felt the need for the establishment of a force to guarantee the smooth running of the company’s business. Goldie’s own military training and his beliefs about Africans as soldiers played no small part in establishing the force. It was later to be the model for the constabulary, which Macdonald organized in the Niger Coast protectorate and had a great influence on the method that Lugard employed in raising the West Africa Frontier Force (WAFF) as we shall explore later. The Royal Niger Constabulary was the prototype of Nigeria’s armed forces. The Royal Niger Constabulary was instrumental in the liberation of the peoples around the confluence from the yoke of Nupe hegemony during the Nupe and Ilorin expedition (Blackwell, 1927:23-30). Major General M. Macdonald was appointed to investigate the causes of constant frictions between the Liverpool traders and Brass men on the one hand and Royal Niger Company on the other founded the Niger coast protectorate constabulary (Niger Coast Protectorate, 1899:2). He submitted his report in 1890 and was immediately appointed Commissioner and Consul-General over the Oil River, which later became Niger Coast Protectorate in order to implement his own

recommendations. Among others, he recommended to raise the Niger Coast protectorate force as a purely military force. It was however, discovered that this could not be done except by an act of the British Parliament and consequently it was raised as a constabulary. The force took part in several small expeditions in Opobo, Qua Iboe, Cross and Calabar rivers. Notable among the expeditions carried out by the constabulary are, Brass, Nana and Benin under-General Moor (Niger Coast Protectorate, 1899:3-4).

More importantly, what led to Nigeria's regiment is important here for assessment. Goldie was aware that his company would soon lose its charter in the face of the inability to check the imperialistic tendencies of the French on the Niger, in Borgu and Sokoto areas. The Colonial office in London was becoming impatient with the lukewarm attitude of the company in protecting the British sphere of influence when Joseph Chamberlain became the Secretary of State for the colonies. He was not inclined to lose any part especially those regions, which gave access to the navigable Niger and the rulers with whom the company had treaties. Since neither the company nor Lagos Government had the resources to carry out this policy, he resolved to create a new force, which was to be directly under the control of the colonial office. It was this that gave birth to the formation of West African Frontier Force in 1897 (Haywood and Clarke, 1964:68-73). The name, West African Frontier Force (WAFF) was used to describe all the forces in the British colonies of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State preferred Lord Lugard to take command of the force. Lugard had two essential qualifications for the job. One, he was the only figure of any stature whom Goldie could permit to march over the company's territories without obstruction, because Lugard was an ex-employee of the company in London. Secondly, to the French, his appointment would indicate that they could expect firm opposition having regard for Lugard's performances in Uganda and during the race for Nikki and Borgu. It is important to highlight that the French were well aware of his exploits in Uganda and the race for Nikki and Borgu. While Lugard's work was primarily concerned with the organization of the forces, there were some officers and non-commissioned officers were selected, organized and

sent ahead of Lugard to recruit and train the Africans' soldiers (Haywood and Clarke, 1964:70-72).

There were several constabularies formed and these various constabularies constituted into battalions. However, in 1914 when the Sothern and Northern Protectorates were amalgamated, the Southern and Northern Battalion became one, which was designated as Nigeria's Regiment (the Nigerian Regiment, 1950:2-3). They participated in both the Firsrt and Second World Wars. At the independence of Nigeria on the 1st of October 1960, the army became known as the Royal Nigeria Army (RNA). The total size of the army was about 7,500 men, with only 50 Nigerian officers (Miners, 1971:117-119). However, when Nigeria became a republic in 1963, the title "Royal" was removed and the army was consequently renamed as the Nigerian Army. Many in the new Nigeroian Army were sent to Canada, Australia, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Britain and United States of America for [re]training. Nigeria established Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) in 1964 to give a full three year regular combatant training to officer cadets. Among the pioneering students of the academy include, Lieutenant General S. Ibrahim, Major-General I.O. Williams, Major-General J.N. Dongoyaro, Major-General D.O. Diya and Major-General A.G. Mohammed, among others. The first set of the academy graduated in 1967 (Miners, 1971:119-121).

It must be emphasized that until 1966 when the military took over power, the profession was perceived with disdain by most Nigerians and it was often considered as alternative or option for school dropouts and probably wild individuals. The profession was neither fascinating nor attractive to many people. Moreover, the rule was well defined as a security outfit with the primary responsibility of protecting the territorial integrity of Nigeria from internal and external attacks. This feat is well captured in Section 217(1) of the 1999 Nigerian constitution as:

Defending Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air, aiding civil authorities to help keep public order and internal security when call upon to do so by the President,

subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of National Assembly.

The fear that they could be posted anywhere during wars, where they could lose their lives must have contributed to the above insinuations. Up till 1960 when Nigeria attained independence the basic requirements for recruitment were fearlessness, boldness and courageousness (Perham and Bull, 1969:15-17). This probably justified the reason why Lord Lugard affirmed that the Hausa people were good for the military because they were considered as possessing the above qualities better than any other ethnic groups in Nigeria. The above comment could also justify the reasons the Hausa people dominated West Africa Frontier Force (WAFF), which was later transformed to Nigerian Army.

The triumphant entry of the military into the Nigerian Political Scene

Besides the major turbulence as earlier examined, the first Republic of Nigeria was also characterized by corruption, mal-administration, economic mismanagement and ethnic tension. Added to this was the unresolved minority problem. All the above were obvious and they had begun to threaten the peaceful co-existence of Nigeria as early as 1960 (Falola and Dare, 1988:64-65). All the attempts made to solve these challenges failed. It thus appeared the center could not hold. By January 15, 1966, Maj. General Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Adewale Ademoyega and Emmanuel Ifeajuna, along with others out of desperation to redeem Nigeria from its gradual decline to a state of anomy overthrew the Balewa Government in a violent *coup d'état*. Ozeogwu in his broadcast after the *coup d'e'tat*, as expressed by Gbulie, (1981:18) remarked:

...our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cent, those that seek to keep the nation divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least; the

tribalists, the nepotists; those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds.

Adewale (1981:22) added more insight into the situation when he wrote *inter alia* that:

Meanwhile, the political situation was getting worse throughout the country. Riots raged especially in the west, but also in Lagos and Benue Province of the north. The Balewa government was inefficient. It failed completely to find solutions to the problems of the nation. Gradually, life became more and more unsafe. Motorists were waylaid, killed and their vehicles set on fire. Political opponents were killed and their houses burnt but Balewa pretended that all was normal and under control throughout the country. He even found time to host a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth for the purpose of discussing the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith of Zimbabwe. While that conference went on, riots, arsons, and looting claimed people's lives and property even inside Lagos metropolis.

The above statements give more insights why the military had to intervene in order to salvage the nation from the verge of collapse. The coup d'état claimed the lives of prominent Nigerian politicians including Sir, Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello and Chief Ladoke Akintola, the Premiers of Northern and Western Regions respectively. Also killed in the coup d'état was Chief Okotie-Eboh, the Federal Finance Minister.

The government was then taken over by the most senior officer in the Nigerian Army, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi. However, the unresolved problem of minority, which had been in Nigeria before independence also found its way into the military. Ironsi's inability to try the coup plotters who were mostly assumed to be Igbo people met with negative reactions by other ethnic groups specially the Hausa people in the army. They took the coup to be tribalistic as well as being sectionalized (Adewale, 1981:26). The situation galvanized into a serious bottled resentment because of ethnic tension that had

gain entrance into Nigerian army. It is intriguing assessing the contradictions of the military at this point of Nigeria's development. The military claimed to be the umpire to salvage Nigerians from the cobwebs of greedy politicians. Paradoxically, they became social vampires. They turned around to become stimulus for calamities, which resulted in engulfing darkness on the nation to which the country is still gasping to escape. Ethnicity within the Nigerian army led to another counter-coup, in which, the Head of State, General Aguiyi Ironsi was killed within six months into power and replaced by Major-General Gowon.

The military and the Nigerian civil war

The death of the Head of State, General Aguiyi Ironsi, paved the way for Major-General Yakubu Gowon, a northerner, to become the Head of State of Nigeria. However, the frustration of the Igbo after the death of General Aguiyi Ironsi and the great casualties they suffered in the north coupled with the rift of seniority agitation between Gowon and Ojukwu occasioned the civil war. Ojukwu's argument was clear. He was of the opinion that the most senior in the army, Brigadier Ogundipe, a Yoruba by ethnicity should be the Head of State instead of Major General Yakubu Gowon. He therefore vowed never to recognize or accord any respect to the Head of State. There were both internal and external mediations to bring about peace between the two. For instance, General John Ankrah of Ghana called Aburi peace meeting between Gowon and Ojukwu in Ghana but the meeting ended in a deadlock. The Head of State shortly after returning from Ghana issued decree 34, which established the twelve states on May 27th, 1967. While they could have been other reasons for this move, this was perhaps meant largely to break the power of Ojukwu who controlled the Eastern Region. Three states each were created across the four regions. The three states from the Eastern Region were headed by appointed military Governors by the Head of State. Realizing the implications of the political development, three days later after the announcement of the creation of states, that is. on May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the Eastern Nigeria a Sovereign and Independent State of Biafra (Ojiako,

1979:6-9). This ultimately degenerated into Nigerian Civil War from July 6, 1967 to January 12, 1970. The pattern of the war was figured along the major ethnic lines. To this extent the Hausa and Yoruba stood on one side versus the Igbo who were placed on the other. Other minority groups had to join either of the groups. Almost all the minority groups except those within the Eastern Region were in support of Nigeria. At the end of the war in 1970, between 1.5 and 3 million people were estimated to have lost their lives with Igbo having the highest number of casualties before Major-General Philip Effiong who was the acting Biafran leader announced the orderly disengagement of his troops (Gambo, 2014).

The above prompted Gowon's administration to embark on the policies of Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (RRR). The reconciliation policy was aimed at reconciling the two warring sides for peaceful co-existence with the slogan of "no victor, no vanquished". It was expected to act as instrument of unity rather than disunity (Kirk-Green, 1971:112). In order to further cement the unity of the country, the regime promulgated Decree 24 on 22nd of May 1973, which established the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). Through the scheme, the youths, after completion of their studies in institutions of higher learning were to be posted to other parts of the country for a year doing compulsory service to the nation. The rationale behind this was to expose them to the cultures of other ethnic groups of Nigeria. This was also aimed at removing prejudices against the 'ethnic others' as it was also meant to makethem appreciate the values of other ethnic groups other than their own. General Gowon was overthrown in another palace coup d'état which brought Brigadier Murtala Mohammed to power in July, 1975. In his state broadcast immediately after the coup d'état, he remarked as noted Oluseye (1989:27-29):

...after the civil war, the affairs of the state hitherto a collective responsibility became characterized by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and even neglect. Indeed, the public at large became disillusioned and disappointed by these developments. This trend was clearly incompatible with the philosophy and image of a corrective regime. Unknowingly to the

general public, the feeling of disillusion was also evident among members of the armed forces whose administration was also neglected but who, out of sheer loyalty to the nation, and in the hope that there would be a change continued to suffer in silence...Responsible opinion including advisable eminent Nigerians, traditional rulers, intellectuals etc was similarly disregarded. The leadership, either by design or default, had become too insensitive to the true feelings and yearnings of the people. The nation was being plunged, inexorable into chaos.

The statement above validated the argument earlier made that the evils the military accused the politicians for are not alien to them. The regime promised to improve the condition of Nigerians within a short time after which it would hand-over power to a democratic government. In preparation towards actualizing the goal of handing over to the democratic government on October 1, 1979, the regime appointed a fifty-man Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) to prepare the draft constitution that would provide a sound basis for the continuing existence of a united Nigeria. The plans were in the process of execution when the Head of State was assassinated in a bloody coup on January 13, 1976 because of discordant among the military officers due to ethnic tension. General Olusegun Obasanjo who was then the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters became the Head of State in February 1976. He continued the programmes of the slain Head of State until he successfully handed over power to a democratically elected politician on October 1st, 1979 (Ojiako, 1979:11-13).

The military rule 1983-1999

The Second Republic of Nigeria, 1979-1983 also collapsed. The politicians that were voted into power failed to learn from the problems encountered during the First Republic political experiment after independence, 1960-1966. The same political crises that brought down Tafawa Balewa's administration began to manifest in Alhaji Shehu Shagari's regime. By the eve of 1983, the situation of Nigeria was synonymous to Hobbesian state of nature where there was no

orderliness. Discordance among the citizens was on the increase. Election rigging, corruption, destruction of lives and properties that gave rise to high tension became prevalent in Nigeria. This shows that Nigerian politicians did not learn anything from the past. The ship of the Second Republic capsized when Major-General Muhammadu Buhari and Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon took over the government on December 31, 1983 (Ojiako, 1981:12-13). They identified corruption and indiscipline as major problems bedeviling Nigeria. They therefore introduced War against Indiscipline (WAI) to combat the problems through government apparatus of laws. However, on August 27, 1985, Major General Babangida took over the government in a palace coup. In his national broadcast, he stated the reasons for the coup thus:

Regrettably, it turned out that Major-General Mohammadu Buhari was too rigid and uncompromising in his attitude to issues of national significance. Efforts to make him understand that a diverse polity like Nigeria required recognition and appreciation of differences in both cultural and individual perceptions, only serve to aggravate these attitude... Major-General Tunde Idiagbon was similarly inclined mutual respect. As a Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, he failed to exhibit the appropriate disposition demanded by his position. He arrogated to himself absolute knowledge of problems and solutions, and acted in accordance with what was convenient to him among the machinery of government as his tool (Babangida, 1985).

The above summarized the reasons for the coup that ousted Buhari and Idiagbon out of power by General Babangida. He started by abrogating the Buhari and Idiagbon's Decree No. 4, which was to him an impediment to fundamental human rights especially the Press. He introduced different economic programmes that destroyed the Nigerians' economy by way of acting the script dictated by the World Bank, which ordinarily did not favour the Nigeria's economic situation. Instead of improving the living standard of Nigerians, it ended up impoverished them. Notable of these programmes was Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which he introduced in

1986. For eight years of his tenure, Nigeria imploded in all sectors of the economy. The greatest problem that rocked his tenure was the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election presumably clamored to have been won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola. This episode generated great hullabaloo that almost culminated in a state of anarchy. The pressure from within and from outside forced him to step aside from office after he ignorebly and horribly set up an Interim National Government (ING), headed by Chief Earnest Shonekan on August 26, 1993. It was an illegitimate government to many people. Miscreants unleashed orgies of violence across Nigeria's major cities calling for the June 12 mandate. In the midst of this state of political instability, General Sani Abacha took over from the unpopular government in a palace coup on November 17, 1993. Sani Abacha ruled with almost iron hands. Critics to his government were forcefully sent on exiles while some were assassinated by unknown people. The atmosphere was tensed throughout Nigeria. He was planning to hand over power as military to himself (Democrat) by setting up a kangaroo democratic process when he suddenly died on June 8, 1998 (Tribune, 1998). The death of General Sani Abacha brought General Abdulsalami Abubakar into power on June 10, 1998. One of the notable achievements of his administration was its successful transition from military to a democratically elected government on May 29, 1999.

The impact and legacies of the military on Nigeria's democracy

From 1966 to 1999, the military had dominated Nigeria political scene. With the exception of few years (1979-1983) when Nigeria had democratic experiment, which eventually failed until the ongoing tortuous process was put in place in May 1999, the military had been a key player on the theatre of Nigeria political scene (Lewis, 1994:323-340). The democratic experiment of Nigeria has not been absolutely free from the unwholesome political quagmires. It has been noted that the challenges of the current democratic experiment in Nigeria are not wholly the legacy of colonialism as some commentators would want to argue. The military factor is a phenomenon in the democratic challenges of Nigeria till date (Welch,

1998: 593-614). Evidently, the contributions of the military to nation building in Nigeria are apparent. Objectively, it can be evaluated in two dimensions - positively and negatively. On the positive side, the military was responsible for the integration of Nigeria after the civil war (Oluleye, 1985: 14-17). In addition, the military was also responsible for the creation of states, from the regional setting, which was created by the British Colonial administration since 1936. As at 2016, Nigeria has 36 states, created by different military regimes. The military were also accredited for the establishment of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and Unity Schools across Nigeria in 1973 as part of the process of solidifying the integration of Nigeria after the Civil War. Military impact could also be noticed in the infrastructural development of the nation. For instance, they were instrumental in the building of many stadia, road constructions and bridges among others.

Be that as it may, their negative impact and legacies on the Nigerians' democracy are enormous. In the first instance, the military officers were not trained politicians. They were rather trained to protect or secure the nation from the internal and external aggressors. Seizing power and remaining on power for such a long time had great implications (Osaghae, 1998:19-24). Their coming to power has spelt doom on Nigeria's socio-cultural, political and economic environments. Their lack of political acumen has contributed in no small measure to decay infrastructure and bastardization of Nigeria's economy and democratic culture. The principle of democratic culture is dictated and regulated by the constitution. Since military governments do not reckon with the constitution but decree, the principles of democracy is thus suspended during the military regimes. This resulted in the violation of fundamental human rights of Nigerians.

Since the military came to power in Nigeria, the culture of orderliness without rancor, due process and patience have been eroded. The slogan of obey before complaint is largely associated with the military. This was sold to the Nigerians as critical reasoning and due process for the best have completely evaporated. Nigerians' attitude, thinking, judgment and mannerism have become militarized. All the people who were born since 1966 up to 1990 lived in the

atmosphere of militarized culture. No Nigerians is willing to allow others have their ways legitimately in any engagements in the public and private life. Everybody wants to consider himself /herself first before others with force. This explains the reason democratic era of President Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999 – 2007 was regarded as a period of military-democracy (Omotola, 2006:183-208). There was no respect for the rules of laws and due process as norm of democracy for the purpose of accountability was always ignored for selfish interests and gains. This has always resulted to insurrections, ethnic militias, religious crises, student riots, secret cult activities in the institution of higher learning among the youths, all had their roots in the military especially after the Civil War. Killings are mostly characteristics of the military. Many political activists who opposed the military dictatorship were assassinated with no clue of their assailants. People were hunted like rabbits while those who could escape went into self-exile to hibernate (Daudu, 2014). One major implication of this type of jungle life advertently or inadvertently is that the children who were born during this period and grew under the same culture of arbitrary killing imbibed the culture as an acceptable way of life. This manifested overtly in the activities of cultist groups in Nigeria between 1990s- 2000, when they took over many Institutions of Higher Learning and through their activities several students were murdered in various universities in Nigeria such as Universities of Benin, Ibadan, Ife, Ilorin among others.

More importantly, military rule gave birth to ethno-militias in Nigeria. The intrigue in this trajectory was the spread of new ethnical ideology among the various ethnic groups in the regions shortly after the Nigerian Civil War. The death casualties and destruction of properties after the War in 1970 created another phase of historical development in Nigeria. Each of the ethnic groups began to establish socio-cultural movements in line with their ethnic groups for solidarity (Odion, 2014). These groups include, the *Afenifere*, which was formed by a Pan Yoruba group. There was also the Arewa People's Congress or Arewa Consultative Forum for the Hausa-Fulani for the old North. The *Ohaneze* for the Igbo, and the Middle-Belt Forum for the minority groups in the Middle-Belt (Alubo, 2004: 46-49). Similar associations were equally formed by the Southern

minority groups such as Niger/Delta Forum among others. Initially, these associations were structured to fight for the interests of the various ethnic groups. Overtime, the associations took another dimension. The peaceful conduct of the association suddenly metamorphosed into different militant behaviours. For example, there was the rise of Oodua People Congress (OPC). This grew out of *Afenifere* to form a militant socio-cultural Yoruba group. There was *Yanbanga* group, which grew out of Arewa Congress in the North. There was also the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). This group grew out of *Ohaneze* group in the eastern Nigeria. They were militant in their approach. Their major objective was to fight the cause of the Igbo group towards the realization of the defunct attempted state of Biafra. Furthermore, there was the establishment of the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) (Nnoli, 2014:83-85). This group was established by the people of Niger Delta in South-south of Nigeria to fight for their welfare and resource controls in their area.

It must be pointed out that when these socio-cultural movements initially emerged, they offered convincing arguments as groups defending the ethnic values of their groups from the commonwealth of Nigeria. However, overtime, they put on the uniform of criminality, rubble-raising and ethnic agitation. The current boko-haram insurgencies in the northern part of Nigeria, specifically, in the north-eastern part were part of the consequence of the militarized culture under which Nigerians dwelled for several years. Most of the people who became members of the Boko haram were drawn from those who had had military training during the military era. Some of them were dismissed from the military for one offence or the other (Abubarkar, 2015). Some, after they had retired or disengaged from the military, they became religious bigots and began propagating falsehood and militancy among their followers. The idea of militarism and the usage of military weapons were part of the radical way of their lives, which they used to terrorize Nigerians around their zone.

Another dastard legacy of the military in Nigeria, which has continued to reverberate in the orbit of its democratic process is election violence. Since the military disengagement from politics in Nigeria since 1999, there is arguably no election that has been violent

free. The major point that must be emphasized here as noted by Ojo (2006), is the fact that Nigerian's culture had been militarized for such a long time. All the children born that were born in Nigeria since 1966 have lived under the military culture, ideology and influence. This explains why the idea of democratic way of life was alien to them. It was strange for many people seeing majority determining those who represent them in governance. The idea laid far behind them and justified the reasons for election violence, rigging, killing and maiming during the processes of elections in Nigeria. Politicians used the youths to foment these troubles for their gains. The youths ordinarily lacked the capacity and wherewithal to refrain them because that is the pattern of life they used to since they were born. In addition to this, it is not strange in Nigeria that military officers were often deployed by the government in power to polling venues during elections to maintain peace and order. It is now a common thing that the military used their military power to force electorates to vote for certain candidates they preferred (Ademola, 2014).

The problem of corruption that has almost destroyed the Nigeria's institutions became rampant during the military era. Indeed, corruption predated the independence of Nigeria. We can argue succinctly that political corruption in Nigeria can be traced to the creation of modern public administration (Tignor, 1993:187). However, the discovery of oil in 1956 heightened the level of corrupt practices in the country. The oil boom of 1970s tempted the military leaders to embark on meaningless projects that had no meaningful economic impacts on Nigerians. The military leaders made several unguided utterances that attested to their reckless expenses. For example, General Yakubu Gowon was reported to have said, "Nigeria has money but the only problem is how to spend it". It was as if the military rules legitimized corruption in Nigeria by jealously guided their corrupt officers from punishments. For instance, it was reported that during General Gowon military regime, 10 out of 12 Military State Governors were found guilty of corruption by General Mohammadu's regime that succeeded him. The regime confiscated many of the properties after they had been probed and found guilty of the charges. However, General Badamosi Babangida later returned the properties or assets to the officers without publically justifying

the reasons when he got to power. In the same vein, in 1993, five acting state military administrators were found guilty of corruption by the State Bureau. Evidences of monumental corruption were discovered under General Sani Abacha's regime (1993-1998). This demonstrates that the military regimes have done great harms than the good they purportedly claimed. It was in this light that Okoosi (1993:110) remarked:

Government turned blind eyes to corruption by disregarding it...the celebrated Mr Jennifer Maduiké/Fidelis/Tai Solarin's cases, the Governor Maina of Borno, Alhaji Bashir and Vice President Augustus Aikhomu's cases are all instances in which the government virtually defended its officials without prior investigation.

Corruption was also found in state and local government, which has been the main achievement of the military rule in Nigeria. Cases where State or local government was created or their headquarters sited in a particular place without considering the historical and cultural affiliation but the wishes of "girl friends" or "concubine" abounds in Nigeria. Instead of such States or Local Governments to serve as factor for development, in many instances, they have been sources of fracas and skirmishes, which served as bane to national development.

Still on the economy spate of Nigeria, the military is responsible for most of the economic woes the country is currently experiencing with all efforts at bringing solutions defying possible solutions (Biersteker and Lewis, 1997:221). The military officers used their power of the gun to milk the Nigerian economy and to build for themselves castles, estates and farms. Having almost destroyed the economy, they constituted themselves into kingmakers in their estates and farm where they determine who and who and what and what goes in the ongoing democratization process. Politicians flowing into their empires built with their stolen money to see them in convoyed for anointing for Governors, Senators and President. They made all effort of government to tackle corruption ineffective because the sources of their wealth are on corrupt practices.

Conclusion

The emergence of the military in Nigeria is traceable to the colonial era. It was initially recognized as Glover Hausa or Hausa Militia before it became known as Lagos Constabulary. However, when the Royal Niger Company was granted a charter, its constabulary was transformed to West African Frontier Force (WAFF). Their duties were clearly spelt out, which among others was to protect the British holdings along the Western coast of West Africa sub-region.

It must be emphasized that Nigerians initially looked down at the profession and treated it with disdain. The general thoughts then were that, it meant for school dropouts and wild individuals. What however, brought the profession into a limelight was the coup of 1966. The triumphant entry of the military into Nigerian politics and how they have remained as the prime-mover, shakers of events and major players in the Nigerian political games for almost three decades uninterruptedly made the profession to become popular. However, their lack and bereft of political astute needed to project ideas that would aid the fast growth of strong and virile socio-economic and political structure are partly responsible to the socio-economic and political problems currently facing the country. The hydra-headed problem of corruption even though its genesis predated military rule in Nigeria, it is evident that the military aided it to degenerate until the whole system has become affected and now in the state of cancer. Militarized ways of life without respect for fundamental human rights, gangsterism, ethnic militias, armed insurrections and Boko haram insurgencies are emphatic products of protracted military impact and legacies in Nigeria. For the culture of democracy to be fully entrenched and come to stay in Nigeria, democratic process must be afloat uninterruptedly in order to demilitarize the mindsets of the people, which has been militarized for several decades.

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Intra- and Inter-party Violence in Africa: Narratives and Reflections from Zimbabwe

Bernard Pindukai Humbe and Munyaradzi Mawere

Introduction

While historians of evolutions such as Charles Darwin believe that people evolve and improve over time, reality surprisingly reveals that the 21st century African society, as elsewhere in Europe and the United States of America, is dominated by survival of the fittest and the dog-eat-dog kind of politics. More often than not, the kind of politics that carry the day is replete with violence that unfortunately has mothered ill-timed injuries and deaths on the continent of Africa, Zimbabwe included.

Characteristically, violence proves to be a contested term, which is notoriously resistant to definition (David 2012). However, in a bid to capture the elusiveness of violence, David (Ibid) proffers four dimensions of the phenomenon [violence]. First, he presents violence as direct physical harm to persons or property; second, as the violation of humanity; third, as an illegitimate force imposed on others; and fourth, some force that must be immediately evaluated in terms of its ethical intentions, motives, means, ends or consequences. Yet, although the above interpretation of violence is insightful, it is problematic in the sense that it is more inclined to physical violence which does not address the holistic nature of political violence in its subjective, psychological and objective nature. No wonder scholars like Zizek (2008) point out that violence is either subjective or objective. Zizek (2008) even goes a step further to discuss the nexus of a triumvirate of violence in the form of subjective violence and the two forms of objective violence, he notes as symbolic and systematic violence. For him, subjective violence is that which is visible such that more often than not, it results in physical harm. This includes crime and terror, while symbolic violence, for Zizek, is

rooted in language with all its subtle forms including, racism, hate speech and discrimination. Systematic violence, on the other hand, is located in the economic and political systems of the world. To complicate his analysis further, Žizek argues that there is a link between subjective and objective violence such that what may be perceived as irrational (subjective) violence could be rooted in the objective forms of violence.

In view of the perspectives of violence examined above, this chapter adopts a broader perspective of viewing political violence as a method of communication which responds to particular circumstances of social existence in the form of conflict. The study is grounded on the symbiotic relationship between political agencies and victims in communication of their messages through various methodic patterns during election times and at other critical junctures related to mobilisation for political office. It is against this backdrop that this work considers the following types of political violence: physical body harm (physical violence), gradual death of poor people due to harsh socio-economic conditions (structural violence) and lastly psychological as depicted in discrimination and stigmatisation against people basing on race, ethnic, cultural and religious inclination (cultural violence). Therefore, the view of political violence employed here is not limited to physical manifestation but also extends to the psychological, insidious, institutionalised, structural, economic, social, cultural yet still retaining the prefix 'political' violence.

The research was principally carried out using qualitative ethnography. Though there is lack of homogeneousness among scholars on the definition of ethnography, this work subscribes to Brewer's definition because of its suitability in the context of this research. For Brewer (2000), ethnography is the study of people in naturally occurring settings or 'fields' by means of methods which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities such as participatory observation, interviews, lived experiences, and focus group discussions, among others. One of the authors of this chapter lived in Buhera at the height of Zimbabwe's political violence of 2008, thus both overtly and covertly observed and experienced politically motivated violence of [27] June 2008 elections. This

researcher was privileged to listen and experience, firsthand, both the perpetrators and victims' speeches, asked questions and discreetly collected and recorded data that shed light into the local people's experiences during the period under consideration.

We also consulted documents on political violence generated by both civic organisations and academics to augment our findings and generate new insights. In recalling the history of violence in Buhera in 2008, it was necessary to go beyond academic delineations by locating violence in the symbols, myths, rituals and traditions of Buhera people's world-views that have made violence not only powerful but also meaningful (David 2012:61). In our presentation of various experiences of violence in the period under study, we have decided to use pseudo names in order to deal with the possibility of victimisation of the interlocutors.

As already alluded to, this chapter focuses on politically motivated violence in Buhera District of Manicaland Province in the aftermath of the March 2008 harmonised elections and leading up to and immediately after the disputed 27 June 2008 presidential election run-off in Zimbabwe. It is imperative to point out that this is not pioneering work on political violence in Buhera. There have been other studies on the same topic that have been conducted prior to the present study. Worth mentioning is the research by Heal Zimbabwe Trust (HZT) and another one by Artwell Nhemachena, which both generally focus on local rural communities in the five districts of Manicaland that were badly affected by the post-29 March 2008 political violence. More specifically, the memorialisation project by Heal Zimbabwe Trust was, for example, a public memorialisation project carried out between 2010 and 2011. This project was extended to Buhera in 2011. Besides, soliciting information on and about the 2008 violence, it provided families of the bereaved and their communities with the opportunity to openly grieve the death of their beloved ones who had been killed during the decade long period of political violence of the new millennium.

Furthermore, the chapter goes beyond mere recording of violence that transpired in 2008, to critically reflect on our understanding of the processes in which experiences of violence at election times in Zimbabwe emerge and continue to take its toll.

Thus, using the case study of Buhera District, we reflect on the recurring causal patterns that shape trajectories of political radicalisation and perpetual conflict corkscrewing in Zimbabwe.

Buhera as the amphitheater of politicking and political violence

Buhera District is one of Manicaland Province's seven districts. The name Buhera is a Nguni adulteration of the Anglicised version of the name uHera. UHera means *territory of the Hera* ethnic group. According to Beach (1980 cited in Nhemachena 2014:27), Buhera was an area dominated from the pre-colonial era, by people of the Shava/Hera totem dynasties in the south centre of the country. In the north Buhera shares borders with Chikomba and Wedza Districts which both are in Mashonaland East Province. To the south and western part of Buhera lies Gutu District which is in Masvingo Province. To the northeast lies Makoni District while Mutare District lies to the east. The southeastern part of Buhera shares a border with Chimanimani and Chipinge Districts. District offices are located approximately 170 kilometers, by road, southwest of Mutare which is the provincial capital. Buhera District is a home to 24072 habitants (geoview.info 2013) and the vaHera of the Museyamwa totem occupy most of the Buhera territory (under Chief Nyashanu). Although the district is predominantly populated by the Shona speaking people, there are some Ndebele speaking people in the far north who were resettled by the colonial government from Matabeleland region to Buhera in the 1930s following the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which divided land along racial lines (Nhemachena, 2014:29).

Climatically, Buhera falls within Agro-ecological Zone Five with low annual rainfall and high temperatures that are not suitable for successful commercial crop production. The most successful agricultural production activity under the climatic conditions of the area is that of drought tolerant crops such as millet (*zviyo*), bulrush millet (*mbunga*), sorghum (*mapfunde*), groundnuts (*nzungu*), roundnuts (*nyimo*), pumpkins (*manbanga*), cucumbers (*magaka*) and cowpeas (*nyemba*). Poor harvests in the area are also a result of poor sandy soils of granitic origin. There is however a thriving but subsistence

livestock activity which has been the communities' major source of livelihood. There are no income generating activities in the area apart from those related to rain-fed crop production and livestock production, trading in water melons, groundnuts and roundnuts. The other major source of income for members of the community is from remittances from family members either in the Diaspora or urban areas within the country (Heal Zimbabwe Trust [HZT] 2008). As we further noted, other sources of income include harvesting and selling of wild fruits. The indigenous fruits that are traded include fruits from *Munyii* (*Berchemia discolor*), *Munyuu* (*Adansonia digitata*), *Mushumba* (*Diospyros mespiliformis*), *Mukwakwa* (*Gvarada gascariensis*) and other non-timber forestry products. As per the HZT (Ibid) records, the per capita income for Buhera is among the lowest in the country, hence it is one among the most impoverished districts.

It is such natural, economic and social stresses that created Buhera a fertile ground for political interests during the 2008 and other preceding national elections. In this district, it has now become a norm that politicians stampede for electorate support. This study focuses on the 2008 election.

Basically, two major political parties thrived in Buhera namely Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU PF) formed in 1963 led by President Robert Gabriel Mugabe and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formed in 1999. Out of the numerous MDCs in Zimbabwe, this work focuses on MDC which is headed by Mr Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), who hails from Buhera. When the MDC-T was founded, the people of Buhera were eager to support a political figure who had emerged from within their home area. It being an underdeveloped and impoverished district made some to perceive his potential ascendancy to power as a tool that would help change the fortunes of the district and the province at large. Also, among all opposition parties to thrive in Zimbabwean political landscape MDC was viewed as the most potent one that could bring an end to the ZANU PF's long rule and a plethora of challenges dogging the area. As such, there was great symbolic significance attached to Buhera in MDC-T politics at national level.

Whilst the district had such profound significance to the MDC-T, the same was held for ZANU-PF, which was one of the two

principal liberation movements in colonial Zimbabwe. Among others, it was in Buhera that the second liberation war, the Second Chimurenga, was extensively fought. Because of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 promulgated by the colonial regime, one common thing about Buhera was villagisation which created dense settlements making it easy to mobilise human resources during the war. Besides, there were a lot of thickets as well as mountains which were conducive for guerrilla warfare. It is not surprising that the biggest staging point (political base) for ZANLA liberation forces in Zimbabwe during the Second Chimurenga War (1966-1979) was Chiurwi Mountain or Fortfox, Dzapasi in Buhera. In the 1980s, it was possible that in every five homesteads encountered, at least someone from one of the homesteads had participated as *Mujibha* (or *Chimbwido*) or fought in the liberation. Thus, with this role that the district actively played in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe, it was emotionally regarded in the ruling ZANU-PF circles as a stronghold of the ruling party. On this note, the potential ascendancy of Tsvangirai and his MDC-T party in national politics was an abomination to the ethos of the Second Chimurenga and was cast strongly as a reincarnation of the British rule.

Furthermore, the symbolic significance of Buhera can be established in linguistic 'politics' in Zimbabwe. This can be traced back to Doke (1928) who created the concept Shona as a language used by the indigenous Zimbabweans. His project, whose findings considered Zezuru language as standard among all the Shona dialects resulted in consciousness of ethnic sentiments among the locals. It promoted hegemony and superiority complex of the *Zezuru* dialect which then was viewed as the standard language to be used even in schools.

Prior to independence, Buhera was part of *Karangaland* and as such it was one of those regions that were subdued by *zezuruism*. The rise of Tsvangirai to opposition politics presented those who had an anti-*Zezuru* feeling with an opportunity to oust the *Zezuru* oriented ZANU PF party from the helm of Zimbabwean politics. For them it was a means of liberating themselves from internal political and cultural colonisation. This later found expression in notions like *vanhu vekuBuhera vakapanduka, vakaramba ZANU PF* (the people of Buhera

have rebelled against ZANU PF) and in a broader sense they were viewed as a people who were too ambitious and with the unsatiable desire for regime change. Suspicion and distrust befell the district such that it became dangerous even for the ordinary citizens to identify themselves with Buhera.

It should be underscored that the hodgepodge and political contestation between ZANU PF and MDC in Buhera dates back to 1999 with the birth of MDC party. The contestations, however, exploded and cascaded into violent incidences in 2000. It was in Buhera District, that the first deaths of political violence of the new millennium were recorded and these were highly publicised in April 2000. The victims were Talent Mabika and Tichaona Chiminya who died of petrol bombing. Since 2000, the political duel has claimed many lives, displaced people internally and destroyed property worth millions of dollars (HZT, 2008). Thus Buhera District became one of the districts that were most intensely affected by violence partly because the leader of the opposition MDC-T hailed from Buhera District which was thus heavily contested between the opposition party and the ruling ZANU PF party that historically had its strongholds in rural areas including Buhera (cf. Nhemachena, 2014).

The 27 March 2008 harmonised elections in Buhera showed that the MDC-T won three parliamentary seats out of four (Buhera South, Buhera Central and Buhera West) while ZANU PF won only one seat, Buhera North Constituency. This was also the same with presidential results where the MDC-T candidate, Morgan Tsvangirai triumphed over ZANU PF candidate, Robert Mugabe in Buhera and nationally. Collectively, the majority of the parliamentary seats were won by MDC-T as Morgan Tsvangirai had a feat against Robert Mugabe in the presidential race although Tsvangirai did not garner the constitutionally-required 50% plus one of the electorate, according to official results (Chitando and Togarasei, 2010). This called for a presidential election re-run, yet the announcement of the March 2008 presidential election results already had catastrophic repercussions in the district. ZANU PF party manned new strategies in its campaign for the presidential re-run set for 27 June 2008. In the their campaign, ZANU PF supporters made frantic efforts to revitalise bitter memories of the armed struggle and even equated the

run-up of the 27 June elections to the legendary Second Chimurenga. Nationwide, a new election campaign mode was implemented under the coordination of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). JOC was a supreme organ for the coordination of state security coded Operation *Mavhotera Papi?* (Operation whom did you vote for?) as well as VaMugabe *chete muOffice* (no one except Mr Mugabe in the office). There was re-establishment of the Second Chimurenga liberation bases in all the Wards of the District, with villagers were expected to visit bases in their respective Wards as a symbol of loyalty and recognition to the ZANU PF government. *Pungwes* (all-night meetings) were revived, where victims allegedly went through an “orientation process” from which they were expected to emerge out as devout born-again ZANU PF supporters (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2008: 3). This ignited a wave of tension and violence in the whole district. Table 1 below shows the demographic data on political violence in Buhera District in 2008.

Targeted age group of victims of political violence	51 years and above	40-50 years	29-39 years	18-28 years
Gender	Male	Male and female	Male	Male and female
Period	2008	2002 and 2008	2008	Mostly 2008
Perpetrators	ZANU PF Youth, policemen, soldiers	Youth from Border Gezi and ZANU PF policemen and soldiers	Youth from Border Gezi and ZANU PF policemen and soldiers, Chiefs, War Veterans, C.I.O	Policemen, youths from Boarder Gezi, youths from surrounding areas, chiefs, war veterans, ZANU PF youths
Extent of damage	Looting of property especially livestock and	Beatings leading to being disabled and miscarriage,	Beatings leading to being disabled and miscarriage, burning of houses,	Loss of parents, looting of property especially

	forced to leave residential area, beatings, rape of family members	burning of houses, killings, looting of property especially live stock, rape, being chucked out of work, jailed	killings, looting of property especially live stock and crops, rape, being chucked out of work, jailed,	livestock and crops, beatings,
Number of victims who hold party positions	11 out of 14 (78%)	11 out of 16 (68%)	9 out of 11 (81%)	2 out of 5 (40%)
Are they registered voters?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Was the violence politically motivated	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
On average the number of people who attacked the victims	10 < (and more)	10 < (and more)	10 < (and more)	10 < (and more)
Cases reported to the police	10 out of 14 (71%)	11 out of 16 (68)	9 out of 11 (81%)	3 out of 5 (60%)
Where the perpetrators arrested?	No	No	No	No
How many victims are willing to participate in	14 (100%)	16 (100%)	11(100%)	5 (100%)

future elections?				
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Table 1: Demographic data on political violence in Buhera District in 2008

Source: *Adapted from Heal Zimbabwe Trust (2008).*

Table 1 covers demographic data on violence for the whole district of Buhera. As shown on the table, the most targeted victims were MDC-T activists, agents, suspected and known supporters, human rights NGOs, local election observers and teachers (Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2008: 3) as were perceived to be the sympathisers and source of the opposition party’s revolutionary powerhouses. Although the targeted group was between 18-51 years, the extent of the damage caused by the inter-party violence in Buhera spilt-over to the innocent children and senior citizens, also regardless of gender. Several women and men above 51 years of age as well as children under the age of 15 were were also beaten up. In Buhera West, most of the victims of politically motivated violence were the elderly who are above 51 years of age. The members of the police force were also reported to have been responsible for harassing individuals to the extent that some were maimed and women miscarried resulting in not more than physical scars, but emotional and mental trauma as well (Heal Zimbabwe Trust, 2013, 5 July, ISSUE No. 2).

Reportedly, army units, police and Central Intelligent Organisation (CIOs) roamed around Buhera District like hungry lions ready for preying. They instigated various forms of political violence which catapulted the abuse of human rights to an unimaginable level. The nature of political violence from the table shows that it was more inclined to extreme physical, systematic, psychological and retributive acts of violence. The consistency and uniformity with which the acts of violence were applied smacked of a well-coordinated programme of violence, which one can characterise as institutional violence. The main perpetrators were reportedly those from the ruling party with more cases allegedly involving war veterans, ZANU PF youths, militia, ZANU PF councilors, and traditional chiefs (Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2008). This explains why there is a big ‘No’ on the question that continues

to haunt many victims of the violence nearly a decade afterwards: “Were the perpetrators of the infamous 2008 violence arrested?” However, there seem to be currently no indication of retaliatory violence, yet there is the possibility that such questions will one day be invoked and cause a great stir among citizens. This is because, while violence in the district escalated in 2008, to date there continue to be recorded cases of abductions that are politically linked. From a research carried out by Heal Zimbabwe Trust (2013), Buhera abductions did not start in 2008 but were also experienced as far back as 2002. In 2002, one Colonel Mzilikazi was the chief instigator of these abductions. He operated in the Muzokomba, Mutiusinazita, Mutepfe and Masasa areas. The HZT findings further reveal that in 2008 alone, more than 20 people were abducted and taken to bases. Traditional leaders also allegedly took part in these abductions as they submitted names of people in their villages who they suspected or knew to be MDC-T activists or pro-change advocates. The political activists were taken to “bases” and subjected to various inhumane acts and torture after being abducted during the night or early morning hours.

Also, table 1 above shows mainly extreme forms of physical violence, which in no way is easy to distinguish from psychological violence. This violence in its holistic form made Buhera a lead hot spot zone. However, there is need to question the data shown on the table since there are no cases of MDC-T supporters perpetrating violence, yet in any instance of violence it’s normal that victims sometimes turn themselves into agents of violence. In an interview with Rikie Tsika (not his real name), a traditional leader, the situation on the ground was that some of the MDC-T supporters who instigated politically motivated violent acts were reportedly arrested by the police. Therefore, this table wrongly depicts the MDC-T as a party which was always at the receiving end in a volatile political situation.

Whether it was offensive or defensive form of political violence, generally speaking, post-March 2008 election violence assumed more methodical, ferocious and retaliatory features. Allegedly, political victims were beaten up with logs, knobkerries and *syjambokos*. Mostly, the body parts which were lashed were the buttocks, under the feet

and thighs. As they were beaten up, some victims were handcuffed, hands-tied by bicycle chains or forcibly made to roll on muddy ground. Some were burnt with hot plastics on their hands, face, and the back. Some were assaulted with fists, claps, and booted feet with their stomachs and heads down, while others had their hands cut-short in a style that was dubbed “short-sleeved”. More others had their properties – houses, granneries, livestock and fields – set ablaze, and others had their lips cut with knives. All these nefarious horrific experiences qualify to make amphitheater of politicking and political violence.

Slogans, names, and political speeches

At their rallies and gatherings, both ZANU PF and MDC supporters used slogans which we believe fomented violence. Starting with ZANU PF, they used the following slogans: “*Pamberi na comrade nhingi*,” that is, “forward with Comrade so and so” (with their clenched fists lifted high), and: “*Pasi nanhingi, pasi neMDC-T*,” that is, “down with so and so or the MDC” (fists pointing down). According to Makumbe (2012), by far, the worst slogan that promoted violence was ZANU PF’s. This slogan was used during the war of liberation to declare that the mentioned person be killed (Chidavaenzi, 2013). The slogan actually meant that those mentioned should be killed for the major reason that they were perceived as betrayers of the struggle. In Buhera, mentioning someone’s name while pointing to the earth/soil – *uchinongedzera pasi* – simply means the desire for the death of the accused. For example, in their day-to-day ordinary usage of *pasi* in conflicts, people are heard saying *ndokudzikise pasi* (I will bring you down/I will kill you), or *unokorera pasi sembambaira* (your body grows in the soil like sweet potatoes/you will rot in the grave). These idioms serve to show sentiments of death carried in the link between a victim and the earth. Therefore, the philosophy underpinned in ZANU PF slogan of “Down with so and so” conveyed messages of death to the people who did not share the same ideology as ZANU PF. This was realised in the fact there was a deliberate commission of the last part of the 2008 violence which made provision for teaching those who were ignorant of the party’s ideology (*vasingazivi*

ngavadzidziswe). At bases and rallies, slogans were used as a prelude to the psychological and physical violence of those condemned by ZANU PF as political opponents (Hove, 2013).

On the other hand, MDC-T made use of several violence promoting slogans, including the popular “*Chisa mbama chisa!*” (torch using an open palm). This was in reference to the open palm, the symbol of the MDC-T. Interpretation of this slogan was urging the audience to beat up their opponents or political rivals using their palms. After calling out the names of their political rivalries, they chanted *mudenga* meaning lift them high, and the slogan ended with “*Hezvoko...Bwaaa!*” (crush them down violently). This observation is also captured by Chidavaenzi (2013), who notes that the MDC-T, just like ZANU PF, had one of its popular slogans calling for the crushing of enemies by lifting them up high before crushing them to the ground. The grand mind boggling question then is: “Who was being slammed to the ground? Was this not a call to violence?” In their experiences of violence at election times, some section of the electorate felt that this was a slogan used by a political party that abhorred violence. At the burial of his friend and party colleague Professor John Makumbe in January 2013, the then Minister of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs, Eric Matinenga, who was the incumbent legislator for Buhera West, expressed concern over the violence inferences in the slogan. “We say hit someone against the ground. Of what help to us is that slogan?” It is against this backdrop that it suffices to say that in the post-March 2008 election both political parties in Buhera were guilty of using slogans that clearly promoted various forms of insidious violence against their rivals.

From the fieldwork findings, the study provides some of the terms that emerged and reinforced by perpetrators of political violence. The period under study in Buhera was known as *bhomomo bhomomo*. The phrase derives its name from the Shona verb *kubhumura* which means violent destruction of an established structure. It was noted that *bhomomo bhomomo* was equated to physical violence applied by perpetrators of violence on human beings, property and livestock. Destructiveness of the political violence as couched in this term is hammered by Keyasi, a victim who had this to say: “because of the

political violence buildings were razed down by fire, able bodied people became disabled and some lost their lives”.

There was also deployment of words like *chikundi* which has roots from the verb *kukunda* meaning being victors. *Chikundi* is heavily associated with use of violence by dominant groups against a member of the minority. Dominance was shown by the number of people who collectively instigated the violence to subdue the despondent victim. As shown earlier in table 1, more often than not the group exceeded ten people. An MDC-T victim, Mary reveals that *chikundi* was the most appropriate term to describe physical violence, for those who orchestrated violence moved in groups and prompted their violence in groups. For this reason, a group of ZANU PF youths in Buhera was popularly known as *chikundi*. It is interesting to note that MDC-T youths who were involved in acts of political violence were not associated with the term *chikundi* for the major reason that they were associated with the “minority party”.

Another popular term that was widely used by perpetrators of violence in Buhera, as elsewhere in Zimbabwe, was *jambanja*. Though its use predates 2008 elections, *jambanja* was popularised by the musician, Marko Sibanda in his song: *Jambanja pahotera* (violence at a hotel). The word broadly refers to pandemonium in any situation. From the observations made during the research, *jambanja* also included insidious acts of violence unleashed against the opposing elements and their respective properties.

Those who belonged to MDC-T party were ascribed tags by the ZANU PF which drove bearers to ruminate their self-perception. One such label was *madbinjalo*. From the research we carried out, many of our interlocutors could not exactly pinpoint its real meaning for it was a label that only filtered through the district during the era of political violence. Alex Mhondodzi (not his real name), however, opined that the term was derived from the initials MDC, with the “M” standing for “Ma”, and “D” for “dhi”, and “C” for “njalo”. He then concludes that this term was coined to disguise ZANU PF party. However, some interlocutors argued during fieldwork that the term gave an impression of how dangerous MDC-T supporters were in the political circles. To compliment this, other interlocutors argued that the term *madbinjalo* was a derogatory concept crafted by ZANU

PF supporters in a bid to mock and provoke the MDC-T supporters. In this test of provoking, thus, names became critical lenses through which the dominant society's values were viewed, carried and perpetuated. The MDC-T party was viewed as a cohort 'sell-outs' and therefore they were 'enemies' of the revolutionary gains that came with sweat and blood. For the same reason, the MDC-T leader was called by various derogatory names, for example, "Tsvangison". The name Tsvangson meant the son of Tsvangi, and in this context, Tsvangi was said to be a Westerner. Along this nickname was the name 'tea boy,' again referring to Tsvangirai's person. This name emanated from the general belief among ZANU PF members that Tsvangirai was working for the Westerners' interest and his role was equated to that of white men's tea boy. The symbolism was that, Tsvangirai was also delivering the "country" to whites, therefore reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. Cartoons of Tsvangirai wearing an apron carrying a tray with tea cups were publicly circulated on social media.

Besides, the MDC-T leader was also called by the name, *the white man's 'condom'*. This came on the pretext and belief that Tsvangirai was allegedly understood as someone being used by Westerners in their interests in Zimbabwe and would be ultimately dumped like a used condom. As a condom, thus, Tsvangirai was seen as a conduit of sexual gratification without it being gratified. Again, several cartoons depicting Tsvangirai as a condom were seen on dura-walls.

Another name accorded to Tsvangirai was Chamatama (one with unique cheeks). This was coined to communicate Tsvangirai's facial ugliness, which his rivals equated to the ugliness of his heart or spitefulness. In short, Tsvangirai had violence orchestrated against his persona and name, with all the caricaturing in different images aimed at lowering his political value.

MDC-T supporters referred to ZANU PF party government as a group of corrupt thieves, murderers, rapists, a bunch of liars, Satanists who were only interested in self-aggrandisement and not sincere to the lives of the suffering villagers. So, the only way out was to vote out, in the common Buhera lingo, *chiburumende cheZANU-PF*, that is, the corrupt failing ZANU PF government. At Chitambo, an MDC-T activist gave reference to the shambolic state of the 120 km

Murambinda-Birchenough dust road: “*Chinoita kuti upenyu butiomere muno muBhera inhau yeroad, yakadyirwe mari ngeZANU PF kubvira Kangai uchiri MP. Izvozvi mugwagwa wese dzangove mbabvu dzaKangai. Kana uchida kusvika kwaunoenda nemota wotoshandisa zviKangai roads*” meaning (what makes our life difficult here in Buhera is the sorry state in which our road now is. ZANU PF has been abusing resources for the road since Kangai was still the Member of Parliament. Now corrugations on the road look like Kangai’s ribs. If you want to reach your destination, drive using sideways nicknamed *zviKangai* ways).

At ZANU PF rallies, beer parties or any social gathering, some of the war veterans and security forces were blunt about the impending danger if the ZANU PF presidential candidate was going to lose during the run-up to 27 June 2008 presidential elections. The elections became militarised with declarations like the words of Major-General Engelbert Rugeje: “This country came through the bullet, not the pencil. Therefore, it will not go by your X of the pencil” (Masunungure, 2010:84) becoming *zvi* common at ZANU PF rallies. These utterances instilled great fear among civilians such that pacification became the panacea to avoid a “bloody Buhera”. According to Tumbarengé (not his real name) in an interview, on the 4th of June, at Mukome an angry war veteran, “Dzvuke” declared at a rally: “*Isu takafa kare muhondo, saka atitombotyí kuuraya vanhu vanode kudzosere nyika kuarungu. Muno ndiri kuone makuwa embandu dzemusangano*” meaning (we have already experienced death during the liberation war so we do not hesitate to kill anyone who wants to return the country to the whites. I foresee graves of enemies of the State). Tumbarengé further notes that the war veteran’s words created a tense, unpredictable and volatile atmosphere such that “Mai Mutezwanga” whose husband had escaped after being enlisted to die, sobered helplessly. Again, from the crowd three women reportedly instantly soiled themselves. After the rally the crowd dispersed quietly speculating the peevish effects of what was awaiting them in the aftermath of 2008 June 27 presidential run-off elections.

There was use of hate speeches at rallies. Addressing a star rally at Nehumambi two days before the 27 June presidential re-run elections, “Mai Guvhungu,” leader of ZANU PF party called three couples up-front whose children had allegedly been reported to have

fled Buhera because of political violence. According to Tengengende Ruwombanga an eyewitness who was also in ZANU PF party leadership structures, mai Guvhungu had this to say:

“Where are your children hiding? I instruct you to look for your sons and bring them back before elections or risk yourselves to severe physical torture till you defecate in front of your relatives. These ZANU PF youths will strip-off your panties exposing your organs for public mockery. If your children come back after elections then they shall not walk on our land, trees shall be their places of abode, but again I warn them not to drop their faeces on ZANU PF ground.”

The vulgarity contained in the language deployed by Mai Guvhungu had humiliating effects for one of the couples consisted of professionals who were in the civil service. The couple earned tremendous respect for they had done a lot towards social development of the local area. It can be argued that Mai Guvhungu's utterances were meant to show the power she wielded as a ZANU PF leader against the powerless suspected MDC-T allies. Thus, the political actors appropriated victims as a communication medium that would reinforce the power of their party (David, 2012: 62).

Singing and dancing with violence

Activities which transpired at ZANU PF “base camps” were punctuated by singing and dancing. Some of the songs sung at bases included those that were composed by or for the liberation army during the late 1960s to 1979 for political education. On 2 June 2008, for example, captured MDC-T supporters were beaten up at Chapanduka Base where songs like: ‘*Zanu ndeyeropa*’ (translated to mean ZANU has a blood-trail history) were sung by angry ZANU PF members. Message of such a song did not only stimulate fear, but trauma in the targeted spectator as its content was too strong to contain.

Another song was: “*Tsvangirai ndiye muroyi ngaarobwe tsvimbo musoro*” meaning (Tsvangirai is a witch and should have his head

crushed with a knobkerry). In Buhera as elsewhere in Zimbabwe, a witch is humanity's worst enemy and so the crowd was being conscientised of the unscrupulousness and deceitfulness that Tsvangirai and his supporters had become, hence deserved execution.

Yet, the same use of malicious songs was observable in the MDC-T. The MDC-T party also sang songs that were directed at decampaigning ZANU PF. In a song sung by the supporters at Bangure, the words were:

Vocal: *Mogie Morgan,*

Chorus: *ZANU PF yaora baba,*

Vocal: *Morgan Tsvangirai ndizvo.*

This song meant that Morgan Tsvangirai is the ideal leader because ZANU PF has rotten. Such a song complemented by stories of Tsvangirai's gallantry in the face of the allegedly ZANU PF's anarchy and impunity, made the MDC-T supporters to envisage a charismatic messiah in the person of Tsvangirai who was going to bring back the sanity of the country to its golden days. For this change to be realised, many people of Buhera believed that the need for their sacrifice in the struggle initiated by their home area leader was a priority. What also emerged was the appellation of heroism on Tsvangirai against the standards of ZANU-PF heroism.

One of the popular dances exhibited by ZANU PF in its campaign gimmicks was *kongonya*. According to Gonye (2013:66), *kongonya* is a dance born of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle of the 1970s against the white Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith. However, being a traditional dance with productive and reproductive symbolisms, a closer look at the dance shows that it predates colonialism. For a people waging a war of liberation, *kongonya* facilitated political mobilisation, morale boosting, psychological anchoring, and, above all, a comforting sense of the ordinary in an otherwise traumatic context. Thus, according to Eliade (1959), ritual acts often draw their meaning and power by reenacting "the mythic time of the beginning of things". Etymologically, however, the literal meaning of the word "*kongonya*" derives from the Shona lexical term

“*kongonyara*,” which describes the swaggering movement of a mature male baboon (Gonye, 2013: 66). Also, the vigorous hip twisting emphasises both the reproductive and productive role of the waist in African communities.

At base camps and during rallies, *kongonya* became traumatizing dance with full artistic, or politically communicative, significance. ZANU PF politicians used it to coerce and manipulate Zimbabwean nationals to support and identify with the revolutionary party in 2008. Depiction of how *kongonya* was danced by ZANU PF supporters in Buhera reverberated with Gonye’s (2013: 67) description:

After introducing a political speech, the local party leaders started revolutionary songs and *kongonya*. There was a combination of abundant waist swirling, stamping the ground, hopping, and jogging steps, retreating to the center before returning to mark their boundary. Their waists, poised in an arch, allowed the pelvis to propel as the dance moves progressed. In another impassioned move, each had one hand hold the side of the head while the other hand held the outside hip with a mockery gesture reflected in the face. Apart from horizontally pounding the ground, the dancers also twisted and wove their legs repeatedly about the knees, and twirled their thighs vigorously.

The pattern of political violence in the run up to June 2008 presidential elections was scheduled in such a way that the persecution of targeted victims by ZANU PF supporters was often preceded by *kongonya*. Thus, *kongonya* appeared to be a social and political tool that assisted perpetrators of violence to psyche up for political violent acts that they perhaps would not engage in under normal circumstances. The dance acted with the same effect as drugs to psychologically hypnotise the perpetrators of violence, and also to act as a preparatory backdrop to violence. It induced anger to the youths and other dancers. During the *bhomomo bhomomo* period, anger in the camps was seen as something almost holy or as Holy Spirit that when visits someone, s/he is glorified. Anger, which in peace studies of violence is regarded as a vice, was indeed highly regarded as

something bound up with heroism, through which the ancestors of the territory interfered in the workings of the youths to safeguard the sovereignty of the country.

In an interview with the eighteen year old Gondiwanganda Rutongindo (not his real name) from Chamutsa, we learnt that from the moment Gondiwanganda started staying in the ZANU PF base camp receiving political education, his mindset changed. To him, staying at base camps while others enjoyed the comfort of their homes meant great sacrifice and commitment for ZANU PF. Understanding and agreeing with ZANU PF ideology which was antagonistic to the regime change agenda of the “foreign-backed” MDC-T, was expressed through dancing *kongonya*. As Gondiwanganda himself revealed, his life was full of anger and fury especially each time he heard about MDC-T’s somewhat success adventures. Singing revolutionary songs and dancing *kongonya* made him more focused on defending the country even if it meant harming or killing “an MDC-T enemy”. For him, only faithful daughters and sons of the ZANU PF party (*nemusvo chete*) had the right to live.

Given this scenario, one can safely infer that through singing and dancing, perpetrators of violence psychologically prepared themselves to mete out violence to the victims. Presented with the floor to punish “the enemy,” their rationality was transmuted into unconsciousness and temporary psychosis. They assumed a status of possessed party spirit mediums who did not feel responsible for violence as long as it was meted out to those who were perceived as enemies of the revolution. The ZANU PF youths, thus, had become so obsessed with violence, that for them it became more of a culture.

Violence and the claim for innocent lives

The violence in the period between the end of March and 27 June 2008 was also characterised by violent killing of opposition functionaries. Some of these targeted killings included the MDC-T Chairperson at Mutiusinazita, Nyoka Chokuse Mupango, who was staying in Durwi Mountain for fear of ZANU PF supporters. He was axed by ZANU PF youths in full view of his wife and children in May 2008. The executors of this cold-blood murder reportedly placed

Nyoka's mutilated body on a stretcher (*hwanyenze*) and displayed it to the villagers in a celebratory mood for they had finally killed the MDC-T enemy. The execution of Nyoka punctuated by a public parade of his corpse had concerted psychological effects on his family members and villagers who witnessed the horrendous incident, thus, they became intimidated, down spirited and traumatised to the spine by such a despicable event. This enforced "public discipline" in the whole of Buhera, where such executions served the double role of killing the target as well as intimidating and sending a powerful message to the audience. In a similar event, ZANU PF members murdered another perceived MDC-T supporter called Dickson Sibamba. They had gone to his home to grab his goats and one of the goats behaved in a mysterious manner. The youths accused Sibamba of practicing witchcraft and for using his goats as witchcraft familiars. Reportedly on the 17th of May 2008 the ZANU PF youths dragged Sibamba to Nyarushanga River near Jori base camp where they took turns to "thresh" him using logs and knobkerries till he lost his life. Again, the murder of this prominent MDC-T supporter was interpreted as a ritual of purification designated to eliminate some defiling and therefore dangerous agents of the "enemy" from society. This dirty work concretised the ugly face of violence, prompting the anthropologist Mary Douglas to aver: "dirt is matter out of place" while "purity is a matter of order" (David, 2012: 61).

Socio-economic sanctions

The year 2008 was not only punctuated with the atmosphere of conflict and political violence. For Zimbabwe, it was also a bad year characterised with hunger and famine as farmers struggled to get descent harvest due to poor rains in the whole country. This was even worse in Buhera considering its unfortunate climatic geographical location.

After getting very poor harvest, villagers in Buhera had to rely entirely on food handouts from the government and NGOs, besides the kindness of nature through its provision of wild fruits. However, the distribution of food was done along partisan lines. Those who

were known to be members of the opposition were denied food aid that was channeled through state and ZANU PF structures. At Mutusinazita, for example, those who were discriminated were suspected MDC supporters and those who did not attend ZANU PF meetings for whatever reason. These interrelated notions of food and party affiliation had series of ramifications (Bosil, 2014:4). A continual deprivation of access to food handouts, for instance, led some opposition members to be more defiant. It was better for them to be political martyrs than carrying a ZANU PF card to get food. The idea of starving other community members was one of the surest ways of orchestrating structural violence in Buhera. So, conflicts between ZANU PF and MDC-T were envisaged in the socio-economic sanctions imposed on MDC-T supporters. Only those known to be ZANU PF members were allowed to take part in Food for Work Programmes and food provisions channeled through the state structures.

Political violence: Against the etiquette of *Ukama*

One thread which generally tied the people of Buhera for millennia was *ukama* (kinship ties). As posited by Murove (2004), the Shona word *ukama* implies relationships, and an understanding of reality in terms of interdependence. The people of Buhera did not confine *ukama* to marital and blood ties, because there was a tendency in this district to see all people as *hama* or relatives. There was this saying: “*Munhu wose ibama*/ everyone is a relative”. This was because the presumption behind *ukama* was that being human entailed living in relationships or seeing each other as relatives or seeking to establish this relationship as an actuality.

Unfortunately, this formidable thread of *ukama* was broken in the intricate web of the 2008 violence. In fact in 2008, there was a shift partly in people’s understanding of *ukama*. Who became ideal relatives? Sharing the same political disposition became the benchmark of relationality. Relatives from outside Buhera were no longer welcome in this district, especially those who were coming from towns and cities; worse still from the diaspora. When that relative had to risk coming he/she had to carry a ZANU PF party

card to avoid being suspected of coming to ‘spoil’ locals with MDC-T alien ideas. In June 2008, roadblocks were manned randomly at Gwama where passengers were interrogated and those who did not satisfy the interrogators were meted out with punishment in public. Political violence became a blockade to existing social ties between Buhera and other places. This initiative also promoted isolationism basing on regionalism since anyone without “07” on his/her National Identity Card (ID) was viewed as a political suspect. “07” is a district code used on national IDs, hence this became a visa for staying within the confines of Buhera District. That was a manifestation of socio-cultural violence and violation of the human right to freedom of association and of movement.

The run up to 2008 June presidential election runoff was a moment of unleashing revenge against old scores in some families. In Kandoro Village, Ndombilani a woman who was a ZANU PF District member, for example, had matters to revenge during *bhomomo bhomomo*. Married at a tender age to a soldier, she failed to proceed to secondary school after her husband allegedly accused her of unchastely behaviour. Ndombilani was convinced that her husband had been influenced by family members to bar her from going to school. When the opportune time to revenge for this misfortune came in 2008, she labeled her whole husband’s family MDC-T claiming that she was well informed as an insider. The family suffered enormously at the hands of ZANU PF supporters and youths. Yet from the data we harvested from the field during this research, this was typical of private goals scored by many perpetrators manipulating the political environment in Buhera.

The ritual of impoverishing the rural poor

A new and sinister element which developed in Buhera was the appropriation of asserts that supported victims’ livelihoods. Those who were in charge of reprimanding and disciplining the MDC-T supporters implemented a ritual which left the poor people to suffer in Buhera. From the point of view of MDC-T supporters the post March 2008 election campaign violence provided ZANU PF supporters with an opportunity to ‘grab’ scarce assets (Sachikonye,

2011:84). One day in May 2008 in Nemadziva Area, ZANU PF supporters descended on Manganganga (not his real name) homestead, which was a family of five who were alleged to be MDC-T supporters. The head of the family, Mr Manganganga had sought refuge in Chiyadzwa. The perpetrators confiscated about 15 goats, 10 by 12 feet asbestos roofing material, two solar panels and torched the granary. Pregnant “Mai Manganganga” was reportedly thoroughly beaten till she had a miscarriage. That very day some of the ZANU PF youths went to Chiyadzwa and captured Manganganga whom they assaulted, and the injuries he sustained later led to his death. The destruction of the homestead, beating of their parents, loss of property and livestock had ripple effects on the children and their grandmother who was living with disability. The trauma of seeing their mother being in agony battling for life after the miscarriage had long lasting impressions in the children’s lives. The family’s source of livelihood which was rearing of goats had been destroyed. The Zimbabwe Peace Project (2008:3) likened this method of impoverishing people to the scorched earth war strategies. What was manifested in 2008 March post-election patterns were, thus, inclinations towards war atrocities, criminality and lawlessness characterised by upsurges in cases of theft, looting, public abuse, and torching of homes and granaries (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2008: 3).

The church and its [in-]visibility

In the language of the bible, a slogan to do with the date of the re-run and ZANU PF’s rejection of any other winner other than Mugabe went as ‘June 2008,verse 27: *handichazofizve ndakafurirwa kubva pana baba Mugabe*’ (I shall never again in my lifetime be fooled to betray Father Mugabe in a vote) (Chitando and Togarasei, 2014). This became a secularised view of the church’s involvement in politics at election times. There emerged divisions within some Zimbabwean churches regarding their attitudes towards the Mugabe regime. Some of the church believers were active in promulgating liturgies for corporate instigation of violence. In a survey we made during research for this chapter, we found out that almost all ZANU PF members who were active in violence professed to be Christians.

Some even justified the deaths and injuries they inflicted basing on the pretext that MDC-T supporters wanted to remove their God given leader, hence they were sinning against God. Thus, for them it was befitting to injure and kill the MDC-T supporters for theirs was a Holy War against those “blaspheming” against ZANU PF. On Sundays, which are usually reserved for Christian church services in Buhera, some Christians from both parties opted to go for rallies than attend church services. However, a good number of MDC-T Christians who had ZANU PF church mates quitted their denominations after realising that what the perpetrators preached in church was not in tandem with what they were doing in the world of politics. However, there were some exceptions, for example, in Zion Apostolic Church with its Head Quarters at Mutusinazita, where one of the ZANU PF leaders, Aminon was asked to stop participating in church activities since his hands were ‘smeared with blood’. The same was with “Evangelist Tongai” of the African Apostolic Church who was also ordered to stop from performing his church duties for he had shed blood in elections.

Gender-based violence

The manner in which women participated in politics during this period deserves serious penetrating attention. At a base camp near Bhegedhe Village, a ZANU PF activist, “Mhene” reportedly ordered five women who were suspected to be MDC-T supporters to remove their blouses and body tops and pulled their breasts as punishment. The women were as much embarrassed as abused so much but because of fear did not make a report either to the police or the traditional leaders. Pulling breasts of nude women was a mode of demeaning and humiliating women dignity. It is a matter of concern that little is accurately known about the prevalence of politically related and sexual abuse amongst women (Sachikonye, 2011:78). It is important to note that some of these rape and sexual abuses orchestrated as violence against women was revenge for participation in politics or campaigns by members of the victim’s family. About 56% of a sample of National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) women members stated that they had been abused because a member of their family was involved in politics (RAU 2009) in (Sachikonye, 2011:78).

In Vhiriri Village, a 75 year old “Mbuya Vovo” of Mozambican origin was beaten by ZANU PF youths on 18 June 2008 until she became unconscious because her son who had died in 2002 was an MDC supporter. Having lost her only son six years back, it was unimaginable to be beaten on the basis of her late son’s political inclination. By physically assaulting Mbuya Vovo, the youths were revoking xenophobic sentiments, vivified by their utterance: “*maMoscan munodei munyika muno?*” meaning, what do ‘you’ Mozambicans want in our country?

Retaliatory violence

As noted earlier in this chapter, the MDC-T was not exonerated in political violent acts. In Buhera south, three veterans were reportedly beaten up on 14 May 2008 by MDC-T supporters after they had allegedly destroyed the crops belonging to these MDC-T supporters. In Chaibva Village, a ZANU PF youth was reportedly severely beaten on 11 May by angry MDC-T supporters allegedly for calling them Tsvangirai boys (Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2008). In Gunura and Chishanye, MDC-T males mobilised and rose against ZANU PF activists who had effected political violence against their fellow MDC-T supporters. It became a reactionary group meant to thwart any violent activities instigated by ZANU PF bearing in mind that political violence was often a response of those who were forcibly prevented from peaceful participation in the process of democratic politics. In light of this Sachikonye (2011:65) argued that there appeared to be a worryingly imitative adoption of ZANU PF style political violence by the MDC-T supporters.

To be more precise, linked to MDC-T supporters whom we said formed reactionary groups were reports of formation of Democratic Resistance Committees (DRC) operating in hot-blooded Buhera. These were essentially local self-defense bodies ostensibly formed to protect MDC-T members from attacks by ZANU-PF and state-linked agencies (Sachikonye, 2011). In an interview with Pesenai, a ZANU PF leader in the district, some of the politically motivated acts of violence were carried outside Buhera by the people of Buhera. He gave an example of the diamond fields of Chiyadzwa which had become a base of Buhera MDC-T political violence victims.

According to him, it was reported that on the 3rd of July 2008 a ZANU PF youth Mondora was severely beaten up by angry MDC-T youths, who accused him of having caused a lot of mayhem in Buhera South during the run up to the June 27 presidential elections. It was a moment of unleashing vengeance and lack of support from the ZANU PF youths made Mondora a helpless prey. Before beating Mondora, the MDC-T perpetrators forced him to denounce ZANU PF party and its leaders, and the T-Shirt he was wearing was torn into pieces.

Conclusion

The narratives and reflections revealed in this chapter as real lived experiences encountered by people of Buhera demonstrate a symbiotic relationship that normally exist between elections and political violence in Zimbabwe. What the Buhera people went through were basically national experiences of violence in miniature. On a national level, basing on what is reflected by the findings harvested during this research, the 2008 experiences of violence were a replica of the year 2002 run up to presidential elections in methodical features. It is imperative to point out that the two elections were held after ZANU PF had embarrassing experiences at the polls. For example, the 2002 presidential elections had been preceded by the constitutional referendum of 2000 and ZANU PF was distressed by the “No Vote” while the run up to June 2008 presidential run-off elections came just two months after ZANU PF had for the first time emerged from an election defeat though Morgan Tsvangirai failed to garner the 50%+ one vote (Zimbabwe peace project 2008: 8). After the release of 2000 referendum results, ZANU PF spearheaded occupation of white owned farms, setting of base camps, training of youth militia and their subsequent integration into the election campaign process. The announcement of 2008 March 29 presidential results gave birth to serious involvement of war veterans, state agents and youth militia in the campaigns for an election to be held on June 27 2008. Both 2002 and June 2008 elections were characterized by gross violence (Zimbabwe Peace Project, 2008).

Why Buhera had extensive election political violence may be adduced to stiff competition and growing restlessness and political insecurity between MDC-T and the ruling party ZANU PF. This resonates with Nhemachena's (2014) observation that Buhera District was one of the districts that were most intensely affected by violence partly because the leader of the opposition party, the MDC-T, hailed from the area, which was thus heavily contested between the opposition party and the ruling ZANU PF party. A sustained campaign of fear, retribution, displacements, disenfranchisement and fencing off the district by the state seemed to be the only available route for the ruling party to reclaim its stronghold on the province. According to Schwarzmantel (2011:60), the state exists in order to prevent the unrestricted or illegitimate use of violence by private persons or groups. Through its law enforcement agents the state's function was to guarantee the security of citizens, and to prevent infringement of their rights by other individuals or groups of individuals. Contrary to this, the function of the Zimbabwean state in 2008 resonated what was precisely echoed by Max Weber "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. It is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence" (Weber 1970: 78, Cited in Schwarzmantel 2011:28). This implies that those in power are the architects of political violence. But, does it mean that the party agencies of political violence in various wards are not criminals? If they are not responsible for the above mentioned human rights abuses, does it mean that during election times conscience and morality cease to exist? We conclude with Marongwe (2014), who argues that as violence deepened and was further extended, there was little those at the political party helms could do to manage it all, which gave rise to local initiatives and opportunities by the lower level structures.

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Symbolic Violence and Troubled Citizenship: Re-imagining Xenophobia and Foreignness in Post-colonial Zimbabwe

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Introduction

This chapter discusses the intersections of symbolic forms of violence and the emergence of hidden forms of xenophobia in post-colonial Zimbabwe that targeted Zimbabweans of Malawian, Mozambican and Zambian origins. Intermittently, though, reference will be made to other Zimbabweans of other foreign origins, including Europeans, indigenous Africans from other African countries, the so-called coloureds and those of Asian and American origins. The attempt here is to problematise the notion of xenophobia which, by and large, has been conceptualised in its obvious and physical forms rather than in its subtle and other everyday manifestations. These forms of cryptic xenophobic attacks that have been directed at foreigners include troubled citizenship statuses, which usually manifests in documentation acquisition challenges, for example when wanting to access birth certificates and national identity cards and citizen rights such as voting; denying 'local' children to marry foreigners by creating 'fairy tales' meant to demean, uncivilise and dehumanise 'foreigners'; the use of derogatory and denigrating terms to refer to foreigners; negative connotations of foreigners in the post-colonial [re]making of Zimbabwean nationalism; and constructions of foreigners as totemless urbanites who supported 'the West and its regime change agenda'.

The chapter rests on the premise that more often than not these forms of violence against those of foreign origins in Zimbabwe, are not accorded due recognition as constitutive of serious xenophobic attacks compared to the more physical forms of attacks on foreigners, which were witnessed, for example, in South Africa in

May 2008 and April 2015 wherein foreign nationals were brutalised, stabbed, lynched, scarred out of their dwelling units, and/or had their property looted, destroyed or burned. It is also hinged on the premise that xenophobia is under researched in Zimbabwe compared to other forms of violence, including political and domestic violence. To this end, xenophobia in Zimbabwe has remained overlooked in academic researches and has largely been relegated to literary works in which mockery of the vernacular language intelligibility (especially of the Shona language) of the foreign speakers and some of their customs and traditions dominate rather than some serious interrogations that link these everyday comments, jokes and forms of hidden exclusions to xenophobic attacks. As such, the desire is to visibilise the different modes of symbolic violence against foreigners that potentially result in xenophobic attacks and, to visualise, so to say, ways that they help to map out the trajectory of the often subtle xenophobia in Zimbabwe.

Broadly, the chapter contends that these symbolic kinds of violence directed at ‘foreigners’ result in symbolic forms of xenophobia with almost similar effects, of othering, exaggerating difference, mental brutalisation, economic marginalisation and dehumanising outcomes, as the physical forms of attacks against foreigners that are usually considered as constitutive of xenophobia. This is because these tags as Tafira (2011: 117) would probably say, are “value laden; all carry a particular meaning denoting the social and cultural origin of the carrier.” Our contention here, as Solomon and Kosaka (n.d: 5) argue, is that the “fear or hatred of foreigners or strangers ... is embodied in discriminatory attitudes and behavior [which] often culminates in violence, abuse of all types and exhibitions of hatred.” Among the cases that inform this chapter are the attempts to take away Zimbabwean citizenship from the Zimbabweans of foreign origins under the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2001, the attempts by Rudo’s parents to stop her from marrying a domestic worker of Malawian descent in the literary work *Akada Wekure*/Loved a foreigner that was written by Genius Runyowa in 1981 and some cases of crude language intelligibility tests that have been conducted on the Zimbabweans of Malawian,

Zambian and Mozambican origins across the country (Chimedza, 2008).

Moving forward, and borrowing a lead from Crush and Pendleton (2004:3), we would like to posit that what probably kept these forms of symbolic xenophobia from developing into the realm of physical attacks – or fully fledged xenophobia – as those witnessed in South Africa, for example, is that the immigrants from Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique were not considered as serious economic threats as they were largely confined to working in low paying jobs on the farms, in mines and as domestic hands in homes (Chikowero, 2008: 122). Also, their access to land, both commercial and communal, which is associated with belongingness in Zimbabwe, has been very marginal. We argue therefore, that their presence has been invisible to invite physical xenophobic attacks. This argumentation borrows from Mangezvo's (2015: 59) contention that a struggle for economic goods tends to generally trigger violent attempts to exclude non-citizens. Second, these insidious forms of xenophobia resulted in the troubling of the notions of nationalism, citizens, citizenship and increased resort to nativity as the basis of according citizenship in post-independence Zimbabwe. For those categorised as foreigners, they were denied some of their entitlements that citizens are supposed to enjoy, including the right to state protection, access land and identity documents. In terms of the law, the Zimbabwe government enacted the Citizens Amendment Act of 2001 to repeal from those with dual citizenship of Zimbabwean citizenship. However, as Muzondidya (2007: 335) has argued, it was directly meant to “disenfranchise the largely immigrant white farmers and farm workers” because they were perceived as the principal supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. Although it was later amended to allow dual citizens for Zimbabweans of Southern African Development Community (SADC) origins, it had seriously attempted to repeal their Zimbabwean citizenship (Mano and Willems, 2010: 2). The Citizens Amendment Act also generated structural violence against the foreigners, while also engendering critical negative myths about the respective foreign groups. In the end, the symbolic violence damaged the ego, self-worth and socio-economic-political standing of those

targeted. It also provided moralising ideological underpinnings for the exclusion of those categorised as non-nationals.

Understanding violence and symbolic violence

This section has a double role. One, it discusses the definitional lexes of the different forms of violence. Second, it uses Slavoj Žižek and Pierre Bourdieu to theorise symbolic violence. The aim, ultimately, is to situate the place of symbolic violence in xenophobic feelings and xenophobic expressions in post-colonial Zimbabwe. By definition, violence “is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (World Health Organisation, website, n.d). From the definition, we can deduce that violence is caused from the outside, can be verbal or actualised, is injurious either psychologically or physically and it leads to, or is intended to produce, an involuntary action. Slavoj Žižek (2008:1), a key theoretician of violence, conceptualises violence as taking three basic forms. These are subjective violence and the two forms of objective violence, that is, symbolic and systematic violence. To him, subjective violence refers to the forms of violence which are visible, for example crime and terror. Systematic violence is found in the economic and political systems of the world (ibid). Most importantly, he posits that there is a link between subjective and objective violence. To him, what may be perceived as irrational (subjective) violence could be rooted in the objective forms of violence which are not easily decipherable. For him, systematic violence operates like “a notorious ‘dark matter’ of physics, the counterpart to an all too visible subjective violence (ibid: 2).” Thus, systematic violence underwrites subjective violence. As such, even when systematic violence cannot be easily deciphered, it should be assumed and taken into account in order for subjective violence to make sense.

Symbolic violence is rooted in language and its forms like racism, hate speech and discrimination (Ibid: 2). In addition, symbolic violence also comes “through the production of text and meaning in

the conversation, advertisement, film, novel and other cultural products” (Udasmoro, 2013: 156). As a result, one sees that symbolic violence operates in the hidden and psychological realm. The symbolic violence, which is heavily linked to “invisible power relations” (Lakomski, 1984:153) of domination, represents “censored, euphemised, that is misrecognisable and recognised violence” “disguised, transfigured” or “gentle, invisible violence, unrecognised as such, chosen as undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts [and] piety ...” (Bourdieu, 1990 : 126-127). Because of the misrecognition, symbolic violence operates with the consent of and shared common belief of both the dominant and the weak/ruled. This derives from the assumption that symbolic power, the basis for symbolic violence, “is an ‘invisible’ power which is ‘misrecognised’ as such and thereby ‘recognised’ as legitimate” (Bourdieu, 1991:23). In the above context and through processes of naturalisation that affects both the conscious and sub-conscious human states, symbolic violence “enables relations of domination to be established and maintained through strategies which are softened and disguised, and which conceal domination beneath the veil of an enchanted relation” Bourdieu, 1991: 24). In this regard, too, the continuous repetition of these forms and symbols of domination, the abuse in them becomes increasingly unseen hence is normalised and accepted. Going forward, we argue that the forms of symbolic violence as expressed in words [and other symbolisms] that were used as “instruments of ... abuse ... condescension and contempt” (Bourdieu (1991:1) towards foreigners were also xenophobic. As well, they also represented some of the societal attitudes towards foreigners. This is hinged on the premise that “language and social life are inextricably linked” and that language develops within specific socio-historical contexts (Bourdieu, 1991:1).

Zimbabwe as a multiracial and multiethnic society: A history of the making

Broadly, this section considers the creation of the multi-racial and multi-national Zimbabwe. One could say that there are different

groups of people in present day Zimbabwe who can or have been considered foreigners at different times and under different political, economic and social conditions. These groups have led to the creation of a multi-racial and multi-ethnic Zimbabwe. These include Europeans (whites), Zimbabweans of Malawian, Mozambican, Rwandese, Mfengu (Fingos), Indians and people of mixed blood, popularly called 'coloureds' in Zimbabwe. To this list Ranger (2010: 25) has added the Zulus, Basutho and "Cape-half breeds".

The major argument in this section is that the roots of the introduction of foreigners into the present day Zimbabwe can be dated back to the colonisation of Zimbabwe by the British, led by Cecil John Rhodes and the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1890. Using the Rudd Concession and the Royal Charter of 1889 that allowed him to conquer Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi), Rhodes proceeded to form the Pioneer Column, which *de facto* was the invasion force to annex Zimbabwe. Officially, Zimbabwe became a British colony on 12 September 1890. While there have been different contestations as to why the Europeans colonised Africa, including strategic, power or political, civilisational, Christianising missions and economic reasons, it has become more acceptable to consider the process of colonisation as a direct need to service the economic needs of Europeans. And, in this scheme of things, Zimbabwe was no exception as she was thought to possess the second rand belt that was supposed to extend with its rich gold reserves from South Africa. Zimbabwe was also blessed with a relatively less harsh climate that was favourable for European settlement, rich fertile soils that permitted commercial agriculture and it also had a rich fauna suitable for big game hunting.

The dominant foreign African groups in Zimbabwe today, as in the colonial past, are Mozambicans, Malawians and Zambians. Their coming into Zimbabwe is heavily linked with the development of settler colonial economy that sought to make profits with minimal losses on wages. Primarily, this bordered on primitive accumulation of profits in which the availability of cheap labour was the cornerstone for the success of the nascent capitalism that was generally underfunded. Under these conditions of the early years of

colonialism many black locals of Southern Rhodesia were averse to seeking paid wage labour from the Europeans. As Chadya and Manyavo (2002:13) assert: “this was partly as a result of the peasant prosperity ... as well as lack of incentive in the mining and agriculture sectors where wages were very low and working conditions generally poor.” And, “under the circumstances, settler farmers and mining companies were forced, in cahoots with the state, to explore possibilities of acquiring cheap labour further afield”, especially from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia (Ibid).

The efforts at recruiting the labour involved individual efforts which saw individual farmers or mining concerns going into the region to recruit labourers. It also involved the constitution of state bodies that were mandated to secure labour from the region, and also within Southern Rhodesia. These included the formation of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (1903 to 1933) and the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission from 1946, which supplied up to 13 000 labourers between 1906 and 1911 and 14 000 foreign labourers annually between 1946 and 1971, respectively (Chadya and Mayavo, 2002:13). The state also entered into various concessions, including the Tete Agreement of 1913 with Mozambique and the Tripartite Labour Agreement in 1937 with Zambia and Malawi for quarters on labour supply into Rhodesia (Chadya and Mayavo, 2002:13). The successes of the foreign labour recruitment is attested by the fact that by the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, about 54 per cent of all male farm labourers were from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia (Chadya and Mayavo, 2002: 13). This high figure can also be amply demonstrated by the fact that by 1956 Southern Rhodesia had some 300 000 migrant workers from southern African countries (Diamon, 2015: 2).³ Furthermore, of the Africans employed in Salisbury by 1947, forty-one per cent were Southern Rhodesians, while fifty-nine per cent were from across the borders (Raftopoulos, 1995: 82). It also has to be seen that the recruitment of the foreigners from Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi was aided by the positive perceptions and perceived possible opportunities by these

³ The high figures are also comparable with those that have been provided by the Human Rights Watch, 2006 cited in Culbertson, 2009: 20 which states that by 1951 there were 246 000 migrant workers from the southern African region.

immigrants. Among others, and comparatively, Southern Rhodesia had “higher wages and better working conditions” than their home countries and hence promised a better escape from poverty following the proletarianisation of Africans from the rampant land expropriations in these countries. For the Mozambicans they additionally needed to escape the compulsory free labour provision to the Portuguese colonial capitalists (Chadya and Mayavo, 2002:14).

Furthermore, the constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 1953 and 1963 resulted in the streaming of Malawians and Zambians into Zimbabwe. As Chikowero (2008: 120) rightly observed, this was because Southern Rhodesia had more economic opportunities rooted in the numerous gold mines, commercial farms and other commercial activities related to processing industries. These were more attractive to the workers compared to working in the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia or on the rice fields and in fishing industries of Malawi (Chikowero, 2008: 120). As a result of these attractions to Southern Rhodesia, many foreigners of Malawian and Zambian origin who came to Zimbabwe during the Federation period settled in areas such as Shabanie (now Zvishavane), Wankie (now Hwange), Gatooma (now Kadoma), Bindura and Sinoia (now Chinhoyi), which were predominantly mining and commercial farming areas (Chikowero, 2008:120).

Furthermore and outside of the colonial labour demands, but still heavily related to the desire to ensure the success of the fledgling settler capitalism, some foreign groups of Africans were brought into Southern Rhodesia to create a cordon between the settlers and the indigenous Africans. To this end, the Mfengu from South Africa and the Tswana from Botswana, who were considered “loyal” to the British interests were brought in large numbers by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to Matabeleland in the 1890s (Ncube, 2013: 24-26). Broadly, their settlement in Matabeleland stemmed from the hostile if not warlike relations that obtained between the colonial settlers and the Ndebele, which had produced two wars that is the

Anglo-Ndebele and the *Umvukela* 1/*Chimurenga* 1⁴ wars in the short space of three years in the 1890s (Ncube, 2013:24). It also emanated from the failure of the Christian missionaries to convert the Ndebele into Christianity (Zvobgo, 1986). As a result of the twin reasons given above, the Ndebele were regarded as “incorrigible savages” who “needed to be neutralised through the introduction into Matabeleland of Christians from South Africa” (Ncube, 2013: 24).

The immigration of foreign workers from the region did not stop with the advent of independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. On the contrary, the streaming of foreign workers continued, particularly from Mozambique. For the Mozambicans, besides the colonial labour demands by the colonial settlers, the streaming of Mozambicans continued into the post-independence period due to the devastating effects of the civil war (Chikowero, 2008: 120). Largely, besides bringing infrastructural destruction, the 1975-1992 Mozambican civil war caused a lot of socio-economic hardships and generated large-scale insecurities in the country. A combination of the hardships and the insecurities led many Mozambicans to stream into Zimbabwe where some joined the labour market particularly as unskilled farm workers while others became refugees.

Colonialism and xenophobic underpinnings in post-colonial Zimbabwe⁵

The thesis of this section is that the colonial policy, pronounced in the Government Notice No 223 of 1898, of classifying Africans of non-Zimbabwean origins as aliens and non-citizens sow the roots of xenophobic discriminations in the country. Under that Government Notice, the colonial state made strenuous efforts to create a binary between the ‘natives’ into “indigenous” and “non-

⁴ *Umvukela* or *Chimurenga* are Ndebele and Shona terms for war. *Chimurenga/Umvukela* 1 refers to the First war of resistance to British imperialism in Zimbabwe.

⁵ This section is heavily influenced by, and it summarises, the views of J. Muzondidya, 2007, “Jambanja: Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 33 (2), pp.325-341, Available at:

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25065199>, Accessed 12 November 2015.

indigenous” ‘natives’, or as expressed in the Government Notice as “aboriginal natives” and “colonial natives” (Muzondidya, 2007: 327). The colonial natives “had no rights to the Tribal Trust Lands”, which were “the preserve of the ... aboriginal natives of Southern Rhodesia” (Muzondidya, 2007:328). What made the conditions of the colonial natives worse compared to the other natives, was that these non-indigenous natives eked precarious survival on the farms where they received very low wages, had limited or no pensions, could not retire to the farms and following the passing of the Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment in 1958, all who had not acquired citizenship had to return to their countries of origin at the expiry of their contracts (Muzondidya, 2007: 328).

The non-belonging tag continued into the post-independence period. Among others, the Zimbabweans of foreign Malawi, Zambia and Mozambican origin were issued with national identity cards that were marked “alien”, which limited their access to the full rights of ‘full’ citizens (Muzondidya, 2007: 331). The demarcation of the alienness of these Zimbabweans of foreign origin had serious connotations. As Solomon and Kosaka (n.d: 15) argue, alien denotes “not only that migrants do not belong, but also implies difference, strangeness and otherness.” Furthermore, up to 1997, farm workers, the majority of who were of foreign origin, could not vote in local government elections because they were not rate payers or rent payers (Muzondidya, 2007: 331). Furthermore, as ‘aliens’ or *mabvakure* in Shona, the Zimbabweans of foreign origins contrasted with “*vana vevhu/ abatwana bomhlabathi* (sons of the soil) ... the original and true inhabitants of Zimbabwe who have pre-eminent rights to the country’s land and other resources” (Muzondidya, 2007: 334). Thus, as non-autochthonous the Malawian, Mozambican and Zambian –Zimbabweans could not access Zimbabwean nationality and citizenship together with the associated benefits. The above discussion on the denial of citizenship to the Zimbabweans of foreign origin speaks to a similar one by Nyamnjoh (2006 cited in Mangezvo, 2015: 45-47) that discusses citizenship as a key tool in strengthening the binary between what he calls insiders and outsiders. Insiders and outsiders determined the categories of those who belonged and had rights from those who did not belong and had no

rights. Effectively, as discussed under the Nyamnjoh binary, insiders or in our case the “aboriginal natives” had more claims to rights, benefits and national resources than the non-”indigenous natives”.

In the same vein, the so-called Coloureds and other people of Asian descent, including Indians and Malays, who were colonial ‘subject races’ were also accorded limited rights. Broadly, as Muzondidya (2007) argues, they had better rights than Africans and were largely classified as Europeans. In many respects they were in effect lesser subjects than Europeans. Effectively, they were the Second class citizens. Among others, they had limitations in terms of where they could acquire property and reside. In the post-colonial era because of this colonial tag as ‘Europeans’, they have not been considered indigenous enough in the nativity discourse of Zimbabwean nationalism. They, thus, belong in the category of those “without a rural home (*kumusha*)” (Muzondidya, 2007:331), a status which was marked by a double zero on their national identity cards that denoted that they did not have a rural home (Muzondidya, 2007:333). In addition, there were moments that demonstrated how these communities have been disparaged and/or marginalised for not being ‘authentic’ Zimbabweans, including as Miss Zimbabwe winners, as Second Chimurenga liberation war veterans, in indigenisation and empowerment schemes, as ZANU-PF political representatives and in land redistribution largely because they ‘represented’ colonialist interests (Muzondidya, 2007: 329-335).

In the ensuing section, we turn to detailed considerations of the intersections between symbolic violence and xenophobic expressions in Zimbabwe. This section will be addressed through the following prisms that manifested the different contours of symbolic violence across the country: language, marriage, new millennium Zimbabwean nationalism, workplace relations, cultural practices and in the occurrence of crimes.

Language and xenophobia

In this section we consider the value of language in expressing anti-foreign sentiments. We do this by demonstrating how language has been deployed to among others, marginalise, dehumanise,

denigrate, discriminate and ridicule foreigners in Zimbabwe in the post-colonial era. For us, language is a significant transmitter of dangerous negative stereotypes and hate that may lead to discrimination. In this regard, language dehumanises those that are targeted and is thus a potent vehicle of ‘othering’. It also stirs enmity and clears the ground for violent confrontations between the perpetrators of hate language and their victims. In this regard, we draw on the influence of language as a carrier of the seeds that led to the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which the Tutsis were constantly referred to as “cockroaches” in the lead up to the infamous April massacres (Culbertson, 2009: 22). It is however, prudent to mention quickly that while the Rwandan case was extreme, it was not necessarily unique. There have also been other cases, including Hitler’s anti-Semitic vocabulary and in the National Party Apartheid language against blacks in South Africa (Hill, 2005: 64-65). Our contention follows the lead provided by Mahmood Mamdani (2001:6) who contends that in the Rwanda case, more than anything, the government “prepared [the] population, enraged it and enticed it [to kill the Tutsis].” This was through hate-filled radio broadcasts that poured evil scorn on the Tutsis. The above is supported by the findings by Charles Kabwete Mulinda (2010) who contends that while the Rwandan government openly participated in the killings of the Tutsis, it simultaneously prepared and encouraged the population to kill the Tutsis, who were regarded as the cockroaches and foreigners in their own country. We seek, ultimately, to demonstrate how language is also a powerful tool in the crafting of nationalism and in exclusion of the ‘others’. Taking this forward, we argue that where such grammars become internalised, they begin to fashion out dangerous “political languages [that] have shaped past and present everyday narratives about identity and belonging” (Ndhlovu, 2015:n.p). This is notwithstanding the place of language as a potent force in nation building.

What also emerges from hate language is that it helps to foment negative stereotypes against foreigners. To this end, the South African media has been accused at times of [re]constructing foreigners as “job stealers”, “carriers of disease” and as “illegals”, which overall worsens the “xenophobic hostilities” (Tevera, 2013:16)

and ruptures togetherness. Overall, these forms of demonisations and caricaturing of foreigners may help to fuel xenophobic violence against the foreigners. There is a way in which this kind of language is internalised and naturalised and is used to provide some “common sense” in the Geertz (1975) formulation that emphasises the differences between the locals and non-locals. This common sense tends to provide some ethics and some unwritten laws that guide and police life. This reflects some of the most pervasive but hidden ways in which the Zimbabwean state performs surveillance. The above speaks to the effects of the “habitus” (habit/conditioning), which refers to “a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways” (Bourdieu, 1991: 12). What is more is that these “dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously coordinated or governed by any rule.” And, these “dispositions which constitute the habitus are inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable” (Bourdieu, 1991:12).

Various terms and words have been used to derogatorily denote people of foreign origins in Zimbabwe. Among these have been *Mabvakure* (aliens), *Makarushu* (Yam eaters), *Moskeni* (Mozambicans), *Mabwidi/Machawa* (Chewas), *Maruvari* (Maravis), *Makura* (Indians), *Mateveranjanji* (those that follow the railwayline), *Marudzvi* (foreign language speakers), *Manajimbi* (Nigerians), and *Mafengu* (Fingos). These terms used to describe people of foreign origins in Zimbabwe tend to homogenise the foreigners even when those that come from the same country have different ethnicities (see for example, Daimon, 2015: 16) on the Zimbabwean Malawians and the labels also have serious connotations. As labels denoting Zimbabweans of foreign origin, they become significant markers of, in Mashiri’s (2002: 1) words, contemptuous ethnocentric and intolerant “prejudices and stereotypes” that “reflect the [Zimbabweans] disapproval of and stereotypical attitudes towards” the so called foreigners. In the end, they became “ethnic slurs” (Mashiri, 2002: 1) that became valuable conduits in the transmission of discrimination and class/status attitudes and class separation between the indigenous locals and foreign Zimbabweans.

As such, naming them is a symbolic way of drawing interaction boundaries between the ‘natives’ of Zimbabwe and the foreigners. Among others, if one was referred to as *mabwidi emutaundi*, according to Mashiri (2002: 19), they were “the stupid, homeless ones [without rural homes]” who were despised as “*zvichoni*” that is uncultured “permanent urban dwellers” (Ibid: 20). This is very powerful in a situation where having a rural home is central to an unpolluted Zimbabwean identity. Not having rural homes contrasted, say with the various Shona groups who, partly as a result of the colonial policies which denied permanent residency status to Africans in urban areas, maintained two homes, one urban and one rural (Chikowero, 2008: 125). The urban home, usually for the males, was largely a base for going to work, while the rural one was considered the main one and true home for the family and was thus the more valued (Chikowero, 2008: Ibid). Implied in this label of *mabwidi* thus are characteristics of “stupidity, simple-mindedness and homelessness” (Mashiri, 2002: 19). Furthermore, other tags such as *Mateveranjanji* that is those that followed the railway whilst it speaks to the ways the early generation Malawians came to Zimbabwe by following along the railway line into Zimbabwe (Chikowero, 2008: 130) also denoted “inferiority ... desperation” wrought by the abject poverty on the part of the Malawians in Zimbabwe (Mashiri, 2002: 19). The term *Mateveranjanji* also erases all attempts to Zimbabwean originality. This is buttressed by the fact that *Mateveranjanji* depicts a migration into Zimbabwe that is very recent and one that is associated with the advent of colonialism as symbolised by *njanji*, the rail road. The picture that surfaces here is of people following, both literally and figuratively, the path created by colonialism, which delinks them from the so called original Zimbabwean roots that are anti-colonial, in the ZANU-PF post millennium narrative, especially because even those born in Zimbabwe continue carrying the ‘foreigner’ tags.

The above also dovetails with the caricaturing of these foreigners by President Mugabe as “undisciplined, totemless elements of alien origin” (*Daily News*, 14/10/2002 cited in Mano and Willems, 2010: 3) in the new millennium political dispensation in which nativity defined belongingness in Zimbabwe. Coming as they did from the highest

political office in the land, the sentiments spoke to certain kinds of institutionalised xenophobic attacks. In this regard we are using institutionalisation in the context of the definition as given by Bourdieu (1991:8) for institution as a “relatively durable set of social relations which endows individuals with power, status and resources of various kinds.” And, in this context the President as head of the powerful institutions of ZANU-PF, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces and the Zimbabwean state was endowed with enormous power and authority to influence the ordinary lay Zimbabweans. The words also spoke to a certain kind of symbolic authority against foreigners. This was because, as Lakomski (1984: 154) would say, these words were “symbolically violent insofar as they [sought] to impose arbitrary cultural meanings in the context of an arbitrary power relation.” The utterances also reflect the complex ways in which citizenship is negotiated in Zimbabwe. However, as Chikowero (2008: 132-133) demonstrates using the Khiama Boys’ song titled: “*Kubva kure*/To come from far”, these Africans of foreign origins do indeed have totems, but these are coded in different languages.

Taking the labelling further, it also removed the blacks of foreign origins, especially of Malawian, Mozambican and Zambian origin from indigeneity and from ‘true’ Zimbabwean-ness that was marked by having a rural home and access to rural land (Mano and Willems, 2010:3). Foreign-ness is amply supported by terms *Marudzi* meaning other languages or races and *Mabvakure* or foreigners from afar that strongly connote the alien-ness and “otherness” of the Zimbabweans of foreign origin. As Mashiri (2002: 18) says, this formed a strong basis for the exclusion of these Zimbabweans of foreign origins from the new millennium land redistribution processes. As such, these foreigners were “undeserving of a place in Zimbabwe society” (Mano and Willems, 2010:3). This is notwithstanding the fact that “many of these Zimbabweans of foreign origin have lived in the country ever since and have no links to their countries of origin” (Muzondidya, 2007: 326). Culturally, the urban, mining and commercial farm roots for the Zimbabweans of foreign origin represented a sort of “cultural aberration” (Muzondidya, 2007:335). When further stretched there were serious negative political connotations in being labelled urbanite or non-indigenous. This is because since 2000 urban areas had largely

voted for the MDC while ZANU-PF had largely won in rural areas. In the ZANU-PF hegemonic narrative of the new millennium and in what became known as patriotic history, the MDC represented foreign combined British-American-Rhodesian imperialist interests that sought to undo the rural peasants-supported and ZANU-PF led Second Chimurenga goals (Mano and Willems, 2010: 3). This is notwithstanding the fact that some of the foreign groups and individuals, including Malawians and Mfengu/Fingo, had played pivotal roles in the formation and growth of early nationalist movements in colonial Zimbabwe (Scarnecchia, 2008; Ranger, 2013: 27-231; & Ncube, 2013). Among these were the Rhodesia Bantu Voters Association, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union and the National Democratic Party that had active foreign leaders and supporters such as Martha Ngano and Clement Kadalie, among others (Ranger, 2013).

In Zimbabwe, language intelligibility has been used to separate those considered foreigners. As Chimedza, 2008: 88) says, police and municipal and other state security agents used language to locate foreigners. To him, these law enforcers would employ “crude language” tests like word pronunciation of local names and definitional meanings of Shona words. In the end, failure in these tests resulted in the arrest for deportation for the victims. Primarily, these foreigners were categorised as *mabvakure*, literally meaning outsiders who could not access citizenship rights (Chimedza, 2008:91). The above discussion also resonates with insinuations of cultural racism that Tafira (2011:116) discusses that places at the heart of the othering issues like “cultural differences in manners, speech and pronunciation, and the detection of accents with a special attention to the ‘purity’ of local languages”, which are derived from differences “nationality, language, dress, habits and ethnicity” (Tafira, 2011:114).

Reference that is made to the places of origin of the foreigners in the names given to the foreigners is also a deliberate strategy to deny them citizenship. In this regard, if one was regarded as *Mubburandaya* that is one from Blantyre or *Munyasarandi* that is one from Nyasaland/Malawi or *Mumoskeni* that is one from Mozambique they were pointed to where they were supposed to enjoy their rights. In

addition to that, it must also be highlighted that there were serious connotations of inferior civilisations in the people of Mozambican and Malawian origin who came from countries that were ravaged by poverty and war, for Mozambique. As well, both groups were generally perceived as people of little academic education compared to the 'locals'. The economies of the two were also weaker than that of Zimbabwe, particularly in the colonial and immediate post-colonial era (Daimon, 2015). Furthermore, there is also the consideration as stupendous the cultural activities, based on prejudice and ignorance, including *gule wankule*, Islamic codes and matrilineal practices, which are associated with the groups.

Regarding the matrilineal practices, most Malawian men unlike Zimbabwean men, who are patrilineal, pay little or nothing at all as bride-wealth and they go to live with the families of the wives unlike the Zimbabweans where it is the women who go and live among the families of their husbands (Mashiri, 2002: 5). This custom, broadly, makes the "Malawian men lesser men" compared to the Zimbabwean men who also felt threatened by the practice on their (Zimbabwean men's) control over their women (Mashiri, 2002: 5-6). Thus, being called *Mubhurandaya* or *Munyasarandi* was symbolically being emasculated and it meant one had lost the expected and accepted manhood. On the whole, the above speaks to a skewed "feeling of superiority" (Solomon and Kosaka, n.d: 5) by the Zimbabweans over the immigrant populations based on economic dominance that Zimbabwe had over Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi in the early years of independence in the 1980s. All these sentiments could be summed up aptly as Zimbabweans feeling that the incoming foreigners were, in Mangezvo's semantics (2015: 5), "barbarians", that is people with inferior or less advanced or primitive cultures and norms. It also speaks to the findings by Mogweku (2005 cited in Solomon and Kosaka, n.d) that inadequate information about an immigrant group may generate unfounded negative perceptions of hate and fears of threats among the host populations. The fears were around the potential threat that among others, Islam and *Gule Wankule* practices, that are perceived as backward, posed to the Zimbabwean civilisation and to Christianity, the religion of the majority of Zimbabweans. These views tended, so

to say, to be reinforced by the nature of the low grade and cheap employment, as already alluded to, particularly on the farms and as domestic servants that the Malawians, Mozambicans and Zambians were largely found in. Thus, as Gilmore (1982: 698) cited in Mashiri (2002: 14) argues, these “provocative nicknames [were] used not only as a displacement for conflicted hostile feelings, but also to damage rivals ... to achieve a symbolic mastery...”

Marriage discrimination and xenophobia

In this section we delve into some commonly experienced xenophobic social practices that are experienced in the everyday which try to limit intermarriages between locals and foreigners. The character of Aleke in the Shona novel *Akada wekure* (*Loved a foreigner*) graphically illustrates the discriminations that foreigners face in Zimbabwe when they want to marry women from Zimbabwe. In the novel, the author fleshes out how a family strenuously tried to stop their daughter from marrying a man of Malawian origin. Whilst the stated reason was that the Malawian guy, Aleke, was a domestic worker for the girl's family what emerges clearly from the novel is the generalised level of negative stereotyping against Malawians (and foreigners) in general in the family of the lady and society in general (Runyowa, 1981). Broadly, the stigma against supporting the marriages to foreigners is rooted in fears of *ngozi*/avenging spirits of people whose family roots are not known and in fears that the groom of foreign origins is ‘totemless’ and could run away with the wife (Mashiri, 2002 :20 & 25). The former notion (of totemless-ness) was amply demonstrated by President Mugabe when he labelled the ‘foreigners’ living in urban areas as “aliens without totems” (*Daily News*, 17/04/2000 in Mashiri, 2002: 25), after the urban areas had voted overwhelmingly for the opposition MDC party in the 2000 parliamentary elections. As such, the foreigners in Mangezvo's (2015: 5) words were considered as a “threat to the fulfilment of [the locals] sectional interests.” Crucially, as Neocosmos (2006) cited in Mangezvo (2015:52) has established, such statements by key government and state officials become crucial discourses in the sustenance of xenophobic attitudes among the host populations.

What also has to be said about the significance of the literary works such as *Akada wekure* is that besides re-presenting and representing everyday oral discourses by people on the streets, they also immortalised these into the written word which was long lasting. Critically as literary novels, such books have the capacity of transposing the symbolic violence of the condescension of foreigners into the academic realm of the education sector. This becomes worse because as Bourdieu (1991) argues, education functions primarily to [re]produce social capital for the society.

As threats to ZANU-PF hegemony, it was not a surprise that these 'foreigners' in urban areas were subjected to Operation Murambatsvina/Operation Clean up filth. The nature of their filthiness which derived from their support of what ZANU-PF considered 'a foreign sponsored' MDC and their association with white interests meant that they became some kind of pollutant that had to be flushed away. As well, their being 'totemless' meant that they were 'rootless' in Zimbabwe which further strengthened their distance from natives. The significance of having roots cannot be overemphasised in Zimbabwe and it cannot be delinked from the other associated discourses that spoke negatively about the foreigners. One such discourse that is evoked is that of patriarchy that emphasizes fatherhood and masculine rootedness. This discourse speaks to the anti-thesis of most of the Zimbabweans of Malawian and Mozambican origin that favours matriarchy, which as earlier discussed was a significant pollutant to patriarchy.

Related to the above and in support of the general discussion on marriage and other modes of social discrimination, there are also some folk stories that are common among Zimbabweans that reify some of the negative stereotypes against foreigners in Zimbabwe. Among these is a folk lore on girls who married hynas (*vasikana vakaroorwa nemapere*). As the storyline goes, there were some beautiful girls who married exotic men who later on turned out to be hyenas which ended up devouring the girls. The basic message in the folklore is that people should desist from marrying foreigners. Rather, they should marry local men (*rooranai vematongo*) whose ancestry is known or is traceable. Going forward, this storyline therefore warns Zimbabwean women not to marry, for example, *Mateverenjanji* who

could potentially take them to far off areas which could potentially be harmful to their and their families' well-being.

Post-millennium Zimbabwean nationalism and xenophobia

This section tackles the xenophobic undertones that echoed in the [re]imaging of the Third Chimurenga⁶ nationalism. While ZANU-PF-led Zimbabwean nationalism emerged during the colonial period and was greatly influenced by it, we are drawing on its reconstitution in the 2000s to trouble, in part, the genealogical trajectory of xenophobic discriminations against Africans of non-Zimbabwean origins and, broadly others considered as foreigners. This helps to concurrently situate and problematise the post-millennium attacks on foreigners by senior ZANU-PF leaders as totem-less urbanites or as belonging with the farm[ers], which meant they were sell-outs as ahistorical. For us, the oversimplifying narrative of the farm workers, who are largely of foreign origin, as belonging to or with the European needs to be complicated. As earlier discussed some foreigners worked towards the development of nascent Zimbabwean African nationalist consciousness that sought to unravel the shackles of colonial oppression.

Primarily, foreigners of African origin were said to be working for and with whites. As a result of such lumping as working with or for the whites, the Zimbabweans of foreign ancestry were targeted for discrimination and exclusion. This was particularly true with regard to land allocation in the new millennium under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The essence of this is encapsulated well in the findings of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2003: n.p) that established that less than 5 (five) per cent of farm workers received land under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme as they “were seen as extensions of their ‘white bosses’” and thus, “not seen as

⁶ The Third Chimurenga was a violent period in Zimbabwe's history from about 2000 that was marked by the violent farm and firm takeovers, as well as the virulent reconstruction of Zimbabwean nationalism and violent strategies meant to stifle the rising MDC political party. On the whole the period had serious negative effects to the economic and political development of Zimbabwe that culminated in the infamous crisis for the country. Read Raftopoulos (2009) for more on this era.

deserving of any benefits from this exercise.” Thus, due to the associated complicity, the Zimbabweans of Malawian, Mozambican and Zambian origin’s interests were conflated with those of the whites. And, in a serious sense, they became socially, whites, who were the ‘enemies’ of the Third Chimurenga. As such, they suffered the same fate as the biological whites of being denied access to land, forced evictions from farms, being brow beaten and being labelled as aliens (Raftopoulos, 2003: 217 & Daimon, 2015: 3-4). Furthermore, as Hammar (2008:29) avers, the people of Mozambican and Malawian origin were denied land because “not only were they generically accused of supporting white farmers and the opposition, but in addition a xenophobic discourse of denigrating unwanted ‘foreigners’ came into play in the violence and evictions meted out.” Furthermore, in 2008 due to their perceived closeness to whites and their perceived support for the MDC about 40 000 farm workers mostly of foreign descent were displaced following *Operation How did you vote* (Hammar, 2008: 32). Because of the above, the farm workers had their homes “torched, while they were beaten up and driven off the occupied farms” (Chadya and Mayavo, 2002: 21).

Also as a result of their articulation as pro-white and pro-MDC, the foreigners on farms and in urban areas were categorised as non-citizens and/or “less Zimbabwean” in Chimedza’s (2008: 99) language. This led to their further classification as outsiders and as not belonging to Zimbabwe. Once categorised as non-citizens, the ‘foreigners’ were denied certain basic entitlements, especially protection of the state and the right to economic production, productive work and livelihood sustenance. We are here using the definition of citizenship that centralizes rights/entitlements that Marshall, cited in by Chimedza (2008: 92), gives as “a status bestowed on all those who are full members of a community. All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed”, including “civil, political and social” rights and the enjoyment of “the rule of law and consent to that rule through universal suffrage” and freedom from all forms of discrimination, like on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality (Chimedza, 2008: 92). In the end, as [alleged] MDC and white supporters, the [foreign] farm workers were thus lumped as

*vatenges*i or sell-outs who were unpatriotic and were imperialist agents, whose “rights” in Chimedza’a 2008: 100) words “can always be abused, diminished and taken away because as long as they are not members of the ruling (ZANU-PF) party then their loyalty to the nation is doubted and can be easily stripped away.”

However, these foreigners are not the only category of people who have struggled to access citizenship in Zimbabwe. Women have had long, winding and still inconclusive struggles for recognition as citizens. A discussion by Chimedza (2008: 97-98) that touches on the violations of women’s rights on the streets from 1983, to the Magaya vs Magaya’s Supreme Court judgement that denied women the right to succeed as heirs, limited customary rights in marriages and over land ownership, among others, encapsulates the ethos of the debates. As well, for a long time women who operated as prostitutes or were suspected of prostitution have endured serious abuse at the hands of the state that has often roundly and violently arrested them. The practice was however ended in early 2016 when the police were implored in a High Court judgement to stop arresting the women (SOURCE?).

Discrimination in the workplace and home

In this section we consider the separation of vocations according to countries of origins as discrimination that has xenophobic undertones. We particularly look at the cases of people of Malawi and Mozambican origins. These two groups largely work as domestics and as unskilled personnel in the mines and on farms. As Mashiri, 2002: 14) says, these menial jobs, some of which were tough or involved long working hours were regarded as “*mabasa emabwid*”/”typical immigrants’ jobs”. What made the locals to have the luxury to classify these jobs as foreigners’ jobs was because they had other resorts including escaping to their rural areas (*kumusha*) where they could engage in activities that enhanced their economic earnings like subsistence growing crops and keeping livestock (Mashiri, 2002 :14). In support of the above, Ranger (2010: 88) observed that in colonial Bulawayo, for example, low paying jobs like “night soil removers and other unskilled labourers ... also waiters

and chefs and teachers” were a largely a preserve of foreign immigrants. Also, some of the foreigners from these states especially from Zambia and Malawi “did the hard work on the railways” (Ranger, 2010: 96). This is not to discount the fact that some of these foreigners had well-paying jobs (Ranger, 2010: 97). It also has to be noted that the work place classifications given above also emanated from the colonialist stereotyping that ‘invented’ the work ethic of the different colonial subjects (Manganga, 2014: 5). The categorisation also served to create and maintain ethnic chasms that were necessary to safeguard the colonial economic and political status quo (Manganga, 2014: 4).

Besides the workplace discriminations, there were also some labels that saved to denote ‘proper’ areas to live. It was not uncommon to hear people say: *Unoita imba mutaundi semubwidi* or how can you have an urban house like a [stupid] foreigner. As Chikowero (2008: 134) rightly observed, the basis for this was that the locals considered it frownable for one to have a permanent home in or to live in urban areas permanently because “the city was where one went to gather wealth that one used to develop a proper home in the rural areas. For this reason, many opted to have lodgings in the city rather than own their residence while maintaining a family in the rural areas.”

Cultural practices and symbolic xenophobia

What also made the derogatory terms to stick, especially for *Machawa* was that they were associated with Islam, a minority religion in Zimbabwe and a religion that was also largely misunderstood by the majority of the country’s population. The Chewa religious-cultural practices of wearing small hats on their heads (Moslem caps) and long robes distinguished them from the mainstream Zimbabweans. It also led many to call Islam a religion of the Chewa that is *chechi yemachawa* in Shona street lingo. Alongside the misunderstanding of their religious practices was also a serious misunderstanding of their cultural practices. Among others, the fact that the majority of the Chewa did not consume non-halaal meat products, were associated with *gule wankule* a rather secret- based

cultural dance society that many Zimbabweans associate with voodoo practices, occultism, sorcery and black magic. Such perceptions were not helped by the fact that the Malawians and Mozambicans who practiced it tended to conduct these rituals and burials in secrecy. This meant that they stood out or were made to stand out from the majority of Zimbabweans. As we later on established the secrecy was in keeping with the practices of limiting the intricate details to close family members. Regarding this secrecy of cultural-religious practices among foreigners in Zimbabwe Ranger (2010: 41) recounts a tale of an elderly Bulawayo woman married to a Mozambican who pointed out that: “people from Zambia and Mozambique would meet according to their place of origin and hold private sessions singing their traditional songs. They would meet at certain places behind closed doors ... honouring their ancestors and asking for protection in a foreign land.” By keeping the locals at bay, this tended to generate some negative connotations and negative myths about them among the locals. Besides this, they were also easily distinguished by their tendency to speak the Shona language with a distinct accent.

Criminality and xenophobic attacks

The ethos of this section builds from the worldwide scapegoating that links domestic upsurges in criminality to the rise in the numbers of foreigners (Nkealah, 2008). We consider the perceptions regarding some foreign groups in Zimbabwe, especially Nigerians and Chinese. Whilst the Chinese are regarded officially as Zimbabwe’s all weather friends (Scoones, 2016), this view is debunked at the local levels where the Chinese entrepreneurs are regarded as unscrupulous business people. All Chinese businesses and citizens have been lumped up as: fake as their products. Their goods are derogatorily referred to as *Zhing-zhongs* or best before or as the-use-at own-risks in many corners of Zimbabwe. The Chinese entrepreneurs are usually regarded as unscrupulous business people who are abusive and worst exploitative of their workers (Nyoni, 2014; *The Zimbabwean*, 11/5/2011) through paying them “slave wages” (*The Economist*, 2011) when compared to whites. They are also viewed as uncaring of the

environment where they savagely exploited resources with little regard for the environment. The indictment for the Chinese was clearly articulated by the late Zambian President, Michael Sata, who in 2007 charged that the Chinese must “leave and the old colonial rulers to return [because while] they exploited our natural resources too, but at least they took good care of us. They built schools, taught us their language and brought us the British civilisation ... at least Western capitalism has a human face; the Chinese are only out to exploit us” (*The Economist*, 2011). This view is succinctly captured in other words of Renell (2013: np) that the Chinese businessmen were “rarely troubled by conscience or consequence.”

For the Nigerians, broadly, they are considered by many Zimbabweans as conmen, trick stars, and drug dealers. Commonly Nigerians in Zimbabwe are referred to as *Manaijimbi*. However, our investigations revealed that the label has generally been extended to cover people of West African origin in Zimbabwe including Ghanaians, Cameroonians, Senegalese and Congolese. As Tafira says, while it may appear as an innocent marker of people of Nigerian origin, it has tended to be derogatorily and offensively deployed in ways that refer to the criminal tendencies, including white collar crime, cyber-crime, illegal forex dealings and conmen tendencies. As has been highlighted in the South African cases involving xenophobic tendencies regarding West Africans, including the ability/tricks to make quick bucks or business acumen and huge genitalia (Nkealah, 2008) similar sentiments have been expressed in Zimbabwe. These tags are dehumanising and offensive. In Zimbabwe the *Manaijimbi* are thought to be the ring leaders in the peddling of drugs in the country who control both the domestic and international peddling of hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine (United Nations Office for drug control and crime prevention, 1999). In the international connections, they are thought to be operating as part of a worldwide syndicate together with other drug syndicates in Asia, Europe and Latin America from where they source their drugs particularly heroin from Pakistan, India and Afghanistan and cocaine from Columbia and Brazil which they ‘distribute’ to African countries and to Europe (United Nations Office for drug control and crime prevention, 1999). Several advantages accrue to these drug dealers

from operating in this world wide web, including “global reach [which] provides them additional profits and organisational linkages, making them more financially and operationally diversified, robust, and versatile” (Wyler and Cook, 2009: 4). As such, they are revered by those in positions of power in the country who also partake in the dealing of drugs (Mudzungairi and Chidza, 2015). Simultaneously, having these international links places these ‘Nigerians’ as dangerous people with potential connections with the global terrorist and money laundering groups to the ordinary people (see the potential connections in Wyler and Cook, pp 14-15).

For the Indians, whom we have already said are referred to derogatorily as *Makura* or Coolies were also widely considered as operating criminally and exploited their black workers (Muzondidya, 2007: 334). These sentiments were succinctly encapsulated in the views raised by the Zimbabwean War Veterans Association Secretary for Projects, Andrew Ndlovu in 2002 who accused the Indians of being “unpatriotic”, “economic looters”, for buying “nearly all the developed land in cities” post 1980 and for “looting the economy” via the black market (cited in Muzondidya, 2007: 338). These sentiments were echoed by the Affirmative Action Group. While encouraging its members to takeover “buildings ... owned by Indians ... for the benefit of black people”, the AAG accused the Indians of oppressing blacks and “amassing wealth at the expense of the black people” (cited in Muzondidya, 2007: 338). What emerges clearly also from the discussion are insinuations of racism in the xenophobic sentiments against the Indians. This is both in the biological differences that they exhibit compared to blacks and their privileged position during the colonial period and in the cultural sense as defined by Tafira (2011). In this case, the Indian who is associated with colonial privileges and is considered a non-autochthon is, in Tafira’s (2011:116) words, “the other” who is “seen as a new danger to society, a threat, an invader intent on usurping the hard won materialities which the locals earned with sweat and blood. The ultimate answer is that the ‘foreigner’ be kept at a distance, expelled and if all else fails, destroyed.” What is not said is that the materialities that the “blacks” earned include the land and a place to benefit from having a stake in the economic wealth of the country.

Conclusions

As the chapter has ably demonstrated, while Zimbabwe's historical landscape is shorn of open physical-based attacks on foreigners, it shares with most parts of Africa in measures and moments that have led to or insinuated xenophobic attacks. Broadly, the chapter has thus invited for a more disturbed reading of the problematic of xenophobia through an analysis of the junctures between symbolic forms of violence and encrypted xenophobia. In the end, it has invited for an understanding of xenophobia that transcends the more obvious physical attacks on foreigners to one that incorporates its multifarious and hidden manifestations, including in language and attitudes that consider foreign cultural practices and stereotypes. The chapter has also demonstrated that the coded forms of xenophobia that have pervaded Zimbabwe have had deleterious effects on those considered as foreigners as they have led their rights being trampled upon, have been denied hands in marriages and have been denied citizenship rights.

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Peace Education and Peace Culture: Panaceas for Sustainable Peace and Security in Nigeria

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Introduction

Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, military *coups*, ethnic rivalries and religious carnage have typified post-independence Nigeria (Alanamu, 2005). The country has become a sort of battle field as evidently shown by series of ethno-religious violent crises that epitomized the socio-political entity called Nigeria (Ofogbor, 2004). As the people feel more differentiated; the spate of violence increases and the people of the country plunge deeper into the abyss of social unrest, insecurity, deprivation, poverty, misery and under-development. Consequently, the nation projects a panorama of escalating human rights violations and innocent civilians falling helpless victims of senseless killing. According to a report on violent conflicts in Nigeria as collated by Peace and Development Projects (PEDEP) (2003), Nigeria has always witnessed violence in the following forms: (a) political and electoral violence; (b) communal clashes and ethnic clashes; (c) civil disturbances and violent clashes; (d) intra and inter-faith conflicts and religious violence; (e) campus cultism and violent activities; and (f) violence associated with social and economic conflicts. The Project further reported that, more than 15,700 people have been killed in inter-communal, political and sectarian strife since Nigeria returned to Civilian rule in 1999.

For example, in the year 2000, 2,000 people were killed in violent sectarian clashes sparked by Christians' protests against the proposed introduction of Sharia law in Kaduna state (Anugwom & Oji; 2003). Two years later, also in Kaduna State, sectarian violence was sparked by Muslim protests due to the Miss World beauty contest left some

250 people dead (Human Right Watch, 2003). Also in Plateau State, the human cost of such violence has been particularly high, Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 3,800 people have been killed in inter-communal and sectarian clashes in the state since 2001 (Human Right Watch, 2007). Deadly election related and communal violence in Northern Nigeria following the April 2011 Presidential voting left more than 800 people dead. The violence began with widespread protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a Northern Muslim from the Congress for Progressive Change, following the re-election of incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the Niger Delta in the South, who was candidate for the ruling People Democratic Party (Human Right Watch, 2011). The protests degenerated into violent riots or sectarian killings in the Northern state of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. More than 65,000 people were displaced (Human Right Watch, 2011). More recently inter-group conflict between herders and farmers in Benue State in March 2016 left over hundreds dead (Nigeria Online, 2016).

These violent incidents enumerated above are just tips of an iceberg in the series of ethno-religious violence that characterised the Nigeria state. However, because it has for long been said that human progress and sustainable development cannot be achieved in a society characterised by violence and insecurity, then it could be right to assume that lack of sustainable peace and security have been albatrosses stifling the development of the Nigerian society. In line with this understanding, the government, intellectuals in the academics as well as concerned media experts have expended a lot in analyzing the dynamics of social violence/conflicts in Nigeria, including evaluating its causes, variants, its attending consequences and probably some passive recommendations to get out of the challenges (Nnoli, 1978; Otite, 2000; Egwu, 2001; Adebisi, 2002; Adeniyi, 2003; Aluede & Oniyama, 2009).

In a similar manner, successive Nigerian governments have over the years also adopted a series of control measures to improve national integration and unity to reduce the incidences of ethno-religious conflict in the country. The governments tried both short-

term and long-term measures but with little or no success (Hassan & Fagbemi, 2001). Some of such measures included initiation of programmes and policies to promote social cohesion, use of force by the law enforcement agents, sometimes leading to more loss of lives and property; direct intervention by the government such as sacking a democratically elected Governor; use of mediators, - elders in the society like Obas, Obis, Emirs, former Heads of state, Presidents or some international figures and some non-governmental agencies. Despite all these strategies, the levels of insecurity continue to increase unabated (Nsikaka-Abasi & Nneji, 2010).

Broadly, therefore, it can be discerned that a series of efforts from the academia, government and other concerned groups have examined the incidence and consequences of violent conflicts in Nigeria and many of these efforts have recommended series of means by which this abnormal situation could be brought under control. However, few of these efforts underscore the relevance of peace education and peace culture in achieving sustainable peaceful co-existence and an improved security of lives and properties in the country. This is a wide gap that needs to be covered practically and academically. In this regard, this paper examines the essentiality of peace education and peace culture in ensuring sustainable peace and security in contemporary Nigerian societies. In a way, the chapter advances the findings of such scholars as Fieldman & Matjasko (2005); Lin (2006); and Noddings (2006) who have argued that one of the fundamental factors responsible for the perpetuation of conflicts in virtually all known human societies is the absence or lack of institutionalization of peace orientation and inculcating of the culture of peace in the people, especially the youths who are often used as instruments of inciting conflicts (Adeola, Amoako & Baker, 2005; Muhammed, 2005; Aluede & Oniyama, 2009).

Conceptual discussions

For the purpose of clarity, some relevant concepts are discussed:


Peace

Peace is the most ancient item on the agenda of humanity. The old idea of peace sees it as synonymous to stability, decorum or equilibrium. This conception of peace is also used to refer to internal states of being, that is, a person being at peace with himself. The simplest and the most widespread understanding of peace was that of absence of violence, disorderliness, death and destruction as a result of conflict, unrest or war (Thee, 1982). Oyebamiji (2011) viewed peace generally to connote a state of quietness, calm, tranquility, freedom from war and concord of ideas among different people.

The fourth edition of the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of current English* lexically defines peace as 'state of freedom from war or violence'. Peace connotes a period where a nation, community, country or even family witnesses a state of freedom from violence, war or any form of breakdown, dis-quietness or uproar in the community. French thinker, Raymond Aron, defined peace as a condition of more or less lasting suspension of violent modes of rivalry between politico-economic units (Barash, 1999). Some thinkers conceived of it as simply a lack of war or a no-violence situation and the eradication of all facets of injustices (Cheng & Kurtz, 1998).

In some instances, peace is categorised into two broad forms as negative and positive peace. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct violence. Positive peace refers to the absence of indirect and structural violence, and is the concept that most peace and conflict researchers adopt in studies of peace and security in recent years (Galtung & Jacobson, 2000). The below figure summarized the argument of Galtung (2000) on positive and negative peace:

Figure 1: Negative and Positive Peace



Source: Adapted from Galtung, . . . ,

Going by the assumption of figure 1 as developed by Galtung (1969), these two conceptual typologies of peace shows that peaceful co-existence in a society could be managed from two broad angles which are temporary and permanent peace processes. A peace process is temporary if it just take cognizance of ending a conflict or violent or a non-peaceful situation on a temporary level; without minding if the conflict ensued again in a later date. However, regarding positive peace, the intention is to find a lasting solution to the problem of conflict and bringing about an absolute peaceful situation into the society. Following the argument of positive peace, Laue (1991) defined peace as a process of continuous and constructive management of differences toward: the goal of more mutually satisfying relations, the prevention of escalation of violence

and the achievement of those conditions that exemplify the universal well-being of human beings and their groups from the family to culture and the state both at present and in the future. Efemini (2005) posited that peace is a dialectical concept because it connoted three different realities; it is the absence of violence, under conditions and relationships that provide for the non-violent resolution of political conflict and the freedom to pursue legitimate individual and group goals without threat or coercion. Peace must therefore be understood and employed as a continuous process to lessen social tension, resolve political conflict and create conditions to pursue freedom and justice through a gradual evolution of human perceptions and socio-political institutions.

Peace Education

In its simplest sense, education is the process of transmitting knowledge, societal norms and values to people in a society. Education has been seen as a potential tool for effecting personal and national development. This is because education brings about sustainable changes that are required for achieving sustainable development. Jimoh (2003:3) puts it that:

Education is the activities and experiences put together to assist the all-round development of the student as an individual and as a member of society. It is to help him to think clearly and independently in fields of knowledge and experiences outside his narrow specialization and also to assist him to gain an understanding of people and of the society in which he lives.

Peace education on the other hand is the initiation of a learning processes aiming at entrenching a peace culture in all and sundry in the society such that everyone in the society will be at peace with each other such that the society will attain the peaceful conditions necessary to achieve personal and sustainable development in the society. It is a process of learning that involve actualization and rational resolution of conflicts and enhancement of peace and orderliness in the society (Van-Stachr, 1974; Mushakoji, 1974).

According to Reardon (1982), peace education is a specific form of learning intended to prepare the learners to contribute towards the achievement of everlasting peace for his/herself and the society at large. Reardon, (1982) conceived of it as education for authentic meant of achieving formidable security in the society on short and longrun.

Similarly, Ajala (2003) defines peace education as the type of education that impacts in the learner, norms, values and attitudes and aspirations that bring about conducive environment for the attainment of peace and orderliness in a given society. Peace education takes into cognizance issues relating to values, attitudes, forms of behaviour, ways of life and a commitment to the principles of freedom, justice, solidarity and tolerance among individuals and between groups in the society. Gumut (2004) argues that the objectives of peace education in schools should be about teaching and helping the learner to acquire the skills needed to maintain peace and orderliness in the society. Nsikak-Abasi & Nneji (2010) describes peace education as those aspects of formal and non-formal education, in and out-of-school aimed at the elimination of inter-groups prejudice, stereotypes and hatred which make people prefer war to peace, exclusion to cooperation and destruction to construction. Salomon (2000:4) conceived of peace education activities to focus four important elements:

Peace education mainly as a matter of changing mindset,
peace education mainly as a matter of cultivating a set of skills,
peace education as mainly a matter of promoting human rights,
and finally peace education as a matter of environmentalism,
disarmament, and the promotion of a culture of peace.

Culture of Peace

Conceptually, culture of peace is a phrase used in describing a situation where people's mindset and orientation would be tailored towards peaceful social relationship irrespective of the differences between or among the people. Culture of peace is a much desired situation whereby people promote peaceful way of life. This could be ultimately achieved by continuous and formidable peace education

among the people. On nurturing culture of peace, Sommerfelt & Vambheim (2008) write that culture of peace requires that citizens contain their aggression, be tolerant with one another, exhibit cooperative behavior and avoid situations whereby ethno-religious or class differences would lead to conflicts and violence. The essence of the culture of peace is adequately encapsulated in the definition provided by the United Nations (1999:n.p) as:

a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behavior and ways of life based on respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through dialogue and cooperation...promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms...commitment to peaceful settlements of conflicts...efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations... respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men.

What could be induced from the foregoing is that culture of peace is a living orientation whereby individuals and group of people in the society sees peaceful co-existence as the preferred option for living. In such a situation people see peace as the best way of life, patriotism, loyalty and tolerance characterised inter-group relations. In such society, individuals and groups by shun all activities that would bring about experiencing an otherwise situation such as conflict, violence and war.

Conflicts in Nigeria: An overview

That Nigeria is a multi-ethnic state, grappling with the problems of ethno-religious rivalries and conflicts is no news (Muhammed, 2005; Asamu, 2005). Consequently, one of the challenges of governance has been how to manage the diversities which most times results into ethno-religious and sectarian strife which have further threatened the country's very existence (Bagudu, 2004). According to Olu-Adeyemi (2011), at least 62 serious identity-based conflicts have taken place in Nigeria between 1999 and 2010. Religious intolerance has become more violent and bloody with more devastating results

(Salawu, 2010). Contextual discrimination between ethnic or religious groups based on socio-cultural symbols and religion has heightened suspicion and fear, which have scarred Nigeria through recurrent ethno-religious conflict (Salawu, 2010). According to Olu-Adeyemi (2011), ethno-religious conflict has become a means of correcting the perceived form of marginalization, oppression or domination envisioned by people at different levels of living in the country (Olu-Adeyemi, 2011).

Since the 1980s, violent ethnic and religious conflicts have become more pervasive and have assumed a wider scale (Egwu, 2002). For instance, violent confrontations which occurred in Kaduna (1982); Maiduguri (1982); Jimeta (1984); Gombe (1985) and Kukah (1993) claimed 4,177 lives (Ogunsanya & Popoola, 2001; Akeze, 2009). In July 1999, Oro cultists in Sagamu Ogun State accused a Hausa woman of disrupting their religious celebration, the incident escalated to a violent crisis, where Hausa and Yoruba lost their lives. Later, reprisal killing began in Kano and as calmness returned to Kano; Lagos erupted in violence again as the Odua People Congress moved against Hausa-Fulani traders in the popular Mile 12 market (Abimboye, 2009).

Another example is when the then Governor of Kaduna state, Mohammed Makarfi attempted to introduce Sharia law in the state in the year 2000. This generated violent confrontations between Muslims and non-Muslims resulting in thousands of deaths (Abimboye, 2009). Furthermore, in November 2002, a mob took to the streets to riot after a newspaper published remarks about Prophet Muhammed and the beauty queens of the Miss World Pageant, which Nigeria was hosting. The conflict spread to Abuja and about 5,000 lives were lost to the violence (Abimboye, 2009). Further still, in September 2001, 19 soldiers sent to quell violence between local ethnic groups - the Tivs and Jukuns were abducted and killed. In Jos, the appointment of a Christian as a local council chairman led to violence and killing of 160 persons in the same month. Following the tragic events of 9/11, Kano erupted again in ethno-religious conflict after the US launched an offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In February 2006, the religious riot shifted to Maiduguri. Muslims had converged in the Ramat district to protest a cartoon of

the Prophet Muhammed appearing in a Danish Newspaper. Youths went on rampage, killing and maiming individuals they suspected to be Christians (Abimboye, 2009).

Remarking on the cause of the deadly incidents, Kalu (2000) argued that British imperialism laid the foundation to suspicion and rivalry among ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria. A study conducted in Spain found that societies that are divided along ethnic or religious lines are more prone to intense and prolonged conflict than those divided by political and territorial differences (Reynal-Querol, 2002). In the analysis of Cordesman (2003), and Booth & Dunne (2002), the ethno-religious plural nature of Nigeria has been the basis for many sectarian strives among the people in the country.

Recent findings have shown that the incidence of religious conflicts have grown greatly in the last few decades in Nigeria (Ezeanokwasa, 2009). Ethno-religious conflicts have seriously affected the unity and stability of the country (Salawu, 2010). Many a times, minor disagreement between two ethnic or religious groups is over-blown and politicized to become serious socio-political violence. According to Ikejiani (2005) over the years, many events in Nigeria have led to the politics of mistrust, intolerance, violence and acrimonious relations between the various categories of people in the country. These consequences could be seen from an unfortunate insertion of ethno-religious stereotypes, discrimination and confrontation and this has continually added tension to the structures of the Nigerian state since the colonial period.

Between 2008 and 2010, some major ethno-religious crises were witnessed in Nigeria with serious casualties. The Jos crisis of 2008 was fatal as it recorded more than 700 casualties (Umejesi, 2010). Following this, the Nigerian government established federal structure to achieve peaceful co-existence among its various components. However, this effort achieved little in bringing about sustainable peace among Nigerians. This might probably be the feeling of Elaigwu (2005:12) when he writes:

...the violent protests in the Niger-Delta over perceived injustice in resource distribution; the Itsekiri-Ijaw violence in the Delta; the resumption of the Ife-Modakeke communal violence; the menace of Odu'a Peoples' Congress (OPC) and the accompanying violence in

Lagos and Shagamu areas; the formation of the Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC) and the Igbo Peoples' Congress (IPC); the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign States of Biafra (MASSOB) feeble attempt to resuscitate Biafra; the Sharia crisis and the demands for a confederation; the South-South demand for the control of its resources; and all the recent inter-ethnic and religious conflicts in various states across the country are all part of the bubbles of the Nigerian federation. They are based on the historical structures of mutual fears and suspicions among Nigerian groups in a competitive process.

In realization of the menace and threatening effects of the ethno-religious divisions that characterised the Nigerian State since independence, several policies were developed to integrate the people of the country to become one united Nigeria, series of measures were taken to nip the problems in the bud. For instance, successive governments in the country have made several attempts to strengthened the federal nature of the country, the creation of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) and a host of other policies have not really solve the problems of ethno-religious rivalries and problems of social disintegration in the country. The observation that the existing efforts towards creating one-United Nigeria free from all sorts of ethno-religious crises have not yield the expected result underscore the need to develop an alternative approach to support the existing approaches so that the much desired peace, unity and sustainable development could be achieved in the country.

Theoretical Framework

Numerous theories and approaches targeted at reducing conflict and creating a culture of peace are being experimented with (Groff & Smoker, 1996; Johnson, 1998; Evans, 1999; Harris, 1999; Reardon, 2001; Salomon & Nevo, 2002; Bar-Tal, 2002). In order to make this discussion more scholarly robust, attempt has been made to use two relevant theoretical models to explain the importance and elements of peace education in creating culture of peace in our society. These were the Flower-Petal and integrative models.

The Flower-Petal Model of Peace

The Flower-Petal Model of Peace Education is framework that could be used for forming and implementing peace education programs. This model of peace education is reflected upon from the work of Toh (2004). In this model, peace as a phenomenon is seen as a 'flower petal' something needful, beautiful at the same time very fragile, frail and delicate. So as a result of these dilemma characteristics, it should be treated with utmost care and should be given highest priority in the realm of things in all human societies. In other words, the attainment of peace in the society should be a priority and be placed at the center regarding human social existence. The Flower-Petal model has six categories in which attainment of culture of peace is given the utmost importance.

Other supposed elements of peace according to this model are: 1) dismantling the culture of war or violence or conflict (learning to abolish war), 2) achieving environmental peace, 3), encouraging education for justice and compassion, 4) ensuring human rights education, 5) cultivating intercultural solidarity, and 6) encouraging and harnessing inner peace.

Dismantling a culture of war, violence or conflict is concerned with mitigating all supports for the war system, including competitive games, gender oppression, defense spending, oppressive security systems, and the sale of toys that mimic violence and teach children destructive behaviors such as toy guns and knives, violent video games, excessive violence in film. It includes dissolving weapons access as well as disarming the mind from hate. Another fact that could be deduced of this theoretical position is that, the act of inciting hatred, conflicts and animosities among people based on certain differences are antithetical to peaceful process and should be discouraged. This theory also assume that behavioural dispositions antithetical to peace are learned and could be unlearned through an educational process that will focus on measures and programmes aiming at making people to prefer peace to war at local, national and international levels. It is from this cornerstone that the imperative of peace education arises.

Environmental education includes fostering global stewardship, simple living, and combating the environmental degradation that

accompanies unsustainable development and war, conflict or violence. Educating for justice and compassion deconstructs globalization processes, neo-liberalism, and the notion of a commons. Education for human rights would focus on civil, economic, political, cultural and religious rights, among others, and assesses the nature of violations of these rights. Intercultural solidarity is concerned with interactions between differing groups and cultural norms, and national and international institutions that perpetuate violence or foster peace. Education for inner peace allows students to evaluate their own physical, emotional, and spiritual states as well as the interplay between micro and macro conflicts. The Flower-Petal framework focuses on intercultural solidarity, disarmament education, and the relationship between diverse forms of life and ways of living that subvert ethno-centrism, de-humanization, and pseudo-speciation while fostering peace, global environmental stewardship and contemplative practices. In other words, it is only by seeing peace from this perspective that it could be used as a tool to bring about formidable peace, security and sustainable development in a country.

Going by the assumptions of this approach, this framework to peace could be faulted on various premises. For instance, peace is not a stand-alone variable. Also, that education for peace should transform the four walls of the educational system and that it should be seen as an all- encompassing effort that would involve every one - young and old, rich and poor in the society. More so, this approach sees peace as conditioning the other process whereas if critically examined, it could be seen that peace as a phenomenon is a consequence of many factors in life. In a bid to cover the shortcomings of this model, the integrative theory of peace is also considered in this paper.

Integrative Theory of Peace Education

The Integrative Theory of Peace (ITP) is based on the premise that peace is an all-encompassing phenomenon that cannot be attained by viewing it monopolistically or by conceiving it as an end in itself. It is a phenomenon that is psychological, social, political, ethical and spiritual; it has expressions at intrapersonal, inter-

personal, intergroup and international areas of human life. The theory holds that all human states of existence, (peace inclusive) are outcomes of cognitive, emotive and conative capacities (Danesh, 1997; Huitt, 1999a), which together determine the nature of our worldview. ITP draws from the existing body of research on issues of psychosocial development and peace education, as well as a developmental approach to conflict resolution (Danesh & Danesh, 2002a & b) and the lessons learned and observations made during five years of implementation of the Education for Peace Programme in 112 schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Danesh, 1997; Huitt, 1999b; Dannesh, 2006).

ITP further posits that peace has its roots at once in the satisfaction of human need for survival, safety and security; in the human quest for freedom, justice and interconnectedness; and in the human search for meaning, purpose, and righteousness. ITP suggests that there is the need to make some formidable efforts to achieve peace in the society. One of the most recommended efforts that could be used to achieve sustainable or positive peace in a society according to this theory is peace education.

According to Page (2004, 2008), peace education in relation to ITP can be theorized from the framework of the five philosophical ethics: virtue, consequentiality, aesthetics, care, and politics. This underscores the fact that peace is, essentially one of the critical human needs. This accounts for why people prefer peace to war. In other words, the conception of this model is that peace education should not only work towards the integration of all and sundry irrespective of their socio-economic differences but also that peace education programme should be an integration of different elements and relevance variables that would make the accomplishment of peace possible in a society. It should involve issues relating to attainment of peace directly or indirectly, actively or passively.

With this approach, the effort at entrenching a culture of peace among the people of the world should be integrative such that all necessary elements should be given utmost priority by encouraging those that bring about culture of peace and condemning or disregarding those that would encourage war and violence. In other words, the effort at attaining peaceful co-existence among all and

sundry in Nigeria should be an integrative effort where all hands must be on deck, where all areas of living should be considered important and should be that, where everyone would be carried along. According to ITP, these measures if properly considered would go a long way in bringing about peace and unity needed to achieve peaceful co-existence and sustainable development in a society irrespective of their lines of social differentiations.

Peace Education and Peace Culture as Panaceas for Attaining Sustainable Peace and Security in Nigeria

Without mincing words, peace is indispensable in any human society, not only because it is one of the basic requirements of living but also because it is an important condition for the attainment of sustainable development in the society. The importance of peace to national development informed the inclusion of the concepts of peace and unity in Nigerian National Anthem and its entrenchment in the country's Constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution, 1999). Going by the emphasis given to it by the Constitution, it could be said that the issue of peace is accorded higher priority for the Nigerian nation. In line with this, successive governments in Nigeria have given the attainment of peace and unity among all in the country top priority. However, it is saddening that most of the mechanisms put in place by the state have failed to achieve the objectives of sustainable peace and security in Nigeria.

For instance, Nigeria has tried several options to use the formal educational institutions to bring about sustainable peaceful co-existence in the country. As a result, it has introduced some peace education related topics in general studies (GNS) subjects in the higher institutions and in other social studies subjects in the primary and secondary schools. However, it has never introduced peace education as a specific subject with special academic curriculum to be taught in its educational institutions.

In other words, as the existing mechanisms have not yielded the expected results in terms of enhancing peace and security in the country, then an alternative approach of entrenching peace education as a subject with its unique curriculum for the young and old in the

country becomes a considerable option. The peace education to be considered in this regard would go a long way in the inculcation of relevant cultural norms, ethics and values that support peace culture that would enhance security of lives and properties. In other words, inculcation of the culture of peace is seriously needed for attaining peace and national security in Nigeria and this can be achieved through peace education. A culture of peace is a body of shared values, attitudes, behaviours and ways of life based on: respect for fundamental rights and freedom; understanding, tolerance and solidarity; sharing and free flow of communication; and full participation and empowerment of women; non-violent resolution of conflicts and the transformation of violent competition into cooperation for shared goals (Cordesman, 2003).

According to Mark (2004), there are five stages of conflict transformation processes to achieve peace. These are actor, issue, institutional, legal and structural transformation stages. Out of these five stages, actor transformation is singled-out as the most essential stage in attaining sustainable peace in a conflict situation. This is because the actor transformation focuses on the positive changes in the behaviour and the attitude of actors in conflict situations in order to drop their confrontational attitudes and disposition for collaboration to bring about sustainable peace and security. This underscores the fundamentality of peace education in conflict-ridden society like Nigeria.

Adeoluma (2006), Aguba (2006) and Aguba (2010) noted that it is expedient on educational planners to make peace education an integral component of school subjects so that Nigerians can be educated on how to peacefully live together as one united Nation. Through this form of education, the Nigerians would imbibe the culture of peace, which is one of the critical prerequisites for attaining meaningful and sustainable peace and national security in any country. UNESCO (2005) sees education as the key means to spearhead the movement towards a culture of peace. Educating towards a culture of peace cultivates and promotes values, understanding, action and practices for building individuals, families, communities, societies, world committed to: (i) cultivating inner peace; (ii) living with compassion and justice; (iii) dismantling the

culture of war; (iv) promoting human rights and responsibilities; (v) living in harmony with the earth; and (vi) intercultural respect, reconciliation and solidarity (Toh, 2003). Harris (2002:20) identifies ten goals for effective peace education:

- i to appreciate the richness of the concept of peace,
- ii to address problem of fear and inter-personal suspicion among the people;
- iii to provide information about desirable security system;
- iv to detest violent behaviour;
- v to develop inter-cultural understanding among the people;
- vi to provide for a future orientation;
- vii to teach peace as a process;
- viii to promote a concept of peace accompanied by social justice;
- ix to stimulate a respect for life and
- x to end violence.

In order to achieve this, curriculum planners should ensure that peace education curriculum should be such that is capable of changing or shifting people’s minds from a culture of war or violence to a culture of peaceful co-existence as typified in table 1.

Table 1: Toward a Culture of Peace

From a Culture of War	Toward a Culture of Peace
Power based on force	Power based on mutual agreement
Authoritarian Governance	Democratic Participation
Having an enemy, dualism, dichotomy	Tolerance, solidarity and international understanding
Secrecy	Transparency, free flow of information
Armament	Disarmament
Exploitation of people	Human rights
Exploitation of nature	Sustainable Development
Straight male domination	Gender equity and equality

Source: Kevin (2010)

Figure 2 below also gives a graphical presentation of six dynamic dimensions that peace education could take to bring about absolute peaceful co-existence and security among the people.




Figure 2: Promoting a Culture of Peace: Six Dimensions and Operative Values
Source: Navarro-Castro and Nario-Galace (2010)

Figure two also shows that for the attainment of sustainable peace and national security in a nation, six conditions are crucial. These are: Personal and Family Integrity; Human Rights Democracy; Poverty Eradication; Intercultural understanding and solidarity; disarmament and cessation of hostilities; and environmental protection. If these operational values are optimally followed, the attainment of successful inculcation of culture of peace among the people in the society would be achieved. Peace education in this sense assumes that human behavioural dispositions leading to conflict, violence or outright war are learned and through peace education could be unlearned and replaced with alternative behavioural dispositions that would promote the culture of tolerance, peace and unity. This is so because most theoretical frameworks and applied programs in peace education revealed that though, conflict is

inherent in human nature but could be monitored and controlled through a deliberate learning programme (Maoz, 2000; Salomon, 2003; Tal-Or, Boninger & Gleicher, 2002). Peace education programmes should be able to alter negative beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours that are supportive of conflict to those that enhance tolerance, unity and peaceful co-existence (Van Slyck, Stern & Elbedour, 1999).

According to Deutsch (1993), peace education programs centered on conflict resolution should focus on the social and behavioural symptoms of conflict, that train individuals to resolve inter-personal disputes through techniques of negotiation and peer mediation as a *sin-qua-non* for achieving formidable peaceful situation in a society built on remarked social differentiations such as ethnic or religious differences. Peace education which teaches people how to manage anger, fight fair and improve communication through skills such as listening, turn-taking, identifying needs, and separating facts from emotions would be much needed in societies bedridden with problems of incessant inter-group violent attacks and too much social unrests (Harris, 1999). In other words, if people are encouraged to take responsibility for their actions and to brainstorm together on compromises, they would together live befitting lives that are free of all sorts of violence and unrest (Hakvoort, 1996). In other words, inculcating the principles of peace education into the educational curricular as well as other areas of society is an important step towards achieving sustainable peace, security and national development in a seeming multi ethno-religious society characterised by incessant inter-group rivalries and violent confrontations like Nigeria. This effort is necessary going by the fact that a strict and formal peace education framework is yet to be introduced into the Nigeria educational curriculum.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The foregoing analyses have examined peace as a possible reality for Nigeria. The chapter has also argued that peace education could be used as a veritable tool to achieve sustainable peace and security in a conflict ridden society like Nigeria. In other words, the overall discussion showed that conflict and violence have characterised the

country's socio-political existence and that the series of efforts targeted towards enhancing peaceful co-existence among the people has yielded little results. In this regard, this presentation argued that if peace education is considered an option, then the dream of united Nigeria is likely to be achieved. Based on this conception, some suggestions can be raised for policy drivers.

i It is important for all and sundry to understand the importance of peace in the society, everyone needs to understand that peace is a fragile system, and as such it needs to be treated with utmost care and attention.

ii Based on the observation that peace education could assist in bringing about a united Nigeria free of all sorts of inter-ethnic/religious rivalries, there is the need for creating and implementing special curriculum on peace education in Nigerian schools from primary to tertiary institutions. Some of the important issues to be covered are: conflict, analysis/resolution, violence in schools, deviant behaviour, repentance and forgiveness, human relations, peer education, peace clubs, competition, community mechanisms for building peace/resolving conflicts, tolerance learning, mediation processes, concepts of reconciliation, solidarity, social responsibility, peace games and sports, accessible environments, communication skills, faith-based topics, domestic violence, bullying/hooliganism, strikes, and freedom of speech.

iii It is however imperative to sound the note that earlier efforts targeted at peaceful co-existence should not be ignored or abolished, rather they should be strengthened or be complemented by this new measure of peace education.

It is also important to note that, for a formidable peaceful co-existence to be achieved, the following secondary measures should also be considered

iv There is the need for the institutionalization of an infrastructure for peace. The infrastructure that would consist of Councils of Representatives of relevant stakeholders as well as individual Nigerian's that enjoys high levels of trust and respect within society. These Councils should exist at national, regional and district level with the mandate to facilitate dialogue, problem-solving and reconciliation processes at their levels of jurisdiction.

v Peace Building Support Unit could be established within the Ministry of the Interior to coordinate support and collaboration from government agencies.

vi National Peace Council could be established within the Ministry of the Interior to coordinate support and collaboration from government agencies.

vii The peace infrastructures should be put in place and such infrastructure should be (i) the infrastructure that legitimizes the use of dialogue and consensus seeking approaches to conflict at all levels of society; (ii) able to allocate responsibility for violence prevention and peace-building to a specific collection of persons at various levels and locations; (iii) it ensures that sufficient linkage takes place between relevant stakeholders and resources at the different levels.

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The myths of peace and democracy in Africa are at the heart of this volume. Democracy and peace have become buzz words across postcolonial Africa. The gospel of democracy and peace is preached by national governments and by civil society and international organisations alike. But to what extent are the ongoing sideshows and charades of quasi-oligarchies in Africa really democracy? What do ordinary Africans mean when they hunger and thirst for democracy and peace? Positive and noble as the loud sounding rhetoric about democracy and peace in Africa might seem, the reality of propaganda and dissemblance and of multi-dimensional violence are simply too overwhelming not to be disillusioning. This book interrogates the rampant violence, enduring conflicts, autocratic governance, and facades of democracy amidst claims and calls for enduring peace on the continent. This is a monumental resource book for human rights activists, conflict management practitioners, civil society activists, political scientists, statesmen and development practitioners. It poses a challenge to those African governments who claim to embrace principles of democracy and respect for human rights to rethink and reconsider their role as ambassadors of peace, hope, transformation, and good governance.

* * *

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